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This thesis offers an overview of the functions served by various mobilisations of 
„poverty‟ and „the poor‟ across the histories of capitalism.  It shows how „poverty‟ 
and „the poor‟ come to be shaped as governmental categories in the interests first of 
encouraging the acceptance of wage labour in industrial society, and then in 
encouraging the acceptance of a logic of individual responsibility and 
entrepreneurship as wage labour declines in post-industrial society.  It also examines 
the deployment of discourses of poverty within social movements, showing the close 
relationship between the elaboration of governmental discourses and resistance in the 
contested process of the „making‟ of „the poor‟.  In particular, it explores the 
increased mobilisation of discourses of poverty in post-apartheid South Africa, where, 
it is shown, „poverty‟ and „the poor‟ are shaped as governmental categories that aim 
to fashion particular forms of life for that population group identified and targeted as 
the poor, and become ways for poor people to make demands of the state in the 
context of the adoption of neoliberal policies, such as cost recovery, privatisation, and 
the flexibilisation of labour.  Through a close exploration of state policy formulation 
and community struggles in the sphere of the delivery of basic services, this thesis 
presents the contested field of signification and production that emerges around the 
meeting of the basic needs of the poor in the City of Johannesburg and Orange Farm 
(a particularly disadvantaged part of the city) as a case through which to think through 
contemporary mobilisations of „poverty‟ and „the poor‟ in relation to processes of 
subjectivation and the possibilities for the production of subjectivities antagonistic to 
the logic of capital.  Focusing on the City‟s most recent return to indigent 
management as a strategy to contain and address the needs of the poor, in the context 
of organised resistance on the part of poor communities, this thesis offers an 
experience of a process of neoliberalisation as a contested process, in which attempts 
to shape and deploy „the poor‟ and „poverty‟ as governmental categories come up 
against mobilisations of „the poor‟ in challenge of the dominant logic of 
commodification, the market, and „individual responsibility‟. 
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Contested Histories in the Present 
 
For what is it but distress and poverty which can prevail upon the 
lower classes of the people to encounter all the horrors which await 
them on the tempestuous ocean or on the field of battle? 
(Townsend, 1787, quoted in Polanyi, 1946: 121). 
 
The only non-localisable 'common name' of pure difference in all 
eras is that of the poor.  The poor is destitute, excluded, repressed, 
exploited - and yet living!  It is the common denominator of life, 
the foundation of the multitude.  (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 156). 
 
Reading through accounts of „the poor‟ and „poverty‟
1
 across the histories of 
capitalism, two distinct ways of imagining and describing the poor stand out – those 
that approach the poor as a population group to be treated and managed so as to 
encourage its members to behave in ways conducive to the needs of capitalist society, 
and those that emphasise the limits to social stability and order that the poor represent 
in capitalist society; those that treat the poor and poverty as objective categories with 
universalising ends, and those that view the poor as signifying the presence of 
difference to the logic of capital at the very heart of capitalist society.  This thesis is 
an attempt to understand these different approaches to poverty and the poor in terms 
of their relationship to the contested histories of capitalism, through the specific 
experience of struggles around the delivery of basic services in post-apartheid South 
Africa.         
 
Embarking on a critique of “historicist”
2
 accounts of capitalist development, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty returns us to two central concepts in the writings of Marx – “abstract 
                                                 
1
 I use inverted commas when referring to „the poor‟ and „poverty‟ to highlight that they do not refer to 
a subject or conditions that are uniformly and objectively defined, but that their meanings are the very 
subject of processes of contestation.  Having noted this, the rest of the thesis will not repeat this use of 
inverted commas.   
2
 Chakrabarty argues that historicist accounts “all share a tendency to think of capital in the image of a 
unity that arises in one part of the world at a particular period and then develops globally over 
historical time, encountering and negotiating historical differences in the process” (Chakrabarty, 2000: 
47).  He gives as examples to illustrate his point, E. P. Thompson‟s arguments made in the essay 
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labour” and “the two histories of capital”– to show how capital is constituted on the 
basis of an attempted sublation of differences (antagonisms) that are central to it.  
(Chakrabarty, 2000: 2).    
 
Exploring how, in Marx, the concept of abstract labour emerges as “a way of 
explaining how the capitalist mode of production managed to extract, out of peoples 
and histories that were all different, a homogeneous and common unit for measuring 
human activity”, Chakrabarty argues that abstract labour “may thus be read as an 
account of how the logic of capital sublates into itself the differences of history” 
(ibid: 3).  He goes on, however, to illustrate that this process of abstraction is one that 
is not linear or uniform, but contested, a process characterised by Marx as reflective 
of "the two histories of capitalism" - "a past posited by capital itself as its 
precondition - History 1", and a past that emerges from  "relationships that do not 
lend themselves to the reproduction of the logic of capital" and are outside of capital's 
"life processes" - History 2 (ibid: 16).   
 
In this way, Marx “writes into the intimate space of capital an element of deep 
uncertainty” (ibid: 18).  Chakrabarty writes: 
 
In the reproduction of its own life-process, capital encounters 
relationships that present it with double possibilities. These 
relations could be central to capital‟s self-reproduction, and yet it 
is also possible for them to be oriented to structures that do not 
contribute to such reproduction. History 2s are thus not pasts 
separate from capital; they are pasts that inhere in capital and yet 
interrupt and punctuate the run of capital‟s own logic. History 1, 
argues Marx, has to subjugate or destroy the multiple possibilities 
that belong to History 2. There is nothing, however, to guarantee 
that the subordination of History 2s to the logic of capital could 
ever be necessarily complete or total. (ibid). 
                                                                                                                                            
„Time, Work-discipline and Industrial Capitalism‟, and theories of uneven development.  In both cases, 
Chakrabarty argues, capitalism is viewed as “a force that encounters historical difference … as 
something external to its own structure” (ibid: 48).  He further elaborates that in such historicist 
accounts, capital, in the course of a struggle with difference, “eventually cancels out or neutralises the 
contingent differences between specific histories” (ibid).      
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For Chakrabarty, then, the value of Marx‟s notion of History 2
3
 lies in its account of 
difference not as something external to capital, nor as something subsumed into 
capital, but as something that “lives in intimate and plural relationships to capital, 
ranging from opposition to neutrality” (ibid: 66).  He writes: 
 
History 2 does not spell out a programme of writing histories that 
are alternatives to the narratives of capital.  That is, History 2s do 
not constitute a dialectical Other of the necessary logic of History 
1.  To think thus would be to subsume History 2 to History 1.  
History 2 is better thought of as a category charged with the 
function of constantly interrupting the totalising thrusts of History 
1. (ibid).     
 
In post-apartheid South Africa, the two histories of capitalism are evident in attempts 
to entrench the logic of commodification in the sphere of the delivery of basic 
services, and in struggles against such attempts.  In the writing of History 1 
(commodification), attempts have been made to identify and categorise that 
population group unable and/or unwilling to abide by this logic, and interventions 
developed that target members of this population group in ways that aim to encourage 
them to accept this logic.  At the same time, however, members of this population 
group „constantly interrupt the totalising thrusts‟ of commodification by challenging 
this logic in various ways, both in organised protest actions and in their everyday 
lives.  In these contestations, how the poor and poverty have come to be imagined, 
defined, mobilised, and deployed by the state and private enterprises, as well as by 
poor people, plays a central role in determining the nature of the histories that are 
written today.   
 
Spaces of Subjectivation 
 
While Chakrabarty highlights Marx‟s rooting of resistance “in a process through 
which capital appropriates the will of the worker” (ibid: 11) through a number of 
                                                 
3
 Chakrabarty points out that this idea of History 2 is “undeveloped” in Marx, and sets out to expand it 
in the context of his own reading/writing of the history of India.   
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disciplinary processes that are enforced in the factory and “in the way the law … 
imagines labourers through biological/physiological categories such as adults, adult 
males, women and children” (ibid: 7), he also argues that “the idea of History 2 
suggests that even in the very abstract and abstracting space of the factory that capital 
creates, ways of being human will be acted out in manners that do not lend themselves 
to the reproduction of the logic of capital” (ibid: 20).   
 
It is to these “affective narratives” that make up History 2 that this thesis turns in 
trying to understand the “analytical history” (History 1) of poverty and the poor in 
post-apartheid South Africa (ibid: 71).  In post-apartheid South Africa, however, as 
wage labour has declined, it has become important to look beyond the factory walls to 
understand how individual subjects become part of the everyday grid of existence that 
sustains capitalism.  This thesis presents the experience of contestations over poverty 
and the poor in post-apartheid South Africa as an example of how subjects are 
increasingly constituted (and subjectivities produced) outside of the discipline of the 
factory and the wage today.       
 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that “the regime and discipline of factory 
production … is no longer limited to a particular site in society”, but “has insinuated 
itself throughout all forms of social production, spreading like a virus”, with all of 
society “now permeated through and through with the rules of the specifically 
capitalist relations of production” (Hardt and Negri, 1994: 9-10).  They go on to argue 
that this has been accompanied by “a change in the nature and quality of the 
labouring processes”, with labour in late capitalist society “tending toward immaterial 
labour – intellectual, affective, and technico-scientific labour” (ibid: 10).   
 
For Hardt and Negri, these new forms of labour “are immediately social in that they 
directly determine the networks of productive co-operation that create and re-create 
society” (ibid: 10), and hold the potential to produce value outside of capital‟s 
command or “self valorisation”.
4
  They argue that these new labouring processes 
produce “alternative circuits of social valorisation and … new subjectivities” (ibid: 
                                                 
4
 Hardt and Negri argue that the labour theory of value no longer holds as immaterial, intellectual, 
affective, and technico-scientific labour becomes the dominant form that labour assumes with the 
development of capitalism, that is, that labour time no longer serves as the common measure by which 
value is attributed in society.     
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12), which are often antagonistic to the logic of capital.  For them, the specificity of 
the form of affective, immaterial, and technico-scientific labour, “far from being 
closed onto itself, is exemplary of how labouring processes constitute the production 
of subjectivity” (ibid: 13).  They point out, however, in ways that resonate with the 
concept of the two histories, that “the subject … is at the same time a product and 
productive, constituted in and constitutive of the vast networks of social labour”, and 
that “subjectivity is defined simultaneously and equally by its productivity and its 
producibility, its aptitudes to produce and to be produced” (ibid: 12).  This will be 
explored more closely through the specific experiences of the income generation 
projects, organisations and social movements that have been established by poor 
people in Orange Farm in refusal of the inferior quality and standards of living that 
have been prescribed for them by the state and private enterprise.   
 
Hardt and Negri explain their understanding of capital in ways that reflect 
Chakrabarty‟s reading of Marx, and that bring to the fore the antagonistic and 
subversive potentials they apprehend in actions and imaginings of the poor, shifting 
the focus of the discussion back to the question of the production of the subject and 
subjectivity: 
 
Capital, of course, is not a pure form of command but a social 
relation, and it depends for its survival and development on 
productive subjectivities that are internal but antagonistic to it. 
(Hardt and Negri 2009: ix). 
 
For Hardt and Negri, and a much broader tradition of autonomist Marxists, it is the 
writing of these antagonistic subjectivities (History 2s) that is important in exposing 
the limits of capital, of history, the law, and the state.  As this thesis will show, in 
post-apartheid South Africa the making of the poor and poverty unfolds as a space of 
subjectivation/subjectification, that is, a terrain where experiences of oppression and 
resistance, and social investments of desire (e.g. in cultural practices, morals, beliefs 
and values) meet and define common meanings, symbols, languages and practices.  
Emerging in autonomist and post-structuralist writings about the subject and 
processes of subjection, the term „spaces of subjectivation‟ (or „subjectification‟) has 
come to signify the open-ended processes of becoming subject (including resistance) 
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that have been seen to characterise the development of capitalism, as opposed to 
economistic and structuralist approaches that have prioritised subjection, neglecting to 
explore the expressions of power by those in processes of being subjected. (Berardi, 
2003; Foucault, 2003 [1976]; Hardt and Negri, 2009).
5
   
 
Struggles against Commodification in Post-apartheid South Africa 
 
As wage labour in the traditional form declines in the lives of many as the structuring 
force of their everyday lives, contestations over how the poor ought to live outside of 
wage labour become an additional space of subjectivation.  This thesis, then, is an 
attempt to read (and write) the two histories of capitalism in the space of 
subjectivation that is produced in and around struggles for basic services in post-
apartheid South Africa, where the poor and poverty are mobilised as governmental 
categories in the attempted subjection of a particular population group designated the 
status of the poor, and where members of this population group resist such attempts 





This is shown through an overview of state strategies and approaches to poverty and 
the poor and resistance to them across the development of capitalism, followed by a 
closer exploration of struggles of poor people and specific governmental approaches 
to poverty and the poor that have emerged in post-apartheid South Africa.  It does this 
through a close examination of the evolution of policies related to the delivery of 
water, sanitation and electricity services in the City of Johannesburg (CoJ), one of 
South Africa‟s wealthiest municipalities, and their attempted implementation and 
reception in one its most disadvantaged areas, Orange Farm.  In this way, it offers a 
reading of the entry of neoliberal policies in a particular part of the South as a 
contested process in which local actions and knowledges contribute towards the 
particular ways in which neoliberal policies are implemented.       
 
                                                 
5
 See also Veriava (2010). 
6
 Ahmed Veriava (2010) has done important work in this regard, attempting to theorise how resistance 
rebounds on and shapes relations of power in a political context increasingly characterised by struggles 
over forms of subjection.  Martin J. Murray (2008) has also given some centrality to resistance in his 
characterisation of Johannesburg as “a disorderly city”.   
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As the post-apartheid state embraced the fundamentals of neoliberalism, the delivery 
of basic services would be restructured to meet the needs of cost recovery and other 
business principles.
7
  This would mean that a logic of payment for services would 
have to be enforced, particularly in the context of black communities having resisted 
payment of rents and services under apartheid and commitments made in the 
liberation movement to free basic services for all
8
, and in the context of growing 
unemployment, rising inequality and urban poverty an increase in flexible forms of 
labour, and increasing precarity overall (Leibbrandt et al., 2010).  Punishment for 
non-payment, in the form of cut-offs from services like electricity and water and 
evictions from houses, would result in resistance from poor communities, resulting in 
the formation of social movements identifying themselves as poor people‟s 
movements or movements of the poor.  In this way, a field of contestation has 
emerged over what constitutes the basic levels of resources necessary for survival, 
over whether the poor deserve to live in conditions better than those of mere survival, 
and over whose responsibility the fate of the poor is.  
 
Attempting to enforce a logic of commodification and payment in the delivery of 
basic services, the CoJ‟s indigent management policy has evolved to target those 
identified as the poor for assistance with their debts in return for their signing onto 
prepaid systems of delivery and accepting the responsibility to pay for any services 
consumed over and above the free „life lines‟ provided by the state.  In this way, 
defining and targeting the poor has become a way of separating „the can‟t pays‟ from 
„the won‟t pays‟
9
, and enforcing a rationality of restraint, conservation, and payment 
for basic services amongst communities previously without access to services and/or 
refusing to pay for services.  By providing only those resources and services deemed 
necessary for survival to the poor, the so-called „pro-poor‟ policies of the CoJ work to 
                                                 
7
 This is not to suggest that neoliberal policies were not adopted prior to 1994.  As will be shown later 
on in this thesis, neoliberal policies were first implemented by the apartheid government in the 1980s.  
The principle of commodification was also adopted by the apartheid government; however, its 
enforcement was not very successful in black areas as a result of the rent and services boycotts.     
8
 There has been much debate about whether the promise of free basic services for all was indeed made 
in the liberation movement, in particular over whether the RDP held this promise.  However, the ANC 
made explicit its commitment to free basic services during the 2000 municipal elections.   
9
 These categories/terms have emerged in state policy discourse to refer to those in society who are 
genuinely unable to afford to pay for the basic services required for their survival („the can‟t pays‟) and 
those who can afford to pay but are not willing to pay for various reasons („the won‟t pays‟).   They 
appear here in scare quotes to signify that they are terms/categories constructed in policy discourse that 
will be shown to work towards producing particular interventions designed to produce particular forms 
of life for the different population groups that they identify and classify.   
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further entrench inequality and relegate large sections of society to conditions 
inappropriate to a decent quality of life.  While struggles of movements have evolved 
to include contestations at the level of the law, state policy has evolved to include 
some of the demands made by movements e.g. increasing free allocations for water 
and electricity for poor households.  State policy has also responded by adopting more 
targeted approaches, with its latest policy, Siyasizana, categorising the poor according 
to three bands of poverty and allocating free services accordingly.  Struggles outside 
of the law have also continued in the form of illegal reconnections, marches, and so 




 have portrayed community protests around service delivery in South 
Africa as „struggles for survival‟, occurring „spontaneously‟ and lacking any 
theoretical bases or substance, the experiences explored in this thesis suggest that 
these struggles, while emerging out of survival needs, nevertheless reflect a common 
sense of injustice that exists amongst a group of similarly affected people.  Building 
on E.P. Thompson‟s notion of legitimating practices that exist amongst members of a 
mob that result in particular actions, such as food riots, this thesis shows how the 
identity of the poor is mobilised strategically by marginalised people in post-apartheid 
South Africa who knowingly seek to change their conditions of life by challenging the 
ways in which their status and position in life is defined, determined by and through 
state policy.
11
   
 
                                                 
10
 Khanya College, the Socialist Group, and Keep Left are examples of organisations whose members 
hold this position. 
11
 This thesis will continually return us to this tension between notions of survival and notions of life.  
While survival refers to activities related with keeping oneself alive, life points to activities geared 
towards securing access to the resources that permit an unrestricted life beyond the limits of the 
conditions of survival.  As state policy begins to fashion itself around the provision of the very minimal 
resources to the poor, considered necessary for their survival, the production of life beyond these 
conditions has come to be portrayed as the responsibility of individual citizens.  And, struggles for 
access to basic services have come to reassert the rights of poor people to a quality and standard of life 
beyond that of survival.  Ahmed Veriava (2010) argues that survival (activity devoted to keeping 
oneself alive), defined in relation to the grid of everyday practices, is almost always grounded in a 
particular form of life (or bios).  Through an exploration of struggles around the delivery of water in 
post-apartheid Soweto, Veriava mobilises the concept of “life strategies” to illustrate (and to valorise) 
that intensity (as potential) according to which life, even in its most abject forms, moves towards 
creating forms of life.  For him, power‟s significance lies in its attempts to produce subjects aligned 
with this distinction between survival and qualified forms of existence (life), and in acts of resistance 
against such attempts.   
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In Orange Farm, for example, the legitimating practices that have brought people 
together to resist the implementation of neoliberal policies and to make demands of 
the state seem to lie in the common history of struggle shared by many South Africans 
whose positions of hardship endured under apartheid have remained the same or 
deteriorated post-apartheid.  With a particular standard and quality of life being 
imagined as being fought for in the liberation movement, the minimal prescriptions 
for life for a certain section of society being made by the African National Congress 
(ANC) government would not be accepted easily.
12
  In Thompson‟s terms, what 
emerges, then, is a “moral economy” (see Chapter One), in which contestations occur 
over what the commitments of the liberation movement indeed were, and, in this way, 
over the role of the ANC government in the present with regard to „its people‟, 
represented as the poor, and the forms of life made possible for the poor.  Often, the 
moral economy has been directed by struggles over what constitutes the minimal 
levels of access to resources necessary for survival or what the maximum income 
level should be that determines who is considered poor
13
.  And, the poor have been 
characterised as morally tainted, in particular as bearing the trait of laziness or 
idleness, thereby shifting responsibility for their plight away from the state and back 
onto the individual poor person or the culture of poverty (see Chapter One).  In this 
contested moral economy, then, we see movements identifying themselves as 
movements of the poor challenging the ways in which the language, symbols, slogans, 
songs, and traditions of the broad liberation movement have been mobilised by the 
ANC and the state in service of the policies and principles of neoliberalism.       
 
In this moral economy, the duty to pay for basic services has also been emphasised by 
the ANC government in its setting out of the characteristics of responsible citizenship.  
Poor people have argued that unemployment and poverty result in services being 
                                                 
12
 I do not mean to suggest here that the policies of the ANC prior to 1994 held the promise of equality 
and freedom for all.  However, the representation of its policies as holding this promise continues to 
feature in its discourse today, and certainly featured in the statements made by movements of the poor 
and poor people interviewed for this project as defining their political imaginaries.  In the latter case, 
the framing of demands for free basic services has often entailed reminders to the ANC of its 
commitments which include redistribution of wealth, freedom from poverty for all, equality for all, and 
so on.   
13
 While there is no doubt that recent struggles situated on the plane of the technical have the potential 
to result in tangible improvements in the lives of disadvantaged communities (e.g. increasing the free 
allocation of water from 6kl to 10kl), it is also important to consider the ways in which their 
prioritisation can result in a re-emphasis in struggles away from the question of what constitutes a 
decent life to a focus only on securing the conditions of survival for the poor, and in the acceptance that 
the state‟s responsibility ends in its provision of those resources necessary for mere survival.        
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unaffordable to them, and movements of the poor have argued that commodification 
of the resources necessary for life works against the interests of the poor and of 
society in general, entrenching inequality, and individualising and marketising social 
relations with regard to resources previously held and enjoyed in common.  The ANC 
government has, however, chosen to adopt the neoliberal logic of institutions like the 
World Bank, which argues that “the poor are willing and have the capacity to pay for 
services that are adapted to their needs” (World Bank, 2001).  In establishing access 
to basic services for poor communities, then, the ANC government has mobilised a 
language that encourages all citizens, including the poor, to assume responsibility for 
paying for services above those amounts provided free by the state, and that explains 
its provision of differential and unequal levels of access to services dependent on 
ability to pay.   
 
Theorists have analysed post-apartheid movements engaged in struggles for basic 
services in different ways – as reflecting the potential for the creation of mass political 
parties that will work towards contesting state power and establishing socialism; as 
spaces through which unemployed people can collectively organise themselves to 
make demands of the state and/or to produce alternative forms of production (often 
income) for themselves; and as signifying the subversive potentiality of poor people 
to collectively resist attacks on life and to create relationships that do not produce 
capital, outside of the party form and antagonistic to the state.  In the latter case, the 
poor have not been homogenised in singular definitions and ideological frameworks, 
but celebrated as the emergence of "different voices, experiences, traditions and 
practices that show a new kind of politics through their diversity and acceptance of 
different organisational forms and tactics, and new ways of imagining possibilities for 
life" (McKinley & Naidoo, 2004: 10).  In this way, the particular imagining of the 
poor contained in the latter case has presented a challenge to the old political 
traditions of the South African left (which has historically celebrated the organised 
industrial working class as the political subject responsible for change in modern 
capitalist society) as well as to the South African government and ruling party, 





As Andries Du Toit has pointed out, studies about poverty
14
 in the social sciences 
tend to emphasise technical, economic, and quantifiable aspects with the aim of 
producing objective analyses.  Where qualitative approaches are adopted, they too 
tend to work towards painting objective pictures, maps, and models.  But, Du Toit 
argues that the aim of objectivity is a “myth”, and argues for studies about poverty to 
“come to grips with the extent to which the structural configurations of poverty are 
socially meaningful; shaped through and through by the complexities of culture, 
identity and agency” and begin a process of “re-imagining and re-framing of the way 
in which inequality and poverty are conceptualised in the first place” (Du Toit 2007a: 
1-2; emphasis in original).  Taking Du Toit‟s concerns into consideration, this project 
set out to understand the struggles over the meanings given to poverty and the poor in 
post-apartheid South Africa, the rationalities behind different approaches to poverty 
and the poor, and the different ends to which econometric models of poverty work.  In 
the method set out below, it is hoped that a start has been made towards developing 
alternative ways of studying poverty and the poor.     
 
Trying to understand the constitution of poverty and the poor in post-apartheid South 
Africa as the product of a contestation between History 1 and History 2s, from the 
position of one who has been closely involved in and with poor people‟s 
movements
15
, it was decided that the best possible method to adopt would be an 
adaptation of Michael Burawoy‟s “extended case method” (Burawoy, 1998).  
Privileging participant observation and a somewhat open-ended theoretical 
engagement in, with and through ethnographic investigation, as opposed to a distant, 
non-reflexive, positivist approach, Burawoy allows for the conditions of the particular 
and the contextual to give meaning to existing theories and to produce new theories 
about universals, such as labour, resistance, poverty, and the poor.   
 
Different from „grounded theory‟, in which distance and objectivity are foregrounded 
as necessary for the analysis of subjects along rigid, pre-determined frameworks and 
grids, the extended case method begins with particular theoretical questions, grounds 
                                                 
14
 Du Toit makes his arguments in the specific context of his own research into the concept of chronic 
poverty, and its relationship and mobilisation in opposition to the concept of structural poverty.   
15
 I am a founding member of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and Indymedia-SA, the latter seeing 
me work with the Concerned Citizens‟ Forum (CCF), Landless People‟s Movement (LPM), Anti-
Eviction Campaign (AEC), Social Movements Indaba (SMI), the Anti-War Coalition (AWC), and the 
Coalition Against Xenophobia (CAX).   
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them in particular case studies, and then extends out to comment on these theoretical 
questions, allowing for both researcher and subjects being studied the potential for 
contributing towards the shaping of theories.  In the latter case, traditional ways of 
ensuring representativity, generalisability, and the like, are not always possible, and 
the particularities of each experience studied determines specific approaches to these 
questions.   
 
While Burawoy attempts nevertheless to reinscribe the extended case method within a 
closed science that is able to classify, categorise, make general observations, and 
comment on general trends, the value of the extended case method for this project lies 
in its opening up of the research process to allow for meaning and depth of 
understanding to be given to a specific experience of a general theory or set of 
arguments without the need to always prove general trends.  In this thesis, the case 
study of struggles for basic services in Orange Farm and the CoJ provides a space for 
the exploration of contestations over poverty and the poor in post-apartheid South 
Africa, providing experiences of neoliberalism, constitutions of poverty and the poor, 
resistance, and changing modes of power from the particular context of a country in 
the South.  While the experience of the CoJ and Orange Farm are not the same as 
other cities and townships in South Africa, the CoJ is considered a leader in 
developing local capacities for indigent management, and aspects of Siyasizana are 
recognised as a national pilot for the National Integrated Social Information Service 
(NISIS).  Orange Farm is also significant in that it is in many ways both a remnant of 
apartheid planning and an experimental space for post-apartheid planning, and 
because it is one of the CoJ‟s most disadvantaged townships (including several 
informal settlements that have recently sprung up inside its borders).     
 
The thesis facilitates such an analysis by providing an overview of theories about the 
constitution of poverty and the poor, and the history of approaches to poverty and the 
poor in capitalist development, followed by the specific engagement of questions 
thrown up by this overview through the experience of South Africa, in particular 
Johannesburg and Orange Farm, and struggles for basic services.  In doing this, it sets 
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out to avoid providing “a history by analogy”
16
 (Mamdani, 1996: 8-9), analysing the 
particular experiences of South African society and state from the perceived threat of 
„multiracial poverty‟ and responses to it in the forms of segregation and apartheid, to 
today‟s neoliberal attempts at making the poor „know their place‟ (see Chapter One).  
While it draws mainly on theories from and about western societies, it speaks to them 
through the particular experiences of Orange Farm and the CoJ.        
 
Looking both at how state policy and struggles in the sphere of the delivery of basic 
services work to produce „the poor‟ and „poverty‟ as contested sites of signification 
and production, the policy agenda of the Johannesburg municipality in the delivery of 
basic services, and the struggles of residents of Orange Farm, a township falling 
within the Johannesburg municipality‟s jurisdiction, formed the two major sources of 
information and provide the basis for a broader discussion about the poor in post-
apartheid Johannesburg (and South Africa).     
 
Archival work formed the major part of the research into the policy agenda of the 
Johannesburg municipality.  City documents (including minutes, legal documents, 
press releases, discussion documents and research reports) from 1994 to the present 
were sourced from the local government library and the City‟s website – 
www.joburg.org.za.  These were complemented by investigations into the national 
policy archive, accessed through the government website – www.gov.za - as well as 
discussions and debates about the state‟s policy agenda contained in newspaper 
articles, and documents produced by academics, NGO workers, and activists working 
in the development sector.  With the organisational structure and managerial staff of 
the City changing so often over the period under review, it made sense that the 
archive would provide the primary source for tracing the evolution of policy.     
 
Beginning as a Masters project, research for this thesis spanned an initial period of 
intensive archival and fieldwork between 2004 and 2007, followed by the period 
during which upgrading of the dissertation to a PhD thesis took place (2008-2010), 
                                                 
16
 Mamdani argues that many accounts of the development of capitalism in Africa fall into a pattern of 
measuring what happens in African countries according to the grid of capitalist development in Europe 
and the rest of the western world, thus neglecting the specificities of the African experience in the 
shaping of modernity.  In this way, they produce “a history by analogy”, that is, a narrative of social 
and political life in African countries that exists only in relation to a picture of development and 
progress defined by western ideals, values, and the history of countries in the west.   
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through a process of more intensive reading of theoretical and historical texts, further 
archival work, and the conduction of a limited number of follow-up interviews and 
focus group discussions.  It is significant that these two periods correspond to changes 
that happened in the CoJ that relate directly to the object of study.  Between 2004 and 
2007, the City introduced its two major debt write-off indigent management 
programmes (Municipal Services Subsidy Scheme – MSSS – and Reathusa), and in 
2008, a revised indigent management programme (Siyasizana) was introduced.  It also 
underwent related institutional changes that are discussed further on in the thesis.  
This has allowed for this thesis to evolve in direct relation to struggles and policies as 
they have evolved.   
 
It is also significant to note that in the case of the CoJ, interviews with key City 
strategists and leaders were not granted prior to the final outcome of the court case led 
by residents of Phiri, Soweto against the CoJ and Johannesburg Water in challenge of 
the installation of prepaid water meters, that is, during the period of the Masters 
research.  While it was intended that in-depth interviews would be conducted with key 
City officials, the nature of the research and the fact that the supervisor of the project 
was closely associated with the court case, prevented this from happening.  Just two 
interviews were conducted with middle-level managers who signed consent forms and 
granted the interviews without questioning the ends to which the research would be 
used.  However, when, at the start of a group interview, consent forms were presented 
to three of the most senior managers in the City‟s Central Strategy Unit (responsible 
for the major reorientation of the City towards its Human Development Strategy), the 
potential interviewees decided not to allow the interview to proceed on the basis that 
the researcher‟s supervisor (Patrick Bond) was a witness for their opposition in the 
court case.  They stated that the issue of the City‟s indigent management policy, 
which they had been informed they would be interviewed about, was central to the 
case, thus allowing this witness privileged information that they would have made 
available in the interview.  This resulted in the initial piecing together of the evolution 
of city strategy and policy from minutes, research reports, discussion documents, 
press releases, and newspaper reports.  In 2010, an interview was granted with 
Director for Community Development in the CoJ, Jak Koseff, who both confirmed 
much of the analysis already made, and offered new information related in particular 
to the recently launched Siyasizana.   
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Access to state officials at the level of the Orange Farm municipal office, was much 
easier.  A local councillor‟s cell phone number was obtained from one of the Orange 
Farm residents active in the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee (OWCC – see 
below), and contact was made with an extremely helpful councillor who not only 
consented to being interviewed, but also arranged for contact to be made with an 
administrative clerk dealing with payment for services and issues of indigency, and 
community development workers (CDWs).  Orange Farm has four elected 
councillors, all of whom are representative of the ANC.  It was decided that it would 
not be necessary to interview all four councillors as they would all represent similar 
positions.  The councillor interviewed was also the most relevant to this project as she 
is responsible for the ward from which residents mounted protest action for service 
delivery in late 2006, and 2010.  A follow-up interview was conducted with 
Councillor Simango in August 2010 to find out about any developments with regard 
to the delivery of basic services in Orange Farm and the roll-out of Siyasizana.  In 
addition, the administrative clerk responsible for the Siyasizana registration process in 
Orange Farm, Ms Tstotetsi, was interviewed in August 2010.     
 
While formal interviews and focus groups were set up prior to their conduction with 
the above individuals, being physically present at the municipal office in Orange 
Farm also opened up opportunities for other unplanned interviews.  For example, 
someone known from previous activist work in the area was working as a volunteer
17
 
in the local housing department, registering shacks in informal settlements in Orange 
Farm and other parts of the south, and agreed to being interviewed.  Other youth 
leaders waiting to meet with the councillor were also spoken to, and meetings and 
interviews set up.  In developing relationships with some of the youth leaders, access 
was also gained to a workshop being held between community representatives and the 
regional municipal management team about the future of a community skills 
development centre.  The three days spent at the municipal offices in Orange Farm 
were therefore invaluable in providing the opportunity for in-depth interviews, focus 
                                                 
17
 Being a „volunteer‟ usually implies that one is not considered to be employed (in a job), but offering 
a service outside of one‟s usual employment.  However, in South Africa, „volunteer‟ has come to 
signify a particular form of unprotected, part-time, low-wage „job‟ that does not deserve the benefits of 
a full-time job as it is to be viewed as „preparation‟ for a „real job‟.  It is thus not unusual for people to 
say that they are working as volunteers, a contradiction in terms.  This is explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 5. 
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groups, and participant observation that provided many insights into the ways in 
which „poverty‟ and „the poor‟ are being mobilised today.   
 
In trying to understand the history of Orange Farm, and the struggles of its residents 
and their relationship to the concepts of „poverty‟ and „the poor‟, focus group 
discussions and in-depth interviews were the main form of investigation.  Through 
prior research and activist work done in the area since 2001
18
, substantial existing 
knowledge of the area and contacts with people and organisations already made, 
could be drawn on in the setting up of these interviews and discussions.  Bricks 
Mokolo, Chairperson of the OWCC, provided an invaluable asset in setting up the 
majority of community focus group discussions.   
 
In trying to understand the contestation that happens and the diversity of views 
amongst residents and groups living in situations of socio-economic hardship, it was 
decided to bring together different groups of residents facing different situations of 
hardship and those who have come together to find solutions to their problems in 
separate discussions to probe their life histories as people identified as „the poor‟ and 
their responses to their problems.  A focus group discussion was held with residents 
living in bonded houses in Drieziek Extension 2 that were built by their former 
employee, Premier Milling Company.  Having lost their jobs as the company 
underwent various processes of „transformation‟, they now suffer the experience of 
                                                 
18
 I first came to work in and meet people from Orange Farm in 2001, as part of my employment at 
Khanya College as co-ordinator of its gender programme.  Over two years, I co-ordinated a 
participatory research project with the Kganya Women‟s Consortium (consisting of thirteen income 
generation projects established by women living in Orange Farm) looking at the effects of GEAR on 
the lives of women in the area.  After leaving Khanya College in 2002, I have maintained contact with 
some of the organisations making up the consortium.  I have also provided organisational assistance to 
the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee (OWCC) since its inception in 2002 when members of some 
of the projects of the consortium came together to fight electricity and water cut-offs facing their 
members.  In April 2002, I was contracted by the Centre For AIDS Development, Research and 
Education (CADRE) to conduct a short qualitative research project into the impact of the LoveLife Y-
Centre in Orange Farm on the youth of the area.  This brought me into contact with a completely 
different group of residents, giving me new insights into the area.  As a member of the Anti-
Privatisation Forum (APF), I have also remained in close contact with the OWCC, which is an affiliate 
of the APF.  In 2003, as co-ordinator of the APF Research Sub-Committee, I helped co-ordinate a 
participatory research project with members of the APF, the Coalition Against Water Privatisation and 
Public Citizen into the effects of prepaid water meters on the lives of residents of Orange Farm.  All of 
these experiences have led to the building of relationships with a number of people living in Orange 
Farm and with the OWCC and Kganya consortium, in particular.  It has also meant that I have been 
able to experience this community for a much longer period of time than the duration of this project.  In 
writing up this thesis, I have been fortunate enough to return to the original data gleaned from the 
household surveys, interviews and focus groups conducted for all the above projects.     
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not being able feed their families or to afford to pay for the services that their houses 
are equipped to enjoy.  A second focus group was held with residents who had been 
employed and retrenched by a refuse removal company providing services to 
Pikitup
19
.  In addition, focus groups were convened with members of the Kganya 
Women‟s Consortium (consisting of thirteen income generation projects), and the 
OWCC, the only organisation in Orange Farm that has been formed in direct response 
to water and electricity cut-offs.  Through contacts made during visits to the 
municipal office in Orange Farm, a focus group discussion was set up with youth 
volunteers of an NGO set up by the municipality in order to assist its CDWs, called 
Hlanganani.   
 
In-depth interviews were conducted with a selection of residents, chosen from the 
different groups of residents participating in the focus groups.  Residents were 
selected based on their contributions made in the focus groups, that is, if it was felt 
that they deserved more in-depth probing about particular issues coming up in the 
focus groups.   
 
In addition, individual residents met during the course of the research who seemed 
interesting and important to speak to, were interviewed.  For example, while waiting 
for the councillor to arrive for her interview, an interview was set up with the 
Chairperson of the Lebone Skills Development Initiative, who happened to be waiting 
to see the councillor too.  While the focus groups and interviews conducted at 
community level do not make up a scientifically representative sample, they do reflect 
a significant enough number of voices and experiences to explore the contestation that 
takes place around the making of „the poor‟ and „poverty‟ at community level.  They 
are also representative of a set of attitudes and responses to „poverty‟ that exist 
amongst „the poor‟ that resist neat categorisation and analysis.  And it is precisely the 
method of the in-depth interview and focus group that allowed for the contestation 
that happens amongst „the poor‟ to be revealed and explored, in and across all groups 
and organisations included in this study.         
                                                 
19
 Pikitup is the company established in 2001 by the City of Johannesburg and owned by it, that is 
responsible for refuse removal in its residential areas.  In Orange Farm, Pikitup has a record of 
outsourcing many of its duties to local companies notorious for poor treatment of their workers, usually 
local residents employed on contract (Samson, 2003; Focus Group, Retrenched Refuse Removal 
Workers, 31/05/2007).   
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With the exception of the two interviews conducted with officials from the City‟s 
Credit Control Department, which lasted no more than thirty minutes and were 
directed towards obtaining very particular kinds of information due to the limited time 
made available by interviewees, all other interviews and focus groups were conducted 
in a manner that allowed participants to speak as freely as possible in response to 
questions that probed very broad areas of the research and individual attitudes and 
ways of being, living, and responding to hardship and policy.  A significant attempt 
was made not to impose the researcher‟s own preconceived views on discussions by 
allowing questions to be remoulded in the course of the interview or group discussion.  
The overall exercise was thus led by both the researcher and the experiences of the 
interviewee or focus group participants.  In the main, interviews and discussions 
would begin with respondents sharing their life histories.  Responses would emerge in 
various forms, and then be used as the basis for the shaping of questions about the 
history of Orange Farm, the work of residents in their different groups, their 
relationships to employment, the state, NGOs, and so on.  In addition, participants 
would be asked about their attitudes to and understandings of „poverty‟ and „the 
poor‟.   
 
Focus groups went on for between two to four hours, and the majority of interviews 
lasted between one and three hours.  A few interviews were conducted over a number 
of days, in different sessions of two to three hours.  Rather than conducting a larger 
number of interviews and focus groups in which respondents would be expected to 
provide answers to a set list of questions aimed at producing particular kinds of 
knowledge to fit a pre-determined theory or set of theories, a smaller set of „intense 
conversations‟ were held in which participants were guided in the telling of their 
stories to speak to the particular issue of „poverty‟ and „the poors‟.  In this way, the 
voices of interviewees and focus group participants have not just provided the 
information through which a discussion on „poverty‟ and „the poors‟ may take place, 
but they have participated in the discussion.  In this way, those traditionally 
considered „informants‟ in the research process become „discussants‟ and producers 
of the knowledge ultimately contained in this thesis.   
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In 2010, one focus group was conducted with members of the OWCC to find out their 
knowledge of Siyasizana and if anything had changed with regard to their work and 
struggles.  Three in-depth interviews were conducted with key members of the 
OWCC.  Random individuals were stopped and asked of their knowledge of 
Siyasizana outside the municipal office and at the Itsoseng project in Orange Farm on 
two days in May and August 2010.  With Siyasizana being the only real change at a 
collective level for residents of Orange Farm, it was felt that attention should only be 
given to this aspect in fieldwork conducted as part of the follow-up research towards 
the PhD.   
 
It is hoped that the above approach has addressed some of the concerns raised by 
Gillian Hart (2002) in her critique of discourses of globalisation that conceive of the 
process in terms of an „impact model‟.  She argues that globalisation is “typically 
framed in terms of the impact of „the global‟ on „the local‟, described in ways that 
“conjure up inexorable market and technological forces that take shape in the core of 
the global economy and radiate out from there” (Hart, 2002: 13).  Hart argues that 
such discourses are „disabling‟ as they do not recognise the potential for the 
contestation and constitution of global processes from and through the local, the latter 
understood as the product of contested and “multiple trajectories of socio-spatial 
change” (ibid).  She further clarifies her use of the word “trajectories” as being “to 
convey the ongoing processes through which sets of power-laden practices in the 
multiple, interconnected arenas of everyday life at different spatial scales constantly 
rework places and identities” (ibid).  This thesis is an attempt to bring together the 
multiple trajectories that have shaped current approaches to the questions of poverty 
and the poor in South Africa through the specific experience of Orange Farm and 
Johannesburg.   
 
Writing this thesis in the third person has thus far been easy.  But it, at this point 
becomes more difficult, and it would be disingenuous to erase my position as the 
researcher in this process of exploration and narration, my own history, class position, 
and experience being both beneficial to the project and posing certain challenges for 
me.  Gaining access to members of any community that one is not a part of is almost 
always a difficult process, more so when doing research.  This was not, however, the 
case with different groups in Orange Farm.   
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Through my previous work in Orange Farm, already described above, I had already 
built relationships with members of the OWCC and the Kganya Women‟s 
Consortium, two forms of collective responses to the socio-economic hardships facing 
residents.  In addition to allowing access to the broad membership of these two 
structures, contact was facilitated through these organisations with the St Charles 
Lwanga Advice Office (set up by the Roman Catholic Church), and other groups of 
unemployed residents outside of any formal organisations.  My long history with 
these formations would, however, pose a challenge for me with regard to the question 
of my own personal biases and connections with particular individuals threatening to 
cloud the overall analysis.  In this regard, I attempted to include many more 
individuals and organisations unknown to me prior to this research project 
commencing, in my list of interviewees and focus group participants, and to ensure 
that the opinions and experiences of members of the OWCC and Kganya Consortium 
did not undeservedly overshadow those of members of other organisations and 
unorganised residents in the final discussion.  Contacts facilitated through the CDWs 
and time spent at the municipal offices assisted in this regard.  In addition, similar sets 
of questions guided all interviews and focus group discussions, and special efforts 
were made to include organisations and individuals from within the ANC Alliance.  It 
is hoped that this is reflected in the discussion on Orange Farm further on in this 
thesis.   
 
Entering a disadvantaged community, such as Orange Farm, with a certain amount of 
privilege that comes with a middle-class background, strikes up immediate interest 
from residents who identify one as an outsider.  In my case, this worked mostly to my 
advantage, especially when I was unaccompanied by people known to me or acting as 
facilitators or mediators for me in between or on my way to interviews and focus 
group discussions.  Conversations were, in this way, struck up with ordinary residents, 
unplanned, lending another layer to my overall research experience that allowed me to 
compare the views and experiences being heard in interviews and focus groups with 
those heard on the streets, in shops, in taxis, my car (giving people lifts), and so on.  
These informal observations and interactions have lent significant value to the 
outcomes of the overall research project.   
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It is also difficult, when entering a disadvantaged community, with a certain amount 
of privilege, to escape individuals‟ expectations that your presence or engagement 
with them will lead to some form of material gain on their part.  At the beginning of 
all focus groups and interviews, the purposes of the research and my own position as a 
student were explained to participants.  The majority of interviews and focus groups 
were conducted at a central venue in Orange Farm, the Itsoseng Women‟s Project in 
Drieziek Extension 1, that kindly allowed me to use their space free of charge.  
Transport money was given only to those participants living in distant extensions 
requiring taxi rides, and a light finger lunch was provided at focus groups happening 
at this venue.  Other focus groups took place at the municipal offices and the Lebone 
Skills Development Centre, which also kindly offered up their spaces free of charge, 
and no transport money or lunches were provided here.  The reason for this was that 
participants would have been at these venues regardless of the focus groups taking 
place.  In this way, there is no claim that can be made against the research findings 
that focus group participants or interviewees may have been coerced into participating 
through promised material benefit.   
 
At the start of all interviews and focus group discussions, participants would also be 
given the chance to ask any questions about the research process.  In the majority of 
cases, participants would want to know what the ends of the research were and 
whether they would have access to the findings.  I would explain the nature of an MA 
project as well as the details of the research design, and commit to returning to 
Orange Farm at the end of the process to present the findings to participants.  In some 
cases, such as a focus group that comprised unemployed men who had been 
retrenched in the last ten years from a major company, Premier Milling, I was asked 
whether I would be able to assist with the provision of jobs for individuals.  I would 
obviously respond that this was not possible, but that I would allow for this thesis to 
be used by groups in Orange Farm in campaign work being taken up around the issue 
of employment.  Participants were always satisfied with such responses, and I will 
have to live up to my commitment to return with my findings and arguments and to 
make them open to critique, debate and use by residents. 
 
„The informal‟ also presented itself as an important source of information from time 
to time, when individual participants from focus groups decided to continue 
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conversations with me well after the group discussions had been concluded, or when 
my own sources of privilege began to be tapped into for the work of organisations or 
individuals.  For example, I gained great insights into the difficulties faced by CDWs 
by giving a lift from Orange Farm to Johannesburg to one of the CDWs needing to 
attend a meeting in the city, and into the hardships of the income generation projects 
when asked to make donations of food for HIV-positive members or to offer 
assistance with media work for campaigns.   
 
The research process has been an open-ended one, with certain delineations in terms 
of area of focus and questions to be probed, but without predetermined answers or 
theories requiring fulfilment.  Archival work has been brought together with the 
experiences of individuals and organisations, and the outcome has been one in which 
my own individual views have been able to interact and engage with an extremely 
wide range of experiences and theories.  It is hoped that this method of investigation 
has allowed for the next few chapters to provide material substantiation for the 
arguments outlined in earlier sections of this introduction.          
 
Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter One explores different ways in which poverty and the poor have been 
approached in capitalist society, highlighting the relationship between wage labour 
(and its decline) and the constitution of poverty and the poor, from early industrial 
capitalism to the present neoliberal world order.  It also offers a historical overview of 
approaches to poverty and the poor in South Africa from segregation to apartheid, 
similarly showing the relationship between wage labour and state approaches to 
poverty and the poor, and laying the basis for the discussion of post-apartheid South 
Africa that follows.  In doing this, it presents a number of theoretical approaches to 
the constitution of poverty and the poor through which it will attempt to think through 
the questions of poverty and the poor in the specific experience of post-apartheid 
South Africa, in particular Orange Farm and greater Johannesburg, in the remainder 
of the thesis.  The chapter presents an analysis of the development of capitalism, as 
the product of a contestation between History 1 and History 2s, offering definitions of 
concepts, such as neoliberalism, and putting forward analyses of changes in labour 
that are related to the constitution of poverty and the poor/s.     
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Chapter Two shows how the poor (and the poorest of the poor) come to feature in the 
discourse of the African National Congress (ANC) (and the state) from the early 
1990s as it changes its commitment to its people from that of delivering the „better 
life for all‟ to that of enabling the individual citizen to help him/herself to move closer 
towards attaining this „better life‟.  It will also show, how, in the case of struggles 
embarked on against the policies and logic of neoliberalism, the poor has come to 
signify both a challenge to state definitions and measures aimed at promoting 
conditions of survival for the poor, and the possibility for alternatives to neoliberalism 
and capitalism.   
 
Chapter Three shows how the proliferation of statistics, and debates and discussions 
around them, geared towards defining just how the state fulfils its minimalist role, has 
shaped the governmental categories of the poor and poverty to produce a „field of 
knowledge and intervention‟ through which particular standards of living, practices, 
and kinds of behaviour are imposed on and/or encouraged for that population group in 
society identified as being unable to provide for themselves, such that the direct rule 
of the state over its citizens is replaced by a sphere or field of intervention through 
which the state „enables‟ the individual citizen to assume responsibilities previously 
assumed by the former.   
 
While the first three chapters outline the broad context of the making of the poor in 
the history of capitalist development in the west, and in post-apartheid South Africa, 
the rest of the thesis focuses on the delivery of basic services through the specific 
experience of the evolving policies of the City of Johannesburg and their attempted 
implementation in Orange Farm.   
 
Chapter 4 outlines the history of policy development related to basic service delivery 
in the CoJ, focusing on the evolution of its Human Development Strategy (HDS) and 
Growth and Development Strategy (GDS) from its first attempts at neoliberal 
restructuring begun in 1999 with the adoption of iGoli 2002 (and iGoli 2010), 
followed by Joburg 2030, as well as its return to indigent management policies, which 
have undergone several revisions, resulting in its most recent form, Siyasizana, or the 
Extended Social Package (ESP).  The chapter engages primarily with the ways in 
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which the poor and poverty have been crafted and shaped as governmental forms of 
intervention in the lives of a particular population group in order to encourage them to 
behave in certain ways and accept certain inequalities and responsibilities.    
 
The experience of Orange Farm, shared through Chapters Five and Six, will show 
how the conditions of survival imagined for black people by the apartheid government 
in the form of its policies of „organised urbanisation‟ and „controlled squatting‟ that 
produced places of „permanent informality‟, such as Orange Farm, are today being 
perpetuated by the incremental logic of service delivery in the commodified and 
privatised system being championed by the ANC government.  While Chapter Five 
focuses on the way Orange Farm was imagined and made as „a place for the poor‟ in 
and through apartheid and current state policies and actions, Chapter Six highlights 
the many different ways in which Orange Farm has represented the potential for a life 
beyond survival, a life outside of the constraints and boundaries imposed by 
capitalism.  It also explores how this struggle for a different life is often itself 
intimately bound to the struggle for survival.  In the attempts at making the poor in 
Orange Farm, then, we witness the contestation of the category from those its targets, 
and the limits in its implementation that result from the inability of residents to afford 
even the conditions of survival proposed by the changed indigent management policy.         
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The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time.  
It was present at its own making.  (E. P. Thompson 1965: 9). 
 
Thompson‟s painstaking account, in The Making of the English Working Class, of the 
participation of those named „working class‟ in their own production as a collective 
force recognisable and shaped through various common customs and cultural 
practices, beliefs and values, and in the broader development of capitalism, is 
important in bringing into view those written into history through classification yet 
seldom seen to have contributed to the writing of history themselves.  Setting out “to 
rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the „obsolete‟ hand-loom weaver, the 
„utopian‟ artisan … from the enormous condescension of posterity” (ibid), Thompson 
tells the story of the emergence of the working class as political subject central to the 
development of industrial capitalism in England, not just as passive recipient of laws, 
prescriptions, orders, and dictates or reactant to economic stimuli, but as active 
participant in the shaping of the development of society.   
 
By encouraging us to think of class as “something which … happens (and can be 
shown to have happened) in human relationships”, rather than as “structure” or 
“category” (ibid), Thompson offers us an alternative
20
 reading (and writing) of the 
history of the working class in early industrial capitalist England as “an active 
process, which owes as much to agency as to conditioning” (ibid).  While he explores 
the customs, beliefs, values and practices that predispose certain individuals and 
groups to the discipline of wage labour, he also points to instances of resistance and 
contestation of the modes of being and forms of life prescribed for the working class 
by capital.  In this way, Thompson shows how a group of individuals in society 
comes to be known, seen and treated as a homogenous entity, objectified under the 
sign of „working class‟, through an active process of contestation, both of 
                                                 
20
 Thompson sets himself apart from political economists who tend to prioritise the structural over the 
subjective aspects of society, often neglecting questions of human agency in their analyses of the 
development of capitalism. 
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signification and of material conditions.  In this chapter (and the thesis more broadly), 
as we try to understand the effects of the decline of wage labour in late capitalist 
society on the working class, especially the renewed attention being given to that 
group in society identified and named „the poor‟, Thompson‟s use of the term 
„making‟ seems appropriate, allowing us to describe the contested process and field 
of signification (after Barchiesi – see below) that is produced by and through 
engagement about poverty and about/by the poor in post-apartheid South Africa.   
 
In Thompson‟s (1965; [1967, 1971] 1991) attempts to understand the English 
working class in the early years of industrial capitalism, poverty and the poor also 
feature prominently, particularly in his discussions of resistance to incorporation into 
wage labour and in his writings on the crowd, which we will explore later on in this 
chapter.  Read together with other analyses that emphasise governmental logics 
behind the uses and shaping of poverty and the poor (explored below), Thompson‟s 
particular treatment of the poor allows for the very processes in which the poor and 
poverty emerge as lived experience, and as discursive categories, to be understood as 
makings – processes of contestation over the meanings given to poverty, and the life 
forms imagined for the poor in which the poor are active subjects.  Such an approach 
is even more significant today as we apprehend not only the increasing attention to 
poverty and the poor in state, party political, and general policy discourse, but also as 
we are confronted with the increasing mobilisation of the poor as a political identity 
by groups of people coming together to demand access to those resources necessary 
for life, having to survive outside of the protections of a decent wage and adequate 
welfare, and diminishing social support networks.                
 
In doing this, it offers some analysis of transformations in the mechanisms of power 
in capitalist society, as the nature of labour and social relations have changed since 
the advent of capitalism.  It is by no means comprehensive, but seeks, through a few 
popular examples, to provide some context and some history for an analysis of the 





From Poor Laws to the Welfare State 
 
Zygmunt Bauman (1998) argues that poverty and the poor are characteristic of all 
societies.  With those identified as the poor most often being seen to pose a threat to 
the order and norms of society, governmental approaches to poverty and the poor 
have generally been crafted in response to such supposed threats.  While, as Bauman 
shows, the poor of pre-modern Europe were treated as “an essential link in the „divine 
chain of beings‟”, their suffering being viewed as “repentance for original sin and a 
warrant of redemption”, and the provision of relief to the poor understood as a means 
to individual salvation, modernity brings with it “the scrutiny of reason” which 
replaces the „divine chain of beings‟ with “the projects of order and the norm”.  In 
modern societies, Bauman goes on to argue, “the presence of the poor became a 
problem… The poor were a threat and an obstacle to order; they also defied the 
norm.” (Bauman 1998: 87).  Depending on the model of order and norm specific to 
each society, however, Bauman shows how each “constructed its poor in its own 
image, offering different explanations of their presence, finding a different use for the 
poor and deploying different strategies of tackling the problem of poverty” (ibid: 86).     
 
Common to most societies, however, is a differentiation that is made between two 
groups of people living in conditions of poverty – the poor and paupers (the latter also 
called the indigent, referring to the destitute, that is, those unable to provide for their 
basic necessities through their own labour), and the former referring to the able-
bodied who remain in situations of socio-economic deprivation in spite of their 
capacity to labour (Bauman 1998; Hufton 1974; Iliffe 1987; Katz 1989; Poynter 
1969).  Michael Katz (1989) points out that the designation „pauper‟ appears first as 
an administrative category in England and the USA, designed to identify those 
members of society receiving public relief
21
.  With time, it would come to refer 
usually to the aged, the sick, the disabled, and orphans (those understood to be unable 
to provide for their own basic needs through their own mental and/or physical 
activity).  He writes that this distinction between poor and pauper “originally 
attempted to separate the genuinely needy from rogues, vagabonds, and sturdy 
                                                 
21
 John Iliffe highlights that the distinction between the poor and the indigent appears across cultures, 
from France to Greece to Africa (Iliffe 1987: 2).   
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beggars… It translated over time into the restriction of aid to the impotent and the 
exclusion of the able-bodied” (Katz 1989: 12).   
 
John Iliffe points out that across cultures this distinction in poverty can be seen to 
correspond with “the long-term poverty of individuals due to their personal or social 
circumstances” (structural poverty) and “conjunctural poverty, which is temporary 
poverty into which ordinarily self-sufficient people may be thrown by crisis” (Iliffe 
1987: 4).  Iliffe argues that in land-rich societies, structural poverty is characterised by 
a lack of people‟s access to labour (their own through disability, illness or age, and 
that of others, for example, family), whereas in land-scarce societies the very poor 
include such people as well as those among the able-bodied who lack access to land 
(or other resources) and who are unable to sell their labour power at a rate adequate to 
the meeting of their basic needs.  Before capitalism, then, Iliffe argues, structural 
poverty in Europe was characterised by the lack of access to labour.  Capitalism, with 
its forced removal of people from lands held and worked in common in the process 
named by Karl Marx as „primitive accumulation‟, produces a structural poverty 
characterised by a lack of access to land and a lack of access to wage labour sufficient 
to the meeting of an individual worker‟s family‟s basic needs.  With regard to 
conjunctural poverty, Iliffe argues that its chief cause in Europe (until the seventeenth 
century) was insecurity with regard to the climate and the political situation, which 
might result in mass deaths from famine (ibid: 6).  However, he shows that the 
incidence of poverty due to such circumstances declines with the development of 
capitalism and the welfare state, and the ability to predict and prevent such crises.  In 
the most recent phase of capitalist development, however, it could be argued that we 
are witnessing the conversion of the conjunctural poverty caused by the instability and 
precarity of the labour market becoming structural as the decline of wage labour 
continues.       
 
The administration of the principle of separation between the indigent and the poor 
proved, however, almost impossible to implement, with both England and the USA 
exhibiting increasing costs for poor relief in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, resulting in critics being convinced “that in fact the able-bodied had 
penetrated the relief rolls, and a great object of poor law reform in both countries 
became to remove them” (Katz 1989: 12).  While writers show that there was usually 
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no disagreement in society about the provision of relief to the destitute (the 
impotent/the indigent/„the deserving poor‟), they are quick to point out that relief for 
the able-bodied was an entirely different matter.  In fact, the need to ensure that relief 
was being provided only to those in need of it can be shown to have produced a 
particular stigmatisation of the poor.  In the words of a preacher, opening a new 
chapel at a poorhouse in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1834: 
 
… poverty is an unavoidable evil, to which many are brought from 
necessity, and in the wise and gracious Providence of God.  It is 
the result, not of our faults, but of our misfortunes … Pauperism is 
the consequence of wilful error, of shameful indolence, of vicious 
habits.  It is a misery of human creation, the pernicious work of 
man, the lamentable consequence of bad principles and morals. 
(quoted in Katz 1989: 12).   
 
For Katz, this “transmutation of pauperism into a moral category tarnished all the 
poor,” (Katz 1989: 12) and, in spite of attempts to maintain distinctions, “increasingly 
poverty itself became not the natural result of misfortune, but the wilful result of 
indolence and vice” (ibid: 14).  According to Katz: 
 
The redefinition of poverty as a moral condition accompanied the 
transition to capitalism and democracy in early nineteenth century 
America.  It served to justify the mean-spirited treatment of the 
poor, which in turn checked expenses for poor relief and provided 
a powerful incentive to work.  In this way the moral definition of 
poverty followed also from the identification of market success 
with divine favour and personal worth.  Especially in America, 
where opportunity awaited anyone with energy and talent, poverty 
signalled personal failure  (Katz 1989: 14).   
 
The relationship between labour, the poor and poverty, and the development of 
capitalism has been explored in some depth in the writings of Karl Marx ([1939] 
1973; [1976] 1979), Friedrich Engels ( [1886] 2005), Karl Polanyi (1946), Mitchell 
Dean (1991), Zygmunt Bauman (1998), and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2002, 
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2004, 2009), inter alia.  Most of these authors relate aspects of approaches to poverty 
and the poor that are central to that process that Marx described as “primitive 
accumulation” (Marx [1976] 1979: 873).  For Marx: 
 
The capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between 
the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realisation 
of their labour.  As soon as capitalist production stands on its own 
feet, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a 
constantly extending scale
22
.  The process, therefore, which creates 
the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process which 
divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his 
own labour; it is a process which operates two transformations, 
whereby the social means of subsistence and production are turned 
into capital, and the immediate producers are turned into wage-
labourers.  So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing 
else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the 
means of production.  It appears as „primitive‟ because it forms the 
pre-history of capital, and the mode of production corresponding to 
capital (ibid: 874-875).   
 
While Marx focuses on the forceful expropriation of land owned by individual 
peasants, the enclosure of lands held in common, the production of legislation to 
prevent forms of life independent of wage labour (e.g. anti-vagrancy and –begging 
laws, wage regulation), and the elaboration of a system of poor relief, all of which are 
shown to act as mechanisms that coerce independent labouring subjects into wage 
labour in different ways, Mitchell Dean argues that Marx does not pay enough 
attention to the non-coercive, governmental strategies that emerge to ensure that those 
                                                 
22
 Several theorists (De Angelis 1999; Harvey 2005) emphasise the continuous nature of primitive 
accumulation, pointing to the re-emergence of “extra-economic strategies of dispossession” (Harvey) 
and the forced separation of producers from their means of (re)production (De Angelis) in responses to 
crises of capitalist accumulation in this neoliberal phase of capitalist development e.g. in processes of 
commodification of basic services, such as water.  Ahmed Veriava (2006; 2010) has offered an analysis 
of the debates around the continuous character of primitive accumulation in the context of the 
commodification of basic services in South Africa, which is significant for its argument that “any 
analysis of processes of commodification must seek to understand how such processses are caught up 
in a wider transformation of the relations that structure social life” (Veriava, 2010).  It is hoped that this 
thesis adequately illustrates this in the chapters that follow.    
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who are „freed‟ from their land as property are made to accept the discipline of wage 
labour (Dean 1991: 211)
23
.  In addressing this apparent neglect in Marx, Dean 
explores changes in governmental approaches to the poor and poverty from the 
sixteenth century to the nineteenth century, showing how such shifts relate to changes 
in capitalist development as mercantilism makes way for industrial society, and wage 
labour in the factory becomes the dominant mode of social inclusion.   
 
Dean offers us an analysis of the workings of the Elizabethan Poor Laws in England, 
and debates leading to their amendment in the form of the New Poor Laws of 1834.  
He shows how the set of laws regulating the poor in England from the sixteenth 
century until the nineteenth century produced a “discourse of The Poor”, 
accompanied by a “police of The Poor
24
” (Dean 1991), through which the driving 
goal of “increasing the wealth of the nation” was met by ensuring that as many of the 
poor as possible were “set to work” according to the needs of a mercantilist society 
(ibid).  Dean shows how the popularly held view that the greater the numbers of 
working people belonging to a nation, the greater that nation‟s wealth, contributed to 
the elaboration of a set of laws, penalties and policies aimed at counting up “the 
numbers of The Poor”, classifying them according to their relationship to work, that 
is, according to the categories „those who cannot work‟ (the impotent/indigent
25
), 
„those who will work‟ (the able-bodied and willing poor) and „those who will not 
work‟ (the idle poor), and setting the idle to work  (ibid: 25, 26).  The latter was 
prescribed through various means, including the lowering of wages and the increasing 
of prices, laws such as the Vagrancy Acts, and the establishment of workhouses
26
, 
                                                 
23
 While Marx does not go into the detail that Dean does with regard to the changes in the Poor Laws 
from the sixteenth through to the nineteenth centuries in England, he does signal pauperism and poor 
relief as means through which a labouring subject under the discipline of the wage is produced in 
capitalist society.  Dean thus contributes towards Marx‟s analysis of primitive accumulation by 
showing that the poor and poverty held a more central place in the production of the wage labourer 
than they have been given in accounts of this period.   
24
 „Police‟ in this instance refers to “the goal of the reformation of the social order by the regulation of 
all the activities and relations within a political unit” (Dean 1991: 61), being applicable to English 
society since feudal times.  Dean notes a shift in the notion of police in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries where “the object of police shifts from the conservation of the feudal estates or orders to the 
administration of the population” (ibid, emphasis in the original).  Dean points out that this later notion 
of police coincides with Foucault‟s notion of biopolitics as a “political power which had assigned itself 
the task of administering life” (Foucault 1979 quoted in Dean 1991: 61).    
25
 Under the Elizabethan Poor Laws, familial responsibility was enforced with regard to the 
“maintenance of „poor, lame, blind and impotent‟ family members (Dean 1991: 31).   
26
 In a very direct way, the workhouses linked the setting of the numbers of the poor to work to the 
increasing of the wealth of the nation – they produced locally goods that were previously imported.   
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each implemented “to stimulate the labourer to a regular and industrious mode of 
existence.” (ibid: 27).  The administration of relief in the form of aid to the poor and 
the workhouses fell to the local parishes.    
 
For Dean, it is important to note that these laws and policies were designed “not to 
relieve the sufferings of those in a condition of poverty but to formulate the numbers 
of The Poor in such a way as to promote most effectively the policy objectives of 
increasing the strength of the nation.” (ibid).   
 
 Dean then shows the emergence of a series of debates and a proliferation of literature 
about poverty and the poor in the late eighteenth century that mark a shift in discourse 
away from a focus on the numbers of the poor to the condition of poverty, as it comes 
to be argued that the wealth of the nation rests no longer on increasing the numbers of 
its working population, but on ensuring that the numbers of its general population do 
not exceed the finite means of subsistence available to it.  Dean attributes this 
emergence of the treatment of poverty as a condition to a number of key figures, 
primarily Thomas Malthus (through his Essay on the Principle of Population, 1798), 
Morton Eden (through his three volume survey of the poor, 1797), and Jeremy 
Bentham (through his 1843 treatise, Pauper Management). 
 
As England was faced with the effects of war, an agrarian crisis and soaring grain 
prices in the 1790s, individuals, such as Joseph Townsend (1787) and Thomas 
Malthus (1798), began to argue against measures in support of the „uncontrolled 
proliferation‟ of the population as society had finite „means of subsistence‟ available 
to it, and so influenced moves towards amending the relief-providing Poor Laws.  
After all, as Friedrich Engels shows, it had become the commonly held belief and 
view held by government officials that “relief fosters laziness and increase of „surplus 
population‟” (Engels  [1845] 2005: 283). 
 
In the Grundrisse ([1939] 1973), Marx takes issue with Malthus‟ contention that there 
is a direct relation between overpopulation or surplus population and means of 
subsistence (“the necessaries of life”), that is, the contention that if the population 
were allowed to grow unrestrained, there would not be enough resources to sustain all 
of humankind.  Marx argues that “in history overpopulation is … a historically 
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determined relation, in no way determined by abstract numbers or by the absolute 
limit of the productivity of the necessaries of life, but by limits posited rather by 
specific conditions of production” (Marx [1939] 1973: 606, emphasis in the original).  
He quotes the example given by Ricardo that the quantity of grain available in society 
has no meaning for the worker who has no employment, to illustrate this.  For Marx, 
then, the relationship between population (or overpopulation) and means of 
subsistence is socially mediated.  In capitalist society, this relationship is mediated by 
the wage relation, as without the income from a job “the necessaries for life” cannot 
be produced and/or purchased by the individual.  Marx writes: 
 
It is already contained in the concept of the free labourer
27
, that he 
is a pauper: virtual pauper.  According to his economic conditions 
he is merely living labour capacity, hence equipped with the 
necessaries of life.  Necessity on all sides, without the objectivities 
necessary to realise himself as labour capacity.  If the capitalist has 
no use for his surplus labour, then the worker may not perform his 
necessary labour; not produce his necessaries.  Then he cannot 
obtain them through exchange; rather, if he does obtain them, it is 
only because alms are thrown to him from revenue.  He can live as 
a worker only in so far as he exchanges his labour capacity for that 
part of capital which forms the labour fund.  This exchange is tied 
to conditions which are accidental for him, and indifferent to his 
organic presence.  He is thus a virtual pauper.  (ibid: 604, 
emphases in the original).     
 
Marx proceeds to show that with such an understanding, the surplus population is 
central to capitalism‟s development, contrary to Malthus‟ view that the surplus 
population is a “superfluous population”, that is, unnecessary and, therefore, 
dispensable to capital (Malthus 1798).  Showing that surplus value is realised through 
the extraction of surplus labour time in industrial society, Marx argues that greater 
surplus value is realised when necessary labour time is reduced.  Capitalism, 
                                                 
27
 Marx uses the word „free‟ to refer to the fact that the labourer was „freed‟ from the ownership of his 
land, and free to sell his labour power.  It is, of course, ironic that this freeing does not lead to the 
individual freedom of the human being, but to greater exploitation.   
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therefore, thrives on reducing necessary labour, thereby increasing the surplus 
population: 
 
Since it is further the condition of production based on capital that 
he produces ever more surplus labour, it follows that ever more 
necessary labour is set free.  Thus the chances of pauperism 
increase.  To the development of surplus labour, corresponds that 
of the surplus population.  (Marx [1939] 1973:  
 
In Capital, Marx uses the term “the industrial reserve army” to refer to this surplus 
population produced as an essential feature of capitalist accumulation and functioning 
so as to keep the level of wages low.   
 
Engels characterised Malthus‟ „law of population‟ and the New Poor Law (which he 
also saw as being framed by the former) as “the most open declaration of war of the 
bourgeoisie upon the proletariat”.  He argued that Malthus‟ theory shifted debate in 
society away from the problem of “how to support the surplus population” to “how to 
restrain it as far as possible”.  He writes: 
 
Malthus declares in plain English that the right to live, a right 
previously asserted in favour of every man in the world is 
nonsense. (ibid: 282). 
 
Malthus, in particular, called for the laws to be amended in such a way that the poor 
would be encouraged to exercise “moral restraint” (Malthus (1798) quoted in Dean 
1991: 99), one of his prescriptions being the restraint of marriage amongst the poor 
and the denial of relief to illegitimate children.  Malthus and others (Townsend; 
Bentham; Defoe (1704)) would also argue that the system of poor relief produced 
behaviours and practices amongst the poor that were not conducive to the interests of 
the general population, for example, idleness, laziness, alcoholism, having too many 
children, and so on.  Mitchell Dean argues that the notion of moral restraint formed 
“the core” of Malthus‟ approach, seeking “to construct adult males as breadwinners, 
i.e. as agents responsible for the subsistence of themselves, their wives, and their 
children” and aiming to “remove the barriers for the operation of this agency as a 
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natural condition” (Dean 1991: 99).  The functioning of the New Poor Law, then, 
“established the institutional conditions by which adult males and those they had 
contracted as their dependants would have no legitimate claims for subsistence except 
inside the deterrent institution of the workhouse” (ibid).   
 
As mercantilism gave way to industrialism as the defining feature of capitalist 
society, with the crafting of a new order beginning to happen through the new norm 
of wage labour, the arguments that were being mounted against poor relief at the end 
of the eighteenth century in England were to be directed towards the harnessing of the 
population and its making in the interests of the new needs of capitalism.  Karl 
Polanyi‟s The Great Transformation (1946) offers an important observation in this 
regard, that is, that the abolition of poor relief, embodied in the amended New Poor 
Laws of 1834, was central to the stimulation of a self-regulating labour market, 
necessary for capitalism to develop further and flourish at the end of the eighteenth 
century in England.
28
  Polanyi explains: 
 
Eighteenth century society unconsciously resisted any attempt at 
being made into a mere appendage of the market.  No market 
economy was conceivable that did not include a market for labour; 
but to establish such a market, especially in England‟s rural 
civilisation, implied no less than the wholesale destruction of the 
traditional fabric of society.  During the most active period of the 
Industrial Revolution, from 1795 to 1834, the creating of a labour 
market in England was prevented through the Speenhamland Law.  
(Polanyi 1946: 82).   
 
On 6 May 1795, the justices of Berkshire, meeting at the Pelican Inn in 
Speenhamland, “in a time of great distress,” introduced a law which stated that 
“subsidies in aid of wages should be granted in accordance with a scale dependent 
upon the price of bread, so that a minimum income should be assured to the poor 
                                                 
28
 It is important to note that while Polanyi argues that it is essential for a self-regulating market to 
emerge for capitalism to develop, he also argues that society reacts to the negative effects of this 
market by protecting itself in various ways, leading him to characterise the development of capitalism 
as “a double movement” (Polanyi 1946: 133).  Resistance, increased protections on the part of the state 
for its citizens (the welfare state), and fascism have been furnished as examples of society‟s reactions 
to the market.   
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irrespective of their earnings.” (ibid: 83, emphasis in the original).  While under 
Elizabethan law the poor were forced to work for whatever wage they could get and 
relief was restricted to those who could not find work, under the law of 
Speenhamland relief was granted to any man whose wages fell below a particular 
level, determined by the price of bread.  Polanyi argues that while this law embodied 
a “right to life” (ibid: 82), it also meant that “no labourer had any financial interest in 
satisfying his employer his income being the same whatever wages he earned” (ibid: 
84).  He goes on to describe how this regime of payment for labour quickly led to the 
productivity of all labour sinking to “that of pauper labour” (ibid), this, in turn, 
removing any incentive for employers to raise wages above the level at which the 
rates would be paid.  According to Polanyi, the administration of this law resulted in 
widespread pauperism in the long run, its consequences “ghastly” (ibid: 85) for the 
common person.  Viewed together with the enclosure of lands previously available 
for subsistence activities, Speenhamland produced a situation where the majority of 
the poor were forced onto “the rates” and remained on them for life (ibid).   
 
Under Speenhamland society was rent by two opposing influences, 
the one emanating from paternalism and protecting labour from the 
dangers of the market system; the other organising the elements of 
production, including land, under a market system, and thus 
divesting the common people of their former status, compelling 
them to gain a living by offering their labour for sale, while at the 
same time depriving their labour of its market value. (ibid).      
 
Polanyi then argues that it was the abolition of the Speenhamland law in 1834, 
through the removal of all forms of outdoor relief and the restriction of the 
administration of poor relief to the workhouse that facilitated the emergence of the 
first national self-regulating labour market. 
 
Dean, while in agreement with Polanyi, argues that it is not just the abolition of the 
Speenhamland Law, but also a number of other reforms, that set the conditions for a 
self-regulating labour market to emerge.  He shows that there were six different types 
of outdoor relief shown to be abused in the 1834 Report from the Commissioners for 
the Inquiry into the Poor Laws, with the report concluding that only relief to the aged, 
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sick and widows were not abuses of the system.  Dean argues, therefore, that the 
focus of the 1834 report and reforms that followed were not restricted to 
Speenhamland, but included all forms of relief provided to able-bodied males in 
support of their families and themselves.
29
  For Dean, then, it is not the abolition of a 
single law, but the congealing of a number of laws, policies, discussions and debates 
to produce poverty as a condition, that serves to facilitate the emergence of a self-
regulating labour market.   
 
In addition to the views of Malthus and Townsend outlined above, Dean explores the 
writings of Edmund Burke, Adam Smith, Morton Eden, and Jeremy Bentham to 
illustrate how this approach to poverty as a condition emerges.  Without going into 
the various debates that existed between these different contributors here, it is 
significant that Dean shows how this treatment of poverty as a condition comes to 
play the role of providing, in the form of pauperism, a deterrent to people wanting to 
live off poor relief and remain outside of the discipline of wage labour.  By removing 
all forms of outdoor poor relief, confining the receipt of relief to those living in 
workhouses and ensuring that their conditions of life and work were of the lowest 
standards necessary for survival, Dean argues, the condition of living off relief 
(poverty) was made undesirable, thus discouraging the practice of the able bodied 
refusing wage labour.  Also significant in the literature reviewed by Dean, is the 
recurring focus on separating the indigent from the able-bodied poor, and 
transforming the workhouse into a place in which only the truly destitute would 
„want‟ to live.   
 
With regard to the able-bodied poor, the literature of this period is also striking for its 
lack of sympathy and humaneness when prescribing mechanisms for ensuring that 
those who can, do enter into wage labour, evidence that the crafting of the condition 
of poverty, like the Discourse of The Poor, happens not in the interests of changing 
the living conditions of a group in society, but to induce a particular form of life from 
the poor.  Many writers of the time unashamedly explained the need for a certain 
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 Dean points out that it is interesting that while widows were permitted relief, women who were 
separated from their husbands or the fathers of their children were less likely to receive relief.  He 
argues that the change in the Poor Laws do not, therefore, mark a break in the dominance of patriarchy.   
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It seems to be a law of nature, that the poor should be to a certain 
degree improvident, that there may always be some to fulfil the 
most servile, the most sordid, and the most ignoble offices in the 
community.  The stock of human happiness is thereby much 
increased, whilst the more delicate are not only relieved from 
drudgery, and freed from those occasional employments which 
would make them miserable, but are left at liberty, without 
interruption, to pursue those callings which are suited to their 
various dispositions, and most useful to the State… There must be 
a degree of pressure, and that which is attended with the least 
violence will be the best.  When hunger is either felt or feared, the 
desire of obtaining bread will quietly dispose the mind to undergo 
the greatest hardships, and will sweeten the severest labours. 
(Townsend (1786) quoted in Poynter 1969: xvi-xvii).   
 
Closely linked to such discussions about how to get the poor to enter wage labour 
were attempts to determine the minimum levels of the basic resources (primarily 
income and food) that were necessary for a pauper to survive.  Peter Linebaugh tells 
of how an amount of money that would serve to entice the poor into wage labour 
without leading them to amass enough wealth to revert to „idleness‟ became a subject 
of investigation and concern in the seventeenth century: 
 
Money must both excite and hurt.  The point of quantitative 
equilibrium between these apparently opposite purposes became 
the subject of inquiry.  Matthew Hale, in 1683, calculated that 10 
shillings a week, or 26 pounds a year, could provide a small family 
with a level of maintenance that guaranteed continual working.  
William Petty found the realities to be beneath this standard: 8 
dimes a day for husbandmen and 16 dimes a day for tradesmen.  
(Linebaugh 2003: 55). 
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Historians have pointed out that it has been impossible for economists to explain just 
how the poor managed to live on such meagre sources of income (ibid).   
 
It could, then, be argued that the 1834 amendments to the English Poor Laws sought 
“to convert paupers into „independent labourers‟, a form of life with characteristics 
such as industry, frugality in matters of domestic economy, and foresight with regard 
to marriage and procreation.” (Dean 1991: 14).  Explaining that “a form of life
30
 is 
the grid of everyday existence which is constructed through a multiplicity of 
governmental practices, one aspect of which defines the division between a sphere of 
private responsibility and autonomy and a sphere of public responsibility and 
intervention” (ibid), Dean describes pauperism as “an event
31
” through which wage 
labour is made the only reasonable choice for the able-bodied, the latter conditioned 
in the ways of being conducive to wage labour, and the norm through which the new 
order of industrial capitalism thus being imposed.   
   
For Dean, what is important about this period of English history is the transformation 
in the mode of government towards a “liberal mode of governance” in which 
promotion of a particular form of life is encouraged for the majority of people.  Dean 
also speaks of “the conduct of life” coming to feature more prominently (Dean 1992: 
218).  He describes this liberal mode of government as “an historically specific 
ensemble of discursive, legal, administrative, and institutional practices, which 
crosses and seeks to co-ordinate dimensions of the state, philanthropy, households, 
and the economy, with the objective of promoting particular forms of the conduct of 
life” (ibid).  Significant to the realisation of this mode of government is how it 
“extends the boundaries of rule by placing limits on the action of the state” (ibid).  
Dean argues further that these limits are “specified not foremost by a domain of 
                                                 
30
 Dean explains that this concept is different from Weber‟s notion of a „conduct of life‟ 
(„lebensfuhrung‟) whose genesis is located in Christian asceticism and is based on the rational pursuit 
of a divine calling (Dean 1991: 14-15). 
31
 Dean describes pauperism as an event to signify that it is “about the relations between specific forms 
of theoretical and strategic knowledge”.  He writes, “It is about the practical inscription of „scientific‟ 
discourse within specific policies and means of administration of poverty.  It will lead us not to 
uncover the social determinants of knowledge … nor to analyse discourse simply as an autonomous, 
self-referential structure, but to show the effects of knowledge in so far as it embodies a programme 
towards social reality.” (Dean 1991: 1-2). 
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inviolable rights of the person but by a division of responsibility for subsistence 
between categories of individual actors, the state, and other authorities” (ibid). 
 
Here Dean is pointing to the emergence of techniques of self-regulation that come to 
be encouraged through the shaping of governmental categories and strategies that 
target those most vulnerable, and therefore potentially most volatile, in society to 
behave and live in ways conducive to a society in which wage labour is accepted as 
the predominant means of survival for the able-bodied.  In highlighting the 
emergence of the liberal mode of government in the shift between two different 
approaches to the administration of the poor and poverty in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century England, Dean uncovers the emergence of a sphere of responsibility over 
which contestation comes to take place between the individual (often organised in 
groups, organisations, unions or movements) and the state over who should assume 
its reins.     
 
Building on the work of Michel Foucault, Dean also makes the observation that it is 
in this period of English history that we see greater attention being given to the 
phenomenon or concept of population.  Beginning in the era of the Discourse of The 
Poor and government of the police, Dean shows how various kinds of knowledge are 
collected in order to survey, regulate and control the poor.  In the debates leading up 
to the 1834 Amendments to the Poor Law and in the period inaugurated by these 
changes, Dean shows how this attention to population increases.  For example, he 
outlines how Bentham‟s Pauper Management begins to treat the poor as a population 
group to be acted on in particular ways and to be made to act in particular ways.   
 
 
Michel Foucault, trying to understand changes in the ways in which power comes to 
be exercised in European society, writes: 
 
From the eighteenth century onward (or at least the end of the 
eighteenth century onward) we have, then, two technologies of 
power which were established at different times and which were 
superimposed.  One technique is disciplinary; it centres on the 
body, producing individualising effects, and manipulates the body 
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as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and 
docile.  And we also have a second technology which is centred 
not upon the body but upon life: a technology which brings 
together the mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries 
to control the series of random events that can occur in a living 
mass, a technology which tries to predict the probability of those 
events…or at least to compensate for their effects. " (Foucault, 
1976, in Society Must Be Defended, 2003: 249).   
 
Foucault names this latter form of power “governmentality”, and argues that it 
completes a “triangle” of power in society, existing side by side with the modes of 
“discipline” and “sovereignty” (Foucault 2002).  In describing the nature of 
governmentality, he further elaborates that this form of power functions by shaping “a 
milieu” (such as the terrain of engagement around poverty) so as to produce “a field 
of intervention”, which does not affect “individuals as a set of legal subjects capable 
of voluntary actions” (as would be the case of sovereignty) nor does it affect them “as 
a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required 
performances” (as in the case of discipline), but “tries to affect, precisely, a 
population”, by trying to reach “precisely the conjunction of a series of events 
produced by these individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events 
which occur around them” (Foucault 2007: 21).     
 
With regard to the period under discussion, then, various technologies have been 
shown to have emerged for the collection of different kinds of knowledge about that 
population group identified as the poor, those members of the population living in 
poverty, in the creation of a field of intervention through which this population group 
has been encouraged to adopt that form of life conducive to a society in which wage 
labour was becoming dominant.  The crafting of the governmental categories of 
poverty and the poor in post-apartheid South Africa will also be shown to constitute a 
field of intervention, working to encourage particular techniques of self-regulation 
amongst the poor and to enforce particularly inferior standards of living for the poor, 
in the remainder of this thesis.   
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What Dean misses, however, both in his definition of „form of life‟ and in his 
presentation of the constitution of poverty in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
England, is the effects of resistance on the implementation, shaping, and ultimate 
success of governmental practices
32
.  Indeed, the Discourse of The Poor and the 
condition of poverty, as elaborated by Dean, could be said to emerge in response to 
the social threat perceived to be posed by the poor.  In the words of Mantoux (1928) 
the Poor Laws “amounted to an insurance against revolution” (quoted in Polanyi 
1946: 125).  It was also in this period that the terms “the dangerous classes” and 
“lumpen proletariat” became popular, referring to those outside of the discipline of 
wage labour.
33
  Friedrich Engels, writing about the intent of Malthusian changes, 
remarks quite plainly on the fact of resistance on the part of the poor: 
 
If, then, the problem is not to make the „surplus population‟ useful, 
to transform it into available population, but merely to let it starve 
to death in the least objectionable way and to prevent its having too 
many children, this, of course, is simple enough, provided the 
surplus population perceives its own superfluousness and takes 
kindly to starvation.  There is, however, in spite of the strenuous 
exertions of the humane bourgeoisie, no immediate prospect of its 
succeeding in bringing about such a disposition among the 
workers.  The workers have taken it into their heads that they, with 
                                                 
32
 Although Dean acknowledges that his work does not “link its findings in a systematic way to the 
history of popular struggles” and that such an undertaking is vital to grasping “the full intelligibility of 
governmental transformation” (ibid: 10-11), he argues that this omission is “a deliberate theoretical 
strategy to attempt to displace conventional historical and social-theoretical accounts and hence 
establish the nature of liberal transformation of governance on a sounder footing” (ibid).  As this thesis 
will argue, any analysis of governmental transformation that does not account for the presence of 
resistance is incomplete as it is in the first instance in response to the threat of social unrest on the part 
of the poor that social policies are crafted to contain them.     
33
 Gaining popularity through the writings of Marx and Engels, the „dangerous class‟ or „lumpen 
proletariat‟ has become identified with conservatism, and reactionary ideas.  In the Communist 
Manifesto of 1848, it is described as “the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the 
lowest layers of the old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian 
revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary 
intrigue.” (Marx and Engels, 1848 - 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communistmanifesto/ch01.htm, accessed 20/06/08).  
While Marx and Engels tended to focus on the potential for conservative and reactionary behaviour on 
the part of those outside of wage labour, more recently, autonomist Marxists have emphasised the 
potential for the production of life forms antagonistic to capitalism, amongst those outside of the 
discipline of wage labour.  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in particular, celebrate the subversive 
potential of „the dangerous class‟ described as „the poor‟ (Hardt and Negri, 2002; 2004).  This will be 
taken up in more detail and discussion later on in this chapter and in Chapter Two.    
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their busy hands, are the necessary, and the rich capitalists, who do 
nothing, the surplus population.  (Engels (2005[1886]): 282).    
 
Maurice Bruce (1961) argues that it was finally the labourer‟s revolt of 1830 that 
catalysed the amendments to the Poor Laws made in 1834.  Although, as he shows, 
parliamentary committees had sat to consider the question of poor relief in 1817 and 
1824, but “concerned lest any sudden change of policy should provoke revolutionary 
agitation through despair, had found no acceptable remedy” (Bruce 1961: 77).  With 
the “risings, spontaneous outbreaks of rick-burning, rioting and machine-smashing” 
(ibid) occurring primarily in those places in which the Speenhamland system was in 
place, Bruce points out that there was no mistaking the relationship between the riots 
and the inadequacy of the system in the context of economic stress, and discussions 
and processes were set in motion towards the amendment of the Poor Laws.   
 
E.P. Thompson also refers to the centrality of collective acts of resistance in the 
transformations that English society was undergoing in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, for example, riots against increases in the price of bread.  An important 
contribution Thompson makes through these analyses, particularly in an essay 
entitled „The Moral Economy of the English Crowd‟ (in Thompson 1991[1971]), is 
that of the notion of “legitimating practices” existing amongst participants in „mob 
action‟, to counter “the spasmodic view of popular history” in which the actions of 
“the common people” are seen as “compulsive, rather than self-conscious or self-
activating”, “simple responses to economic stimuli” (ibid: 185).  He writes,  
 
It is possible to detect in almost every eighteenth century crowd 
action some legitimising notion.  By the notion of legitimation I 
mean that the men and women in the crowd were informed by the 
belief that they were defending traditional rights or customs; and, 
in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the 
community.  On occasion this popular consensus was endorsed by 
some measure of license endorsed by the authorities.  More 
commonly, the consensus was so strong it overrode motives of fear 
or deference. (ibid: 188).   
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Examining the eighteenth century food riot as “a highly complex form of direct 
popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives”, Thompson argues that while 
“riots were triggered off by soaring prices, by malpractices among dealers, or by 
hunger”,  
 
these grievances operated within a popular consensus as to what 
were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices in marketing, 
milling, baking, etc.  This in its turn was grounded upon a 
consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the 
proper economic functions of several parties within the 
community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the 
moral economy of the poor.  An outrage to these moral 
assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation was the usual 
occasion for direct action. (ibid, my emphasis).   
 
For Thompson, then, struggles of the poor were not just spontaneous responses to 
hunger and the need to survive, but the result of complex relations and systems of 
belief and customs that determine how individuals engage with the dominant logic of 
the state and the market as they try to control and discipline the poor.   
 
In his work on peasant uprisings in South-East Asia, James Scott also used the term 
„moral economy‟ in reference to the underlying beliefs and values which led peasants 
“to risk everything” in “indignation and rage” (Scott 1976: 3).  He described the 
moral economy of peasants as “their notion of economic justice and their working 
definition of exploitation – their view of which claims on their product were tolerable 
and which intolerable” (ibid).  In Scott‟s view, this moral economy of the peasant was 
focused on the right to subsistence, and to preventing the accumulation of any risks to 
this right.  Perceived threats to this right would lead to mass uprisings.  While Scott 
spent some time exploring how what he terms “the ethic of subsistence” (ibid: 4) 
determines when collective protest happens in peasant societies, his later work (Scott 
1985, 1986, 1987, 1990) highlights the need to conceive of resistance more broadly 
than in its mass, visible, collective forms.   
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Continuing to focus on peasant movements of South-East Asia, in particular 
Malaysia, Scott points to “hidden forms of resistance” that emerge in contestation of 
the status quo, outside of any organisations or movements, often at an individual 
level, and often mobilised in ways that do not see the state as the central force for 
change.  Finding existing theory about social movements and collective action 
lacking with regard to such forms of engagement, Scott writes: 
 
The historiography of class struggle … has been systematically 
distorted in a state-centred direction.  Everyday resistance does not 
throw up the manifestoes, demonstrations, or pitched battles that 
normally compel attention.  It makes no headlines.  But just as 
millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do 
thousands of individual acts of insubordination and evasion create 
a political and economic barrier reef of their own.  There is rarely 
any dramatic confrontation, any movement that is particularly 
newsworthy.  And whenever, to pursue the simile, the ship of state 
runs aground on such a reef, attention is typically directed to the 
shipwreck (for example, a fiscal crisis) itself and not to the vast 
aggregation of petty acts that made it possible.  It is seldom that 
perpetrators seek to call attention to themselves.  Their safety lies 
in anonymity.  It is also extremely rare that officials of state wish 
to publicise the insubordination.  To do so would be openly to 
confess that their policy is unpopular and, above all, to expose the 
tenuousness of their authority… (Scott 1987: 422). 
 
For Scott, then, it is not always in the most visible forms of protest that the secret to 
understanding societal change lies.  In his work, Scott examines “the ordinary 
weapons of relatively powerless groups: footdragging, dissimulation, false-
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage and so forth”, 
which he terms “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1986: 6; emphasis in the original).  He 
encourages a reading of peasant societies that takes into account such everyday forms 
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of resistance, which can in their own mounting produce revolutions, and/or serve the 
needs and interests of the peasantry between revolutionary mobilisations.
34
     
 
It was in the context of resistance, then, that wage labour nevertheless became the 
dominant mode through which individuals could secure the basic means to their 
survival and life.  And, over time, resistance would come to take place over the 
nature, conditions and pay of wage labour, rather than against incorporation into it.  
Although there are examples of organised workers‟ protests prior to this, it is only in 
the 1870s that trade unions received legal recognition and protection (Bruce 1961: 
69).  It is also important to note here that until 1885 “acceptance of any form of poor 
relief, even if it were only treatment at a hospital, had disqualified a man from the 
franchise, on the grounds that no one should have a share in the election of those who 
were responsible for relieving him” (ibid: 103).  With the granting of the vote to the 
poor, and the recognition of working class organisations in the form of unions, 
contestation over the nature of the sphere of responsibility enunciated by the advent 
of the liberal mode of governance would come to take on a more formal and 
continuous character. 
 
In the years following the 1834 amendments to the Poor Laws, the problems of 
pauperism did not disappear.  Important figures in society began to point to the 
growing severity in the conditions of the elderly, disabled, and children without 
family support.  In addition, the problem of unemployment persisted, and there were 
still many able-bodied poor living in conditions of squalor and deprivation.  
Gradually concerns about the „deserving poor‟ began to resurface, and policies began 
to be re-crafted with the aim of addressing these needs in society.   
 
In 1886, Charles Booth, a wealthy Liverpool shipowner, “with a profound interest in 
social problems and a flair for investigation” began “a detailed survey of conditions 
in London aimed at bringing out not only the varied employment but the degree of 
affluence and poverty of its people, with all the social influences that told upon 
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 For more that has been written on hidden forms of resistance in the industrial workplace in Africa, 




” (Bruce 1961: 144).  Setting out to disprove what he considered “some of the 
more extreme estimates of the amount of dire poverty prevailing”, Booth ended up 
confirming many of them (ibid).  His study focusing on “the problem of the rather 
fewer than ten per cent of the „very poor‟, amounting in all to some 300 000 people, 
who were for various reasons, and especially through irregularity of employment, 
incapable of supporting themselves and their families” (ibid: 145), Booth concluded 
that society, in its own general interest, should “take charge of the lives of those who 
are incapable of independent existence up to the required standard” (Booth (1894) 
quoted in Bruce 1961: 145).    
 
In 1899, Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree, son of the world-renown businessman and 
philanthropist, Joseph Rowntree, began a study of poverty in York in order to 
compare conditions in a country town with those of London.  Through an 
examination of needs and costs, Rowntree established a minimum level of income  
necessary for the bare maintenance of physical health, and showed that 28 per cent of 
the population lived below this standard, a figure only slightly smaller than that 
reached by Booth for London (ibid: 146).  The study also showed that, as in London, 
there was a greater incidence of ill health and a higher death rate amongst the poor.  
Published in 1901 as Poverty: A Study of Town Life, Rowntree‟s investigation would 
lead him to comment: 
 
That in this land of abounding wealth, probably more than one-
fourth of the population are living in poverty, is a fact which may 
well cause great searchings of hearts. (Rowntree quoted in Bruce 
1961: 146). 
 
Maurice Bruce argues that the studies conducted by Booth and Rowntree provided 
evidence for an already growing deep consternation in British society about the 
generalised conditions of pauperism, leading to politicians and policy makers 
rethinking the approaches to governing the poor that had emerged in the entrenching 
of the order of industrial society in England.  He argues that these two studies “were 
to be the driving force” (Bruce 1961: 146) of a series of reforms that were put in 
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 The study was only completed in 1903, seventeen years and seventeen volumes later (Bruce 1961: 
143).   
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motion by a liberal government from the early twentieth century.  And, he points out 
that the central concern of this liberal programme of reforms was “with the 
prevention of the poverty that Booth and others had so glaringly revealed, poverty 
due not to drink or moral inferiority, as many in the nineteenth century had 
unthinkingly believed, but … to old age, sickness, the death of a breadwinner or 
unemployment” (ibid: 149).  In keeping with the ideology of liberalism, however, 
these reforms did not relate to the redistribution of wealth, but to ensuring that a 
minimal standard of living be possible for all citizens.  While the wage would serve 
as the main vehicle through which such means of subsistence could be secured, the 
state would also provide certain resources to ensure a basic level of survival for those 
unable to work for their own care and those unable to secure wage labour for 
themselves (the unemployed).   
 
Reforms of this period happened in response both to this growing perception of the 
problem of pauperism in society, and to struggles waged by an increasingly organised 
working class for better conditions of work and life inside and outside the factory.  
One of the oldest reforms was the Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905, which 
provided some relief for the unemployed, marking a change in societal attitudes 
towards unemployment, now no longer viewed as a purely personal problem but a 
social one (ibid: 11).  In 1908, old age pensions were introduced; however, they were 
denied to anyone who had “habitually failed to work” (ibid), and a national health 
insurance scheme in 1911.  The sphere of responsibility inaugurated by the liberal 
mode of governance seemed to be shifting once again, with the state admitting to a 
greater share in this than in the period after the abolition of Speenhamland.  However, 
relief or aid or welfare (as it would come to be called) continued to be aimed at 
encouraging a form of life amongst the majority of citizens conducive to wage labour.       
 
As British society would come to bear the effects of two world wars, this fledgling 
system of social welfare would expand, and, in the context also of increasingly 
organised and militant working class movements, the state‟s role in the sphere of 
responsibility would grow, producing what we have come to know as the welfare 
state, characteristic of the form of most European and US states during the greater 
part of the twentieth century (Bruce, 1961; Cleaver, 1979). 
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The welfare state would come to characterise developed industrial capitalist societies, 
with wage labour serving as the norm, that is, the primary form of social inclusion, 
through its provision of the means for a decent life (Barchiesi 2005; Esping-Andersen 
1990).  Gosta Esping-Andersen builds a comparison of three types of „welfare 
regimes‟ through his mobilisation of the concept of decommodification.  According 
to him, decommodification takes place when “a service is rendered as a matter of 
right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 22).  For him, the existence of social assistance programmes 
does not guarantee “significant decommodification” if they “do not substantially 
emancipate individuals from market dependence” (ibid).  Calculating the 
“decommodification score” of different welfare states according to criteria including 
levels of income replacement, benefits provided and rules for eligibility to receive 
benefits, Esping-Andersen identifies three welfare regimes – liberal welfare states, 
characterised by means-tested provisions, some universal transfers and social 
insurance targeted at low-income earners; corporatist welfare states, in which 
entitlements and provisions are linked to employment status; and social democratic 
welfare states, exhibiting high levels of decommodification, and the universal 
allocation of social benefits without them being tied to employment status.   
 
In all of these societies, the state would provide for that category in society 
traditionally referred to as indigent, that is, unable to secure the basic needs for their 
survival through their own physical and/or mental ability, and levels of 
decommodification beyond this would be the outcome of struggles on the part of the 
organised working class and the poor (Cleaver, 1979; Negri, 1988, 1989).  Welfare 
policies would develop for the provision of the elderly, the disabled, the sick, and 
orphans.  Mostly, the poor as imagined and portrayed in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries would disappear, only to rise up again as a threatening force in times of 
heightened unemployment and a decreased national fiscus.  In such times, welfare (or 
relief) would be provided, but, as critics have pointed out, in order to ensure the 
continued reign of wage labour and the maintaining of the population of able-bodied 
poor in situations such that they are ready for work when it becomes available again.   
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Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, in their 1972 Regulating the Poor, provide 
evidence for their contention that relief giving is functional in “regulating the political 
and economic behaviour of the poor” (Piven & Cloward 1972: xv).  They write: 
 
Historical evidence suggests that relief arrangements are initiated 
or expanded during the occasional outbreaks of civil disorder 
produced by mass unemployment, and are then abolished or 
contracted when political stability is restored… [E]xpansive relief 
policies are designed to mute civil disorder, and restrictive ones to 
reinforce work norms. (ibid).    
 
They also point out that much relief work seeks to deal with “the much more 
fundamental problem” of “the erosion of the work role” and related fears about its 
social consequences (ibid: 343).  In their words: 
 
When large numbers of people come to subsist on the dole, many 
of them spurning what little low-wage work may exist, those of the 
poor and near-poor who continue to work are inevitably affected.  
From their perspective, the ready availability of relief payments 
(often at levels only slightly below prevailing wages) undermines 
their chief claim to social status: namely, that although poor they 
nevertheless earned their livelihood.  If most of them react with 
anger, others react by asking, „Why work?‟  The danger thus arises 
that swelling numbers of the working poor will choose to go on 
relief. (ibid).   
 
Franco Barchiesi‟s work on the relationship between wage labour and social 
citizenship as a “contested field of signification” is particularly significant here 
(Barchiesi 2005: 1).  As he notes the opening up of a terrain of struggle over access to 
decommodified services traditionally distributed through the wage with the decline of 
wage labour, Barchiesi highlights the empty promises of signification that manifest 
with regard to the sign of wage labour.  As wage labour (in the form of well-protected 
and paid, permanent work) declines, the signifier‟s promise is unable to be fulfilled in  
society, and space opens up for resignification “from above and from below” about 
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what work is, about state and individual responsibilities, and about how politics is 
imagined and happens (ibid: xvii).  Barchiesi‟s work is particularly significant when 
read together with theorists focusing on the ways in which everyday life and 
subjectivity are shaped by the relationship of individuals to fulltime waged 
employment.   
 
Pierre Bourdieu (1979) is exemplary here, showing, through observation of Algerian 
workers before and after they lose their jobs, how their relationship to their jobs 
determined the structure of their daily lives and social relationships through the 
disciplines and regularities they imposed.  In particular, Bourdieu points to the ways 
in which an individual‟s relationship to and understanding of space and time change 
with the loss of a job.  Not only does one no longer have a place to go to every day in 
order to perform a set of regular tasks, but life outside of the workplace also 
undergoes changes as a result.  Other theorists (such as Michelle Lamont, 2000) have 
highlighted how an individual‟s sense of self (subjectivity) is affected, particularly in 
contexts where success is measured in terms of one‟s access to a job and a career.  
Theorists have also focused on the ways in which masculinity has been constructed 
around the notion of being a breadwinner for a family through working, and the 
stresses placed on gender relations as a result of job losses.       
 
While Barchiesi‟s work focuses on the subject of recently retrenched and casualised 
workers, this thesis looks primarily at the unemployed, in the main those who have 
never held a fulltime job and those who have been out of permanent employment for 
more than ten years.     
       
Returning to the discussion of the relationship between state policy in the field of 
welfare and struggles of the poor, Piven and Cloward explore how relief functioned 
during two periods of US history, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the period of 
mass unemployment in the 1960s.  In both these periods, as the threat of the erosion 
of wage labour as the norm reared its head, discourses of poverty and the poor 
reminiscent of past eras were mobilised by politicians and policy-makers.  For 
example, “the war on poverty” became a popular slogan of the US government in the 
1930s and 1960s (Carson 1991: 15, 16).  Once again, however, it is shown how these 
mobilisations of the „war on poverty‟ discourse were closely related to the regulation 
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of people, in particular the able-bodied poor, and the perpetuation of the dominance 
of wage labour as the norm structuring social order.  And levels of welfare were often 
set according to levels of struggle for particular resources by particular groups.       
 
It has also been shown how a discourse of „the culture of poverty‟ emerged to 
reinforce cultural and racial stereotypes of poor people and to explain the persistence 
of poverty in spite of state policy commitments to eradicate it (Katz 1989: 16-35).  
Writing about the turn to the culture of poverty discourse by US social scientists in 
the 1960s, Michael Katz argues: 
 
The culture of poverty did not have the classification of poor 
people as its primary purpose.  Still, it served the same end.  For 
most writers observed that the culture of poverty did not capture all 
poor people.  Rather, it placed in a class by themselves those 
whose behaviours and values converted their poverty into an 
enclosed and self-perpetuating world of dependence.  Although 
some exponents located the sources of poverty in objective factors 
such as unemployment, the new concept resonated with traditional 
moral definitions.  The culture of poverty could not quite sanitise 
the poor; their ancient odour seeped through the antiseptic layers of 
social science.  They remained different and inferior because, 
whatever their origins, the actions and attitudes of poor people 
themselves assured their continued poverty and that of their 
children. (ibid: 17). 
 
The idea of a culture of poverty was introduced to the social sciences in the work of 
the anthropologist, Oscar Lewis, in particular his ethnographical studies of Mexicans 
and Puerto Ricans.  For him, the culture of poverty was different from “economic 
deprivation” or “the absence of something”.  It was a “way of life … passed down 
from generation to generation along family lines” that could be found in both rural 
and urban areas, as well as different regions and nations (Lewis 1966: xliii – xlv).  
Lewis identified a number of features of a culture of poverty, including “the lack of 
effective participation and integration of the poor in the major institutions of the 
larger society” (ibid: xxlv-xxlvi) and their resultant apathy and hostility; the low level 
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of organisation amongst those living in a culture of poverty; family life characterised 
by the absence of childhood, early initiation into sex, free unions, and a relatively 
high level of the abandonment of wives and children; and strong feelings of 
marginality, helplessness, inferiority and/or dependence at an individual level.  Lewis 
also stressed the difference between poverty and a culture of poverty, arguing that not 
all poor people lived in or according to a culture of poverty.   
 
While Lewis acknowledged the potential for groups of poor people to act outside of 
the culture of poverty characterisation through, for example, their mobilisation by 
charismatic and committed leaders, he focused on the “pathos, suffering and 
emptiness” that he saw amongst those who live in a culture of poverty (ibid: lii), 
arguing that it was important to acknowledge the real conditions of the culture of 
poverty that pervaded the lives of the majority of the poor in order to change it.  
Michael Katz argues that in spite of his intentions, Lewis‟s definition of the culture of 
poverty “lent itself easily to appropriation by conservatives in search of a modern 
academic label for the undeserving poor” (Katz 1989: 19). 
 
Michael Harrington was one of the first writers to apply Lewis‟s concept to the USA 
(ibid: 20).  In a book entitled The Other America, Harrington described the poor in 
the US during the 1960s as “those who, for reasons beyond their control, cannot help 
themselves”, and that “poverty in the US is a culture, an institution, a way of life”.  
Identifying differences between the family structure of the poor and the rest of 
society, Harrington argued that there is “a language of the poor, a psychology of the 
poor, a world view of the poor” (Harrington quoted in Katz 1989: 20).  Katz contends 
that “Harrington‟s call to action against poverty lacked Lewis‟s appreciation of the 
potential of organised militance and assumed the passivity of the poor” (Katz 1989: 
20).  In this way, Harrington‟s position relied on “the intervention of sympathetic 
elites … to lift poor people out of their degraded and helpless condition” (ibid).  For 
Harrington, then, the solution to poverty lay in arousing “the conscience of the 
nation” (ibid), a task of his book.   
 
While several aspects of the 1960s „war on poverty‟ in the USA can be shown to 
focus on elimination of a culture of poverty (Katz 1989), it was perhaps the 
racialisation of poverty by President Lyndon B. Johnson in a speech made on 4 June 
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1965 that drew attention most starkly to the conservative character and potential of 
the concept.  Basing his remarks on a confidential report, „The Negro Family: The 
Case for National Action‟, which had been submitted to him in March 1965 by its 
main author, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then assistant secretary of labour in the Office 
of Policy Planning and Research of the Department of Labour, Johnson declared that 
the: 
 
great majority of Negro Americans – the poor, the unemployed, the 
dispossessed are another nation.  Despite the court orders and the 
laws, despite the legislative victories and the speeches, for them 
the walls are rising and the gulf is widening … The isolation of 
Negroes from white communities is increasing, rather than 
decreasing, as Negroes crowd into the central cities and become a 
city within a city … Negro poverty is not white poverty.  Many of 
its causes and many of its cures are the same.  But there are 
differences – radiating painful roots into the community, the 
family, and the nature of the individual. (Johnson quoted in Katz 
1989: 24). 
 
While Moynihan‟s report did not refer to a culture of poverty or any of its theorists, it 
bore several similarities to Lewis‟s arguments, focusing on the African-American 
population as its subject (Katz 1989).  With Moynihan drawing attention to the 
breakdown of the African-American family as a reason for increased welfare 
dependence in African-American communities, he would draw the anger of the 
growing civil rights movement and come under severe criticism from several 
quarters.  In spite of Katz‟s contention that such criticisms resulted in the 
disappearance of culture of poverty discourses in the USA for some time thereafter, 
similar moralistic undertones that accompanied the culture of poverty discourse re-
appear today in talk of „a culture of entitlement‟ amongst the poor in neoliberal 
society.   
 
South African discussions about poverty and the poor abound with illustrations of 
this.  For example, in a critique of post-apartheid state strategies to improve the 
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position of the poor in society, Mamphele Ramphele (a Managing Director of the 
World Bank during the 2000s, and former Black Consciousness activist) wrote: 
 
The whole approach of the post-apartheid government was to 
deliver free housing, free this, free the other.  This has created 
expectations on the part of citizens, a passive expectation that 
government will solve problems.  It has led to a „disengaged 
citizenry‟ coupled with a style of leadership in the previous 
administration that neither accommodated nor welcomed criticism.  
Thus when people‟s expectations are not met, they revert to the 
anti-apartheid mode of protest which is destroy, don‟t pay, trash.  
We are yet to grasp the role of citizens as owners of democracy. 
(Ramphele cited in Green, 2009).  
 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by ANC government ministers and leaders in 
the context of struggles for basic services in South Africa, and will be explored in 
more depth later on in this thesis.       
 
Piven and Cloward‟s later work, Poor People‟s Movements: Why They Succeed, How 
They Fail (1977), was also important in showing how the discourse of the war of 
poverty emerged in response to movements of poor people protesting their living 
conditions and demanding of the state that it provide for their needs in the context of 
mass unemployment.  Focusing again on the period following the Great Depression in 
the 1930s and that following the second world war in the 1960s in the USA
36
, Piven 
and Cloward argue that it is only in periods of extreme economic and social distress 
that groups of poor people come together to act politically in their own interests.  For 
them, the periods following the 1930s and 1960s in the US produced a “scale of 
distress” high enough to produce collective protest action, resulting in policy changes 
to conciliate and contain the potential social threat presented by organised groups of 
poor people (ibid: 1-10).  They go on to argue that it is in moments of protest or 
“insurgency” that movements of the poor pose the greatest threat to social and 
political order, losing their effectiveness as they are transformed into formal 
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 During the 1960s, mass unemployment was experienced particularly by African Americans who 
were forced off the land and into urban ghettoes (Piven and Cloward 1977: 12).   
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organisations that are encouraged to participate in forms of governance less 
threatening to the order and norms of everyday life under capitalism.       
 
Poverty and The Poor in Neoliberal Times 
 
As the capitalist world economy was thrown into crisis at the end of the 1970s, the 
functioning and organisation of society would undergo further transformations 
(Harvey 2007).  And, there would be fundamental shifts in approaches to poverty and 
the poor.     
 
Theorists writing about these changes have characterised this period as one of 
„neoliberalism‟ (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2007; Saad-Filho and Johnstone 
(ed.) 2005), that is, a return to (and a refashioning of) some of the liberal principles 
defining the functions of the state, the role of citizens, and the nature of society, the 
economy and politics that had characterised the governments of the nineteenth 
century in Europe and the USA prior to the birth of the welfare state, in a new 
context.  While the “intellectual roots” of neoliberalism can be traced to the writings 
of Friedrich Hayek (1960) and Milton Friedman (1962), the practice of neoliberal 
policies and approaches began to first grow and become prominent in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s “as a strategic political response to the sustained global recession of 
the preceding decade” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 350).  Brenner and Theodore 
write: 
 
Faced with the declining profitability of traditional mass-
production industries and the crisis of Keynesian welfare policies, 
national and local states throughout the older industrialised world 
began, if hesitantly at first, to dismantle the basic institutional 
components of the postwar settlement and to mobilise a range of 
policies intended to extend market discipline, competition, and 
commodification throughout all sectors of society.  In this context, 
neoliberal doctrines were deployed to justify, among other 
projects, the deregulation of state control over major industries, 
assaults on organised labour, the reduction of corporate taxes, the 
shrinking and/or privatisation of public services, the dismantling of 
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welfare programmes, the enhancement of international capital 
mobility, the intensification of interlocality competition, and the 
criminalisation of the urban poor. (ibid).       
 
In a recent reader on the subject, 'neoliberalism' is similarly said to refer to a set of 
political and economic practices that seek to extend the logic and rule of the market 
into all aspects of life (Saad-Filho and Johnstone, (ed.) 2005).  There is general 
agreement amongst theorists that since the 1970s, there has been a trend in the world 
economy and politics away from the model of the welfare state (with features of 
strong state regulation of the economy and several social protections for citizens) 
towards greater 'market freedom' and the erosion of state protections and provisions 
for its citizens in the interests of opening up avenues for capital investment and 
accumulation for the benefit of private interests organised largely in transnational 
corporations.  This has resulted in the permeation of the logic of the market into all 
spheres of life, including in many instances the pricing of basic services, such as 
water, often working against attempts at subsidising such necessities for poorer 
groups of people (Bond 2010).  This will be explored in greater detail through the 
specific example of struggles over the delivery of water in South Africa later on in 
this thesis.   
 
In this scenario, the role of the nation-state has changed to facilitate the restructuring 
of politics and the economy in these interests, and it has submitted its workings to the 
rule of international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  Through a system of loans to 
developing countries, often termed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) or, 
more recently, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the IMF and World Bank 
have 'exported' the logic of neoliberalism to the developing world (Harvey 2007: 92).  
These programmes have usually included the standard set of prescriptions for the 
economy, including export orientation, trade liberalisation, privatisation and other 
forms of commodification, cuts in social spending including welfare, and labour 
flexibilisation.   
 
In the world system produced by the UN, IMF and World Bank, a discourse of 
fighting poverty has emerged in which the neoliberal principles of economic growth 
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are lauded as the answer to the problems of the world‟s poor.  This discourse is 
defined largely by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000 by 
147 heads of state during the UN Millennium Summit, which commit their countries 
to the achievement of eight identified quantitative targets with regard to the 
eradication of poverty by the year 2015
37
, and which have come to define how state 
commitments to social welfare are described and measured.   Two leading theorists in 
the field of policy related to the global economy and questions of inequality and 
poverty (Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Collier) offer different prescriptions for addressing 
poverty in areas still plagued by it, that emphasise the role of global institutions, such 
as the IMF and World Bank, and powerful nation-states, such as the USA, in 
„assisting‟ countries of the developing world, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, out of 
their „poverty traps
38
‟.       
 
Sachs (2001) argues for institutions, such as the UN, and nation-states, such as the 
USA, to play a greater and more pro-active role in providing aid to countries trapped 
in poverty through material resources as well as policy guidance, in order to prevent 
any negative developments with regard to the economy and politics that might affect 
the developed world adversely.  In relation to the potential threat posed to the stability 
of the USA by political unrest and/or economic crises in poorer parts of the world, he 
writes: 
 
It is time to reconstruct a strategy of foreign assistance that is 
commensurate with US strategic interests.  The US should urgently 
lead an international effort to help sub-Saharan Africa escape from 
a poverty trap that has led to a downward spiral of disease, falling 
living standards, and increased conflict, during the past 20 years.  
More generally, the US should harmonise the decision-making of 
different parts of the US government, including the Departments of 
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 These are: to reduce extreme poverty and hunger by half relative to 1990; to achieve universal 
primary education; to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women; to reduce child 
mortality by two-thirds relative to 1990; to improve maternal health, including reducing maternal 
mortality by three-quarters relative to 1990; to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases; to ensure environmental sustainability; and to develop a global partnership for development 
(UN 2000).   
38
 A “poverty trap” is “a condition, seemingly paradoxical, in which a poor country is simply too poor 
to achieve sustained economic growth” (Sachs 2001: 189).   
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Treasury and State, as well as the Office of the US Trade 
Representative, to rebuild our national capacity to support 
economic development abroad as a vital component of US foreign 
policy. (Sachs 2001: 197).    
 
For Sachs, external aid becomes necessary when nation-states are unable to prevent 
economic failure of various forms, and must both provide the financial resources 
necessary for economic recovery to begin, as well as the policy guidance to ensure 
that the correct (neoliberal) economic policies are adopted to ensure that economic 
growth occurs.   
 
Paul Collier (2007) also argues that aid must be accompanied by strict requirements 
for economic policy change.  Trying to understand why it is that absolute poverty has 
declined everywhere in the world but in Africa it has increased, Collier discovers that 
“the challenge of poverty reduction in Africa is of a different order from that 
elsewhere and will require different strategies” (Collier 2007: 16764).  He argues that 
Africa has to break out of its “economic stagnation” caused by its lack of economic 
growth and its low levels of income preventing it from addressing questions of 
poverty adequately.  This, he argues, should happen through varying degrees of 
foreign aid accompanied by economic policy changes that bring states closer in line 
with neoliberal principles.   
 
But prescriptions such as those of Colliers and Sachs are implemented in contexts of 
varying complexity, related to existing bureaucracies, belief-systems, resistance, and 
so on.  As Harvey (2007) and Brenner and Theodore (2002), amongst others, argue, 
there cannot be a 'one size fits all' approach when trying to understand how and why 
neoliberal policies are adopted and implemented in different places.  Rather, as 
Harvey explains: 
 
A moving map of the progress of neoliberalisation on the world 
stage since 1970 would be hard to construct.  To begin with, most 
states that have taken the neoliberal turn have done so only 
partially - the introduction of greater flexibility into labour markets 
here, a deregulation of financial operations and embrace of 
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monetarism there, a move towards privatisation of state-owned 
sectors somewhere else.  Wholesale changes in the wake of crises 
(such as the collapse of the Soviet Union) can be followed by slow 
reversals as the unpalatable aspects of neoliberalism become more 
evident … Any moving map would therefore feature turbulent 
currents of uneven geographical development that need to be 
tracked in order to understand how local transformations relate to 
broader trends. (Harvey 2007: 87). 
 
Significant in this excerpt is the use of the word „neoliberalisation‟, as it highlights the 
ongoing and open-ended nature of the implementation of neoliberal policies and the 
entrenching of neoliberal rationalities, as presented by Harvey, Brenner and 
Theodore, and others.       
   
In a similar vein, Brenner and Theodore describe these ongoing processes of 
neoliberalisation through the concept of “actually existing neoliberalism”, which they 
use to “illuminate the complex, contested ways in which neoliberal restructuring 
strategies interact with pre-existing uses of space, institutional configurations, and 
constellations of sociopolitical power”.  Arguing, therefore, that “neoliberal 
programmes of capitalist restructuring are rarely, if ever, imposed in a pure form”, 
they write that “ the evolution of any politico-institutional configuration following the 
imposition of neoliberal policy reforms is likely to demonstrate strong properties of 
path-dependency, in which established institutional arrangements significantly 
constrain the scope and trajectory of reform” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 361). 
 
The particular forms assumed by processes of neoliberalisation are, then, to be viewed 
according to the particularities of context with regard to history, pre-existing 
institutions and ideologies, and socio-economic and political relations and resources.  
In addition, they argue that neoliberalisation takes place differently at different levels 
of scale, that is, local, national and global.  However, neoliberalism also presents 
challenges to the traditional separations that are made between these different levels 
of scale.  Brenner and Theodore show how “the geographies of actually existing 
neoliberalism” transform “capitalist territorial organisation from the nationally 




 configuration of global-national-local interactions in which 
no single scale serves as the primary pivot for accumulation, regulation, or socio-
political struggle” (ibid: 363).   
 
A similar understanding of this dynamic relation between these different levels of 
scale in the production of life and meaning resonates in the work of Gillian Hart 
(2002), who argues for approaches that conceptualise change today in terms of 
“multiple trajectories of socio-spatial change” (see Introduction of this thesis).  
Hart‟s significance lies in her emphasis on subjectivity and contestations over 
meaning in trying to understand the world.  James Ferguson‟s (2006) critique of re-
presentations and discourses of Africa with regard to globalisation offers a similar 
approach to that described above, in his presentation of the experiences of 
neoliberalism in Africa being heterogeneous and productive of (as much as 
responsive to) the ways in which neoliberalism unfolds in different contexts.   
 
It is with this approach that Brenner and Theodore understand the different phases of 
neoliberalism identified by Peck and Tickell (2002).  Peck and Tickell show how 
neoliberalism has changed since the late 1970s, from a relatively obscure set of 
economic principles and means to „roll back‟ Keynesian welfarist protections (1980s), 
to “most recently, a reconstituted form of market guided regulation intended not only 
to release short-term bursts of economic growth but also to manage some of the deep 
socio-political contradictions induced by earlier forms of neoliberal policy 
intervention” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 362).   
 
Brenner and Theodore go on to argue that particular attention must be given to the 
scale of the local in the form of the city, as experimentation with neoliberal policies is 
increasingly seen to take place at this level.  With regard to analyses of the city and 
changes in its form and governance, they argue that the shift from the “welfare city” 
to the “neoliberal city” should not be seen as “a linear transition”, but as the result of 
“multifaceted processes of local institutional change” that “involve a contested, trial-
and-error searching process in which neoliberal strategies are being mobilised in 
place-specific forms and combinations to confront some of the many regulatory 
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 This term has also been used in this manner by Eric Swyngedouw (1997), from whom Brenner and 
Theodore borrow much in their analysis.   
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problems that have afflicted advanced capitalist cities during the post-1970s period” 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002: 375, my emphasis).  Such an analysis will be shown to 
be true also of the City of Johannesburg as we explore the evolution of its strategies 
towards entrenching the principle of commodification in the delivery of basic services 
in Chapter Four.    
 
In relation to the City, privatisation is a particular aspect of neoliberalism that has 
been experimented with.  In their analysis of water privatisation in Southern Africa, 
David McDonald and Greg Ruiters develop an understanding of privatisation that 
expands its strict definition, which they state is “the outright sale (divestiture) of state 
assets” (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005: 2).  Instead, they define privatisation “to refer 
to non-state actors involved in water [service] delivery (including NGOs and 
community organisations) where the transfer of ownership and/or decision-making 
responsibility to private interests occurs (in part or in total)” (ibid).  In this way, 
privatisation also refers to public-private-partnerships (PPPs) and other such 
arrangements, in which there is “a transfer of ownership and/or control that changes 
the operational calculus of a service from „public good‟ to „private profit‟” (ibid: 3).  
They also expand the definition of privatisation to include “commercialisation”, 
which they explain as “a process that refers to the more general pattern of running 
water services „like a business‟ and that can be implemented without any private 
sector involvement at all” (ibid).  By this logic, “corporatisation”, that is, “the creation 
of independent business units financially and managerially ringfenced from all other 
sectors in a municipality” would also qualify as a form of privatisation.   
 
Importantly, McDonald and Ruiters argue that “underlying all of this activity … are 
the broad forces of commodification: the transformation of all social relations to 
economic relations, subsumed by the logic of the market and reduced to the crude 
calculus of profit” (ibid).  McDonald and Ruiters‟ expanded definition of 
privatisation, then, allows us to view the implementation of privatisation in its various 
forms as contributing towards the path-dependent, context-specific, and multiple 
processes of neoliberalisation.  As such, studies of the implementation of different 
processes of privatisation, such as this thesis, offer a contribution to analyses of the 
broader processes of commodification and neoliberalism.       
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With regard to poverty and the poor, literature on neoliberalism shows the 
convergence of these multiple, path-dependent processes of neoliberalisation in the 
production of increasing inequality and poverty on a global scale, and the emergence 
of the figure of the global poor or “underclass” (Bauman 1998; Katz 1989; Davies and 
Ryner (ed.) 2006).  In the search to lower costs of production, fulltime waged 
employment has declined and flexible, unprotected forms of labour have become 
dominant, with casualisation and unemployment becoming a feature of an 
increasingly global labour market.  Theorists have pointed to the emergence of a 
global “precariat” (Bourdieu, 1998; Standing, 2009), that is, the replacement of the 
traditional proletariat with an increasingly vulnerable and mobile pool of labourers 
engaged in seasonal, part-time, casual, contract and informal jobs, their social 
positions characterised by uncertainty.  Significantly, as neoliberalism has occurred in 
a context in which socio-economic and political relations have taken on a global 
character, this precariat has come to be composed of individuals from different 
nationalities, many crossing national borders in order to find employment.     
 
Theorists also point out that for many “the global poor are a potential source of 
resistance to current global policies, while for others they are a threat to stability, 
wealth accumulation, power and privilege” (Harrod in Davies and Ryner (ed.) 2006: 
39).  Jeffrey Harrod argues that “the urban poor, in all their religious, ethnic or 
antisocial configurations” is today‟s feared „mass‟, as the peasants were in the 1960s, 
and the organised working class was in the 1980s (ibid).  Existing side by side with 
this image of the immoral, violent mass of the poor to be feared is the figure of the 
suffering, supplicant poor to whom society is urged to contribute in helping out of 
his/her poverty.   
 
Zygmunt Bauman points out that the term „underclass‟
40
, when first used by Gunnar 
Myrdal in 1963, did not bear any of the moral judgements that it would come to in 
later, neoliberal times.  Rather, it pointed to “the dangers of de-industrialisation, 
which … was likely to make growing chunks of the population permanently 
unemployed and unemployable; not because of deficiencies or moral faults in the 
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 See also Veriava (2010). 
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people who found themselves out of work, but purely and simply because of the lack 
of employment for all those who needed it and desired it” (Bauman 1998: 68).  
 
However, by the late 1970s its use would seek to connote moral degradation and 
chosen social exclusion on the part of a particular group in society.  Bauman adds to 
this the fact that the underclass would also come to be portrayed as that class of 
individuals in society beyond the social discipline of wage labour (and the work 
ethic), that is involved in “anti-social behaviour”, and that “generally feels excluded 
from society, rejects commonly accepted values, [and] suffers from behavioural, as 
well as income deficiencies” (Ken Auletta quoted in Bauman 1998: 69, original 
emphasis).  Bauman argues that such a discourse works so as to “wash clean all the 
hands and consciences inside the accepted boundaries of society of the guilt of 
abandoning a large number of their fellow citizens to permanent redundancy”.  
“Purity of hands and consciences is reached by the twin measure of the moral 
condemnation of the poor and the moral absolution of the rest.” (Bauman 1998: 72).             
 
Bauman‟s argument makes sense when examining the crisis of wage labour, described 
above, together with the accompanying rollbacks in the role of the state (versus the 
individual) in the sphere of responsibility that we saw inaugurated with the birth of 
the liberal mode of governance in the nineteenth century.  As state spending on social 
welfare decreases, and wage labour (in the form of fulltime permanent formal sector 
employment) declines, individual responsibility is increasingly emphasised with 
regard to accessing the resources necessary for a decent life.  The casting of the poor 
in moral terms serves, then, to instil amongst the poor an ethic of care of the self and 
individual entrepreneurship over dependency on the state or other external 
institutions.   
 
Bob Jessop, for example, argues that in a neoliberal world the welfare system has 
taken on the characteristics of a “workfare regime in so far as it subordinates social 
policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural or systemic 
competition” (Jessop 2000: 19).  Under this regime, recipients of welfare, particularly 
in Britain and the USA, would be subjected to compulsory participation in various 
work programmes through which services could be delivered to the state, the 
community and to the private sector without the need for proper wages to be paid or 
 74 
any of the costs of according labour protections and security needing to be incurred.  
Arguments in support of workfare over welfare thrived on the very moralising 
discourses described above that functioned to make the poor responsible for their own 
plight in society and to accept the task of improving their situation as individuals with 
the very minimal assistance of the state.  As Jessop writes, these changes in the roles 
assigned to the state and the individual within the sphere of responsibility, represent: 
 
a major reorientation on the part of the state to the making and 
remaking of the subjects who are expected to serve as partners in 
the innovative, knowledge-driven, entrepreneurial, flexible 
economy and its accompanying self-reliant, autonomous, 
empowered workfare regime (ibid).   
 
As wage labour declines in its role as the vehicle through which social inclusion 
occurs under neoliberalism, a discourse of individual responsibility and moralising 
distinctions between „the deserving poor‟ and „the undeserving poor‟ emerge once 
again, this time to impute from the poor a form of life conducive to the needs of a 
neoliberal world.  How this takes place must be understood according to the 
particularities of different contexts. 
 
Nikolas Rose and Thomas Lemke have celebrated, in Foucault, the notion of 
'governmentality', which they use to try to explain the operations of 'neoliberal 
rationalities', uncovering different ways in which these rationalities come to take root 
in the choices that individuals make in life. Understanding neoliberalism becomes, 
then, for them, an exploration of a new modality of government.  As Lemke explains,  
 
From the perspective of governmentality, government refers to a 
continuum, which extends from political government right through 
to forms of self-regulation, namely 'technologies of the self' as 
Foucault calls them. (Lemke, 2001:201).   
 
Describing the rationalities underpinning neoliberal government, Rose explains that 
governmentality today is: 
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predicated on interventions to create the organisational and 
subjective conditions for entrepreneurship – not only in terms of 
extending the 'enterprise model' to schools, hospitals, housing 
estates, and so forth, but also in inciting individuals to become 
entrepreneurs of themselves.  In addition, this process of 
'responsibilisation' often goes hand in hand with new or intensified 
invocations of 'community' as a sector whose vectors and forces 
can be mobilised, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and 
techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-
management and identity construction, of personal ethics and 
collective allegiances (Rose quoted in Hart, 2005: 12).   
 
Theorists of the governmentality school have come under criticism for being “quite 
limited” (Hart, 2005: 11), in particular for their neglect of the constitutive place of 
resistance in the implementation of neoliberalism.  Drawing on arguments made by 
O‟ Malley at al. (1997), Gillian Hart points to the potential for governmentality 
studies to “degenerate into 'ritualized and repetitive accounts of „governing‟ in 
increasingly diverse contexts'”, as a result of their “tendency to define politics in 
terms of 'mentalities of rule,' emphasise the programmatic nature of rule, and rely 
heavily on texts of rule” (Hart, 2005: 11).  She goes on to write: 
 
Deliberate distancing from 'messy processes of implementation' 
means that the constitutive role of contestation drops out of sight, 
and what remains is an 'insular and episodic vision of rule'. (ibid).   
 
Gupta (also quoted in Hart, 2005) further argues that  "governmentality is itself a 
conjunctural and crisis-ridden enterprise" that "engenders its own mode of resistance 
and makes, meets, moulds, or is contested by new subjects.” (Gupta, 2001: 69).  The 
CoJ‟s experiments with enforcing a logic of commodification in the delivery of basic 
services and resistance to this from poor communities, studied in this thesis, provide 
ample evidence for Gupta‟s contention.  In this way, it may be argued that any 
attempt to understand how social inclusion occurs in society today cannot neglect the 
central place played by resistance, both organised and collective as well as 
unorganised and at an individual level. 
 76 
 
Zygmunt Bauman, looking at societies in the developed world, argues that 
consumption becomes the means through which social inclusion (and exclusion) 
occurs as the nature of labour changes and as all aspects of society become 
commodified under neoliberalism.  In such societies, the poor exist as “flawed 
consumers”: 
 
In a consumer society … having no access to a happy or merely a 
normal life means to be consumers manquees, or flawed 
consumers.  And so the poor of a consumer society are socially 
defined, and self-defined, first and foremost as blemished, 
defective, faulty and deficient – in other words, inadequate – 
consumers.  In a society of consumers, it is above all the 
inadequacy of the person as a consumer that leads to social 
degradation and „internal exile‟.  (Bauman 1998: 38). 
 
In this way, the market and the spectacle of consumption become the means through 
which a particular form of life is encouraged for individuals, a form of life that 
produces the consumer.  Bauman‟s argument makes sense in a different manner for 
South Africa, as will be discussed later on in this thesis through the example of the 
encouragement of the duty to pay for basic services amongst the poor.  Rather than 
the spectacle of consumerism serving as the sphere through which suitable subjects 
are induced, the sphere of the consumption of the very basic resources necessary for 
survival becomes the vehicle through which a particular form of life is encouraged 
amongst the poor, a form of life that produces subjects willing to be entrepreneurs of 
themselves and to pay for their necessities in life.   
 
It is also significant how, in this society of spectacular consumption, „fighting 
poverty‟ has become a market itself, with percentages of sales of particular products 
and services being donated to various poverty alleviation schemes in massive 
marketing campaigns in which big name celebrities endorse the buying of brands in 
the name of the poor, and free advertising time is bought through large-scale radio 
and television phone-in pledge programmes (such as the music reality television 
programme, American Idol, which „gives up‟ one of its slots to raising funds for 
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celebrities‟ favourite charities, usually in Africa).  And while Simon Cowell (the 
founder and producer of American Idol) was able to retire with a bank balance 
probably big enough to buy off an African country or two, a couple thousand more 
African people received mosquito nets or a few-days supply of mealie-meal.  Once 
again, the eclipse of persistent and growing inequality in the world by a minority‟s act 
of charity in the name of the poor.     
 
Once again, however, theorists point out that processes of neoliberalisation cannot be 
understood without accounting for the agency of those at the centre of the changes, 
that is, workers and the poor.  Louise Amoore writes: 
 
…[D]espite increased recognition of the importance of poverty for 
world politics, the policy and academic literature lacks a sense of 
the way in which the global poor contribute as subjects to world 
politics via production and work relations (Amoore in Davies and 
Ryner (ed.) 2006: 14).  
 
As fulltime, permanent jobs become scarce, production and work relations are no 
longer necessarily defined and/or imagined in terms of the wage.  This results in a 
large number of activities undertaken by the poor in order to live that might lie 
outside of the traditional definitions of production and work relations,  resulting in 
their non-valorisation in the world.  For example, many of the global precariat turn to 
different forms of waste collection in order to survive, their contributions hardly 
being reflected in popular representations and discussions of economic production 
and growth, or conservation and ecological sustainability.  Undertakings by groups of 
unemployed workers to take control of abandoned factories and get them running in 
the interests of collectives in Argentina would be another example.   
 
In many instances, such collective undertakings by groups of poor people to find ways 
of surviving, result in broader collective mobilisations that challenge political 
arrangements and prescriptions, forcing their acknowledgment by the dominant and 
the mainstream.  Much has been written about acts of resistance on the part of the 
poor from early capitalist societies to the present, some of which we have already 
commented on (Piven and Cloward 1977; Scott; Thompson).  With regard to the 
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current neoliberal phase of capitalist development, resistance has been theorised in 
relation to changes in the nature of work, the state, and strategies for mobilisation and 
redress that are characteristic of this period.  While an overview of a selection of these 
theories that relate to our overall discussion of the poor and poverty follows, many of 
the questions that they pose will be explored in greater detail through the specific 
example of South Africa in the remainder of the thesis.   
 
As neoliberal forms of government have come into being, theorists have tried to 
understand the forms of resistance that have emerged, both in response to the effects 
of governmental interventions on particular targeted population groups, and in the 
context of the political terrain being shaped by the dominance of such governmental 
modes of engagement in society.  Writing about India, Partha Chatterjee argues that 
while the formal structures of the state permit all citizens equal rights, particular 
population groups demand special attention outside the accepted spheres of bourgeois 
politics, namely civil society, as they lack access in real terms to these rights.  
Chatterjee writes: 
 
Most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and even then 
ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense 
imagined by the constitution.  They are not, therefore, proper 
members of civil society and are not regarded as such by 
institutions of state.  But it is not as though they are outside the 
reach of the state or even excluded from the domain of politics.  As 
populations within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, they have 
to be looked after and controlled by various government agencies.  
(Chatterjee 2004: 38). 
 
He goes on to argue that these activities “bring these populations into a certain 
political relationship with state” that does not “always conform to what is envisaged 
in the constitutional depiction of the relation between the state and members of civil 
society” (ibid).  For Chatterjee, this relationship unfolds in that particular space in 
society in which the strategic negotiation, struggle or contestation takes place between 
“those who govern” and “the governed”, what he calls “political society”.  Political 
society is that arena in which those individuals and groups targeted by governmental 
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categories, such as „the poor‟ or „the indigent‟, struggle over the meanings and forms 
of life entrenched by these categories, outside of traditional civil society (ibid: 39-40).  
Chatterjee writes:  
 
What happens then is a negotiation of these claims on a political 
terrain where, on the one hand, governmental agencies have a 
public obligation to look after the poor and the underprivileged 
and, on the other, particular population groups receive attention 
from those agencies according to calculations of political 
expediency” (ibid: 40).   
 
Although Chatterjee provides an easy analysis for how organised groups of poor 
people make and win demands of the state, it could also quite easily be appropriated 
towards the elaboration of strategies for engagement with the state that reproduce 
neoliberal logics and so entrench social inequalities and divisions.  This, particularly 
in a context in which it has become somewhat of a mantra that there is no alternative 
to neoliberalism.   
 
Autonomous Marxist theorists, such as Hardt and Negri, argue that there is an 
alternative to neoliberalism, that they understand as being produced by the very 
changes in labour and capital that characterise the neoliberal period of capitalism.  As 
capitalism develops, they argue, the command that capital has over „living labour‟ 
(through the wage relation and the discipline of commodity production located largely 
in the factory) becomes less dominant as labour tends towards more immaterial, 
affective and intellectual forms, produced outside of the factory.    Hardt and Negri 
especially celebrate the poor of neoliberal society, who, they argue, hold a greater 
potential for “self-valorisation”, outside of the command of the wage and the factory.  
Understanding the production of the poor/the multitude as an immanent process, 
Hardt and Negri argue that alternatives to capitalism lie in the interactions and 
engagements of the poor, actions that cannot be anticipated, but that unfold in the 
collective struggles of the poor. (Hardt and Negri 2000; 2004; 2009).  While Hardt 
and Negri celebrate the potential for joy, love and subversion amongst those who are 
the poor, what they do not account for is occasions when the poor act against each 
other, and in conservative ways.             
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Hardt and Negri‟s analyses of seventeenth century debates about the poor resonate 
with the work of Jacques Ranciere (1999, 2009), who argues that politics is “the 
specific kind of power that deals with a specific entity, a specific community named 
„the people‟” (Ranciere 2009: 118).  He writes that trying to understand what this 
means leads to the realisation that: 
 
the essence of politics is the power of the people, and that the 
essence of the „power of the people‟ is: the power of those who 
have no quality to exert power. (ibid).   
 
However, he goes on to argue, “democracy was invented as a polemical name, 
designating the unthinkable power of the multitude of those who have no qualification 
for governing” (ibid: 116).  Protest (or in Ranciere‟s words „disagreement‟ or 
„dissensus‟) therefore “implies a struggle about what politics is” (ibid), with those 
excluded from the traditional means of change making themselves heard and asserting 
their presence as political beings.  Hardt and Negri argue that Ranciere‟s “part of 
those who have no part” (those who are excluded from the traditional political sphere 
and make themselves be counted) may be viewed as “the party of the poor”, which “is 
not an identity of one exclusive portion of society but rather a formation of all those 
inserted in the mechanisms of social production without respect to rank or property, in 
all their diversity, animated by an open and plural production of subjectivity” (Hardt 
and Negri 2009: 45).   
 
These questions about the nature and significance of movements of the poor will be 
explored in greater detail through the specific experience of struggles for basic 
services in post-apartheid South Africa in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
The South African Experience 
 
Approaches to poverty and the poor in South Africa reflect its history of colonialism, 
segregation, and apartheid.  While the governmental treatment of poverty and the 
poor in South Africa does relate to the driving forces examined above with regard to 
the need to coerce people into accepting wage labour as the norm, it exhibits features 
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particular to a colonial formation in which race played as much a role as class and 
gender in the constitution of the subjects and forms of life necessary for the sustaining 
of a particular capitalist society.        
 
John Iliffe points out that any discussion of poverty in Africa in pre-colonial and early 
colonial times is difficult for a number of reasons.  Firstly, written sources are few as 
“literacy was rare until modern times” (Iliffe 1987: 2) and “the impressions of 
poverty to be gathered from oral traditions and from generalised descriptions by 
foreign observers can be seriously misleading” (ibid).  Secondly, concepts such as 
absolute and relative poverty did not come to exist amongst Africans until the 1930s.  
And, the third problem is “the widespread belief that until recently there were no poor 
in Africa, because economic differentiation was slight, resources were freely 
available, and the „extended family‟ supported its less fortunate members” (ibid: 3).  
Iliffe argues that it is often claimed that “only with the coming of colonial rule, 
market economies, and urbanisation … did things begin to fall apart” (ibid).  Iliffe 
quotes a South African as saying: 
 
There were no poor and rich; the haves helped those who were in 
want.  No man starved because he had no food; no child cried for 
milk because its parents did not have milk cows; no orphan and old 
person starved because there was nobody to look after them.  No, 
these things were unknown in ancient Bantu society. (R. V. Selope 
Thema, Bantu World May 1934, quoted in Iliffe 1987: 3).   
 
Iliffe goes on to show how this view was widely accepted by white South Africans, 
anthropologists, and colonial officials, who also “transmitted it to nationalist 
intellectuals and international agencies” (Iliffe 1987: 3).  He quotes the United 
Nations Regional Adviser on Social Welfare Policy and Training, Economic 
Commission for Africa as saying in 1972: 
 
In rural Africa, the extended family and the clan assume the 
responsibility for all services for their members, whether social or 
economic.  People live in closely organised groups and willingly 
accept communal obligations for mutual support.  Individuals 
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satisfy their need for social and economic security merely by being 
attached to one of these groups.  The sick, the aged and children 
are all cared for by the extended family.  In this type of 
community, nobody can be labelled as poor because the group 
usually shares what they have.  There is no competition, no 
insecurity, no big ambitions, no unemployment and thus people are 
mentally healthy.  Deviation or abnormal behaviour is almost 
absent. (ibid).   
 
Iliffe goes on to show that such a romantic view of pre-colonial African societies is 
flawed, and later points out that the naturalisation of such a view served the interests 
of the colonialists and emerging capitalists very well as it allowed for them to argue 
that African male workers could be paid low wages as their reproductive needs were 
being subsidised by the labour of women on land in the reserves.  This has also been 
explored in discussions and debates about the articulation of pre-capitalist and 
capitalist modes of production in the early history of the development of capitalism in 
South Africa (Guy; Wolpe).  
 
Iliffe argues that poverty did indeed exist but was “relatively rare” in pre-colonial 
Africa (Iliffe 1987: 3).  As pre-colonial Africa lacked stratified classes, poverty was 
not visible very often, that is, as the extreme of wealth did not exist, its opposite did 
not exist.  This did not mean that social inequality did not exist, with traditional and 
customary authority determining the distribution of resources.  However, Iliffe 
argues, there were always in African societies those unable to provide for themselves 
through their own labour (the sick, the aged, the disabled), and that it was this group 
that constituted the structural poor of pre-colonial Africa.  As pre-colonial South 
Africa was a land-rich country, it was largely those without the means (physical in 
terms of the individual and having family) to work the land, who remained poor.  
However, with colonialism and the development of capitalism, structural poverty 
came to be characterised by a lack of access to land rather than labour, as individual 
males were forced into wage labour and families were forced to survive off pieces of 
land that were increasingly less arable and small.  While Iliffe focuses on the 
structural poverty caused by landlessness amongst African South Africans, Colin 
Bundy (1986) looks at the poverty caused by landlessness amongst the white settler 
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population (as well as African peasants (1988)).  It is important to look at the 
arguments made by Bundy and Iliffe together in order to fully understand how 
poverty and the poor begin to be mobilised as governmental categories in South 
Africa.     
 
While it is important to acknowledge the existence of poverty prior to colonial and 
capitalist development in South Africa (as Iliffe and Bundy have done so well in 
reminding us), for this thesis it is more important to point out that it is with the 
emergence of capitalism that we apprehend the first governmental mobilisation of 
poverty and the poor in South Africa.  Writing against an accepted historiography in 
which the problem of poor whites is described as emerging only in the 1890s, Colin 
Bundy, in showing that “a numerically substantial class of poor and proletarianised 
whites existed in the Cape well before the 1890s”, demonstrates that: 
 
the „emergence‟ of the poor white problem in the 1890s may have 
been to an important degree the outcome of new ways of 
perceiving white poverty, that a set of perceptions and anxieties 
may have crystallised out in the form of the „poor white question‟ 
(Bundy 1986: 103).   
 
While Bundy shows the existence of various types of white poverty prior to early 
capitalist development in the form of the landless rural poor (bywoners
41
, agricultural 
labourers and servants); small-town, low-skilled, and low-paid wage labourers; and a 
lumpen proletariat element (labourers, people in insecure and seasonal forms of 
labour, and “drifters, beggars and criminals” (ibid: 104), he also states that in the 
1890s “there was a redefinition of poverty (which reflected a metropolitan as well as 
a local ideological shift) as a social problem to be tackled by state action rather than 
as a phenomenon of individual failure to be assuaged by charity” (ibid).  In addition, 
Bundy argues that poverty “became „ethnicised‟ to a much greater extent than before: 
perceptions by professional, religious and political authorities of a „poor white 
problem‟ helped shape public awareness … assumptions of (white) ethnic solidarity 
                                                 
41
 Bywoners was the name given to white landless individuals and/or families who lived on the farms of 
others under a range of tenancy agreements, also known as squatters.   
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rapidly replaced older forms of ideological distance and hostility along class lines” 
(ibid).   
 
Bundy argues that this new attention to the question of the poor whites related not to 
those officially defined as indigent and receiving public funds or committed to 
hospitals, asylums or charitable institutions as “so stringent were the regulations 
governing the disbursement of public monies that the numbers of this group were in 
any case always small: only 115 were recorded in the 1865 Census, and 703 in that of 
1875” (ibid: 104).  Rather, they related to “the various types of propertyless, low 
income poverty experienced in much larger numbers among the settler population in 
the Cape” (ibid), including the rural landless poor and artisans and small tradesmen, 
“once self-employed but increasingly unable to support themselves” (ibid: 116), who 
became casual labourers on farms and in small towns or beggars, vagrants, and 
criminals.  Bundy argues that this “underclass formed a clearly visible component of 
Cape society”, being referred to as “people of the poorest sort” or “men of the lowest 
class”, and “frequently denigrated for their idleness, licentiousness, drunkenness, and 
other vices” (ibid) by whites of a higher social status.  Bundy shows how another 
feature of this period was the fact that “many well-to-do white farmers and other 
employers were conscious of a great social distance between themselves and poorer 
whites” (ibid: 117), pointing to the significance of this period for the emergence of 
particular class attitudes amongst whites.   
 
Bundy also highlights the growing attention given to race in characterisations of poor 
whites.  For example, citing evidence from the 1893 Labour Commission, he relates 
how many of the witnesses spoke of increased „mixing‟ between black and white, 
interracial marriages, and other ways in which black and white culture were being 
assimilated with each other.  Several farmers and middle class whites are quoted as 
calling for laws such as the Vagrancy Act of 1897 and the Strop Act (Masters and 
Servants legislation) “to be applied more rigorously against poor whites” (ibid: 118).  
With the establishment of the Department of Public Health in 1891, several reports 
were produced of the unsanitary living conditions of poor whites, in particular 
problematising the cohabitation of poor whites with blacks.  Bundy concludes that 
“there took place in the Cape colony in the 1880s and especially the 1890s a major 
shift in ruling-class perceptions of the nature of poverty that was analogous to 
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ideological developments in metropolitan Britain, and partly derived from them; and 
that in the colonial context these altered perceptions tended to be expressed in racial 
terms” (ibid: 119).  These developments in Britain, Bundy argues, relate to the period 
after 1880 when thinking about poverty shifted from the view that defined the 1834 
reformed Poor Laws (that poverty is the result of moral failure on the part of 
individuals) to one that now acknowledged the physical and economic environments 
as causes of poverty.   
 
John Iliffe argues that this sudden attention to white poverty in the form of  “the poor 
white question” in the 1880s and 1890s must be understood as a response to the 
existence of “multiracial poverty” or “the multiracialism of South African poverty” 
which “in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was most obvious in the towns” 
(Iliffe 1987: 114).  In the 1830s the poor of Cape Town included Coloured people of 
Khoi origin, freed slaves, and struggling white men, “all huddled into multiracial 
slums” (ibid).  While, Iliffe argues, the next forty years saw a decline in inter-racial 
marriage, an increase in residential segregation, and the granting of voting rights and 
educational opportunities to white men that were superior to those enjoyed by black 
men, these changes were felt least amongst the poor.  From the 1830s on, the numbers 
of the poor in Cape Town also increased tremendously through the first major 
immigration of Africans.  Iliffe points out that while some of the new arrivals settled 
separately from whites on the edges of the town, a large number of Africans settled in 
the multiracial slums.  For Iliffe, it was because of this “African influx” that demands 
for “greater segregation and social control” started to be made in the 1880s and 1890s 
(ibid: 115).  Iliffe shows in some detail how multiracial poverty comes to be 
characterised as a moral and social problem, and the steps taken by each of the major 
South African cities to try to eradicate it from the 1890s on. 
 
Significant for this thesis is Iliffe‟s characterisation of Johannesburg as “the most 
revealing illustration of multiracial poverty in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries” (ibid: 116).  He shows how just two years after its establishment, 
Johannesburg‟s Sanitary Committee marked out a separate area for African residence 
(an “African location”) in 1886; however, the fact that the law did not force people to 
live there and the remoteness of the location meant that many Africans chose not to 
settle in this location but rather in areas closer to the city centre, in particular the 
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racially mixed slums of Ferreira, Vrededorp, Newclare, Fordsburg and Brickfields, 
where Indians, Coloured people, and “the most impoverished white men, who were 
chiefly Afrikaners” lived (ibid).  Here, brickmaking, domestic service, transport, and 
sex work provided employment for all race groups, but the quality of life was poor 
due to the kinds of wages, protections and stability afforded by such occupations.  In 
1896, Iliffe writes,“demonstrations by needy Afrikaners obliged the authorities to 
abandon the old distinction between deserving and undeserving poor and create a 
public works programme and relief fund confined to whites” (ibid).  At the same 
time, attempts were made to regulate the lives of African workers in employment in 
the city and to prevent unemployed Africans from residing in the city.  In the words 
of the Chief Inspector of the Native Affairs Department in 1902, the priority of the 
British authorities was: 
 
to enforce the residence of all native employees whether in the 
property of their employers or in a licensed location.  All 
unemployed natives found living elsewhere than in a licensed 
location should be arrested and punished under the vagrancy law.  
(quoted in Iliffe 1987: 116).   
 
In spite of this, multiracial poverty continued, growing not only in the slums of the 
city centre, but spreading also to two freehold settlements on suburban land that had 
not been wanted by whites – to the west of the city centre, Sophiatown (because it 
was next to a dump), and to the north, Alexandra (because it was too far away).  Iliffe 
argues that “South Africa‟s rulers identified multiracial poverty as the poor white 
problem” (ibid).  Like Bundy, he argues that “although destitute white men had long 
been numerous, they were first seen as a social problem – rather than victims of their 
vices – during the 1880s and 1890s, when new European notions of poverty as a 
social phenomenon mingled with South Africa‟s growing concern with racial 
categorisation” (ibid).   
 
This segregation of the urban poor was legislated in 1902 in the form of the Native 
Reserve Location Act, which designated particular areas as „locations‟ in which 
African residents would be permitted (Mamdani 1996: 93).  The crafting of 
governmental strategies towards segregating poor whites from poor blacks would 
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work towards encouraging the production of different forms of life for poor white and 
poor black, forms of life conducive to the sustenance of the racially differentiated 
system of cheap labour vital to South Africa‟s emerging industrial economy.   
 
Several writers highlight the fact that the emergence of the poor white question in 
South Africa‟s history of capitalist development spoke in the first instance to the fears 
that existed amongst British authorities of social revolt by a united non-racial mass of 
the working poor (Freund 1992; Morrell 1992; Turrell 1992; Parnell 1992).  Bill 
Freund, commenting on the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, writes: 
 
The ultimate nightmare of the ruling class was a class movement 
that would transcend the race line and unify the poor and 
oppressed, white and black, a nightmare that both Rhodes and 
Smuts expressed at times (Freund 1992: xvii). 
 
Sampie Terreblanche argues that two pieces of legislation introduced in 1911, the 
Native Labour Regulation Act and the Mines and Works Act, served to assuage the 
fears of white workers while creating the conditions for cheap African labour to 
sustain capitalist development.  With the Botha/Smuts government (which assumed 
office in 1910) facing “the difficult task of creating conditions conducive to 
accumulation (for mining and agriculture) on the one hand, and having to pamper the 
white electorate (especially mineworkers and poor Afrikaners) to prevent them from 
endangering the legitimacy of the new state on the other”, “two important 
segregationist laws were passed which created a pattern that would last for decades: 
the one was a repressive measure aimed at making African labour cheaper and more 
docile, and the other a discriminatory measure aimed at protecting white miners 
against competition from Africans” (Terreblanche 2002: 269, original emphasis).  
While the Native Labour Regulation Act declared contract-breaking and striking by 
African workers illegal, the Mines and Works Act protected the interests of white 
workers in different ways, including through the reservation of certain jobs on the 
mines for whites only.  These twin strategies of repression and discrimination will be 




Writing about white poverty in the eastern Transvaal district of Middelburg, Robert 
Morrell points out that this growing concern with the threat of social unrest by 
increasing numbers of poor whites pertained also in areas outside of the towns.  In 
areas where white farmers slipped into poverty due to the fact that agriculture was 
becoming “unproductive and unprofitable”, various measures of aid and relief began 
to be offered (Morrell 1992: 2).  He writes: 
 
The other aspect of the problem concerned the political threat 
posed by poor whites.  In order to deal with this threat failed 
farmers were offered new opportunities, jobs were created and 
relief provided.  The intention was to convert „dangerous‟ class 
members into conformist class members.  (ibid).   
 
Colin Bundy, in The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (1988), shows how 
the needs of white farmers in the commercialisation of agriculture in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, together with the demands for cheap labour by 
the growing mining industry, produced further policies and legislation in support of 
racial segregation.  Inadvertently, they would also result in further class stratification 
amongst whites, with bywoners becoming more impoverished in the process.  He 
writes: 
 
Further brakes on the development of a dynamic commercial 
agriculture derived from the internal economy of South Africa: in 
particular, the retention of large amounts of land in relatively few 
hands, the establishment of quasi-feudal relations on these lands 
and their occupation by squatter-peasants and bywoners, and the 
continued ability of large numbers of African peasants to produce 
an agricultural surplus large enough to pay taxes and satisfy 
consumer wants.  This last had a double impact on white farmers: 
it meant that they remained „victims‟ of a labour „shortage‟ at the 
very low wages they offered, and it meant that they encountered 
effective competition from African farmers. (Bundy 1988: 112). 
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While there were other problems facing both white and African farmers
42
 (e.g. a lack 
of access to capital, unfertile soils, unpredictable climatic conditions, and natural 
pests), Bundy argues that African peasant farmers had some advantages over white 
farmers in spite of their limited access to land and other resources, that allowed them 
to participate in the markets for labour and produce “on terms not wholly 
unfavourable” (ibid).  These included having “specialised knowledge of local 
conditions and methods”, and the fact that “the peasant tended to cultivate more 
intensively because of the growing scarcity of land” (ibid).  Bundy also argues that 
the African peasant‟s “lower consumption costs and his use of pre-capitalist forms of 
labour meant that production of a modest surplus – the sale of a few bags of grain or a 
bale of wool – enabled him to participate in the exchange economy largely on the 
terms of his own choosing and without the surrender of his land, security or cultural 
identity” (ibid: 13).  The African peasant could often, then, “produce a surplus for 
sale when the white agriculturalist could not” (ibid).  Bundy highlights, then, that a 
large number of African peasants (“certainly a majority of the Cape‟s African people” 
(ibid)) “retained at the beginning of the gold-mining era a measure of economic 
independence” (ibid), resulting in a number of white farmers complaining about 
difficulties encountered in trying to secure sufficient labour for agriculture at the low 
wages they were offering, to the Cape Labour Commission of 1893-4.  After listening 
to the complaints and evidence brought before it by white farmers, commissioners 
concluded the following: 
 
The mere necessities of life are few, and are obtainable with little 
effort.  These people [African peasants] do not therefore feel 
impelled to work … A cause of the insufficiency may also be 
found in the fact that some natives are in some sense land or rather 
lease-holders … on shares as it is called.  (ibid: 114).  
 
In time, white farmers would be presented with a new problem in the form of 
competition for African labour from the gold mining industry (and the industries that 
it would spurn e.g. transport, construction and the service industries), which “created 
a qualitative increase in the need for a class of permanent wage earners” (ibid).  
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 African farmers were mostly peasant farmers, working small pieces of their own land or living and 
working on land rented from white farmers, or as sharecroppers on white farms. 
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Bundy writes that mine-owners also “knew that „sufficient‟ labour at the rates they 
offered would not be forthcoming while the black peasant enjoyed access to his lands 
and the ability to produce enough agricultural surplus to meet his cash requirements” 
(ibid).  In the words of the President of the Chamber of Mines, in a speech given in 
1911: 
 
The tendency of the native is to be an agriculturalist, who 
reluctantly offers himself or one of his family as an industrial 
worker for just so long as the hut tax can be earned, and expects 
the industrial demand to expand to give him work when his crops 
are bad.  He cares nothing if industries pine for want of labour 
when his crops and home-brewed drink are plentiful. (quoted in 
Bundy 1988: 114). 
 
Calling for a policy that would ensure “that the surplus of young men, instead of 
squatting on the land in idleness … must earn their living by working for a wage”, the 
President of the Chamber of Mines asked the government to “do everything to 
encourage the native to be a wage-earner by extending the policy of splitting into 
family holdings land now held in the native reserves under tribal tenure” (ibid).  
Bundy concludes that: 
 
Both the farmer and the mine-owner perceived in the late 
nineteenth century the need to apply extra-economic pressures to 
the African peasantry; to break down the peasant‟s „independence‟, 
increase his wants, and to induce him to part more abundantly with 
his labour, but at no increased price.  Implicit in their demands was 
the assumption that Africans had no right to continue as self-
sufficient and independent farmers if this conflicted with white 
interests. (Bundy 1988: 115).   
 
Bundy shows how, in the period between 1890 and 1913, as white farmers sought to 
increase their productivity and success through commercial agriculture, practices and 
legislation emerged to force African peasants off the land and into wage labour.  In 
the immediate term, anti-squatter legislation and practices emerged that worked 
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against forms of rent and sharecropping.  The 1908 Natives Tax Act forced African 
„squatters‟ to pay a levy of 2 pounds, while labour tenants were “wooed” with a tax of 
1 pound (ibid: 212).  Rent „squatters‟ were forcibly removed by “direct governmental 
action” from some farms in 1909 and 1910 (ibid).   
 
The commercialisation of white agriculture was also “aided by a massive programme 
of subsidies, grants and other aid”, including “fencing, dams, houses, veterinary and 
horticultural advice” and the cushioning of farmers “by generous rail rates, by special 
credit facilities, and by bountiful tax relief”  (ibid: 116).  Bundy writes: 
 
This beneficence to white commercial agriculture had profound 
implications for black peasant agriculture (and for white bywoners: 
legislative supports for farmers did not help the small tenant 
farmer, nor were they intended to).  In the first place, almost all of 
the legislation was racially discriminative, and blessed only 
modernising white farmers, which of itself conferred important 
competitive advantages on that class.  These were buttressed in the 
second place by legislation (most particularly the 1913 Natives 
Land Act) aimed at curtailing the possibilities open to peasant 
production, at preventing the accumulation of capital by Africans 
and at translating independent squatter-peasants into wage-
labourers. (ibid). 
 
The significance of the 1913 Natives Land Act is undisputed in historical accounts of 
the development of capitalism in South Africa.  While most historians focus on the 
Act‟s prohibition of the purchase of land by Africans in areas demarcated „white‟, and 
the designation of just 13 per cent of South African land as „native reserves‟ in which 
all Africans were to be accommodated, Colin Bundy argues that another extremely 
important purpose of the Act was “the reduction of rent-paying squatters and share-
croppers to the level of labour tenants” (ibid: 213).  In the case of labour tenants, 
occupation and working of a piece of land would be received in exchange for the 
provision of a certain amount of labour to the owner of the land (usually a white 
farmer), whereas rent-paying squatters would not exchange their own labour for the 
opportunity to work and live on a piece of land.  Bundy also argues that while the Act 
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might have had effects on the ability of white farmers to advance economically, it 
also had important consequences for African people living within the reserves.  He 
writes: 
 
By preventing the most obvious form of accumulation open to 
successful black peasants, it sought to apply a brake to the process 
of class differentiation in African rural areas, thus inhibiting the 
growing group of small commercial farmers (potential competitors 
with white farmers, as well as displacers of indigent bywoners).  It 
sought to „freeze‟ social relations in the reserves, so as to avoid the 
creation of a permanently landless majority of Africans, whose 
urbanisation would have further drained the supply of rural labour, 
as well as posing a political threat. (ibid).   
 
Several theorists (Bundy, 1986, 1988; Guy, 1982, 2006; Iliffe, 1987; Mamdani, 1996; 
Terreblanche 2002; Wolpe, 1972, 1988) have written about the ways in which the 
development of capitalism in South Africa was bolstered by the organised separate 
accommodation of African females, children, the aged, the disabled and the sick in 
native reserves in which a lower standard and quality of life was considered 
appropriate for African people as compared with white people, and the simultaneous 
coercion of able-bodied African men into wage labour on the mines, white 
commercial farms, and the cities.  Citing evidence from the Native Economic 
Commission of 1930-1932, and various other state documents, Colin Bundy (1988) 
argues that the areas occupied by African peasants had already begun experiencing 
“underdevelopment” by 1913: “signs of agrarian degeneration and their 
transformation into teeming rural slums” (Bundy 1988: 221).  And in the forty years 
following the adoption of the 1913 Land Act, much would be written about “the 
nature and extent of underdevelopment in the reserves (particularly the Ciskei and the 
Transkei)” (ibid).  With a local historian writing of the time that “natives of the Union 
as a whole are dragging along at the very lowest levels of bare subsistence” 
(Macmillan quoted in Bundy 1988: 221-222), it would seem correct to argue that the 
reserves served to produce the conditions of poverty for the majority of African 
people so as to force able-bodied African men into forms of wage labour that paid 
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low wages on the basis that women and land in the reserves served to provide some 
level of subsistence to the African worker and his family.   
 
Writing in 1940, G. F. Findley, in a review of Alfred Hoernle‟s South African Native 
Policy and the Liberal Spirit, argues:  
 
The mines want healthy and vigorous workers who would have to 
have higher wages to attend to their own health and diet.  It is 
therefore cheaper to give them hospitals, balanced diets, and even 
games and cinemas upon collective and dictated basis … „Married 
quarters‟ for Africans on the mines would be more expensive than 
homes in the reserves … The vast spaces available in South Africa 
are a fine substitute for doles and unemployment relief as well as 
„married quarters‟.  They serve as the sponge that absorbs, and 
returns when required, the reserve army of African labour.  Tribal 
tenure is a guarantee that the land will never be properly worked 
and will never really belong to the natives.  Cheap labour must 
have a cheap breeding place, and so it is furnished to the Africans 
at their own expense.  (quoted in Bundy 1988: 242).   
 
The introduction of the principle of one-man-one-plot, the limitation on plot size, and 
the closing of the free market in land worked to ensure that the reserves would remain 
under-developed for the purpose of providing the cheap labour necessary for the 
emerging industrial capitalist society, in particular the mining industry, and keeping 
the African majority docile.  For Bundy, the 1913 Land Act, then worked “to preserve 
… an under-developed peasantry: a peasantry whose productive capacity had been so 
inhibited, whose access to land so confined, whose access to markets rendered so 
unfavourable, that its members must have recourse to labour for white employers 
even at the very low wage levels prevailing” (Bundy 1988: 242).  It also benefited 
white capitalists in other ways.  Bundy argues: 
 
… the ability of the reserve inhabitants to supply a portion of their 
subsistence through peasant production conferred direct benefits 
upon urban employers – particularly the mines – in the form of low 
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wages, cheap housing, the avoidance of welfare considerations for 
workers‟ dependants, and a brake on the growth of an urban 
proletariat (ibid: 243).  
 
But, as capitalism flourished through the system of the reserves and their 
(re)production of cheap labour, underdevelopment in the reserves would also produce 
a steady stream of African men and women into urban areas in search of new 
livelihoods.  With anti-squatting legislation working also against the security of white 
bywoners, poor whites would also swell the numbers of urban slums in the early part 
of the twentieth century.  And the multiracial poverty identified by Iliffe would 
continue, particularly in urban slums.  So too would segregationist legislation and 
policies, with attention to the poor white question increasing. 
 
Sue Parnell, in her study of the city of Johannesburg between 1920 and 1934, shows 
how increases in the numbers of poor whites living side by side with poor blacks in 
slums “moulded the state‟s approach to the issue of working class residential 
segregation” (Parnell 1992: 115).  While the mining companies provided hostel 
accommodation for their male contract labourers in compounds, the permanence of 
Johannesburg saw a growth in the non-mining sectors of the economy, and the arrival 
of women and families of men working on the mines and in other jobs in the city.  
With the inability of existing hostels to meet the needs of the changing composition 
of the city, a housing crisis quickly emerged.  Parnell writes, “… while Randlords 
constructed elaborate colonial mansions for their brides, poorer folk sought out a 
room in a slumyard of the city in which to establish their family residence” (ibid: 
116).  And, by 1914, “Johannesburg had a slum legacy that cut across the colour bar” 
(ibid).   
 
Parnell shows how the housing crisis became a major political issue locally, with the 
Labour Party taking it up in the municipal election of 1919, arguing for subsidised 
housing for whites, and winning the election.  With white workers earning little more 
than black workers at the time, Parnell argues that white workers would not have 
been able to afford shelter of a standard higher than that of slum conditions without 
state assistance.  Within weeks of the Labour Party winning control over it, the 
Johannesburg Council “had endorsed the principle of a white public housing scheme 
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provided by the local authority „so that the mixing of poor whites and blacks could be 
remedied‟” (ibid: 118).  Parnell then shows how, in spite of this commitment, 
resources are not immediately accessed for such an approach.  Instead, attention to 
the white working class housing question “was subsumed in efforts to get the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act proclaimed and enforced in the city” (ibid: 119).  She writes: 
 
The proposed provision of a white housing scheme was dropped as 
the most important item on the council‟s agenda, and replaced by 
the drive to rid the inner-city of all blacks.  The focus on the 
removal of Africans from slums, however, was not inconsistent 
with the council‟s concern for white housing needs.  For the 
council, the white housing problem had been defined as a problem 
of residential integration, and could therefore be solved by the 
removal of „the native menace‟ (ibid). 
 
Such prioritisations with regard to strategy would have been guided by the 
recommendations of the Stallard Commission of 1922, which once again berated the 
mixing of Africans and whites in slum conditions, and called for the strict regulation 
of Africans in urban areas: 
 
The native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are 
essentially the white man‟s creation, when he is willing to enter 
and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart 
therefore when he ceases so to minister. (quoted in Posel 1990: 
40).   
 
Mahmood Mamdani argues that the Stallard Commission went beyond calling for 
racial segregation to make “segregation the basis of representation” (Mamdani 1996: 
93), recommending that each local authority establish a Native Affairs Department 
that would assume responsibility for the administration of its own segregated 
residential location, and, at the same time serve as “ unit of representation, being a 
Native Advisory Board staffed by African legal residents but chaired by a white 
superintendent of locations” (ibid).  Formalised in the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) 
Act, this was, according to Mamdani, “a piece of legislation that for the first time 
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crystallised not only residential segregation but a comprehensive administration of 
urban Africans along separate racial lines, thus constructing a Chinese wall between 
native and white civil society” (ibid: 93-94).   
 
Between 1923 and 1927, 30 000 African people were forcibly removed from the city, 
setting up home in “unproclaimed remnants of the city”, including Sophiatown, 
Newclare and Martindale, as well as municipal hostels and locations (ibid: 120).  
However, Africans returned to slum areas, and new migrants to the city occupied 
slums next to poor whites in spite of the Johannesburg Council‟s efforts at 
segregation.  More importantly, however, is the fact that the number of poor whites in 
the city increased dramatically.  Nationally, those defined by government as poor 
white rose from 106 000 in 1916 to 120 000 in 1921 and 300 000 in 1933, with “a 
large proportion of these newly urbanised poor” seeking “a niche in Johannesburg” 
(ibid).  As the living conditions of these increasing numbers of poor whites 
deteriorated on a scale that could not be ignored by the authorities, specific attention 
turned towards the establishment of state-subsidised housing for poor whites.  Sue 
Parnell argues: 
 
The most difficult aspect of ridding slums of whites proved to be 
finding suitable alternative accommodation.  Political imperatives 
of wooing poor whites, combined with elitist notions of the 
inherent superior potential of whites as opposed to blacks, made it 
essential that whites be provided with housing that would 
encourage their social upliftment.  As the private sector was 
unlikely to initiate housing of the standard required at a cost within 
the means of poor whites, the state intervened to make available 
funds for public housing schemes.  In this way, the establishment 
of council housing for whites was seen as crucial in eliminating 
racial mixing in cheap quarters of the city. (ibid: 129). 
 
In 1930 the Central Housing Board was authorised to grant sub-economic loans for 
white housing schemes; a low rate of interest was introduced to allow for low rentals 
to be charged.  And, in 1934 the Slums Act was passed, giving local authorities the 
powers to seize whole areas considered to be slums without the need to obtain 
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eviction orders (which demanded that alternative accommodation be made available 
to the affected residents).  Parnell illustrates that it was made quite clear that the 
strategy of authorities was to remove all slum-dwellers and to re-house only the 
whites.   
 
This racialised approach to poverty and the poor would come to characterise state 
policy in the years to come, culminating in the policies of apartheid from 1948 to 
1994.  Between 1929 and 1930, the poor white problem became the subject of a 
report, funded by the Carnegie Foundation, which serves as an important historical 
document with regard to poverty in South Africa.  The report of the Carnegie 
Commission painted a pitiful picture of white poverty, both in the countryside and in 
the growing urban areas, making reference to the various conditions of poor whites 
described above through the work of Bundy, Iliffe and Parnell.  The report portrayed 
white poverty as the structural poverty of landlessness, combined with the poverty of 
low wages and unemployment, and the burden of large families.  It also emphasised 
that the destitute were a separate category, still generally including the sick, the 
disabled, widows, and those who had lost the family breadwinner.  Significantly, the 
report concluded that “agriculture offered no solution to the poor white problem and 
that „the best prospects for the family as a whole are offered by the bigger industrial 
centres‟” (Iliffe 1987: 119), drawing on the experiences of poor whites who “only 
most unwillingly” left the countryside (ibid).   
 
Iliffe points out, however, that the Carnegie Commission‟s report, being based on 
research conducted before the depression, was too optimistic in this regard as it 
“ignored the white poverty caused by incapacitation and unemployment” in the towns 
(ibid).  Looking at a study conducted in the first half of 1933 by the Cape Town 
General Board of Aid, Iliffe shows the existence of high levels of poverty amongst 
the able-bodied, „assisted‟ by inadequate levels and systems of relief in urban areas 
during this period.  Iliffe argues that the Carnegie Commission and the Cape Town 
investigation “agreed that existing attempts to alleviate white poverty by charity and 
relief were inadequate, misguided, and unnecessarily complicated” (ibid: 120).   
 
Each province had its own system of poor relief as the South Africa Act of 1909 had 
designated poor relief a provincial responsibility.  In the Cape, both municipal and 
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provincial administrations financed the Cape Town General Board of Aid and 
provided match funds to the amounts spent by charitable organisations; the Transvaal 
spent large amounts on poor relief, but left the fate of Johannesburg‟s poor to the 
Rand Aid Association and other private charities; the Orange Free State spent 
generously on poor relief, with a quarter of the monies spent being distributed to 
Africans, and all of its funds going to private charities; Natal insisted that poor relief 
for Africans was a Union (national government) responsibility, distributing nearly all 
its funds to charities working in white communities (ibid).  The role of the Union 
government in welfare/relief provision was initially limited, with its most significant 
service being the provision of free medicine to the poor, and its responsibilities 
extending to miner‟s phthisis and workmen‟s compensation.  In 1913, the Children‟s 
Protection Act introduced at a national level the provision of maintenance grants to 
white and Coloured destitute children, orphanages and children‟s homes, and mothers 
and grandmothers in need.  In 1928, old age pensions were introduced for indigent 
whites and Coloureds.  In terms of private charities, more than 1 000 voluntary 
welfare organisations are said to have existed in 1939.  A survey of them showed that 
“roughly one-half dealt with general relief and welfare, more than three-quarters 
concerned themselves only with Europeans, and there was a heavy concentration in 
large towns” (ibid: 121).   
 
John Iliffe points out that the Carnegie Commission “complained that amateur relief 
bodies pauperised poor whites by indiscriminate charity” (ibid).  The Commission 
looked towards the experiences of social welfare in the USA, which “had stressed the 
need to investigate each case and grant relief only in a form which would rehabilitate 
rather than pauperise” (ibid), „rehabilitation‟ referring to the individual‟s ability to 
become productive through entry into wage labour and caring for himself and his 
family.  In response to these concerns from the Commission as well as the Cape 
Town investigation mentioned earlier, the Union government established a 
Department of Social Welfare within the Department of Labour in 1933.  In 1935, 
these were linked in the creation of the Department of Labour and Social Welfare, 
and in 1937 an autonomous Department of Social Welfare was established with the 
Cabinet-defined function to “rehabilitate the socially unadjusted or poorly adjusted 
individual or family” (ibid).  In 1940, the Department took over the relief functions of 
the provinces (with the exception of Natal), and “ordered that every application [for 
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poor relief/welfare] must be thoroughly investigated, only one agency must provide 
relief in any area, relief must normally be given in kind and only to those wholly 
destitute and without close kin, recipients must where possible render some return 
service, and assistance must not be made attractive” (ibid: 121-122).  Private charities 
were also discouraged from providing general relief, being encouraged instead to 
cater for specific categories of the poor.   
 
Between 1939 and 1945, the Department of Social Welfare‟s work involved primarily 
the administration of the Children‟s Act of 1937, old age pensions, and the extension 
of certain welfare provisions in imitation of welfare state models in Britain and New 
Zealand (ibid: 122).  In 1933, a Social Security Committee proposed unemployment, 
disability and other benefits.  While Europeans, Coloureds, Asians, and long-term 
African wage-earners who elected to join would receive full benefits at “rates 
graduated by race” (ibid), most Africans would only receive old age or disability 
pensions and other minor benefits.  While the total cost was estimated at an annual 
figure of 30 000 pounds, Iliffe notes that “Parliament drastically reduced the 
proposals, especially for non-Europeans, and in 1945 Government abandoned a 
comprehensive scheme in favour of ad hoc improvements” (ibid).  For whites, the 
“chief gains” were unemployment benefits and family allowances (ibid).   
 
Iliffe argues that one possible reason for scepticism towards proposals for greater 
welfare provisions was the fact that the poor white problem was diminishing.  While 
Afrikaner nationalist mobilisations of relief for poor whites had not eradicated the 
problem and welfare measures could be described as nothing more than palliative, the 
real amelioration came “by providing jobs for whites at African expense” (ibid).  But, 
Iliffe argues, such measures did not provide the long-term solutions required to 
ensure that poor whites were able to escape their inferior living conditions 
permanently.  The poor white problem would only, in the longer term, be settled 
through the fact that poor whites “had the vote and succeeded after 1945 in pressuring 
their rulers into transferring their poverty to poor blacks” (ibid).   
 
Until the 1940s, food rations for the permanently indigent and short-term emergency 
relief given in the form of food or work were the primary forms of state aid to the 
African poor, administered by the Native Affairs Department.  Institutional care was 
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also provided in the form of subsidising care at the Bantu Refuge at Germiston 
(established in 1927 in a deserted mine compound as a home for “aged, infirm and 
maimed natives and for children who have no relatives capable of supporting them” 
(Department of Native Affairs quoted in Iliffe 1987: 140); the Elandsdoorn rural 
settlement for the aged and infirm; and to insane asylums.  However, conditions at 
these institutions were so bad that many preferred to try to survive outside of them.  
For example, in 1940 the Bantu Refuge at Germiston had space for 200 men and 54 
women, but housed only 60 men and 21 women, with Iliffe quoting from the Native 
Economic Commission that the Refuge‟s “depressing cheerlessness encouraged the 
poor „to make their living on the streets‟” (Iliffe 1987: 140).  Most responsibility for 
aid to the African poor was left to municipalities, with some large towns forming 
social welfare branches and setting up almshouses in the 1930s and 1940s.  A few 
private charities were also involved; however, they relied largely on public funds.  
Overall, very little relief was provided to the African poor.  Iliffe notes that in 
Johannesburg in 1936, only 5 per cent of charitable expenditure happened by 
organisations servicing African needs in any meaningful way (ibid). 
 
In addition to poor relief, the state granted compensation to African workers who had 
contracted phthisis and silicosis from 1911, and the Workmen‟s Compensation Act of 
1934 extended compensation to deaths and disabilities resulting from work in other 
industries.  Although the Blind Persons‟ Act of 1936 excluded Africans from 
receiving pensions, the Native Affairs Department started paying a monthly pension 
to blind Africans soon afterwards.  In 1944 the Act was amended to include black 
South Africans.  (Iliffe 1987: 141).  Iliffe argues that it was the central role played by 
Jan Hofmeyr, who became Minister for Social Development in 1937, that led to the 
extension of some welfare rights to poor Africans.  In 1944, Hofmeyr insisted on 
extending the functions of the Department of Social Welfare under the Children‟s Act 
(i.e. the provision of maintenance grants) to small numbers of Africans, “an important 
step because it broke the South African tradition that services for Africans must be 
provided separately and through the Native Affairs Department” (ibid).  Based on 
arguments emerging from the report of the Social Security Committee of 1944, 
Hofmeyr also campaigned for “permanently employed or urbanised Africans should 
receive the same range of benefits as other races, although generally at lower rates” 
(ibid).  The primary benefits, it was argued, should be old age pensions, family 
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allowances, invalidity pensions, and unemployment benefits.  All other Africans 
would be expected to pay lower taxes and enjoy fewer benefits; however, these 
should include invalidity payments and old age pensions.  When government 
abandoned plans for such extensions, Hofmeyr “salvaged the most important African 
benefits by including them in his budget” (ibid).  These included the extension of old 
age pensions, invalidity pensions, and disability grants to Africans.     
 
Controversy also erupted over unemployment benefits, introduced in 1947 for 
permanent urban employees, including Africans.  As white opposition to this policy 
grew, with white men arguing that unemployed African men be assigned to work on 
farms requiring labour and that white working men were unfairly subsidising the 
interests of Africans, the legislation was suspended as “refusals to contribute grew 
and an election approached” (Iliffe 1987: 141).  When the National Party won the 
election in 1948, the legislation was amended “to exclude all lower-paid Africans” 
(ibid).  Apartheid would see the further institutionalisation of racial segregation, with 
the National Party determined “to check African urbanisation, redirect labour to 
farms, and ensure that those Africans indispensable in towns should live not in 
freehold townships or squatter settlements but in segregated, orderly, and easily 
controlled locations” (ibid: 260).   
 
Apartheid legislation would be crafted that completely changed the urban landscape.  
In 1950, the Group Areas Act marked out separate areas for residence by different 
race groups in urban areas, and gave apartheid authorities the powers to forcibly 
remove black people from their places of residence to areas designated for occupation 
by blacks.  The Native Services Levy Act of 1952 made it compulsory for white 
employers who did not provide accommodation for their African workers to pay a 
weekly levy to the municipality.  And urban development under apartheid would 
work to forcibly separate the population along racial lines for the benefit of a thriving 
capitalism.  For example, in 1955, the Witwatersrand town of Benoni would become 
one of the first to have its own new African township created, financed by the 
National Housing Commission.  It was linked by electric rail to workplaces eleven 
kilometres away, and made up of two- and three-room concrete houses with free 
electricity, divided into eight „tribal zones‟ with schools teaching in the different 
vernacular languages (ibid).  In Johannesburg, with the exception of Alexandra, from 
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1955 onwards all squatter settlements and freehold townships were demolished and 
their residents forcibly removed to Soweto, thirteen kilometres south-west of the city.  
In both Alexandra and Soweto conditions of overcrowding and poverty would persist.      
 
While segregationist legislation was crafted to govern the urban black population, 
additional laws would be created to try “to remove and consign the poor to the most 
remote countryside” (ibid).  In 1951 the Bantu Authorities Act, and in 1952 the Bantu 
Laws Amendment Act, were passed, allowing for apartheid authorities to deport 
Africans to nine (later ten) „homelands‟ or reserves, that is, areas of land designated 
as suitable for African occupation, and created „tribal‟ authorities.  Together these 
acts also increased the powers of the chieftancy, “giving them financial powers to 
levy and collect taxes to finance their own costs” (Mamdani 1986: 101).  In 1959, the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was passed, allowing for the 
transformation of the reserves into self-governing „bantustans‟, effectively arguing for 
the separate governing of African people along ethnic or tribal lines.  John Iliffe, 
arguing that this legislation marked clear efforts to remove the African poor to 
separate places of residence as well as to produce a separate system of welfare and 
administration of the African poor writes, “The transfer of the poor to the homelands 
was integral to apartheid” (Iliffe 1987: 275), involving the transfer of responsibility 
for the well-being of the African poor away from central government to native 
authorities in the homelands.  Discourse of the time would revive old notions of 
African society as a caring society in which communities and families took 
responsibility for „their own kin(d)‟.   
 
In the words of the Minister of Bantu Affairs in 1955: 
 
We want to evolve a system whereby we reinstate the natural 
obligations of Bantu authorities and Bantu children in regard to 
their old people, with the support of an equal amount of money to 
that which we now spend wrongly in caring for them. (quoted in 
Iliffe 1987: 276). 
 
This view was one that dominated not only state discourse, but permeated white 
society.  Writing in the Journal of Racial Affairs in 1950, J. L. Sadie remarked that 
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“the outstanding problem, dominating all others, is the relative numbers of the 
different races constituting the Union‟s population, and their differential rates of 
growth” (Sadie 1950: 12).  He went on to write: 
 
For in the long run the numbers must count.  In this connection it is 
the numerical relation between Europeans and non-Europeans, and 
in particular between Europeans and Natives, which commands 
our attention.  A complacent attitude towards this problem on the 
part of the Europeans, who as a minority still rule the country, is, 
to say the least, irresponsible. (ibid). 
 
Outlining the social dangers of allowing the numbers of the African population on 
South African soil to outdo the numbers of the white population, as, Sadie argues, 
will be the case if the white settler population continues to provide for the welfare of 
the African population
43
, he makes the case for the removal of all forms of welfare 
provision for Africans and their removal to homelands with their own authorities: 
 
If the Europeans do not want themselves to be swamped – and it 
may be in the interest of the Native too that the Europeans are not 
so swamped, at least during the next fifty or hundred years – the 
Natives will have to be put into a position where they are 
themselves responsible for their own well-being.  Which does not 
mean that the white man is completely divested of all 
responsibility.  On the contrary.  But integration of the Natives into 
the European economy have to be revitalised.  But the barriers to 
multiplication need not be the bare Malthusian subsistence minima 
any more.  They may contain all the elements of a decent standard 
of living.  But that is perhaps for the Native to decide, under the 
help and guidance of Europeans. (ibid: 17).  
 
                                                 
43
 In Sadie‟s mind, the South African white settler population was superior to other colonising peoples 
who used their superior weaponry to get rid of their native populations.  This would eventually, 
according to Sadie, however, pose a threat to the survival and well-being of the white population as the 
numbers of the African population would exceed those of the white population. 
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What followed was a period of shutting down “wrongly situated institutions” and 
“devising social and welfare services for the Bantu on their own lines” (Iliffe 1987: 
276).  Residents of mental asylums, places of refuge and other state institutions 
housing Africans were removed to the homelands.  Homeland authorities assumed 
responsibility for the provision of care to the sick, the disabled, the aged, orphans, and 
the destitute generally.  Responsibility for the distribution of old age pensions was 
also gradually transferred to them. 
 
By 1981 almost eighty per cent of South Africa‟s poor lived in the homelands (Iliffe 
1987: 269).  This is significant both in that it illustrates that eighty per cent of South 
Africa‟s poverty was experienced by African people concentrated on thirteen per cent 
of its land, and that the administration of poverty and the poor happened largely 
outside of the ambit of central government through decentralised forms in these areas.  
It would appear that the scourge of multiracial poverty identified as a threat to social 
stability and a barrier to economic development at the end of the nineteenth century 
had effectively been dealt with.  Mahmood Mamdani argues that this “reorganisation 
of the state under apartheid was principally the recasting of a relationship between the 
central and the local state through two simultaneous and seemingly contradictory 
moves” in trying to deal with the problem of “native control” (Mamdani 1986: 100-
101).  While “apartheid removed the Native Affairs Department from rural areas and 
replaced it with a decentralised form of Native Authority administration”, “the Native 
Affairs Department emerged full blown in the urban areas” where it “displaced local 
authorities in the administration of all aspects of Bantu Affairs” (ibid).  For Mamdani, 
then, the policies of racial segregation, as they unfolded in South Africa from the late 
nineteenth century, marked both the need for economic change and the need for 
strategies to control an ever-growing and increasingly resistant urbanised African 
population. 
 
Apartheid social welfare policies are clear examples of how racial segregation was 
entrenched in all aspects of life.  Nattrass and Seekings (2006) show how welfare 
spending by the apartheid government in its early years decreased as a proportion of 
overall government expenditure, largely as a result of cutbacks in spending on 
African people.  The Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act of 1949 introduced 
the requirement that “African workers have a very high income in order to participate 
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in the state-subsidised unemployment insurance system” (ibid: 130), resulting in a 
“near-total decline” (ibid) in unemployment benefits paid out to African workers, 
whose average wages would not rise to meet this requirement until 1967 (ibid: 131).  
Nattrass and Seekings argue that “perhaps the most visible attack on the embryonic 
universalistic welfare system was the widening gap between old-age pensions paid to 
the different race groups” (ibid).  While the maximum value of the old-age pension 
for African pensioners remained steady in real terms from the mid-1940s to about 
1970, the real value of the pension paid to white pensioners during the same period 
increased, doubling in real terms in the 1950s and 1960s.  The gap between the 
maximum pension values therefore widened steadily, with the African pension 
reaching its lowest value (R3.70 a month in the mid-1960s or 13 per cent of the white 
pension), which according to government‟s own estimates was insufficient to cover 
the costs of the minimum food needs of an individual (ibid)
44
.      
 
While the policies and legislation explored above have been shown to have been 
crafted in response to resistance to incorporation into wage labour by both black and 
white peasants and to perceived threats of resistance from the poor, apartheid would 
be characterised by the growth of organised resistance against the many restrictions 
on and prescriptions for life amongst South Africans, in particular the black 
population.  But the ideology of separate development would allow the central 
apartheid state to absolve responsibility for African poverty, its authority being 
provoked only by the refusal of African people to accept their subjection to the 
inferior quality and standards of living in the homelands.  This authority would be 
exercised through repressive and forceful means, the instruments of the police and 
army being mobilised to prevent the movement and acting of black people outside of 
the laws designed to consign them to the status of second-class citizens, rather than 
through the crafting of governmental policies.  For the white population, however, an 
expansive programme of state protections in the form of job reservation and social 
welfare provisions would unfold under apartheid. 
 
By the 1970s, however, as a result of increasing resistance and changes in the South 
African economy (Marais), “the apartheid project had shifted” (Nattrass and Seekings 
                                                 
44
 While pensions for Coloured and Indian pensioners were on average higher than African pensions, 
their maximum values also decreased in relation to white pensions (Nattrass and Seekings 2006: 132).   
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2006: 147), with the deracialisation of several state policies or attempts to reduce or 
remove “explicit racial discrimination” (ibid).  Nattrass and Seekings write: 
 
New opportunities opened up for some African peope to earn 
higher incomes.  By the end of the 1970s, all statutory job 
reservations outside of mining had disappeared; the industrial 
conciliation machinery was about to be reformed to include the 
(now legalised) black trade unions.  Shares of national income by 
race shifted drastically.  Welfare payments to African pensioners 
were increased in real terms, as were expenditures on African 
schools (ibid: 148). 
 
However, Nattrass and Seekings also point out that unemployment grew during this 
period, resulting in overall inequality remaining pronounced.   
 
As the problem of poverty became an inescapable feature of everyday life in South 
Africa, in both rural and urban areas, a number of different interests
45
 converged in a 
research process about poverty and the poor in South Africa that spanned the years 
1980-1984, culminating in a conference in 1984, and the publishing of its findings in 
the form of a book in 1989, that is, the second Carnegie Commission into poverty, of 
the 1980s.  The Carnegie Commission was significant in highlighting, for the first 
time, the extent of African poverty, and the need for concrete measures and 
interventions to eradicate it.  Francis Wilson argues that the commission was 
important in showing the need for proper measures of poverty; the need for wide-
ranging and inclusive definitions of poverty and the poor; for attention to be paid to 
the relationship between employment and poverty; and for policy-makers and 
politicians to listen to the poor (Wilson 2009 in Huschka and Moller 2009: 21-22).   
 
He goes on to write: 
 
                                                 
45
 The second Carnegie Commission gathered together “some 450 academics and other knowledgeable 
people from 23 universities and other places around Southern Africa” (Wilson in Huschka and Moller 
2009).   
 107 
The Carnegie Report, when it was published in January 1989, 
seemed to be whistling in the wind.  The apartheid government 
was firmly in power and looked, to most observers, as if it was still 
there for a long time to come.  And an attack on poverty was 
certainly not at the top of its agenda.  But within a year, on the 
second of February 1990, the new leader of the National Party and 
President of the country, F.W. De Klerk made his dramatic speech 
in Parliament.  Political prisoners were all to be released; exiles 
were permitted to return; and the African National Congress was to 
be unbanned.  Four years later democratic elections were held and 
the ANC led by Nelson Mandela swept to power, with a mandate 
that was focused particularly on the eradication of poverty.  (ibid: 
23). 
 
The following two chapters will explore how this mandate to fight poverty unfolds in 
the context of the embrace of neoliberal policies by the ANC government. 
 
Much has been written about the many organisations, movements, and collectives that 
emerged in resistance to apartheid policies (Karis and Gerhart 1997; Dubow; 
McKinley; Seekings), many emphasising the diversity and multi-class nature of 
collective action.  The African National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), which came to define the transition from apartheid to the Government 
of National Unity and Reconciliation (GNUR), were „broad-church‟ formations, 
bringing together people from different classes and races.  And while struggles of the 
poor would continue (for example, in the form of squatter movements), sustained 
organisations would emerge in the form of trade unions and the mass labour 
movement, civics in townships, and political organisations that would emphasise the 
racialised subjugation of all South Africans.  In struggles against apartheid, then, we 
find the emergence of political subjects in the form of „the working class‟, 
popularised in and through the labour movement, and in the form of „Black‟ (the 
racialised subject
46
).  And questions of poverty are addressed largely within the 
                                                 
46
 This is perhaps best evident in the writings of Steve Biko and the philosophy and practice of Black 
Consciousness, in which the oppressed subject is encouraged to imagine himself/herself in positive 
terms, against the negating force of the „non‟ in „non-white‟, as Black, signifying antagonism and 
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overarching frame of racial inequality, the large majority of the oppressed being 
subjected to conditions of poverty.   
 
The remainder of this thesis explores the emergence of the poor as a political subject 
in post-apartheid South Africa, as apartheid‟s segregationist logic is attempted to be 
undone under the mantle of neoliberalism and its attendant growth in conditions of 
precarity and poverty.  Significant for the discussion that follows is the relationship 
between wage labour and approaches to poverty and the poor that has been explored 
in this chapter.         
                                                                                                                                            
production of a subjectivity that does not conform to any essentialist notions of blackness, but to an 
open-ended production of meaning in and amongst people united in common struggles (Biko (2004); 
Naidoo and Veriava in Mngxitama et al. (2009) ).   
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On and around 17 May 2010 all major print, radio and television news bulletins in 
South Africa featured a „surprise‟ visit of President Zuma to a shack in an informal 
settlement next to Orange Farm called Sweetwaters (News24 18 May 2010 - 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zuma-nearly-reduced-to-tears-
20100518, accessed 23/06/2010; SABC News (television) 17 May 2010; The Star 19 
May 2010).  Evidently, the President had been brought close to tears as he 
contemplated the fact that human beings were still living in such squalor and poverty 
(“like pigs”), saying: “It is not almost every time I feel like crying during my visits... 
You could swear no-one lived in that shack” (News24, 18 May 2010).  Listening to 
the President on SABC News, one could swear that the President had never opened a 
South African newspaper or watched a South African news bulletin or even just 
driven around the country he leads.  Driving or flying into any major South African 
city, it is almost impossible not to notice the numerous shacks that litter and border 
these cities and their suburbs, stubborn reminders of apartheid‟s attempts at control 
over the black population and of resistance from black people against these attempts; 
reminders also that an ANC government has not been able to eradicate poverty and 
inequality.   
 
But it would seem that President Zuma believes the rhetoric of his own government 
and party, that is, that in spite of levels of poverty and inequality continuing to be 
high, much progress has been made with regard to improving the lives of the general 
population.  Or, could it be that moments such as the one played out above by Jacob 
Zuma serve the specific purpose of portraying a widespread occurrence as the 
exception?  President Zuma was also quoted as attributing the poor living conditions 
of this particular household to the segregationist policies of apartheid and to the 
failure of local councillors and municipalities to deliver the services necessary to 
ensure that a decent quality of life is ensured for all South Africans (ibid).  In this 
way, his tears served to reinforce the perception that the country‟s President, its 
national government, and the ANC remain committed to the eradication of poverty, 
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unable to comprehend that its policies have allowed for a single household to be 
living in a shack like the one visited by the President.  Rather than its policies and 
commitments becoming the focus of inquiry, reflection and critique, it is the 
implementation of these policies and the individuals and institutions responsible for 
driving this that are blamed for the continued experience of conditions and standards 
of living considered „indecent‟.  
 
President Zuma‟s visit above is just one of many attempts of government ministers 
and ANC party officials to address the age-old moral imperative that society‟s most 
vulnerable be assisted in ways that allow them to live decent lives.  In South Africa, 
the ANC government would carry the additional pressures of delivering on the 
commitments made in the liberation struggle to improving the quality of life for all 
those who had been disadvantaged, oppressed and exploited by apartheid.   
 
Under apartheid, exclusion of the black majority from the right to vote, and severe 
repression and control of the black population meant that the sphere of the political 
was characterised by creative antagonism and experimentation with forms of 
organising and action outside of the traditional imaginary of what politics is.
47
  With 
the dismantling of apartheid, however, collective commitments to ungovernability 
and antagonism towards the state apparatus would have to be undone and remade 
towards co-operative governance, reconciliation, and the building of a unified nation 
through the cultivation of a „partnership‟ between a democratic state and „responsible 
citizens‟ seen to be able to express themselves politically through the vote 
(McKinley, 1997; Robbins, 2008).   
 
But, as this chapter will show, efforts to address the inequalities and injustices 
entrenched by apartheid within a neoliberal framework would result in resistance 
from affected groups, many identifying themselves as „poor people‟s movements‟ or 
„movements of the poor‟, often expressing themselves outside of the electoral and 
legal systems.  With such protests highlighting the exclusion of the poor from the 
newly constituted, „reconciled‟ nation, state and party discourse will be shown to give 
                                                 
47
 See Naidoo and Veriava (2009) for more commentary on this.  For an excellent illustration of this, 
through the case of Alexandra township in Johannesburg, see Belinda Bozzoli, 2004, Theatres of 
Struggle and the End of Apartheid. 
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priority to demonstrating its commitment to the poor.  While the national sphere has 
set in motion a number of debates and processes around defining and measuring 
poverty, the sphere of local government has been pressurised to address these 
commitments to improving the lives of the poor within a framework of cost-recovery, 
privatisation, and reduced state spending (particularly in the form of 
intergovernmental transfers, such as the equitable share
48
 and the generation of 
municipal „own revenue‟ from charging for services).  In attempts by the state to 
commodify basic services, such as water and electricity, a contested field of 
signification has emerged over the needs, rights and forms of life of the poor.  As this 
has happened, inequality as a focus and frame has receded in discussions and debates 
in spite of it being shown to increase as levels of poverty increase (see below).  And 
particular interventions crafted for that population group in society identified as poor 
and therefore deserving of state assistance.  This chapter explores how these 
categories are shaped and evolve in a context of struggle led by poor people in post-
apartheid South Africa.   
 
 'Poverty' Emerges as a Priority in the Transition 
 
In the policy documents and commitments made by the ANC government since the 
early 1990s, there is a consistent move away from approaches that prioritise the 
provision of a decent standard and quality of life for all disadvantaged South Africans 
over the interests of the market, towards a logic through which there is an incremental 
meeting of the most basic needs of the most marginalised in order to „enable‟ them to 
become „self-reliant‟ and „help themselves‟ out of their „poverty traps‟.  This happens 
within a context of the commodification of basic services, the introduction of the 
individual duty to pay for services, and the flexibilisation of labour.  In this way, „the 
better life for all‟, promised in the slogans and election paraphernalia of the ANC, has 
come to be portrayed by the state as a process in progress through a „partnership‟ 
between itself and its citizens.   
 
This „partnership‟ would require that the state provide those minimal resources 
necessary to „enable‟ the individual citizen to improve his/her own life by assuming 
                                                 
48
 Equitable share refers to that portion of the national budget transferred to municipalities in order to 
assist the latter to meet the service delivery needs of those members of their jurisdiction identified as 
indigent or unable to afford the necessities of life. 
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the responsibility to find income and to pay for basic services.  In the discourse 
produced to entrench this logic, a figure has emerged in the form of the poor that has 
come to signify that population group in society through which the state defines its 
minimalist role in the lives of its citizens and for whom it encourages and entrenches 
a particularly inferior standard and quality of life and prescribes the „duties‟ of paying 
for basic services above those free „lifelines‟ provided by the state, accepting flexible 
forms of work and/or becoming entrepreneurs, and „living within one‟s means‟ (i.e. 
being cautious when consuming basic services, budgeting carefully, and exercising 
self-restraint generally).            
 
While there is no doubt that the general values, beliefs and principles upheld by the 
liberation movement committed those struggling against apartheid to the eradication 
of poverty as a state of economic deprivation and lack, through its various resolutions 
and charters that characterised apartheid as a racist system designed to produce a 
servile, black underclass, it is in the 1990s that poverty as a concept and word, and the 
poor and the poorest of the poor as categories come into more frequent and repetitive 
use, as the ANC prepares to participate in and extend the sphere of governance to 
those previously excluded by the apartheid state.     
 
In the Freedom Charter (1955), widely held as the founding document of the Congress 
Alliance, the word 'poverty' is hardly mentioned.  However, the document 
characterises the apartheid state as one built on inequality and injustice.  It commits 
the movement to struggling for equality and justice, both concepts that would require 
the elimination of an underclass in society.  The document also commits the 
movement to fighting for a situation in which "the people shall share in the wealth of 
the country" and "the land shall be shared among those who work it", both being read 
by many as speaking to the need for nationalisation and redistribution in the interests 
of the elimination of inequality and injustice.  Speaking to the need for secure, 
protected, and well-paid jobs; decent and affordable housing; free education; and the 
protection of human rights, the Freedom Charter speaks of a vision of a free, fair and 
equal society governed by a contract between South African citizens and a 
democratically elected government committed to building a non-racial, non-sexist, 
and democratic nation.     
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The 1990s saw the building and shaping of this contract as the ANC assumed the role 
of ruling party in a democratically elected „government of national unity‟.  Happening 
at a time when neoliberal policies had gained ascendance in the world, this contract 
would have to be shaped according to a logic of export-oriented growth and the 
„fundamentals‟ of privatisation and corporatisation, the principle of „user pays‟, 
flexibilised labour, and greater individual responsibility, necessitating a change in the 
language and commitments of the ANC in the crafting of this contract.  In 1994, the 
RDP was adopted as the programme outlining the vision for a democratic transition 
by the Alliance, cementing its adoption of a 'mixed-economy' approach including a 
number of Keynesian and redistributive prescriptions (e.g. with regard to basic 
services), but also committing South Africa to an export-driven, market-oriented 
economy in the interests of boosting investor confidence, trade liberalisation and other 
mechanisms for greater deregulation of the economy (Barchiesi, 2005; Bundy, 2004; 
Gelb, 2004).   
 
For many theorists, the RDP was reflective of an earlier "trade-off" (Bundy, 2004) or 
"implicit bargain or accommodation" (Gelb, 2004: 2) between white big business and 
the ANC, "involving the ANC committing to macro-economic stability and 
international openness and business agreeing to participate in 'capital reform' to 
modify the racial structure of asset ownership, which would come to be called 'black 
economic empowerment' (BEE).  The broad outlines of this accommodation emerged 
in 1990, and policy planning and implementation of trade and financial liberalisation 
began well before the 1994 elections." (ibid.).       
 
But the growth path adopted by the RDP was not what was showcased.  Instead, its 
more redistributive and democratic aspects were celebrated in the galvanising of 
popular support for the ANC as it prepared to govern.  Patrick Bond argues that the 
RDP could be read in at least three ways – “from Left (or „socialist‟), Centre 
(„corporatist‟) and Right („neoliberal‟) perspectives” (Bond, 2000b: 91).  The 
commitment to international competitiveness; the absence of any discussion on 
private property rights; and arguments made that the meeting of basic needs would be 
opened up to the private sector could be characterised as Centre-Right perspectives 
contained in the RDP and its interpretation.  Bond argues, however, that organisations 
such as the SACP were also able to interpret the RDP as providing spaces for the 
 114 
adoption of policies that argued for forms of decommodification and universalisation 
of access in the sphere of basic services, for example.  It is perhaps this characteristic 
of the RDP for multiple and contested interpretations that has allowed for it to be 
mobilised so successfully at a rhetorical level by the ANC, holding the promise of 
progress in the lives of the majority at a symbolic level, yet remaining contested at the 
level of interpretation and implementation.   
 
It was on the basis of the RDP that the ANC would be elected into power in April 
1994.  In the document, poverty is identified as an enemy to be eradicated, and the 
problems created by apartheid are collapsed into the singly understood scourge of 
poverty:  
 
Poverty is the single greatest burden of South Africa's people, 
and is the direct result of the apartheid system and the grossly 
skewed nature of business and industrial development which 
accompanied it.  Poverty affects millions of people, the majority 
of whom live in the rural areas and are women… It is not merely 
the lack of income which determines poverty.  An enormous 
proportion of very basic needs are presently unmet.  In attacking 
poverty and deprivation, the RDP aims to set South Africa firmly 
on the road to eliminating hunger, providing land and housing to 
all our people, providing access to safe water and sanitation for 
all, ensuring the availability of affordable and sustainable energy 
sources, eliminating illiteracy, raising the quality of education 
and training for children and adults, protecting the environment, 
and improving our health services and making them accessible to 
all. (ANC, 1994: 14).    
 
Significantly, the RDP characterises poverty as a threat to sustainable democracy, 
stating,  
 
Without meeting basic needs, no political democracy can survive in 
South Africa (ibid: 15).   
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In acceptance of the 'realities' of the world economy, the RDP sees the ANC Alliance 
beginning to approach transformation and redress according to a logic of the progress 
possible or attainable within the workings of the neoliberal market, and the fashioning 
of a field of intervention for the state in the form of poverty and a figure to be assisted 
by the state in the form of the poor and the poorest of the poor.  By proposing the 
meeting of certain basic needs for a targeted group in society as an approach to 
solving this problem identified as poverty, the RDP also sets in motion a process of 
debate, discussion, research and policy formulation that comes to dominate the 
discourse of poverty in South Africa, a process that becomes increasingly technicist 
and technical, and that in itself produces particular understandings of poverty and the 
poor in society based on specific contestations of what constitutes minimal levels of 
service and access to essential resources necessary for the survival of those considered 
most poor.  In calling for “people-driven development”, the RDP would also elaborate 
a discourse of “lifeline tariffs” and the meeting of basic needs to facilitate “the 
participation of people in their own development” (ibid).    
 
Bond (2002: 185-186) points out that neoliberalism entered post-apartheid state policy 
discourse
49
 in a number of documents, including the Housing White Paper of 
November 1994 (Department of Housing), the Water Supply and Sanitation White 
Paper of November 1994 (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry -DWAF), the 
Urban Infrastructure Investment Framework of March 1995 (Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Development), the Urban and Rural Development Strategies of 
October 1995 (RDP Ministry), the Urban and Rural Development Frameworks of May 
1997 (Departments of Housing and Land Affairs), the Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Framework of July 1997 (Department of Constitutional Development - 
DCD), the Local Government White Paper of February 1998 (DCD), the April 1998 
Policy Paper on Intergovernmental Finance (Department of Finance), the August 1998 
Draft Regulatory Framework for Municipal Service Partnerships (DCD), and the 
December 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy (Department of Minerals and Energy 
Affairs). 
 
                                                 
49
 This is not to suggest that the implementation of neoliberal policies had not already been 
experimented with by the apartheid government.  As will be shown in chapters that follow, elements of 
privatisation and commodification were introduced in the sphere of the delivery of housing and 
electricity (including prepaid meters) in black townships in the 1980s and 1990s.  
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It is interesting to note that the drive towards developing 'proper measures' and means 
of knowing and tracking poverty, while it begins in the early 1990s, increases as the 
ANC and government's approach to the economy changes, with the adoption of a 
much more overtly neoliberal macro-economic framework in 1996, the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), which marked a clear shift away 
from the RDP's logic of 'growth through redistribution' towards that of 'redistribution 
through growth'.  The RDP, while itself shying away from detailed definitions of 
poverty and the poor, does emphasise the need for the development and evaluation of 
“key indicators” for measuring its own success (ibid: 17).   
 
As macro-economic policy comes to be fashioned by the neoliberal principles of 
GEAR, this drive towards measuring and defining the beneficiaries of the most basic 
provisions for survival provided by the state, would increase.  It is also within 
contexts of attempting to implement the neoliberal policies espoused by GEAR that 
we begin to see the development of ways to measure the minimal levels of service and 
access to resources necessary for the poor to survive and 'participate in their own 
development'.  As growth becomes the mantra of the ANC government, the need to 
show that the growth enjoyed by the South African economy is „pro-poor‟, that is, that 
its benefits „trickle down‟ to the poor, becomes paramount.  This in itself necessitates 
the development of techniques to measure where „pro-poor‟ interventions are 
necessary and where the poor are indeed benefiting from growth. 
 
In fashioning poverty and the poor as a field of intervention and knowledge for the 
neoliberalising state, the discipline of statistics and „getting the numbers right‟ (see 
Chapter 3), has also allowed for the proliferation of a revealing political discourse.  
While claiming to want to eradicate poverty, governmental representatives continue to 
approach its actions in an incremental manner, arguing that the state should take 
responsibility only for the provision of the minimal, most basic resources to those so 
poor that they are „trapped‟ in their debilitating positions, in order that they are able to 
help themselves out of these „poverty traps‟.  „Escaping‟ these „traps‟ would take both 
efforts from the state to provide these minimal requirements, and the individual, 
supported by his/her family and community mobilising their own resources to 
complement those provided by the state.  This language of „self-reliance‟, „individual 
responsibility, „the centrality of the family unit‟, and „the importance of the 
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community‟ in assisting people out of their „poverty traps‟ would come to define the 
general approach of the ANC government to addressing the needs of those outside of 
the formal labour market and the market economy, particularly as it began to shape 
policy in the sphere of social welfare in the form of a White Paper in 1997.   
 
„Escaping poverty‟ would come to be viewed as enabling access to the market 
economy through access to jobs or economic activity, with the state‟s role being to 
facilitate access to the very basic resources deemed necessary for the poor to become 
“self-reliant”, and the individual, family and community becoming partners in the 
delivery of “developmental social welfare‟” (RSA, 1997).   
 
Several commentators (Bond, 2007; Du Toit, 2007b; Hart, 2008; Veriava, 2011) have 
highlighted that policy discourse about the continuing problem of poverty in post-
apartheid South Africa has “been dominated by the notion that poor people stay poor 
because they are trapped in a „second economy‟” (Du Toit, 2007b: ii).  First 
introduced by President Mbeki in August 2003 in his „Letter from the President‟ 
published on the ANC‟s website, the thesis of the „two economies‟ has come to 
characterise how poverty and inequality are spoken about in the public sphere, 
designating the co-existence in South Africa of a „first world economy‟ with a „third 
world economy‟.   
 
Andries Du Toit argues that the mobilisation of the two economies thesis by Mbeki 
marked a shift away from “the assumption that GEAR on its own could serve to 
eradicate poverty and cleared the way for much greater emphasis on the role of a 
„developmental state‟” (ibid: 3).  It also marked, for him, an acknowledgement of the 
possibility that “poverty was not simply a disappearing legacy from the past but might 
be perpetuated by features of the post-transition order” (ibid; emphasis in original).   
Identifying the call for the state to develop specific interventions targeted at members 
of the second economy to assist them to develop the skills and access the resources 
necessary to become part of the first economy, Du Toit, however, offers the critique 
that the two economies thesis does not problematise the functioning of the first world 
economy itself, making Mbeki‟s analysis “reminiscent of very familiar – and largely 
discredited – dualist and liberal conceptions of the South African and other 
„developing‟ economies” (ibid).  
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Du Toit (2007b) and Hart (2008) also point out that the strict separation between the 
two economies implied by Mbeki‟s thesis is not born out in practice, but operates 
rather as an inappropriate metaphor.  They argue that the South African economy, 
while highly differentiated and productive of glaring inequalities, must be viewed as 
an integrated system, with the exploitation of large numbers of unemployed and semi-
employed people occupying positions of extreme precarity continuing to contribute 
towards the continued enrichment of a small, secure layer of rich people.   
 
Veriava (2011), building on Hart, argues that the official deployment of the two 
economies thesis should be viewed both in relation to the specific governmental 
challenge that it reflects on (that is, the poor) as well as the imperatives that accrue in 
confronting this challenge in nationalist discourse.  Through an exploration of 
struggles for water in post-apartheid Soweto, Veriava illustrates how the two 
economies thesis comes to be elaborated in “government‟s shifting „tactical approach‟ 
at the intersection of the delivery of basic services, and poverty alleviation and 
indigent management strategies”.  He writes:    
 
what is at stake in the two economies thesis is not that „level of 
abstraction‟ that Marxist political economists treat under the sign 
of „the economy‟, but a particular subject and „the milieu
‟
 to which 
it belongs. It is therefore no coincidence that, while the public 
deployments of the thesis have drawn reference from the 
characterisation of an informal sector, more often than not, what 
are indexed in reference to a second economy are less forms of 
economic activity, than the conditions of life of those said to be 
“trapped” in a second economy. (Veriava, 2011).   
 
It is the aim of this thesis to elaborate, through the experiences of Orange Farm, 
precisely this political subject in the form of the poor/s, produced both in and by state 
policy discourse and in and by movements of the poor.   
 
Franco Barchiesi (2004; 2005; 2007) has shown how contestation over basic needs 
and the rights of the poor emerges in the context of the decline of formal sector wage 
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labour and the traditional reliance on wage labour as a conduit for social citizenship 
rights in post-apartheid South Africa.  In spite of the promises of GEAR that its policy 
proposals would increase the production of formal sector jobs, by 2006 government 
was admitting that it was nowhere near its goal of halving unemployment by 2015 
despite increased growth (Mlambo-Ngcuka quoted in Business Report, 7 November 
2006).   
 
In fact, formal sector employment in sectors such as mining and manufacturing have 
declined, and flexible forms of labour (casual, contract, part-time and seasonal jobs) 
have been introduced as global competitiveness and trade liberalisation have 
demanded particular changes to the organisation of production and the market 
(Barchiesi, 2005).  The service sector, in which more flexible forms of labour are 
common, has, in addition, shown growth (Barchiesi, 2005; Kenny, 2001).  Recent 
research has also pointed to the fact that 44% of workers occupy jobs that are 
considered „informal‟, that is, without job security and benefits, with 80% not having 
formal employment contracts (Devey and Skinner quoted in Barchiesi, 2006).  With 
wage labour being viewed historically as a means through which individual citizens 
are able to meet their requirements for a decent quality of life in the form of 
decommodified health, welfare and basic services, its decline has necessitated new 
ways of thinking about the provision of these resources by the state.  As neoliberal 
principles have come to dictate the workings of the state, provision for the social, 
welfare and basic needs of the growing number of unemployed and informally 
occupied citizens would be represented as the responsibility of the individual citizen, 
with the minimal assistance of the state in the form of the discourse of „developmental 
social welfare‟. 
 
Describing the emergence and evolution of the use of the latter term through an 
exploration of the first years of the Department of Welfare and Population 
Development formed under the democratically elected government in its first term in 
office, Barchiesi writes,  
 
The White Paper (RSA, 1997) reaffirmed the notion of 
“developmental social welfare” as geared towards providing citizens 
with an “opportunity to play an active role in promoting their own 
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well-being”.  The priority on individual self-activation, under the 
guise of „empowerment‟ discourse, was combined with a view of 
social security and social services as “investments which lead to 
tangible economic gains” (RSA, 1997: 1.8). (Barchiesi, 2005: 382).    
 
The expansion of public spending expansion was also seen as dependent on economic 
growth, and “market forces, productivism and individual responsibility came 
therefore to provide strict constraints to redistributive and decommodifying policy 
interventions” (ibid).   
  
But these approaches that spoke only of providing „safety nets‟ in order to assist 
people out of their „poverty traps‟ would not withstand the growing demands of 
movements of the poor and broader civil society for more far-reaching interventions 
to address the problems of inequality and lack of access to basic resources.  In January 
2000, Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya, proclaimed that South Africa 
was facing “a time bomb of poverty and social disintegration” with “the potential to 
reverse the democratic gains made since 1994” (Department of Social Development, 
2000).  A „ten-point programme‟ was announced to improve the welfare system.  In 
Barchiesi‟s words, “the call for comprehensive social security was there combined, in 
stark departure from the developmental social welfare approach” (ibid: 400).  In 
March 2000, the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
Security for South Africa was appointed by the Cabinet, chaired by Professor Viviene 
Taylor, comprising 18 „expert‟ members, and coming to be known as the Taylor 
Committee.   
 
While the Committee‟s final report (2002) would reaffirm previous quantitative 
measures of the extent and reach of poverty in South Africa (see Chapter 3), it would 
mobilise them to slightly new ends, and support them with data gleaned from public 
hearings at which sections of the poor could speak about their experiences.  It would 
highlight that 60 per cent of those measured as being poor were not receiving any 
social security, and that relying on access to formal employment to eradicate poverty 
was not a viable option in South Africa where unemployment was so high and new 
jobs being created offering little protection from vulnerability.  The report spoke, 
then, not just of the unemployed poor, but also of the working poor, and of the need 
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for “comprehensive social security” in South Africa, arguing for universal provision 
of certain goods and services rather than the prevailing targeted system of 
interventions aimed only at the poorest of the poor.   
 
More concretely, the report proposed that a Basic Income Grant (BIG) be provided to 
all South Africans to enable the poor, both working and unemployed, to gain some 
measure of stability and ability to survive and become economically productive.  The 
report also argued strongly for the state to begin approaching the problem of poverty 
through the introduction of a “social package”, understood to be a way of achieving 
“a degree of balance between measures focused on reducing income, services 
(capability) and asset poverty” (ibid: 41).   
 
Using the „capabilities approach‟ developed by Amartya Sen, Nobel-laureate and 
renowned author, the report argues that the content of the Comprehensive Social 
Package (CSP) give centrality to basic services, incomes, and assets as essential in 
enhancing the capabilities of „the poor‟ to change their living conditions (ibid: 42).   
 
Despite these apparent shifts in discourse, the report would again call for the 
development of a nationally accepted quantitative model for the definition and 
measurement of poverty, and for interventions to provide access to certain minimal 
levels of resources calculated to be adequate for survival or that quality of life 
deemed appropriate to enable „the poor‟ to become economically active (ibid: 56).   
 
The Committee‟s report also re-emphasises the importance and centrality of the 
family unit and the community in ensuring that social assistance becomes useful in 
making the individual „self-reliant‟ and „responsible‟.   
 
It is also no different from the earlier developmental approach to welfare in its 
priorisation of the calculation of and agreement on minimal levels for interventions to 
be made, and makes a strong argument for why the BIG should be set at a minimal 
level so as to discourage „laziness‟ and the potential refusal to work.  It argues: 
 
The level at which a BIG is set will be crucial.  At the very least it 
should address destitution.  By providing such a minimum level of 
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income support people will be empowered to take the risks needed 
to break out of the poverty cycle.  Rather than serving as a 
disincentive to engage in higher return activities, such a (and 
irrevocable) grant could encourage risk taking and self-reliance.  
Such an income grant could thus become a springboard for 
development. (ibid: 61).   
 
While the Taylor Committee report certainly marked a shift in terms of some of the 
arguments that were being made with regard to the kind of social welfare that the 
ANC government should provide, it reinscribed the „rule by numbers‟, as even its 
calls for a CSP would be tempered by calls for proper statistics and measures to 
enable this CSP to work.  In addition, it would reassert the need for nationally agreed 
on minimal levels to be determined in the discussion about poverty eradication.  With 
regard to the BIG, it allowed the state to determine its implementation according to its 
fiscal situation.  Over time any discussion about a BIG would fade from state 
concerns.   
 
While the Taylor Committee would open up a debate about the state creating 
universal access to a basic income grant (BIG) not tied to wage labour, it would itself 
point to the current „fiscal constraints‟ of the state in meeting this prescription.  It 
would also very clearly argue for a BIG in the interests of promoting the ability for 
the individual to actively seek work and the self-activity and entrepreneurship 
capacities of the individual.  In this way, decommodified access was being argued for 
in order to stimulate participation in the market. 
 
In a more recent discussion document released by the Department of Social 
Development in November 2006, entitled, Linking Social Grants Beneficiaries to 
Poverty Alleviation and Employment, it is very clearly argued that any recipients of 
decommodified provisions from the state need to be encouraged to become part of 
programmes that encourage wage labour or economic self activity and 
entrepreneurship.  Prescribing a number of mechanisms for the identification and 
targeting of recipients of social grants and the exposure of them to employment and 
entrepreneurship development programmes, the document concludes that “the drive to 
get all South Africans working when they are able to do so must become a central 
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preoccupation” of the state as “a central pillar of building social cohesion and 
inclusiveness”.    
 
Accompanying these policy prescriptions has been a moral imperative for the 
individual not to „expect handouts from the state‟ and to take responsibility for his/her 
own life.  In an interview given to City Press newspaper in November 2007, Gauteng 
MEC for Housing, Nomvula Mokonyane, spoke about the need for “moral 
regeneration” in order to address the problems faced in the delivery of housing, 
arguing that people “should stop the culture of complete dependence on government”.   
 
She said,  
 
People should stop being dependants of government because it will 
destroy them.  Going through free schooling, then underperforming 
to a point where they don‟t qualify for bursaries and loans or even 
pass matric, then falling pregnant and depending on social grants 
to raise these children and waiting for RDP houses similar to those 
they grew up in is not right… That‟s why, during housing protests, 
you see young people – who can study and work – instead of old 
people.  We need to instil morals in our children because solutions 
for the housing backlog relate to education, poverty and moral 
regeneration. (Mooki, V, City Press, 18 November 2007).   
 
In the logic underpinning the MEC‟s words, those who make demands of the state as 
the poor should accept responsibility for their plight and work themselves out of these 
situations.  By expecting the state to provide for them, they become „immoral‟, living 
beyond their means and outside of the logic of restraint, conservation, and hard work.  
Completely erased is any sense that the plight that the poor find themselves in and 
struggle to change is a result of the very policies that the apartheid state and the post-
apartheid state have entrenched.        
 
Gillian Hart (2007) and David Everatt (2008) have characterised state policy 
discourse after 1994 as reminiscent of the New Poor Laws of 1834 England (see 
Chapter 1), highlighting the increasing attention paid towards separating „the 
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deserving poor‟ from „the undeserving poor‟ in post-apartheid South Africa.  Pointing 
out that neither of the above writers go beyond pointing out the vague sense of 
resemblance between contemporary governmental frameworks and the Poor Laws, 
Ahmed Veriava (2011) writes that the proper value of an analogical use of the Poor 
Laws lies in “the ways in which it allows us to recognise that, if one side of the 
processes of commodification are forms of enclosure, its other side is the foreclosure 
of strategies and forms of life resistant to the self-disciplining regimes of the market”.  
He adds that such a perspective also “implies rethinking the notion of the common 
beyond natural and material commons (such as land or water – what might be 
enclosed for instance), to include a consideration of their relation the socially 
productive networks and forms of community that, whether institutionally sanctioned 
or not, function to produce the conditions of life”. 
    
In similar ways to which the Poor Laws of 1834 served to encourage greater 
responsibility for the care of the self by the individual in the inauguration of a liberal 
mode of government by categorising the poor according to the moral attributes of 
willingness and commitment to work (see discussion of Dean and Foucault in Chapter 
1), this thesis will demonstrate how state policy in post-apartheid South Africa, 
particularly in the sphere of the delivery of basic services, works to classify the poor 
according to their willingness and ability to pay for basic services, as well as the 
willingness and ability to work and/or to engage in small-scale entrepreneurial 
activities.  It will also show how policies that seek to improve the lives of the poor in 
post-apartheid South Africa also attempt to make those identified and targeted as the 
poor behave in ways conducive to the logics of neoliberalism, such as paying for 
water and electricity before consuming them by accepting the measurement of their 
supply in the form of prepaid meters (see Chapters 4 and 6).     
 
Since the mid-1990s, then, as neoliberal policies have come to be accepted and 
encouraged by the ANC government, a discourse of the poor and poverty has emerged 
through which the state has attempted to carve out a field of intervention through 
which it has tried to limit its roles and responsibilities to that of providing the very 
minimal resources deemed necessary for survival, often portrayed as those resources 
necessary for the individual to become economically active in society.  Its 
mobilisation of these categories has also served to encourage and entrench minimal 
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standards of living for those on the margins of society, to restrict those identified as 
the poor to particularly inferior and indecent standards of living, and to produce a 
particular form of life for the poor.  But ordinary people, holding the ANC 
government to its promises of „a better life for all‟, have increasingly refused their 
disciplining and control by these categories, also employing these terms to make 
demands against the standards and quality of life prescribed by them (see below).       
 
Transformed into a field of intervention, the poor and poverty have become „sites of 
struggle‟ as the state attempts to govern that population group „excluded‟ from post-
apartheid society through their lack of a job or other decent means of income, and as 
increasingly vulnerable people come together under the sign of the poor to demand 
that the state permit them more than the basic resources necessary for survival and/or 
to make lives for themselves that constitute more than survival.  In these contesations, 
some of which will be explored in the remainder of this thesis, a moral economy (see 
discussion of E.P. Thompson in Chapter 1) has emerged in which the state has argued 
that it is only right for the individual to take responsibility for the care of herself in a 
context of fiscal constraint, and movements have demanded that the ANC government 
deliver on its promise of „a better life for all‟ and remain true to the collective 
commitments of the liberation movement to equality for all.   
 
In the context of a collective imaginary of liberation, made concrete in demands 
developed in the movement; a culture of resistance; and the unfulfilled promises of 
the ANC felt in the everyday lives of people, a moral economy in post-apartheid 
South Africa has increasingly come to be defined by the position of the state in 
relation to those excluded from the circuits of economic (re)production, that is the 
poor.  In the contestations constituting this moral economy, the slogans, language, 
flags, colours, songs, principles, and policies of the liberation movement have been 
struggled over, their aims, on the one hand, being reduced to ensuring the success of 
the electoral democracy according to the plans of elected party leaders, and, on the 
other, being understood as reminding elected leaders and the ruling party of the 
commitments made in the liberation struggle to equality, freedom and justice for all.    
 
While Chapter 4 offers a closer exploration of this contested field through the 
experience of the formulation of policy in the sphere of the delivery of basic services 
 126 
in Johannesburg, showing the influence of struggle on policy and vice versa at a local 
level, discourse and policy have also demonstrated, at a national level, an increased 
attention to poverty and the poor, as protests have persisted by those unable to afford 
the costs of living today.  Most recently, this has taken the form of the „War on 
Poverty‟, launched in his February 2008 State of the Nation address by then-president 
Thabo Mbeki, emphasising the need for an accelerated pace in implementing poverty 
alleviation strategies.   
 
Without evidence of any concrete plans accompanying the broad statements made by 
Mbeki and popularised through government press releases and media campaigns, the 
War on Poverty remained little more than a rhetorical device, serving to reassure, in 
the context of resistance, that the state remained committed to meeting the needs of its 
most vulnerable citizens.  Only six months later, in August 2008, government 
announced ts creation of a „war room on poverty‟, a nationally driven effort to target 
the poorest households and assist them through specific interventions aimed at 
providing them with the very basic resources necessary to enable them to find work or 
become otherwise economically active in taking individual responsibility for the 
improvement of their lives.   
 
The „war room on poverty‟ recommits the state to a national poverty alleviation 
programme that targets those households deemed to be „most vulnerable‟ for 
particular minimal interventions by the state through which the logic of individual 
responsibility, „partnership‟ with government, conservation, self-restraint, and 
payment for basic services is encouraged.  Significant in this move is the increased 
attention now being given to the production and maintenance of proper indigent 
registers or „registers of the poor‟ in an effort to „target appropriately‟ and to track and 
monitor individual households unable to meet their basic needs.  (Bua News, South 
Africa to Launch War on Poverty, 28 July 2008 - 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/social/poverty-280708.htm, accessed 31 July 
2008).  A survey of media reports about the War on Poverty suggests that, at a 
national level, it is the symbolic opportunities presented by the War on Poverty 
discourse that have been employed mostly at a national level, with Deputy-President 
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Kgalema Mothlanthe playing a leading role in showcasing this war.
50
  However, the 
work of experimenting with ways of measuring and targeting the poorest in society, as 
this thesis will suggest, is happening more quietly at municipal level.  While the 
further entrenching of inequality takes place through the crafting and honing of 
indigent management strategies at municipal level, the discourse of fighting poverty 
continues in abstract terms at a national level, giving a positive spin and militant air to 
these policies and programmes unfolding at a local level.   
 
Movements of ‘The Poor/s’ 
 
While the promise of a democratically elected ANC government and its 
implementation of the RDP held hope for many of those marginalised and 
disadvantaged by apartheid and its economy, the decisions made by the ANC in its 
first years of governance, particularly with regard to economic choices, were to 
prevent its realisation of its commitments which had fuelled people‟s hopes.   In fact, 
acceptance of the neoliberal orthodoxies holding sway globally would mean that 
while life would improve for some of the population, life would also deteriorate for 
others.   
 
As market-driven, export-led growth became the solution of the ANC government to 
all the problems inherited from the apartheid regime, job losses would increase in 
parts of the formal economy, such as mining and manufacturing, with a large number 
of black male South Africans losing their full-time, protected, secure jobs, often held 
under apartheid and then lost in the first few years of democracy, as well as in the 
footwear and clothing industries, where a large number of black women were to be 
found in full-time jobs with security and protection.  The kinds of jobs available to the 
majority, and in particular to women, were increasingly those of the part-time, casual, 
contract, and seasonal type.  (Bhorat and Van Der Berg, 1999; Kenny, 1998, 2001; 
Barchiesi, 2005).   
 
Accompanying rising unemployment was the introduction of the duty to pay for basic 
services, such as water, electricity, and housing.  While this „duty to pay‟ might have 
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existed under apartheid, payment was never really enforced in poor, black 
communities, which also engaged in boycotts of such payments.  In a national 
campaign led by the United Democratic Front (UDF), called „Asinamali‟ („We Have 
No Money‟), black residents of townships refused to accept the lower standard and 
quality of services provided by the apartheid government, demanding equality and 
justice in their lives as South Africans, envisioning, in the collective, a kind of life for 
all South Africans that would allow for decency, dignity, and the pursuit of one‟s 
dreams and goals to the best of one‟s potential.  Imagined in the liberation movement, 
then, was a life free from want, for all.    
 
When, in the first few years of ANC governance, this expectation of „a better life for 
all‟ began to be compromised, with rising unemployment and the enforcement of the 
logic of payment for services, felt in the form of water and electricity cut-offs and 
evictions, as well as other effects of the implementation of policies crafted within the 
framework of GEAR, criticisms emerged of the ANC government, and groups of 
people adversely affected by ANC government policy changes began to rise up in 
protest against them.  In the period between 1994 and 1999, such criticism and 
opposition often came from within parts of the MDM, such as SANCO, COSATU 
and SASCO.  Bond writes that between 1994 and 1996 there was a “surge of 
shopfloor, student and community wildcat protests” (Bond 2000: 216).  A number of 
government ministers and policies also came under fire from “radical civil society” 
(ibid: 217).  And, the ANC Alliance would respond by attempting to “demobilise the 
left-flank movements, or when not demobilising them (for instance, in giving 
SANCO more than a million rand during the mid-1990s so as to keep it alive), 
controlling them (ibid: 223; emphases in the original).
51
  As MDM formations 
became embroiled in internal debates and fights, and as they became constrained in 
their actions by the dictates of the process of negotiations and „participatory‟ policy 
formulation under the leadership of the ANC, protests would emerge from outside of 
the organised and regulated structures of the ANC and broader MDM, initially 
outside of any formal organisations.    
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In early 1997, "intense riots" broke out in the low-income Coloured township of 
Eldorado Park, with residents demanding lower municipal rates in a day-long protest 
that resulted in the deaths of four people.  In August 1997, East Rand and Pretoria 
townships, the Mpumalanga town of Secunda, and Butterworth in the Transkei flared 
up in protests over service payments (Bond, 2000a: 366).   During the last three 
months of 1997, water cut-offs (due to non-payment) increased from 11 729 by the 
220 largest municipalities in the three months prior, to 19 162, while those 
households in these areas able to reconnect increased from 6004 to just 7065.  
Electricity cut-offs in late 1997 amounted to 58 678 with reconnections sitting at the 
figure of just 35 113.  (ibid: 367).  Bond argues that by mid-1998, such actions on the 
part of the authorities had resulted in conflicts that reached deep into townships of the 
East Rand and smaller rural towns, with municipal offices and a post office being 
burnt in Witbank and Tsakane after residents were stripped of their personal property 
through evictions.  He writes, “Everywhere urban alienation and rural despondency 
were on the increase (ibid).   
 
In fact, for the many years to come, protests by communities and groups of affected 
people would continue across the country, escalating at different times and taking 
different forms, each time demanding particular concessions from the state with 
regard to its responsibilities related to meeting the needs of the most marginalised in 
society.  As the problems experienced by poor communities grew in the years 
following the adoption of GEAR, groups within communities became more organised, 
and began to be narrated, both through the production of their own media, and 
through increased profiling by the mainstream media as well as researchers, 
academics, and film-makers.  A language of struggle amongst poor people in post-
apartheid South Africa came to be easily apprehended, and the phenomenon of „new 
social movements‟ came to be produced.   
 
Some of the most prominent new social movements that have been profiled from the 
late 1990s onwards include the Concerned Citizens‟ Forum (CCF – Durban), which 
grew around struggles of the communities of Chatsworth, Wentworth, and 
Mpumalanga (Hammanskraal) against evictions, and cut-offs; the Anti-Eviction 
Campaign (AEC – Cape Town), which emerged as communities facing eviction on 
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the Cape Flats came together to try to defend themselves; the Anti-Privatisation 
Forum (APF – Gauteng), which saw university students, workers, and community 
members come together in 2000 to protest against the various effects of the 
privatisation being implemented by the University of the Witwatersrand and the City 
of Johannesburg and grew into a provincial formation co-ordinating the activities of 
twenty two community affiliates and other members; the Landless People‟s 
Movement (LPM), a national movement emerging in 2001 to protect the interests of 
farmworkers and to demand immediate land redistribution; the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC), a national movement bringing together activists from all walks of 
life to demand free anti-retroviral treatment for HIV-positive South Africans as well 
as for the South African state to improve its approach to the treatment and prevention 
of HIV/AIDS, and the Abahlali Base Mjondolo (ABM), a movement of shackdwellers 
emerging in Durban in 2005 to demand that the precarious situation of the homeless 
be addressed by the state.  (Ballard et al. 2006; McKinley and Naidoo 2004; Robbins 
2008).   
 
Much has been written about new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa, 
in the form of newspaper articles, academic papers, different forms of literature 
produced by and from within movements, and a few edited collections of articles and 
books.  Ashwin Desai‟s We Are The Poors, published in 2002, was the first book to 
be written from within a movement by an activist/academic
52
 attempting to give voice 
to the concerns of those experiencing the first effects of the post-apartheid state‟s 
neoliberal commitments.  Written from first-hand experience and engagements with 
other activists, Desai tells the story of one of South Africa‟ first social movements to 
be born in the post-apartheid era, the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF).  While the 
book is rich in its account of new forms of organising and the manifestation of 
antagonism towards the ANC government from those who had voted it into office, its 
significance for this thesis lies in its declaration of the birth of a new political subject 
in post-apartheid South Africa in the form of „the poors‟.  In the book, Desai tells how 
a simple remark by a protesting resident of Chatsworth (a predominantly Indian 
township in Durban) to a government official gave birth to an identity for an incipient 
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movement that had, since 1999, been resisting evictions and cut-offs from water and 
electricity: 
 
As the Council officials retreated, a defining moment in the 
struggle for Chatsworth occurred.  One of the designer-bedecked 
(African) councillors began castigating the crowd.  She had once 
lived in a shack, she screamed.  Why were Indians resisting 
evictions and demanding upgrades?  Indians were just too 
privileged.  One elderly aunty, Girlie Amod, screamed back: „We 
are not Indians, we are the poors‟.  The refrain caught on as 
councillors hurried to their cars.  As they were leaving they would 
hear the slogan mutate as Bongiwe Manqele introduced her own 
good-humoured variant, „We are not African, we are the poors‟.  
Identities were being rethought in the context of struggle and the 
bearers of these identities were no respecters of authority.  The 
particular identity congealing in this moment had no grand 
ideological preconditions and so could not be co-opted by 
government.  It was organised around the primary realisation that 
resistance had to be offered against the hostilities being visited on 
the poor. (Desai 2002: 44, my emphases). 
 
Under the sign of „the poors‟, Desai brings together a number of movements and 
struggles emerging in post-apartheid South Africa to contest the various provisions 
and restrictions being made on the lives of the poor – “unemployed, single mother, 
community defender, neighbour, factory worker, popular criminal, rap artist and 
genuine ou (good human being) … have all come to make up the collective identities 
of „the poors‟” (ibid: 7).  Different in their geneses and make-up, the similarities of 
these movements are shown up in their common antagonism to the ANC government 
and in their demand that alternatives be found to the various instances of neoliberal 
restructuring in motion.  Desai ends his book with the coming together of these new 
social movements and various NGOs in protest of the ANC government‟s policies at 
the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), the first international UN 
conference to be hosted by the South African government after 1994, in Durban in 
2001.  While the celebratory tone of We Are The Poors served an important purpose 
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at the time of its publication and release in providing a counter-argument and 
opposing picture of new social movements to the images emerging in the mainstream 
media
53
, it also ignored several important problems within and amongst new social 
movements that would erupt later on in their history
54
.          
 
As new social movements emerged across the country, a few progressive NGOs and 
academic institutions made funds available for research to be conducted on these 
movements, resulting in a number of research reports being produced by 
activist/academics working in movements and independent researchers and 
academics.   The Centre for Civil Society (CCS) provided a significant portion of its 
general research funds towards projects on new social movements, including 
Remembering Movements: Trade Union Movements and New Social Movements In 
Post-Apartheid South Africa, a report about the APF by two of its members, Naidoo 
and Veriava (2005); The Contentious Politics of the CCF, by Peter Dwyer (2004), an 
independent researcher and socialist activist; The Landless People‟s Movement and 
the Failure of Postapartheid Land Reform by Stephen Greenberg (2004), an 
activist/researcher working with the LPM; Subjectivity, Politics and Neo-Liberalism 
in Post Apartheid Cape Town by Peter Van Heusden and Rebecca Pointer (2005), 
both members of the AEC; A Short Course in Politics at the University of 
Abahlali Basemjondolo by Raj Patel (2006), an academic working with the ABM; and 
„Our Struggle is Thought on the Ground Running‟: University of the ABM by Richard 
Pithouse (2006), also an academic working with the ABM.  These reports were each 
published in different volumes of the CCS‟s research report series.  In addition, the 
CCS made available funds for participatory research projects in various new social 
movements, including the APF, the AEC and the LPM, also resulting in the 
production of a number of reports about movements from within movements.   
 
In 2004, the first edited collection of articles about new social movements in South 
Africa was produced by activists and researchers working in and/or with these 
movements, as a special edition of the journal, Development Update, co-produced by 
Interfund and the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO).  Entitled, 
                                                 
53
 For an example of this see Haffajee, F. 2004. “Fact, Fiction and the New Left”, in Mail and 
Guardian, 11 June. 
54
 For an account of such problems within the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF), see Dwyer, P (2004) 
The Contentious Politics of the CCF, Research Report for the Centre for Civil Society.   
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Mobilising for Change: The Rise of New Social Movements in South Africa, it was 
edited by McKinley and Naidoo, both founding members of the APF.  Through a 
number of workshops with members of the different new social movements about the 
various themes covered in the journal, writers produced articles that spoke to the 
diversity of views within these movements about various questions, such as the 
relationship of movements to the state; forms of organising; attitudes to the electoral 
representative system; strategies and tactics; and so on.  While the journal provides a 
rich source of the commonalities that hold movements together as well as their 
differences, it is also striking that the majority of its writers are middle-class, non-
African members or associates of movements, highlighting a problem that is a 
constant feature of engagements within new social movements and their 
representation, that is, that those who traditionally hold access to resources and skills 
within movements tend to determine how they are portrayed outside of movements. 
 
The establishment of the Independent Media Centre of South Africa (IMC-
SA/Indymedia-SA) during the WCAR in 2001 provided spaces autonomous from the 
mainstream media, political parties and organisations, and corporations for new social 
movements to write about themselves and their movements, in the form of a website 
with auto-publishing features (http://saindymedia.org); facilities for the production of 
community newsletters, press releases, and statements; video production; and a short-
lived radio station (in Soweto).  While Indymedia-SA was particularly effective 
during high-profile campaigns of movements and during times of extreme repression, 
particularly in the period 2001-2004, it could not overcome the problems of 
differential access to resources and the need for some members of its collectives to 
appropriate parts and property of the collective for the ends of individual income 
generation.
55
  Since 2004, while Indymedia collectives have sprung up from time to 
time in different parts of the country, in particular Johannesburg, these have been 
short-lived and without the effectiveness of work done during the earlier period.  
Nevertheless, its existence allowed movements to be creative in their own 
representation and in the representation of their struggles and demands, outside of and 
often against the mainstream media.  At many times, however, Indymedia-SA also 
                                                 
55
 For a more thorough account of the history of Indymedia-SA, its successes and problems, see 
Naidoo, P. 2008. „Indymedia South Africa: An Experiment in Production‟, in Third Text, Volume 22, 
Issue 5, pp. 569 – 573. 
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provided material for the mainstream media, for example, during the WCAR and the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 2002, thereby helping to 
sometimes shape mainstream representations of movements and struggles, and to 
producing an image of new social movements as movements of the poor.    
 
In these many accounts, a rich picture of social movements in post-apartheid South 
Africa emerges, one in which the interplay between „old‟ and „new‟ forms of 
organising, and the diversity of approaches, tactics and strategies, tend to be 
emphasised.  Looking through pamphlets, pictures and video footage from protests 
undertaken by different new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa since 
2001, there are many moments in which people are seen to be defending their claim to 
particular songs, slogans, colours, commitments, and traditions of the liberation 
movement, and, often, giving new meanings to them.  In the case of the APF, for 
example, founding members included activists from the Johannesburg central branch 
of the South African Communist Party (SACP), the University of the Witwatersrand 
branch of the South African Students‟ Congress (SASCO) and local of the National 
Education, Health and Allied Workers‟ Union (NEHAWU), the Anti-iGoli Forum, the 
South African Municipal Workers‟ Union (SAMWU), and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), all part of the Congress-aligned Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM).  While the APF would always be openly antagonistic in its stance 
towards the ANC, its early years would also be characterised by a discourse of 
demanding that the ANC remain true to the commitments and societal vision of the 
liberation movement, and contestation of the ANC‟s attempts to recast the symbols, 
language, icons, and traditions of the liberation movement in the interests of 
neoliberalism (Naidoo and Veriava, 2005).    
 
As the ANC government continues to frame its new policies in the language of old 
traditions and customs, commitments and promises, forged and made in the liberation 
struggle, groups and communities making demands of the state or refusing to accept 
its changing logic have mobilised this same language, insisting that government fulfil 
its promises and remain true to the idea of a just society embodied in the struggles of 
the anti-apartheid movement.  While protesting groups have mobilised notions of 
„right‟ and „wrong‟ in judgement of the actions of the state based on past ideas, values 
and commitments, the ANC government has begun to fashion new notions of „right‟ 
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and „wrong‟ that mobilise the language of the past in service of the logic of 
responsible citizenship through payment for basic services, the „reciprocal duties‟ of 
the state and the citizen, and the changing responsibilities of the individual and the 
state in the context of a changed neoliberal „reality‟ that „cannot be escaped‟.  In this 
contestation, what constitutes „the best interests of the nation‟ has come to be 
struggled over.  As government argues that payment for services, finding employment 
or becoming an entrepreneur are necessary at an individual level for nation-building 
to succeed as it fulfils its role of providing the „enabling environment‟ in which this 
can happen, poor communities and activist groups argue that a successful nation can 
only be built through greater responsibility being assumed by the state for its citizens.     
 
While contestation of what the past was and how the present ought to be meeting past 
commitments makes up a large part of the moral economy in post-apartheid South 
Africa, resistance and struggle also take place around categories, institutions, and 
processes that are very much products of the present.  With regard to the study of 
poverty and the poor in particular, the next four chapters will show just how those 
groups targeted by the state mobilise the very governmental categories that aim to 
regulate them in order to make particular demands of the state.  In this manner, the 
moral economy can be seen to emerge in post-apartheid South Africa, both in the 
assertion of particular traditions, customs, values, beliefs, and commitments held in 
common in the past, and in demands made of the state by groups it targets that seek to 
challenge or change the very governmental categories and strategies aimed at defining 
their quality and way of life in the present.  In this way, mobilisation of the categories 
of „the poor‟ and „the poorest of the poor‟ has happened in strategic ways as those 
unable to accept the new conditions of survival imposed by the state challenge the 
very limitations attempted to be inscribed through definitions of these categories.                 
 
Struggle over the old has, however, been tempered by the failure of traditional models 
of organisation (the party and the trade union)
56
, resulting in experimentation with 
new forms of decision-making, leadership, and direct action.  In the case of the APF
57
, 
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 For a proper discussion of this argument, particularly in relationship to the APF and Johannesburg-
based movements, see Naidoo and Veriava (2005).   
57
 Beginning as an activist forum bringing together members of the Wits University branch of the 
South African Students Congress (SASCO), the Johannesburg central branch of the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), the South African Municipal Workers‟ Union (SAMWU) of the 
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its own structures of decision-making, elected leadership and appointed administrators 
has evolved since its emergence, from a small open activist forum with a rotating 
chair, to a fully-fledged organisation with over 22 affiliates (in the form mainly of 
mass community based organisations and small political groupings
58
) with elected 
office-bearers, an appointed and paid co-ordinator and administrator, 
subcommittees
59
, and regular meetings representative of all parts of the organisation 
at which decisions affecting all members are taken.  The APF has also, however, 
always allowed for individual activists who do not belong to any formal organisations 
or groupings to participate in its activities, resulting in a mix of representative and 
non-representative forms of engagement existing within the organisation. 
 
While the APF was formed by the coming together of a large number of activists 
already active in political formations, many with particularly defined political 
orientations, its later growth would depend on the emergence of struggles in various 
communities against water and electricity cut-offs and evictions which coalesced into 
community forums and crisis committees.  In particular, the act of reconnecting 
residents illegally to their supplies of water and electricity when cut off for non-
payment, and returning them to their homes when evicted, would come to characterise 
                                                                                                                                            
Johannesburg city, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the National Health and 
Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU), the anti-iGoli Forum
57
, and members of various ANC branches in 
and around Johannesburg, the APF brought together a number of different individuals from diverse 
political backgrounds, as well as races and classes to organise protest actions against a conference 
being hosted by the University of the Witwatersrand in partnership with the City of Johannesburg in 
July 2000.  Named „Urban Futures‟, the conference, at which several world renowned academics (such 
as Saskia Sassen and Immanuel Castells) would be making presentations about urban regeneration and 
development, served as the backdrop to the unveiling of the first plans to restructure the city and the 
university along neoliberal lines, iGoli 2002 and Wits 2001 respectively.        
58
 Members of small political groupings operating within new social movements tend to hold the view 
that the initial acts of resistance that led to the formation of movements were „spontaneous‟ and 
required the intervention of more skilled and learned individuals to provide political education to 
community members to enable them to understand their „spontaneous‟ actions in terms of their political 
context and so translate these „outbursts‟ of anger and frustration with issues related to their survival 
into more „meaningful‟ political actions that can be sustained and built over time into a programme of 
action against the status quo.  This view is quite clearly enunciated in literature produced by Khanya 
College, as well as members of the Socialist Group (SG) and Keep Left, all three spaces strongly 
influenced by Trotskyists.      
59
 Five years ago, the APF decided collectively to dissolve all subcommittees, partly as a result of them 
becoming spaces in which individuals were attempting to defraud the organisation of money.  This 
highlights the open nature of the APF‟s organisational form, able to change in response to its own 
internal needs.    
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the APF and its affiliates, as well as other new social movements in other parts of the 
country, such as the AEC in Cape Town and the CCF in Durban.
60
   
 
While campaigns against cut-offs and evictions defined the early focus of movements 
like the APF, over time, as longer term visions and strategies began to be crafted, 
debates would ensue over the political orientation of the movement, in particular its 
attitude to state power.  Led by small socialist groupings, debates would focus the 
attention of the movement on whether to transform into a political party and/or 
whether to field candidates in the contestation of elections, with affiliates being 
divided on more than one occasion over this issue.
61
  In particular struggles, such as 
against prepaid water meters, the immediacy of the plight of families living without 
water as a result of their resistance to the installation of meters, together with the 
advice of lawyers and debate amongst activists in the movement, led to the 
prioritisation of legal strategies over illegal acts of bypassing and reconnection.  In 
these moves, rights-based frameworks have been privileged over demands for 
decommodification, universal access to, and/or self-management of the delivery of 
basic services, and any potential for subversion contained in the act of reconnection 
have been foreclosed, able to be imagined only as a tactic, a means to an end.  But in 
the prioritisation of the courts in its latest campaign, the APF, together with the 
Coalition Against Water Privatisation, has produced from the state an „answer‟ to its 
complaint that the needs of the poor have not been included in its plans in the form of 
the targeted delivery of basic services for the poor.  And, with increases in amounts of 
water and electricity allocated to the poor and provision being made for emergency 
supplies for the sick, it is going to be difficult to answer for the persistence of illegal 
reconnections and acts of bypassing meters in townships.  These questions will be 
explored further in Chapter Six through the experience of Orange Farm.  In the case 
of Johannesburg, it would appear that the City has appropriated the language of 
movements identifying themselves as movements of the poor to refine further its 
strategies of cost recovery (see Chapter Four), posing a question for the value in 
using the poor strategically as a political identity in such rights based struggles.                     
                                                 
60
 The CCF and AEC adopted much less formal organisational models, with their lack of structure 
producing different sets of problems (see Dwyer 2004 with regard to the CCF, and Pointer and Van 
Heusden 2004 in relation to the AEC).   
61
 In 2004, a group of affiliates of the Johannesburg region of the APF, led by Trevor Ngwane and the 
SECC, launched the Operation Khanyisa Movement (OKM), a political party, to contest the local 
government elections.  This caused significant division in the movement.   
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With the growth and evolution of new social movements have come problems, both 
common to all and particular to each.  Repression on the part of the state has been a 
common response to all forms of collective protest that have taken place outside of 
and/or in question of the ANC.
62
  This has, in some instances, led to the focus on legal 
strategies for change, and activists‟ mobilisation of rights based discourses over 
demands for decommodification, universal access, and/or self-management, 
narrowing the imagining of the possible to the prism of „the practical‟.  Repression, 
together with the need to sustain campaigns with largely unemployed membership 
base, new social movements also quickly became reliant on funds and other resources 
from external sources, such as international donor organisations and research 
institutions.  While critiques have been raised from within all new social movements 
about the negative influence and effects of such assistance on movements, no new 
social movement in South Africa has not and does not accept such aid.  In the case of 
the APF, access to large amounts of money has meant that some members have 
approached the movement as having the potential to generate income for themselves 
as unemployed people.  While this was debated in the APF, with the resolution to 
establish a subcommittee dedicated towards exploring possibilities for establishing 
income generation projects in APF communities, nothing much has come of this, and 
from time to time individual members do try to use spaces of the movement to access 
funds for themselves.  With new social movements consisting largely of unemployed 
people, questions of organisational form and sustainability inevitably come up against 
the need to provide for its own members.   
 
The question of an approach to unemployment and questions of labour has also 
generated debate and division within movements like the APF.  While all affiliates 
support campaigns for the creation of more jobs, some, like the Orange Farm Water 
Crisis Committee (OWCC) have also established their own income generation 
projects in the context of the absence of formal, permanent jobs.  This experience will 
be explored in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six.   
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 See Mckinley and Veriava (2005) and Freedom of Expression Institute (2003).   
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Within the APF, differences in approach to questions of labour have manifest in the 
form of differences with regard to the kind of language used in political speech.  For 
example, while members of the SECC speak in reference to „the working class‟, 
members of the OWCC refer to „the poor‟ and „the poorest of the poor‟.  This reflects 
a strong influence in the SECC of the Trotskyist grouping, the Socialist Group, led by 
Trevor Ngwane, which argues strongly for the orientation of all struggles towards 
those of the organised working class and the uniting of new social movements with 
organised labour in the toppling of the ANC government and the establishment of a 
socialist state.  The OWCC, on the other hand, consists largely of members with 
backgrounds in the Black Consciousness Movement and Pan Africanist Congress, as 
well as ordinary church members and unemployed people without any history in 
political organisations, who emphasise the potential for self-emancipation and self-
organisation of the poor.     
 
 Franco Barchiesi writes: 
 
Class-based discourses and practices retain a crucial relevance for 
community movements that are contesting the neoliberalisation of 
the South African transition.  South Africa‟s „politics of the poor‟ 
questions, however, both the incorporation of the waged working 
class in the ANC-driven „national democratic revolution‟, and its 
centrality as an agent of change in socialist discourse.  The co-
existence of traditional left organisations with local struggles that 
are highly diversified in terms of subjects, structures and ideas 
defies, in the final analysis, an „ontological‟ understanding of 
South African social movements as premised on a homogeneous 
agent of social transformation.  More attention is therefore needed 
for the processes of politicisation where a multitude of actors 
discovers commonalities, elaborates strategies, confronts power, 
becomes political. (Barchiesi 2006: 240; my emphasis).           
 
The exploration of the OWCC in Chapter Six offers some account of the complex 
ways in which new subjectivities and collectivities are produced in the processes of 
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subjectivation that accompany those defined by wage labour and the factory, and in 
the politics of the poor.
63
    
 
In spite of this potential, however, post-apartheid movements of the poor seem to 
conform to Piven and Cloward‟s (1977) contention that the moment that movements 
become formal organisations marks the demise of protest action and their 
“insurgency”.  In the case of the APF, a certain rhythm has set into the organisation, 
with few campaigns having any significant impact since the loss of the case against 
the installation of prepaid water meters, and much time being spent dealing with 
internal problems.  As „service delivery protests‟ have become an annual feature on 
the South African calendar, with several new communities rising up each year, often 
including ANC members, the APF has connected with very few of these, its affiliates 
often embroiled in resolving problems internal to their formations.
64
  What continues 
to be a feature of new uprisings is the mobilisation of the sign of the poor in demand 
of change and in coming together.      
 
Aside from the literature emanating from within movements, two edited academic 
collections that have gained some prominence
65
 are Voices of Protest, edited by 
Richard Ballard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valodia, academics in the School of 
Development Studies at the University of Kwazulu-Natal,, and Challenging 
Hegemony: Social Movements and the Quest for a New Humanism in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa, edited by Nigel Gibson, academic at Emerson College, Boston, and 
editor of the Journal of African and Asian Studies (JAAS), both published in 2006.    
 
The first collection attempts to evaluate a set of movements selected by the “informed 
intuition” of its editors according to a grid of gains and losses, successes and failures 
with regard to changes they are able to effect through their approaches to engagement 
with the state, the building of alliances and coalitions, and their chosen definitions and 
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 For a sense of some of the debates that have taken place within new social movements about ways of 
relating to the organised working class and approaching questions of labour, see Martin Legassick 
(2007: 537-546).   
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 Gillian Hart has coined the term “movement beyond movements” to refer to “vitally important 
processes taking place largely outside the scope of new social movements” (Hart 2008).   
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 Voices of Protest formed part of the taught syllabus for a second level sociology course with the title 
„Organisations, Movements and Change‟, taught at the University of the Witwatersrand from 2007 to 
2010.   
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processes of framing of themselves.  The identified “antagonism” of movements like 
the APF, the CCF and the AEC is measured against the “more diverse” and “less 
confrontational” tactics adopted by TAC in its relations with the state.  And the ability 
of movements like TAC to build alliances with COSATU is held up against the 
resistance of movements like the APF towards alliances with COSATU.  There is 
very little space to imagine or recognise new forms of organising that might be 
emerging amongst activists within these movements, in particular approaches that 
might be anti-state or argue for a different role for the state or for different forms of 
political engagement in society.  This is evident particularly in the chapter on the APF 
by Sakhela Buhlungu, who misses the diversity so characteristic of the organisation.  
 
In the second collection, while greater attention is given to the diversity within and 
between movements, the potentialities opened up for non-state-facing politics 
explored in more depth, it is quite striking that the editor‟s introduction and the 
chapters written by Patrick Bond and Richard Pithouse speak of the influences of 
„socialist‟ and „autonomist‟ influences in movements like the APF (in particular the 
SECC), CCF, AEC, LPM and ABM.  Conducting no research whatsoever with so-
called „autonomist‟ factions within movements and spending very little or no time in 
the movements that they write about, these authors provide sad caricatures of the 
actual debates which emerged within movements in relation to forms of organising, 
approaches to the state, political parties, and so on, basing their theories on the views 
of particularly prominent individuals within or related to movements.     
 
Much has been written in critique of the ways in which academics have related to new 
social movements, and, in particular of the romanticisation of movements in their 
writings, ironically often by academics who have re-presented movements in their 
own work (Bond 2008; Bohmke 2010a&b; Desai 2006, 2008; Desai and Pithouse 
2004; Pithouse 2006; Sinwell 2010; Walsh 2008).  Missing from all these critiques is 
a self-reflexiveness that is able to problematise the very structures of representation 
and valorisation (re)produced in and by academic writing and academia.   
 
The question posed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in her essay of the same title, 'Can 
The Subaltern Speak?' (Spivak in Chrisman & Williams, 1994: 66-111) is an 
important one to consider here.  What Spivak points us to in asking her question, is 
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the swift eclipse of the power imbalances inherent in the act of representation, in „the 
giving of voice‟ to „the subaltern‟. She shows how a need to apprehend 'the pure 
consciousness' or 'voice' of the subaltern results in the dual meaning of 
'representation/re-presentation' (i.e. both to portray ('darstellen') and to speak on 
behalf of ('vertreten')) being run together, and thus removed from view in the practice 
of 'allowing the subaltern to speak'.  Not only is Spivak critical of the invisible 
mediating role of those claiming to „give voice‟, but she also highlights the ways in 
which subaltern subjects are represented in various dominant (con)texts so as to be 
understood according to logics valorised by the west or Europe.  Defining „the 
subaltern‟ as “the position of being without access to the lines of social mobility,”  
(Spivak 2004), different ways of living, giving value, making meaning, and being, 
that might be practiced amongst subaltern groups, are not able to be read in/by the 
dominant script of global hetero-patriarchy, and the subaltern subject is always being 
made to speak in the register of the dominant.   
 
Spivak offers us the example of the suicide of Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, a young Indian 
woman involved in a revolutionary movement, as a possible speaking by a subaltern 
woman against her own inscription in the dominant script of Sati and suicide (in 
western texts professing to 'save' Indian women and in Hindu scriptures refusing 
women the same status as men in discussions on sanctioned suicides).  Bhuvaneswari, 
a middle-class Indian woman by birth, conducts her suicide making deliberate choices 
to ensure that her act is not read in particular ways (e.g. she kills herself while 
menstruating to ensure that people don't think that she acted out of fear of being 
pregnant out of wedlock).  But Spivak does not succeed in finding an example in 
Bhuvaneswari of a subaltern woman speaking.  Instead, Spivak leaves us readers 
(both of Bhuvaneswari and of Spivak) uncertain of exactly what Bhuvaneswari's 
intentions were and of what Spivak intends to do with the example.  Instead of a clear 
reading of Bhuvaneswari's act of suicide (quite obviously carefully planned and 
designed), we are left with a number of possibilities for the reasons for her death.  
What is clear is that our own attempts to make sense of her suicide, through Spivak's 
lenses, can only contribute to the foreclosure of meaning inherent in her act, the 
foreclosure of her speaking.   
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Rather than claiming to make Bhuvaneswari speak, Spivak uses the uncertainty of 
meaning inherent in the act to encourage us not to seek 'a pure voice' or 'pure 
consciousness' of the subaltern, but to allow the voices of subaltern subjectivities to 
exist as difference, as antagonism, incomprehensible in the dominant script and logic 
of capitalism and patriarchy.  In placing Bhuvaneswari's act in conversation with the 
voices of French intellectuals, Indian intellectuals, and British colonisers, Spivak also 
encourages us not to ignore the privileged positionalities of 'intellectuals' and 
'interpreters', positionalities also produced by capital, whose own relevance and 
meaning is derived from and dependent on the creation of specific notions of the 
subaltern.   
 
For Spivak, then, it is not the task of the intellectual to 'allow the subaltern to speak' or 
to 'give voice to the voiceless' or 'to apprehend the voice of the subaltern' or even 'to 
make the silences speak'.  Instead, in acknowledging one's own privileged voice as an 
intellectual, it becomes one's task to enter into conversation with subaltern groups and 
voices as they emerge, and not to seek to represent these voices in any homogenising 
images or constructions that work towards various ends.  The task of the intellectual 
becomes that of „putting the economic under erasure‟ (Spivak in Chrisman & 
Williams, 1994: 75), the economic referring to that task of defining, making rational, 
making intelligible within the dominant logic of the academe and of capitalist, 
patriarchal society.  And, importantly, the task becomes one of investigating „what the 
text cannot say‟ rather than trying to „make the silences speak‟ (ibid.)
66
.  For Spivak, 
the act of 'speaking' in an unchanged society seems to be riddled with the problems of 
having to make oneself understood and be heard and read according to the very script 
that one is challenging.  What the example of Bhuvaneswari seems to illustrate is the 
fact that every act of speaking from a subaltern position must be understood as taking 
place and being heard within its specific conditions of the unchanged script of 
capitalism and patriarchy.  As hard as she tries to ensure that Bhuvaneswari's act will 
not be read within this dominant logic, not even Spivak (the post-colonial woman 
intellectual - herself sometimes considered subaltern) can offer the 'real meaning' of 
her act to us.   
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In a public address given at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 2004, 
Spivak explains how she has come to respond to her own critiques in her own life by 
“learning to learn from below,” seeking to understand the different terms on which 
different collectives make meaning and give value to and in the world, rather than 
trying to translate and „give voice‟ in and according to the dominant ways of defining, 
understanding, and valorising.  She goes on, however, to argue that “the subaltern has 
become greatly permeable,” providing the example of the transformation of 
indigenous knowledge systems into intellectual property in South Africa as evidence 
of the increasing incorporation of subaltern knowledge/s into the dominant frames 
in/by which knowledge is given value and shared.  Highlighting the difference 
between „seeking to know‟ and „wanting to learn from‟ subaltern groups, Spivak 
again argues for the embrace and production of diverse ways of understanding, 
translating, and living (in) the world, such that our „learning from‟ happens on terms 
set by the logic/s and reason/s of those from whom we are learning.     
       
Such a reading of Spivak does not permit for the recuperation of academic spaces for 
the representation of movement voices, as Desai and Pithouse (2004) suggest is 
possible.  Instead, academia must be seen as producing particular forms of thinking 
about and writing (about) the poor.  In much of the literature that has been produced 
about the relationship between academia and movements, very few people have asked 
where knowledge about the poor is being produced, and who is doing this production.  




Rather than trying to find analytical models to which to fit the 
movements that the group of academics chose to write about, a 
more valuable exercise would probably have been to try to write 
with and not simply about these movements.  This is a challenge 
that faces all “progressive academics” today; a writing „with‟ 
rather than „on‟ or „for‟, and an intellectual approach with 
something of the openness of a conversation.  It is a difficult 
challenge, as it requires first and foremost the acknowledgement 
of the privileged and powerful positions occupied by the 
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academic in shaping and directing the processes of narration and 
knowledge production about movements. (Veriava 2008: 487).        
 
While the debate about the role of academics in new social movements continues, 
struggles of the poor continue.  As movements transform into organisations, new 
movements mushroom, and new forms of subversion emerge, sometimes hidden from 
view, evading arrest and punishment.  What is certain is that post-apartheid South 
Africa has witnessed the acclamation of a new political subject in the form of the 
poor/s, a new process of subjectivation in the form of contestations over the forms of 











It doesn't mean that if you live in Sandton, you can't be poor one 
day.  You can be poor tomorrow.  Actually, there are people 
living in Sandton who have more debt than me.  This guy's got 
minus R200 million in his bank account, but because his 
accountant knows how to balance the figures, he can sustain that 
kind of life that's seen as rich, but he's living with a massive debt.  
Whereas me in Orange Farm, I'm owing my shonisa [local 
money lender] R200 and I'm the one who's being called poor! 
(Thando Ngoma, interview, Orange Farm, 16/10/2007). 
 
Imagine a poverty eradication strategy targeted at all those individuals with debts over 
R100 000, based on a definition of poverty that takes individual debt, rather than lack 
of income, as its determining indicator.  Consumption patterns of these „poor‟ might 
be monitored in an attempt to „rehabilitate‟ their „excessive spending patterns‟ and 
interventions might be designed to encourage these poor to live within „their means‟, 
their struggles with the state revolving around whether owning one or two cars, or 
having a swimming pool, constitutes an „essential need‟ and the like.  Quite an 
unlikely scenario, but an interesting exercise that highlights just how mutable 
definitions of and categories such as „the poor‟ and „poverty‟ are.   
 
Since the first attempts in seventeenth century England to develop a measure of the 
standard of living below which people could be said to be poor or living in poverty, 
income as a reflection of absolute poverty
68
 has dominated as the primary way of 
identifying the poor and conditions of poverty in spite of the production of numerous 
critiques of it over the years (Du Toit, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Green, 2006; Green and 
Hulme, 2005; Reddy, 2006, 2008; Reddy and Pogge, 2010 (forthcoming); Sen, 1982, 
1988).  A poverty line determined by income has been popularised in development 
policy through the approaches to poverty alleviation of global institutions like the 
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World Bank, as it has sought to demonstrate the success of its interventions in this 
regard in a globally comparative manner (Green, 2006; Green and Hulme, 2005).  
This has usually meant the calculation of the cost in monetary terms of a basket of 
goods and services considered essential to the survival of an individual
69
.   
 
However, amongst the many critiques that have been put forward, several writers 
have argued that experiences of poverty and the poor are not homogeneous, as 
definitions based on income tend to suggest; that there are several other indicators that 
need to be considered in addition to income, such as health and education levels; that 
inequality is not reflected when absolute poverty is prioritised to the neglect of 
relative poverty; that income measures technicise processes of defining and 
intervening in the lives of people; that such technicisation silences or excludes the 
voices of those being defined; and that the prioritisation of the economic in such 
definitions excludes important elements of the experience of poverty in terms of its 
social and political aspects.  Nevertheless, it would seem that the development of 
poverty lines are simple ways in which to identify, intervene, monitor, and 
demonstrate success rates in what has become a business of alleviating poverty, 




As the problem of poverty and the figure of the poor became increasingly prominent 
in post-apartheid South Africa, mainstream debates and discussions became 
preoccupied with the technical aspects of defining and measuring 'poverty' and 'the 
poor', with the stated long-term objective of intervening to address this objectively 
defined scourge.  Deciding whether poverty is defined by an individual income of $1 
a day or R322 a day or whether 6kl or 10kl of water should be the minimal level of 
access provided by the state to the poor seems to be the dominant nature of 
discussions about poverty today.  As the state insists on its new role as providing just 
the very minimal resources deemed necessary for survival, demands for free basic 
                                                 
69
 It has been shown that richer countries set their poverty lines at higher levels than poorer countries, 
suggesting that the setting of these lines is socially influenced (Green 2006).  The influence of struggles 
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within the frame of relative poverty rather than absolute poverty, that is, insisting that levels of 
inequality be considered and so the redistribution of wealth (Cleaver).   
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 An exception to this line of approach is the work being led by Andries Du Toit at the Programme for 
Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape (UWC), in which attempts 
are being made to develop models for the study of chronic poverty that go beyond and challenge 
narrow “econometric” models.   
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services, for example, are slowly transformed into debates about how high 'life-lines' 
should be or what the cut-off individual income should be for determining who 
qualifies for such 'life-lines'.  And what was previously a highly contested field of 
political engagement has become a space about making particular gains within the 
sphere of the technical rationalities naturalised by the discourse of statistics and 
'measuring poverty'.  As this technical field works increasingly to set out the minimal 
levels of service provision considered the responsibility of the state, „a better life‟ 
becomes a dream each must individually aspire towards, and the role of the state 
becomes one of „enabling‟ the individual to accept and perform the task of assuming 
responsibility for the care of one‟s self.   
 
This chapter explores how the apparently „neutral‟ and „objective‟ production of 
statistics, definitions, and other measures through which to understand and intervene 
in the lives of the poor works to provide the means to define a particular standard and 
quality of life for that population group in society identified as being unable to 
provide for itself, and thus to support the development of programmes to regulate and 
shape their everyday grid of existence and its possibilities.  In directing struggle in 
this arena towards engagement about these minimal levels and standards of living, 
these processes contribute to the naturalisation of conditions of survival defining the 
lives of those designated „the poor‟.   
 
A ‘Field of Intervention’ 
 
As the terms of the transition were being negotiated and the ANC prepared to govern, 
a number of independent researchers and policy think-tanks, assisted and funded by 
the World Bank and other international aid organisations, began the process of 
defining and trying to apprehend in concrete terms the reach of socio-economic 
hardship in South Africa, named poverty.  This was seen as important as apartheid 
had neglected to produce any meaningful statistics about poverty amongst black 
people as it had largely neglected the welfare needs of this population group, 
consigned to a system of separate government in the homelands.  As the structural 
inequalities left by apartheid would necessitate state interventions in order to correct 
them, policy analysts and academics argued that „proper statistics‟ were needed in 
order for appropriate interventions to be crafted to this end.  Trying to make poverty a 
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measurable set of quantities and the poor an easily identifiable group in society, these 
individuals would contribute to the naturalisation of these categories in discussions 
and debates as finite, closed, and knowable so that those identified by them could be 
acted upon or made to act in particular ways.   
 
The discussion that follows will illustrate how the practice of defining poverty and 
the poor through the employment of statistics in South Africa since the 1990s has 
worked to shape a particular “milieu” in the production of a “field of intervention" 
(Foucault 2002, 2007 – see Chapter 1 of this thesis) for the state through which it has 
chosen to provide certain minimal amounts of resources to those identified as the 
poor in the hope that these will „enable‟ them to become „self-reliant‟ through their 
participation in the market economy.  Key to the success of such governmental 
approaches is the ability to identify, know, and affect the poor.     
 
Concerned with the business of 'getting the numbers right' (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006), 
most of those involved in discussions aimed at defining poverty and the poor would 
assume their role in society to be that of providing the state and civil society with 
'proper' quantitative measures to be able to define and track the development of the 
'well-being' of individuals in society over time.  For the most part, standard measures 
would be developed and agreed on by which the numerical expression of poverty and 
'well-being' (defined in relation to these measures) could be calculated and tracked 
over time.  This would generally be understood as being necessary to allow the state 
and other actors to make proper and appropriate interventions to alleviate and/or to 
eradicate poverty.  The nature of such interventions would depend on the nature of the 
definitions of poverty espoused by particular processes, and their 'success' would be 
determined according to particular changes measured within an overall understanding 
of what numbers constitute the accepted definitions of poverty in a process or society.   
 
While there is nothing inherently wrong with the generation of statistics and 
quantitative models to try to address issues, when preceded by a context in which 
particular fiscal rationalities and economic possibilities are already decided, such 
models are often geared towards determining and entrenching minimal levels of 
access and standards of living for particular sections of society.  In South Africa, 
discussion has focused on the need for broad definitions, for the adoption of specific 
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poverty datum lines, and on the development of minimal living standards for those 
identified as the poor in society.  In the proliferation of measures for knowing and 
fighting poverty, income would come to dominate as the preferred indicator, and 
quantitative models would be prioritised over qualitative ones, reinforcing approaches 
aimed at determining and providing the very minimal levels of resources necessary 
for life to those unable to provide for themselves.      
 
While the business of defining and measuring poverty within the South African state, 
civil society and academia only really gained pace after 1996, some early studies 
began paving the way for later programmes by initiating the development of „base-
line‟ figures which would later be used in discussions and debates about the success 
or failure of government's policies with regard to the position of the most marginal in 
society.  In 1992, the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development 
(PSLSD) was launched, managed by the Southern African Labour and Development 
Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town and funded by the 
Norwegian, Dutch and Danish governments, with technical support provided by the 
World Bank.  In the words of its final report,  
 
The principal purpose of the survey, which was undertaken 
during the nine months leading up to the country‟s first 
democratic elections at the end of April 1994, was to collect hard 
statistical information about the conditions under which South 
Africans live in order to provide policy makers with the data 
required for planning strategies to implement such goals as those 
outlined in the Government of National Unity‟s Reconstruction 
and Development Programme. (SALDRU, 1995: 3; my 
emphasis).   
 
Not only did the PSLSD produce a quantitative „base-line‟ study against which other 
processes of policy analysis have unfolded, but it also pointed the way for the 
methodological approaches to be adopted in future studies, such as the October 
Household Survey (OHS) conducted by the Central Statistical Service (CSS).  It could 
be argued that the PSLSD marked the beginning of a period post-1990 during which 
particular approaches to the definition and measurement of poverty began to be 
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naturalised amongst institutions participating in what would come to be called „the 
transition‟, in particular those that prioritised or favoured large household surveys 
through which information related to income, expenditure and consumption measured 
against levels determined to be minimal standards necessary for a quality of life 
acceptable for „the poor‟.   
 
Acknowledging the need, however, for more qualitative research "to provide a fuller 
and more integrated understanding of poverty from the perspective of those who are 
poor and to fill the gaps which quantitative studies can not readily explain” (May et. 
al., 1998), the South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA) followed, 
led by NGOs, university-based researchers and the RDP Office, and funded by the 
Dutch Trust Fund managed by the World Bank and supplemented by funding from 
Overseas Development Administration, the latter two institutions also providing 
technical assistance.  As one of the only qualitative research projects on poverty in 
this period, it would come to be referred to in most subsequent projects that would 
prioritise quantitative approaches to data collection and definitions and then use the 
SA-PPA to give qualitative „substantiation‟ to their statistical findings, an approach to 
the analysis of qualitative data that would also become acceptable and widely used.  It 
is also significant that the data collected from the more qualitative aspects of the 
research processes cited above have almost always served the function of giving 
support or adding texture to the trends and arguments emerging from the more 
quantitative research.  Seldom have qualitative approaches dominated or framed 
mainstream research efforts that came to shape South Africa‟s post-1994 discourse of 
„the poor‟ and „poverty‟.   
 
The Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR), commissioned by the South African cabinet 
in October 1995 to be undertaken by South African researchers, and finalised in 1998, 
would also reassert the dominance of the quantitative model in the analyses and 
approaches to be adopted by the state in the years to come.  It states,  
 
One consequence of apartheid has been the lack of 
comprehensive social indicator data that could assist in policy 
formulation. For example, between 1976 and 1994 official data 
excluded the supposedly „independent‟ TBVC territories, thus 
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excluding many poor South Africans. The PIR accordingly 
makes use of the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards 
and Development (PSLSD) which provided a base-line survey, 
the 1995 October Household Survey (OHS), and the 1995 
Income and Expenditure Survey (IES), supplemented 
qualitatively by the 1995 South African Participatory Poverty 
Assessment (SA-PPA). The PIR concentrates on the dimensions 
of poverty and inequality that are easily and objectively 
measurable. It uses conventional, money-metric measures, as 
money is commonly the means people use to obtain inputs 
needed for their development; such measures are therefore 
practicable, allow for comparisons between people, and are a 
fairly good proxy for standards of living. The PIR also uses a 
broader, composite indicator of deprivation to obtain a poverty 
profile. (ibid: 8; my emphasis). 
 
The PIR then sets about using statistics to provide certain minimal standards of living 
deemed appropriate for those unable to afford a higher quality of life through the 
choices that it makes in how it defines „poverty‟ and „the poor‟ and its choice of 
„indicators‟ to determine what constitutes „poverty‟ in South African society.  It 
states,  
 
Poverty is characterised by the inability of individuals, 
households or communities to command sufficient resources to 
satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard of living. Poverty 
is perceived by poor South Africans themselves to include 
alienation from the community, food insecurity, crowded homes, 
usage of unsafe and inefficient forms of energy, lack of jobs that 
are adequately paid and/or secure, and fragmentation of the 
family. In contrast, wealth is perceived to be characterised by 
good housing, the use of gas or electricity, and ownership of a 
major durable good such as a television set or fridge. (ibid: 6).   
 
Later on it states,  
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Poverty can be defined as the inability to attain a minimal 
standard of living, measured in terms of basic consumption needs 
or the income required to satisfy them. (ibid: 9). 
 
The PIR is also quite clear about its approach to the interventions that it deems 
necessary to address „poverty‟ and the situation of „the poor‟ as it defines them.  It 
unapologetically supports government‟s adoption of a neoliberal macro-economic 
policy in the form of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), 
presenting it as the best available option open to the ANC government given the 
prevailing play of forces in the global economy.  As such the PIR argues that while 
growth alone cannot be expected to eradicate poverty, the prioritisation of growth is 
nevertheless what will produce the conditions through which the poor will be enabled 
to extricate themselves from their situations of poverty.  To this end, the PIR 
advocates that the state adopt a programme that works to „expand the capabilities‟ of 
„the poor‟ through ensuring that they have access to the basic resources necessary for 
their survival, seen as enabling them to then participate effectively in the „economic 
opportunities‟ made available to them by related state programmes.  It states,  
 
Expansion of capabilities focuses on the relationship of people to 
the resources they have and the commodities they require when 
meeting their basic sustenance requirements. (ibid: 5).  
 
It is also significant that the PIR presents poverty (portrayed as a result of a lack of 
economic growth) as having the potential to worsen social conflict, also seen as 
working against further growth (ibid: 12). 
 
Under the rationality of GEAR and its prioritisation of market-led growth, the PIR 
further encourages acceptance of the state‟s limited ability and responsibility to 
intervene in the lives of those most marginalised by the economy, offering them the 
bare minimum of resources necessary for survival, seen as enhancing their ability to 
enter into economic activity to help themselves out of poverty.  
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While the PIR acknowledges the fact that the field of statistics ignores the voices of 
those it studies, when it does attempt to give space to the lived experiences of „the 
poor‟, it tends to portray „the poor‟ as an homogeneous group of disempowered, 
weak, and voiceless people, thus undoing any earlier pretensions it might have 
displayed towards representing the „actual experiences of the poor‟.  It states,  
 
Statistics say little about people‟s actual experience of poverty.  
However, qualitative data from the SA-PPA study indicates 
clearly that poverty typically comprises continuous ill health, 
arduous and often hazardous work for low income, no power to 
influence change, and high levels of anxiety and stress. The 
absence of power is virtually a defining characteristic of being 
poor, and is worsened for women by unequal gender relations. 
Poverty also involves constant emotional stress, and violence has 
a profound impact on the lives of the poor. (ibid: 10).   
 
Missing from such an account is the view expressed by those falling into the category 
of the poor, who were interviewed and/or participated in focus group discussions for 
this thesis, who spoke of the immense sense of power and resilience expressed and 
felt by and amongst poor people who overcome great odds.  There was also the view 
expressed that mainstream definitions and characterisations of the poor tend to 
stigmatise people and discourage their progress.  These views are explored in greater 
detail in Chapter 6.     
 
Debates over Poverty Statistics  
 
From 1995 onwards, the data sets presented by the censuses, household surveys and 
labour force surveys, conducted by Statistics South Africa (SSA), would provide a lot 
more „meat‟ for analysts, with studies on „poverty‟ and the related subject of 
inequality increasing in the context of wanting to assist the new state in meeting its 
stated commitments.  As the measurement of minimal levels of service, income, and 
so on would come to characterise this growing field of „poverty studies‟, David 
Everatt would remark,  
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Poverty is no longer seen as an execrable result of skewed 
economic growth compounding global, regional and local 
discrimination; rather, it is increasingly regarded as an 
unfortunate but unavoidable by-product of growth. Where 
fighting poverty was a cause, it has become a profession, 
populated by (barely distinguishable) consultants from the 
private and non-profit sectors. „Development‟ is merely one 
among many services provided by government. Poverty has also 
been obfuscated by the „“meaning-of-poverty” industry‟ with 
competing definitions, indicators, strategies, toolkits and the like, 
each favourite championed by a gaggle of donors, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), activists and academics 
(Everatt, 2003: 87).   
 
As the collection of data to measure and monitor „poverty‟ and its „alleviation‟ or 
„eradication‟ grew, debates about what these statistics were saying would also grow.   
 
In the written debate and discussion about poverty that unfolds in the process of 
reviewing the first ten years of ANC government in South Africa, there are two 
distinct periods into which analyses may be separated, based on two distinct data sets 
that are generally available and made use of by analysts in their discussions of 
changes in patterns of inequality and poverty since 1994 - the Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (IESs) of 1995 and 2000, and the Census of 1996 and 2001.  
While there have been several problems raised around the quality of the data collected 
in these sets (Simkins, 2003; Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2006; Meth, 2006), including "the 
lack of price data, the exclusion of home-grown products in consumption and 
significant problems with sampling" (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006: 2), the numbers have 
nevertheless served as the basis for a number of discussions and debates about 
whether poverty and inequality have increased or decreased since 1994.  Using 
individual income as a measure of 'poverty', most analysts, even though they might 
use different cut-off lines for their poverty datum lines, agree that there has been an 
increase in poverty in South Africa since 1994.  Using a $2 a day poverty line, the 
headcount index increased nationally from 32 to 34 per cent between 1995 and 2000, 
or from 26 to 28 per cent between 1996 and 2001.  Using the same poverty line, the 
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average poor household earned 11 per cent below it in 1995, and by 2000 this had 
increased to 13 per cent.  The statistics also show that income inequality has 
increased, with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.565 to 0.577 between 1995 and 2000 
and from 0.68 to 0.73 between 1996 and 2001, using the different data sets (Bhorat 
and Kanbur, 2006; Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2006; Liebbrandt et al, 2006).   
 
Most analysts then go on, however, to argue that income alone is insufficient in 
determining one's well-being and thus poverty.  For most, access to basic services, 
health care, education, and other social services are equally important to determining 
whether an individual or a household is poor (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006; Van Der 
Berg, 2006; Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2006).  Figures from the different data sets are 
then brought out to illustrate how the state has actually addressed poverty in ways that 
are not reflected in the statistics indicating income poverty.  In particular, spending on 
social services and the provision of access to basic services are examined and quoted 
as evidence of the state's commitment to 'the poor', not always reflected in measures 
of pure income poverty and inequality.  In the words of Leibbrandt et al,  
 
This income-based approach presents only one of many 
dimensions of the measurement of well-being in South Africa.  
The narrowness and limitations of this approach are revealed 
when we show that, over the same 1996-2001 period, there have 
been important improvements in access to basic goods and 
services for many households. (Leibbrandt et al, 2006: 97).   
 
Bhorat and Kanbur, supported by Servaas Van Der Berg, argue that, clearly evident 
from the statistics on government spending, is the "pro-poor orientation of fiscal 
expenditure" (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006: 8).  They go on to state, "In the case of 
services - principally water, sanitation and electricity - the results point to a widening 
of access for vulnerable households." (ibid: 8).  In government responses to criticisms 
that it has overseen a period of worsening poverty and inequality since 1994, the need 
to measure "the social wage" emerges, referring to those additional services provided 
by the state to individual households that are not counted in income poverty studies.   
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What these discussions neglect to consider, however, is the context in which such 
access was being made possible - that of cost recovery and privatisation in the 
delivery of basic services which ushered in the practice of user-fees for services 
accessed.  Bhorat and Kanbur, do, however, follow their celebration of increased 
access of the poor to basic services with the following caution,  
 
… recent evidence has indicated that the key drivers of aggregate 
inflation for poor urban households in the 1998-2002 period have 
been public services including water, electricity, transport and 
sanitation services.  The provision of the asset or service, 
therefore, remains only a first step in ensuring that vulnerable 
households are sufficiently empowered to extricate themselves 
from permanent or transitory poverty (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006: 
8-9).   
 
While access to services may have increased, the expectation that people would pay 
for these services resulted in widespread cut-offs from water and electricity and 
evictions from the late 1990s onwards, with the figure of 10 million cut-offs between 
1997 and 2002 gaining support and substantiation through research (Bond, 2004; Fiil-
Flynn, 2001; McDonald and Pape, 2002).  While the state would contest these figures, 
trying to show that conditions of „the poor‟ had improved through increased access to 
services, those directly affected by cut-offs and evictions, those defined as 'the poor', 
would make their dissatisfaction with their situations of precarity and vulnerability 
known through protests and demonstrations.       
 
More recently, debate has erupted over poverty statistics related to the period 2002-
2004 and after (Meth 2006, Van der Berg et al. 2006).  In spite of disagreements over 
the levels of poverty, there is broad agreement that there was a slight decrease in the 
numbers of people living below the poverty line after 2002 (Meth 2006, Leibbrandt et 
al. 2010, Van der Berg et al. 2006).  Significantly, analysts attribute this decline to the 
increase in the number and value of social grants after 2002.   
 
In January 2010, researchers from SALDRU released a report on poverty and 
inequality (in the form of income distribution) since the end of apartheid that made 
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use of national survey data from 1993, 2000 and 2008(Leibbrandt et al. 2010).  The 
report shows that income inequality increased in South Africa between 1993 and 2008 
generally, and within each racial group.  In addition, it shows that while there was an 
“unambiguous increase” (ibid: 14) in poverty between 1996 and 2001, there has since 
been a slight decrease in income poverty at an aggregate level.  However, it is pointed 
out that poverty “persists at acute levels for the African and Coloured racial groups” 
(ibid: 4).  The report also compares poverty in rural and urban areas, highlighting that 
poverty rates in the former have always been and continue to be higher than in the 
latter areas.  However, they point out that poverty rates “increased unambiguously in 
urban areas between 1992 and 2001” (ibid: 15).  And, they go to show that “while a 
much higher proportion of the rural population are poor, the proportion of the poor 
who are in rural areas is declining” (ibid).  One of the reasons for this is the increasing 
migration from rural to urban areas that happened over this period (ibid).   
 
The report also flags the fact that “intra-African inequality and poverty trends 
dominate aggregate inequality and poverty in South Africa” (ibid: 4), pointing to 
rising inequality within the labour market (due to increasing unemployment and rising 
earnings inequality) as the primary reasons for rising levels of aggregate inequality as 
they “have prevented the labour market from playing a positive role in poverty 
alleviation” (ibid).  In this context, the report confirms, social grants, in particular the 
child support grant, the disability grant, and the old-age pension, “alter the levels of 
inequality only marginally but have been crucial in reducing poverty among the 
poorest households” (ibid).       
 
But monitoring of this kind, at a more general level, has many flaws.  For example, 
data indicating household connections to water and electricity do not always reflect 
actual access to running water and electricity.  Another striking problem, highlighted 
also by the Taylor Committee Report, is the fact that none of these studies track 
developments within the same set of households over time.  In other words, none of 
the national studies that state interventions have been based on have been longitudinal 
studies.  There are just a few notable exceptions to this, for example, the local level 
Kwazulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) and the Cape Area Panel Survey.  
While these studies go some way in trying to ensure that the same set of sources are 
monitored over a period of time, and in trying to include the „actual experiences of the 
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poor‟, these studies still fall into the pattern of wanting to know how best the most 
minimal interventions can be made to serve the interests of the poorest in society.   
 
Distinguishing between „chronic poverty‟ and „transitory poverty‟, KIDS works with 
the concept of “asset-based dynamic measurement of poverty”, proposed by May and 
Carter in 2001, predicting the conditions and resources necessary to enable the poor to 
escape from their „poverty traps‟, in this way prescribing “a new typology of poverty” 
(May, 2006: 346) through which targeted interventions can be made in the lives of 
those at the margins of society to enable them to have access to the minimal resources 
deemed necessary for their survival and their ability to become economically active.  
While such studies purport to be studying the range of practices undertaken by „the 
poor‟ that allow them to survive and escape their „poverty traps‟, the models that they 
use, in prioritising market mechanisms for change, tend to neglect to study those 
strategies adopted by poor people that might fall outside of the market and/or the law 
e.g. illegal connections to water and electricity; and collective approaches to 
reproductive tasks at community level (e.g. shared childcare).  In this way, studies 
such as KIDS, play a normative role in their definition and monitoring of poverty, 
reinforcing market solutions to the problem and neglecting more creative approaches 
to survival and life that emerge amongst groups of poor people.     
  
Another interesting discussion and debate has unfolded over statistics related to the 
issue of unemployment, with much time and paper being dedicated towards proving 
that the claim that South Africa has experienced "jobless growth" since 1994 is 
unfounded (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006: 2).  With income from employment being 
viewed as an important means of individual's ensuring their well-being, government 
and its supportive consultants, academics, and researchers have been outraged by the 
mobilisation of particular sets of statistics to show that unemployment has by all 
definitions increased since 1994, and that the growth predicted by GEAR has not been 
sufficient to produce the numbers of jobs necessary to alleviate poverty, that is, it has 
not been 'pro-poor'.  In a series of arguments that highlight several statistical 
inconsistencies in the arguments made by those positing the 'jobless growth' thesis, 
Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2006) show how this notion relied on a single and incomplete 
data set, the Standardised Employment and Earnings (SEE) series, said to exclude  
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large swathes of economic activity, and in so doing 
misrepresents aggregate employment in South Africa”.  “As a 
consequence, reliance on this data revealed steady decline in 
employment from the mid-1990s in South Africa.  This result, 
when tested against the more reliable household and labour force 
survey data, has since been shown to be fundamentally flawed - 
with employment in fact expanding in the post-1994 period. 
(Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006: 3).   
 
What such statements don't state overtly is the fact that the majority of these jobs 
were created in the informal sector or take the form of part-time, casual, contract 
work.  Once again, then, we see the mobilisation of statistics in a particular way, this 
time to show that government has indeed created more jobs.  What cannot, however, 
be hidden is the fact that even when these jobs are considered, the levels of growth 
and job creation have not been sufficiently high to produce the kinds of change 
necessary to have effected much change with regard to levels of poverty.  In the 
words of researchers,  
 
Consistent with GDP growth, we find that there was little growth 
in per capita household expenditures during this period.  Roughly 
60 percent of all South Africans, and two-thirds of the African 
population, were poor in either year.  The depth and severity of 
poverty increased as a result of declining expenditures at the 
bottom end of the expenditure distribution, and inequality among 
Africans rose sharply.  By 2000, there were approximately 1.8 
million more South Africans living on less than $1/day and 2.3 
million living on less than $2/day.  While substantial progress 
was made in other areas, such as access to safe water and 
sanitation, or coverage for social transfers like the old-age 
pension programme, the government's macro-economic strategy 
failed to generate the projected growth and create enough jobs to 
bring down the high rate of unemployment.  Even if the 
projected growth rates had been achieved, it should not be 
assumed that substantial reductions in poverty would have 
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followed.  Without a progressive shift in the expenditure 
distribution, even if South Africa grew at a remarkable annual 
rate of 8 percent per capita - similar to China's growth rate in the 
1990s - it would take approximately ten years for the average 
poor household to escape from poverty. (Hoogeveen and Ozler, 
2006: 87).   
 
Bhorat and Oosthuizen have also shown how the overall growth rate of the labour 
force in the period after 1994 in South Africa contributes to the fact that the 
unemployment rate increases in spite of more jobs being created (albeit informal 
sector or casual and contract jobs) (Bhorat and Oosthuisen, 2006).  
 
In the most recent attempts by the state to sell its idea of the „war room on poverty‟, 
statistics have been wielded to show that the economic growth enjoyed by the country 
over the last few years has allowed for increased state spending on targeted 
interventions to improve the lives of „the poorest of the poor‟.  In particular, increased 
access to basic services and employment have been shown to be key in the success of 
the eradication of „poverty‟.  While a similar debate to the one engaged above could 
be entered into around these new claims, it is not the concern of this thesis to prove or 
disprove either sets of claims in this debate.  Rather, it is to show how statistics are 
used to target specific population groups in society in order to prescribe particular 
ways and standards of living for them.   
 
Poverty Lines and Indigent Policies 
 
While it is clear from these debates and discussions that have come to preoccupy 
mainstream state, academic, and civil society discourse about poverty that the 
mobilisation of statistics may occur differently, in favour of different ends, allowing 
the position and figure of the poor to be defined and employed to different ends, the 
debate and discussion about what constitutes the 'proper measures' and the 'right 
statistics' continues as government officials, academics, consultants, and researchers 
persevere in their roles as providers of those figures and definitions necessary to 
measure their own interventions in the problem as defined by them.  In fact, the 
debates and defences mounted during the ten year review of the ANC government 
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would lead to further criticisms that in spite of continued commitments in word by the 
state to eradicating poverty, with targets such as the Millenium Development Goals 
(MDGs) invoked, there was no common definition of poverty nor any standard 
measures of poverty that would allow for 'proper monitoring' of poverty towards the 
ends of meeting overall goals and targets.  In this world of specifying targets for 
intervention, and measuring progress in meeting them, an urgency would develop 
around developing a standard poverty line for South Africa.   
 
In these critiques, South Africa's non-compliance with the international regulatory 
system has been raised, for example, the Copenhagen Programme of Action of 1995 
which required each country to develop "a precise definition and assessment of 
absolute poverty" by 1996.  In the words of Charles Meth,  
 
Poverty is a somewhat different matter.  Not only does 
government have the capacity to influence the number of poor 
directly (in particular, through the social grant system), but the 
poverty headcount, and the severity of their poverty, can, in 
principle, be determined with some precision.  The fact that this 
has not been done is an indictment of all concerned.  Calls for 
more 'research' may elicit groans, and reasonably so - the appeal 
being sometimes little more than thinly disguised self-interest at 
work.  That would clearly not be true in the present case.  The 
problem of poverty is of such overwhelming importance that no 
effort should have been spared in addressing the difficulties 
raised above.  The government is plainly delinquent in having 
failed to comply with the Copenhagen Programme Of Action 
stipulation of building an appropriate poverty line (that should 
have been done by 1996).  Its efforts to monitor and evaluate its 
anti-poverty policies are unimpressive. (Meth, 2006: 436-7).    
 
In apparent response to such criticisms, government has, since 2007, commissioned a 
number of studies and papers towards the development of a national poverty line.  
Under the stewardship of the National Treasury, the „Strengthening the Impact of Pro-
Poor Programmes (SIP) Research Project‟ has been established, with financial support 
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from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
United Kingdom‟s Department for International Development (DFID), and has 
already produced a largely quantitative framework for approaching the discussion 
about the adoption of a national poverty line.  Central to this debate is deciding what 
measure or set of measures are best suited to representing that minimal standard and 
quality of life below which one would be said to be living in poverty.  In this 
discussion, „experts‟ debate whether „absolute‟ or „relative‟ measures of poverty are 
needed; whether the international World Bank poverty line of $1 a day is appropriate 
to the South African context; what goods and services reflect a standard and quality of 
life deserving of the poor; and what levels of access to these services determine 
classification as poor.  Previously used and tested measures, such as the Household 
Subsistence Level (HSL), the Minimum Living Level (MLL), and the Subsistence 
Living Level (SLL) are discussed with regard to their appropriateness to the South 
African situation.  While most of the papers published for discussion call for the 
adoption of multiple measures and strategies for the development of a poverty line, it 
is quite clear that their intention is to count up the very minimal levels of access to 
resources that are necessary for survival.  In this counting exercise, it is largely the 
opinions and calculations of „experts‟ that determine these levels, with little to no 
input from those being studied.   
 
While the above process produced a number of papers for debate and discussion 
(Leibbrandt et al. 2007; National Treasury and Statistics South Africa 2007; Studies 
in Poverty and Inequality Institute 2007), there is still no sign of consensus about a 
national poverty line.  In a recent article David Everatt berates the “spray and pray 
approach” to poverty alleviation by the South African government which, he argues, 
must be replaced by the development of a national poverty line and proper 
mechanisms for targeting those truly deserving of social assistance from the state 
(Everatt 2008: 294).  Similarly, in an interview (15 June 2010), Jak Koseff (Director 
of Community Development in the City of Johannesburg) vented his frustration and 
that of the City‟s in trying to implement pro-poor policies in the absence of a common 
national poverty line.  In both cases, arguments for the development of a national 
poverty line support the idea that such a line should reflect the most basic resources 
necessary to enable an individual to survive or, resources permitting, to become 
economically active and self-sufficient.   
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It would appear that discussions about a national poverty line are currently being 
taken up in a participatory process of developing a national anti-poverty strategy by 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) and civil society partners.  Drawing on 
arguments made by the Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute (SPII), which 
makes the case for more than one indicator being used to identify poverty, the PSC, in 
its Audit of Government‟s Poverty Reduction Programmes and Projects, has 
categorised poverty reduction programmes in terms of causes of poverty, including 
income poverty, service poverty, asset poverty, capability poverty and social 
insurance (Republic of South Africa, Public Service Commission 2007 – Report on an 
Audit of Government‟s Poverty Reduction Programmes and Projects: 17).  
Prioritising the development of “a broader statistical definition of poverty” that “can 
serve the multiplicity of needs emphasised above”, it sets out the main aims of this 
process of dialogue as answering the following questions: 
 
Is there an emerging consensus on how to conceptualise, define and 
measure poverty in South Africa? 
Are we developing the data series that will adequately measure 
poverty and at the same time meet the divergent needs of the people 
who design and implement poverty reduction programmes? 
Have poverty levels increased or decreased over recent years? (ibid).   
 
While discussions continue at a national level about ways in which to measure 
poverty so that it may be eradicated or alleviated, the field of the delivery of basic 
services has seen a return to indigent management as a way of ensuring that the poor 
are identified as those unable to pay for their basic services and targeted for the 
delivery of free basic services of a particular standard.  Bond argues that the 
introduction of neoliberal policies in the delivery of basic services, through their 
differentiation between different levels of service made accessible to different 
categories of people based on their ability to pay, has led to “class based services 
segregation” (Bond, 2002:191).  He shows how policy processes, such as that related 
to the development of the Municipal Investment and Infrastructure Framework 
(MIIF), would aim to set minimal amounts of resources whose provision would 
become the responsibility of municipalities, which would base their decisions related 
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to increasing access for „the poor‟ on their commitments to cost-effectiveness and the 
commodification of services and the corporatisation of service delivery, with the 
expectation that the provision of any access greater than that necessary for survival 
would be the responsibility of the individual citizen.  He shows how the Urban 
Development Strategy (UDS), a precursor to the MIIF, released in 1995, stipulates, 
for example, a number of levels of service considered adequate to the needs of 
different income groups in South Africa.   
 
According to the UDS, there should be “an average national distribution of 55:25:20 
between full, intermediate and basic levels of services” over the ten years ahead of it, 
with basic services defined as “communal standpipes (water), on site sanitation, 
graded roads with gravel and open stormwater drains and streetlights (electricity)”, 
and would be targeted at households earning less than R800 per month, and costed at 
between R35 and R50 per month.  It defined intermediate services as including “water 
provision through yard taps on site, simple water-borne sanitation, narrow paved 
roads with no curbs and open drains and 30 amps electricity with prepaid meters for 
households”, considered to be “affordable to households which earn between R800 
and R1 700 per month”, and costing between R100 and R130 a month.  It defines full 
services as “house connected water supplies, full water-borne sanitation, paved roads 
with curbs and piped drains and 60 amps electricity provision”, and costs them at 
between R270 and R350 per month, targeting households with a monthly income of 
above R3 500.  (UDS quoted in Bond, 2002: 191). 
 
While the UDS and MIIF symbolise a move by the state towards the adoption of more 
targeted interventions aimed at specific population groups, defined by their indigent 
status, the implementation of their proposals would unfold within a context of 
increasing resistance from communities demanding an end to cut-offs from their 
water and electricity supplies as the logic of cost recovery and commodification came 
to be felt under the duty to pay for services.  In this context, minimal levels of 
resources and the constitution of groups for targeted interventions would come to be 
decided in struggles undertaken by poor communities affected by such calculated 
decisions in their everyday lives.   
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As government has been forced to show its commitment to meeting the basic needs of 
the marginalised in society, a terrain of engagement has opened up over what 
constitutes those minimal levels of access to services and resources considered 
necessary for survival or 'bare life'.  As poor communities and groups have protested 
against their cut-offs from essential services, such as water and electricity, for non-
payment, government has developed certain 'lifeline' amounts of water and electricity 
that municipalities are supposed to ensure are delivered to all households, thereby 
allowing those unable to afford to pay for services access to the basic minimum 
amounts of services necessary for survival.  At present, most municipalities nationally 
provide 6kl of water and 50kW of electricity free per household per month.  Processes 
of research and debate related to these minimal levels have also been opened up as a 
result of protests, and due to the increased attention being paid to indigent 
management policies at a municipal level.   
 
In 1998, after a period of sustained community resistance in townships of 
Johannesburg, the municipality began implementing an Indigent Management Policy 
that would offer citizens able to prove that they were „poor enough‟ (earning below a 
certain amount) certain rebates on basic services.  City documents state that the 1998 
policy was 
 
a poverty reduction strategy aimed at creating a safety net for the 
poorest and the elderly by subsidising the supply of water below 
10 kilolitres per month to households with a total monthly 
income of less than R800, or not more than two state pensions in 
the case of pensioners with the cut off of R1 080 per month” 
(City of Johannesburg, 2007mcase: 28). 
 
Faced with “administrative and process problems” (ibid), only 25 199 applicants were 
successful, with only 30 659 applications received (Palmer Development Group, 
2004a: 11).   
 
This led to the repeal of the policy in 2002, with the adoption of the Special Cases 
Policy, which targeted pensioners with a family income of less than R 1 100 per 
month for one pensioner or R1 241 for a husband and wife; families with an income 
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of less than R1 100 per month, and breadwinners with full-blown AIDS or their direct 
orphans (ibid: 12).  Its objectives included the provision of a subsidy on refuse 
removal and sanitation for households without the financial means to pay for these 
services; the establishment of a “poverty register” to inform “poverty mapping and 
targeted socio-economic developmental programmes”; and “to enhance credit control 
measures by providing a safety net for the poorest of the poor and identifying those 
using poverty to not pay for basic services” (ibid: 11).  While the Special Cases Policy 
might have been more ambitious than its predecessor, it too would face similar 
problems, with its registration of just a fraction of those it aimed to attract (ibid; 
Bond, 2002: 221).  Bond points out that while City officials would brag about the 
objectives of the Special Cases Policy to increase the access of poor households to 
basic services, its record of 92 400 water and electricity cut-offs between January and 
April 2002, told a different story (Bond, 2002: 221).     
 
In trying to offer reasons for the failure of these initial attempts at indigent 
management policies, Bond and Greg Ruiters argue that such policies have 
stigmatising effects that prevent individuals from coming forward to claim their 
supposed benefits (Bond, 2002; Ruiters, 2005).  This is explored in greater detail 
through the example of the evolution of the indigent management policies of the City 
of Johannesburg, in the following chapters.   
 
In 2003, noting government‟s commitment to the provision of free basic services “to 
address the needs of the masses of impoverished citizens of South Africa” and its 
constitutional obligation to provide a “basic level of service” to all citizens, as well as 
the numerous “difficulties
71
” faced in the provision of basic services, the DPLG 
undertook a study into the provision of free basic services in the country.  Consisting 
of a quantitative survey of all 284 municipalities, interviews with a national sample of 
municipalities (28), and interviews with identified stakeholders in the sphere of free 
basic service delivery (e.g. Eskom and DWAF), the study found that 67 per cent of 
municipalities had undertaken some formal process to identify households qualifying 
                                                 
71
 These „difficulties‟ were said to include the fact that available statistics “did not provide a detailed 
picture of delivery at municipal level; that “there was a lack of information on the challenges faced by 
municipalities in delivering free basic services”; that the impact of free basic services on poverty was 
unknown; and that there was no information about which municipalities were experiencing problems or 
requiring support in rolling out free basic services (DPLG – Directorate Free Basic Services, 2003: 1). 
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for free basic services (DWAF – Directorate Free Basic Services, 2003: iii).  In the 
report from the study it is therefore argued that “the high number of municipalities 
who had attempted to identify indigents indicates an interest to develop a record of 
indigents in their municipality” (ibid.).   
It also found that a number of problems were being experienced by municipalities 
with regard to developing their own indigent management policies, stating:   
… the qualitative interviews with municipalities showed that 
municipalities were struggling with the development of an indigent 
policy for free basic services implementation (ibid: 7). 
Throughout the document the need for the development of guidelines for 
municipalities about their approach to the indigent is mentioned.  The report would go 
on to show how a targeted approach, such as that of an indigent register and policy, 
would make more sense for municipalities with regard to cost-effectiveness, 
„efficiency‟, and the ability to monitor the interventions made by government.  While 
it would recognise that municipal managers interviewed in the study had expressed 
reluctance at adopting such policies because of their perceived administrative burden, 
the report would nevertheless make a strong case for the development of national 
guidelines for the implementation of indigent management policies at municipal 
level.   
 
In 2004, armed with the findings of this research, Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, 
Chairperson of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) would 
announce SALGA‟s commitment to the registration of indigents and the provision of 
free basic services to this group in a „war against poverty‟: 
 
At today‟s meeting in Kempton Park, the SALGA Consultative 
Assembly agreed to a campaign to register the poor throughout our 
country in the war against poverty.  The aim of the campaign is to 
ensure that the most marginalised of our people - the poorest of the 
poor - receive a subsidy from their municipalities for basic services. 
This will go a long way to ensure service delivery to the poor, who 
are deprived of a basic amount of water, sanitation services and 
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electricity because they are too poor to pay for these services rather 
than unwillingness to pay for services." (Media Statement By The 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA) 
Chairperson, Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, 16/6/2004) 
 
As poor communities rose up in refusal of the enforcement of the duty to pay for basic 
services, the state began to increase its efforts at appeasing „the poorest of the poor‟, 
with indigent management policies becoming a favoured strategy.   
 
In June 2005, in the midst of what were called 'service delivery riots' in townships all 
over the country, the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) made 
public a proposed national indigent policy to set the frameworks for municipalities.  
Interestingly, the entire proposed indigency policy hinges on the provision of free 
basic services, or, at least, the provision of those services necessary for life.  The 
proposed policy framework states,  
 
Indigent people have in common the need to access affordable 
basic services that will facilitate their productive and healthy 
engagement in society. (DPLG, 2005).   
 
This national prioritisation of the identification of a particular section of the 
population as 'indigent', that is, dependent on the state for their basic survival, has 
meant the proliferation of processes of research and policy formulation at a local level 
around what constitutes 'indigency' and 'poverty' and what minimal levels of 
intervention would be appropriate and necessary.  The example of Johannesburg, 
explored in the following chapter, clearly illustrates this point.   
 
In the state‟s most recent discussion document, Towards an Anti-Poverty Strategy for 
South Africa, released in October 2008, commitments to targeted interventions for the 
poor are reaffirmed and mechanisms further outlined towards their realisation.  These 
latest priorities of the state confirm the argument made in this chapter that statistics 
and other measures are being put to work in the construction of a field of intervention 
through which the poor are targeted to embrace particular standards of living and 
possibilities for their everyday grids of life.     
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Johannesburg, my city, 
dreams come here to die. 
(Lesego Rampolokeng) 
 
The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 would result in the growth of 
South Africa‟s most prosperous city - Johannesburg.  Known more popularly as 
„iGoli‟ (or „Place of Gold‟), Johannesburg, in its changing forms, would come to 
symbolise the dreams of many for „a better life‟.  From its early days when people 
made their journey to the big city in search of their piece of the gold that was said to 
pave the streets, to current trends that see people migrating to the city in search of 
fame and fortune, Johannesburg has been seen as a site through which economic 
prosperity, a greater quality of life, and independence of individual choice, are made 
possible – a place in which dreams are able to be realised.   
 
But, as Rampolokeng‟s words insist, Johannesburg is also a place in which people 
realise that their dreams are not attainable.  And for many, their condition of making 
the city their own is the very recognition that their reason for being in the city has 
changed or no longer exists- their dreams dying.  For the majority who first came to 
Johannesburg, then, seeking greater economic gain, the dream of unfettered individual 
success through the acquisition of material wealth would quickly disappear as the rule 
of wage labour and the capitalist market prevented the widespread and collective 
ownership of the means to the gold that produced the wealth that was quickly 
becoming the preserve of a few corporate elites.  Instead, the majority of fortune 
seekers would be forced into exploitative positions of work in the mines and the 
subsidiary manufacturing and service industries that grew to support the gold mining 
industry.  And segregation and apartheid would produce a city divided along rigid 
race and class lines, in the interests of the creation and perpetuation of a cheap and 
servile labour force, with Black people (and Black women) at its lowest rungs.             
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But the making of Johannesburg under segregation and apartheid was also marked by 
resistance on the part of individuals and communities, refusing incorporation into 
wage labour and refusing removal from the city on the basis that they were refusing 
waged employment (Van Onselen, 1982).  And as much as the dreams of ordinary 
people might have come to Johannesburg only to die, it was the life created in the city 
by these same people that challenged the dream that was apartheid.  Today, as wage 
labour is on the decline in the world, the country and the city, Johannesburg has 
become a laboratory for new state policies that seek to address the increasing 
vulnerability of its citizens outside of the social protections traditionally afforded by 
the formal wage, and new strategies of resistance against the minimal standards of 
living and quality of life being prescribed for these citizens. 
 
Johannesburg is an important case study for a project wanting to understand the 
mobilisation of the poor and poverty in post-apartheid South Africa as it illustrates so 
clearly the changes in government thinking about how questions of inequality and 
need are addressed, and how the delivery of basic services comes to be dominated by 
a discourse of poverty and the poor that works towards entrenching the logic of 
commodification, as well as towards the production of a field of intervention for the 
state that allows it to reduce its role to providing the minimal resources deemed 
necessary for survival to a particular section.  Important here is the fact that much of 
this evolution of policy has occurred in the context of resistance and struggle.  
 
From Apartheid City to ‘World Class City’: Re-Imagining Johannesburg Post-1994 
 
Johannesburg‟s history is one of state-led segregation and the entrenchment of 
divisions along race and class lines, resulting in a city space reflecting these divisions.  
Until the 1980s, black people were only welcome in the city if they were workers, 
and then the majority only for the period in which they were employed, having to 
„return‟ to their „homelands‟ during their holidays and periods of unemployment or 
remain in „townships‟ established for „black living‟ on the outskirts of the inner city 
and away from the white suburbs.   
 
The Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 forced local authorities to allocate land for 
black occupation, resulting in the removal and relocation of black people from the 
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municipal jurisdiction to an area south of the city that was to become Soweto from 
1924 on.  It also made it illegal for blacks to rent or own property in areas designated 
for white occupation only.   
 
Apartheid further entrenched these racial divisions through influx control laws and the 
establishment of the homeland system, as well as later legislation, such as the Group 
Areas Act (1953).  Through such legislation, the apartheid state attempted to organise 
the city so that it could house its cheap black labour force away from white workers, 
in dwellings deserving of people thought to require a lower quality of life than whites 
(Parnell, 1992), and keep its reserve army of labour in the homelands, sustained 
largely by the reproductive labour of the homestead, or townships and hostels, where 
a lower quality of life would be entrenched for black people.  But, the hardship of life 
in the Bantustans would see many unemployed black people move to the city and its 
outskirts illegally, with the burgeoning of squatter camps and an informal economy 
from fairly early in Johannesburg‟s history, becoming an inescapable reality and 
problem for the apartheid state by the 1980s.  This is explored in greater detail in the 
following two chapters that look at the emergence of an informal settlement called 
Orange Farm.   
 
By the late 1980s, then, Johannesburg was a symbol of the change forcing itself on 
the country – the unstoppable force of black people who had resisted influx control to 
settle illegally in and around the city, demanding their share of Johannesburg‟s wealth 
and comforts, and making parts of the city their own.  But the apartheid state‟s 
acknowledgment of the situation of poor black people in the city would go no further 
than the formalisation of their informality (see next chapter), and the perpetuation of 
different standards of living for the urban black poor.  In response to this, several 
campaigns unfolded from within the liberation movement to challenge the notion that 
black people deserved a lower standard and quality of life and to demand improved 
living conditions for black people.   
 
While the ANC government would, in 1994, then inherit a city deeply divided along 
race and class lines, with glaring levels of inequality and differential levels of and 
access to services, it would also have to meet the expectations amongst the black 
majority for change in their interests.  Many writing about Johannesburg on the brink 
 173 
of democracy would comment on its potential for great prosperity as well as its need 
to address the problem of growing poverty and social resistance.   
 
Writing about the changes brought about in 1994, Beauregard, Bremner, Mangcu and 
Tomlinson state,  
 
As the centre of finance for South Africa, Johannesburg would 
thrive.  It would become the gateway for South Africa‟s entry 
into the global economy.  Consequently, publicists for the city 
touted its ostensible inclusivity and rapid transition to equal 
opportunity.  The city adopted a strategic plan that would 
promote Johannesburg as a world city, an international 
metropolis, and even bid to become the South African nominee 
for the 2004 Olympic Games.  Without the burden of apartheid, 
Johannesburg could be imagined as a global city. (Beauregard et 
al. 2003: xii).   
 
But later on they write,  
 
Although civic leaders proposed to make Johannesburg a 
„globally competitive African world class city‟, they struggled to 
give substance to this vision.  It seemed that before Johannesburg 
could join the company of world cities it would have to address 
apartheid‟s lingering consequences: enduring poverty, too few 
jobs, racial divisions, capital flight, low educational levels, and 
the other social and economic obstacles that made the city 
seemingly no more egalitarian and no more just that it had been 
before 1994.  In addition, in the 1990s Johannesburg came face 
to face with the HIV-AIDS epidemic. (ibid: 4).   
 
The re-imagination of Johannesburg was, therefore, “constrained by the need to 
balance harsh fiscal and administrative realities with growing demands for social 
justice”, and characterised by attempts to achieve a balance between “equity and 
efficiency goals” (Beall, et. al., 2002: 5).               
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For the entire first phase of its development, Johannesburg municipal policy would, 
however, prioritise the goal of increasing economic growth through greater 
„efficiency‟ through which the „equity goals‟, it would argue, could then be reached.  
Civil society organisations and individual citizens would proactively be encouraged 
to assume the logic of market-led growth, payment for services, and „trickle-down 
development‟, in line with the evolving macro-economic strategy of the newly elected 
ANC government, and continuing on a path already adopted by the apartheid 
government in its period of reforms from the 1980s on.   
 
This would be done through the drawing of pre-1994 civil society organisations 
(many of them highly mobilised against the local authorities under apartheid) into 
consensus-making forums that would lead to the establishment of the Central 
Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber.  Central to the process of re-imagining 
Johannesburg were the civics – self-organised township structures that emerged to 
contest the authority of the apartheid state in its many forms, in particular the 
establishment of black local authorities in 1982.  Beauregard, Bremner, Mangcu and 
Tomlinson write,  
 
The creation of the black local authorities was the first 
recognition of the permanence of black residence adjacent to the 
white cities and a tacit acknowledgement that the old policies of 
influx control as a way of regulating black urbanisation had 
failed.  But the black local authorities were in an impossible 
situation.  As illegitimate political structures and in the absence 
of a commercial and industrial tax base, they were to collect 
rents and services payments and to use this revenue base, 
inadequate as it was, to run the townships. (Beauregard, et. al., 
2003: 8). 
 
With the rise in campaigns from 1983 onwards, that boycotted black local authority 
elections and institutions, this task was made impossible.  The Asinamali Campaign 
(„We Have No Money‟), which started in 1984 in townships of the Vaal, spreading to 
townships across the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal region (PWV), was particularly 
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significant in encouraging residents not to pay for rents and services.  By the early 
1990s, fifty two of eighty four councils in the Transvaal province had been faced with 
rent and service boycotts (ibid: 9).  As negotiations between the liberation movement, 
increasingly represented by the ANC, and the apartheid state unfolded, a policy-
making body was formed to allow decisions to be made amongst a range of 
stakeholders in Johannesburg through consensus – the Central Witwatersrand 
Metropolitan Chamber.   
 
In its final form, it consisted of fifty three organisations – the Transvaal Provincial 
Administration (TPA), local government structures, civic associations, white 
ratepayer and residents‟ associations, the ANC, and other political parties.  In this 
manner, those previously organised in opposition to the authority of the apartheid 
state were drawn into „democratising structures‟ that were reflective of the 
compromised relations being negotiated in the settlement that would end apartheid.    
„Nation-building‟ through the creation of „stable environments‟ for foreign investment 
and export-led growth would become the priority promoted for all citizens, who 
would be encouraged to become part of the various „stakeholder-driven‟ forums being 
established as part of the drive towards building „participatory governance‟ and a 
culture of individual and collective responsibility towards meeting the needs of the 
nation as it was being constructed according to the „fiscal constraints‟ and market 
logic that had gained ground.  With this thinking, „the citizen‟ would come to be 
treated and made as „the customer‟ (Ruiters, 2005), and a logic of payment and 
individual responsibility would come to determine the delivery of basic services.      
 
A large part of the work of these forums came to be defined by a campaign 
conceptualised by the Department of Constitutional Development, called Masakhane 
(„We Are Building‟).  On 20 January 1995, the National Department of Constitutional 
Development launched the campaign as “part of a drive to normalise and improve 
relations of governance and to focus on rights and responsibilities of citizens and 
government” (Department of Constitutional Development, Cabinet Memorandum No. 
26, 1996: 1).  Central to this campaign was the encouragement of citizens to pay for 
their basic services.  However, government would strive to make the campaign appear 
to be more than the issue of payment for services, encouraging the campaign to be 
viewed as reinforcing the theme of payment for services within a broader “vision of 
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development of communities, transformation of government and promoting sound 
relations between government and the people” and being “about „working together to 
get things done‟ and building partnerships around development issues”, the 
consequences of which should include “improved service delivery and increased 
levels of payment” (ibid: 2-3).   
 
In its attempts to localise the campaign and encourage joint responsibility between 
citizens and the state for the creation of the conditions in which payment for services 
would be accepted and naturalised as part of the general growth and success of the 
nation, government would argue that Masakhane be seen as “a joint campaign with 
civil society, including community groups, labour organisations, business and 
religious groups”, with a “shift” towards “promoting collective responsibility by 
means of building co-ownership with all stakeholders at local, provincial and national 
level” (ibid: 3).   
 
Although short-lived, the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber marked the 
beginning of a period in which the role and character of the Council would be shaped 
according to the logic of addressing apartheid‟s legacy through the corporatisation of 
core functions of the state in the interests of running the city like a business and 
making it work, primarily, in the interests of the world‟s rich.  Guided by the process 
for transformation outlined by the Local Government Transition Act of 1993, the 
Chamber represented the first of three phases that did away with apartheid‟s unequal 
and differentiated system of separate local authorities governing separate racially 
determined areas, and began reorganising the functioning of local government 
according to a business logic.  It would oversee the establishment of local forums to 
negotiate the appointment of temporary local government councils to rule until 
elections were held in November 1995, followed by a phase that would cover the 
period between the 1995 municipal elections and the design of a new local 
government system and the election of a new local government.  The final phase 
began with local government elections in 2001.  During the second phase, the seven 
apartheid era city councils (Johannesburg, Soweto, Sandton, Randburg, Dobsonville, 
Diepmeadow and Roodepoort) and areas falling under the jurisdiction of the former 
Regional Services Councils (RSCs) and the Transvaal Provincial Administration 
(TPA) e.g. Orange Farm, were dissolved in the formation of the Greater Johannesburg 
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Metropolitan Council (GJMC) and four subsidiary Municipal Substructures (MSSs), 
only to be later further transformed into a single unicity with a more centralised 
system of governance.  It has been argued that during this period of transition the City 
of Johannesburg “endured an extended period of uncertainty and political dispute, 
financial difficulties, and cycles of centralisation, decentralisation, and then 
centralisation again.” (Beauregard et. al., 2003: 11).   
 
The immediate term plan that was envisioned as resolving the uncertainty and other 
problems of this period was iGoli 2002, which would also speak to a longer term plan 
called iGoli 2010.       
 
In 1997, the problems of the city were acknowledged by the GJMC as a „financial 
crisis‟,
72
 prompting the intervention of the Gauteng provincial government.  On 10 
October 1997, Gauteng‟s MEC for local government issued a proclamation that 
prevented the City from new capital investment and required it to begin a 
restructuring exercise aimed at reducing budget deficits, improving service delivery, 
and enforcing the duty to pay for services.  The proclamation required, in particular, 
that the municipality explore the possibility of „public-private partnerships‟ in 
reconfiguring its service departments into business units. (Barchiesi, 2005: 196).   
 
The proclamation also set in process the establishment of a „Committee of Ten‟, 
consisting of representatives of the GJMC and the four MLCs, whose aim was to 
devise a plan for the restructuring of the City that would address the financial crisis 
and define its new functions as a unicity.  The Committee of Ten later became the 
Committee of Fifteen, which, in turn, became the Transformation Lekgotla in 
February 1999, comprising the chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of the GJMC 
and the MLCs, and five co-opted councillors.  The GJMC and the MLCs entered an 
„urgency agreement‟ through which they delegated their powers to the Lekgotla, 
leading Barchiesi to remark that  
 
                                                 
72
 Critics have argued that this „financial crisis‟ was just a ruse to usher in a set of neoliberal policies 
through which the city could be „restructured‟ (Barchiesi, 2005; Bond, 2000a).   
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in this way, an administrative unelected body assumed full 
policy-making powers, of which the Councils as composed of 
elected representatives were deprived. (ibid: 198).   
 
In September 1998, a management team of four was appointed by the GJMC to 
oversee the immediate transformation plans of the City.  Together with the 
Transformation Lekgotla, the team developed iGoli 2002, which was adopted by the 
Lekgotla on 16 March 1999.   
 
With the slogan, „Making the City Work – It Cannot be Business as Usual‟, iGoli 
2002 was envisaged as a three-year immediate term set of plans for the City aimed at 
streamlining its functions and making it a more efficient and friendly place for 
business and the making of profits.  Reiterating the belief that Johannesburg‟s 
solutions to its problems lie in its becoming „world class‟ and running itself like a 
business, the document presented itself as a concrete set of proposals towards 
attaining the broad vision previously proclaimed for the City.  Importantly, it again 
prioritised market-led economic growth as the primary solution to meeting the needs 
of all Johannesburg‟s citizens.   
 
Under the heading „Strategic Position of Johannesburg‟, the iGoli 2002 
Transformation and Implementation Plan of 1999 states:  
 
Johannesburg is and will remain the most significant 
metropolitan area of South Africa and the economic heart of the 
region.  It continues to serve as the barometer for economic 
growth, social development, creation of opportunities and 
generally the well-being of the nation.  The fact is that it is home 
to 70 per cent of corporate head offices, 55 per cent of the 
country‟s A-grade office space, producing 11 per cent of the 
country‟s GDP.  Moreover, it is the key intellectual centre, 
responsible for development and growth.  Johannesburg without 
being consulted is thrust with the responsibility of leading by 
example and being the catalyst for social and economic 
development in the region, and increasingly so in the continent.  
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If there is to be an African renaissance, Johannesburg will be at 
the heart of it. (City of Joburg, 1999: 1).   
 
Seeking to harness this potential for Johannesburg in the interests of all its citizens, 
the document goes on to argue that  
 
In Johannesburg the need for transformation is generally agreed 
as being informed by a broad vision for the city capable of 
meeting its people‟s basic needs, growing the economy, creating 
jobs and becoming more competitive.  Transformation should 
address the needs of all of the varied segments of our citizens, 
especially the poor and involve them in a meaningful way. (ibid: 
1).   
 
In this way, earlier commitments to balancing „efficiency‟ with „equity‟ goals 
continued.  However, in the characterisation of the City‟s problems as an 
overwhelmingly financial crisis requiring very specific and immediate structural (or 
„practical‟) changes, „equity‟ goals would again be submitted to an overall economic 
framework that would prioritise growth and the „efficiency‟ required of successful 
businesses in the operations of the Council.   
 
Under the heading „Why does Johannesburg need transformation?‟ the document 
states: 
 
Councils are presently unable to extend the provision of service 
to the poorest of the poor at a fast enough rate.  Those who 
already have infrastructure are not properly serviced.  In the 
current financial year the Councils are spending only R330 
million (the optimal figure is approximately R800 million) on 
maintaining infrastructure while R400 million is set aside as bad 
debt.  To address backlogs, the city should be spending R1.2 
billion instead of the current R376 million capital budget.  In 
respect of social and economic development, Johannesburg has a 
31 per cent unemployment rate, an economy that grew by 0.3 per 
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cent over the last two years while the population increased by 2 
per cent per annum. (ibid: 4).   
 
Characterising the problem in such overwhelmingly economic terms within an 
overarching rationality of the „efficiency‟ necessary in order to „spend meaningfully‟, 
the document would then argue that economic growth and the reorganisation of the 
functioning of the City according to the logic of the market and the principles of 
business are the best solutions to the City‟s woes, solutions that would be in the 
interests of all Johannesburg‟s citizens.     
 
In relation to the delivery of basic services, the document placed its transformation at 
the centre of both the financial crisis and its solution.  Non-payment was noted as one 
of the key factors contributing to the financial crisis, with the Councils being owed 
R2.6 billion from services arrears and this debt growing by an average of R33 million 
a month (ibid: 5).  In addition, iGoli 2002 argued for greater efficiency in the 
management of service delivery, with more attention being paid to business principles 
that would overcome the problem of the surpluses generated from service delivery 
going towards the subsidisation of other operational costs of the Council.  It says:  
 
The trading services (water, electricity, etc.) produce a R400 
million surplus, which should be reinvested in improving these 
basic services but instead is spent on other functions of Council.  
The non-trading services are currently heavily subsidised.  For 
example, the bus company with R70 million, the Civic Theatre 
with R20 million, the Zoo with R30 million, the existing housing 
stock with R134 million among others.  Subsidies to non-trading 
services add up to roughly R700 million.  If councils were 
reinvesting the R400 million surplus from trading services and 
the R650 from RSC levies into capital expenditure, the City 
would be able to address its capital needs.  Currently, both 
amounts are used for Council‟s operating costs. (ibid: 5).   
 
As a solution, then, iGoli 2002 would prescribe different forms of corporatisation for 
these different trading and non-trading services, with the basic principle being to 
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separate or ring-fence each service into a business unit or utility that would then 
operate and be run according to the logic of profit and the market.  Cutting its 
subsidies to the non-trading entities, and arguing that they be run as separate business 
units, the Council argued that the surpluses be used to improve the efficiency of the 
trading services so that they would be able to generate greater revenue for the City.  
While the effects of such changes on the non-trading services is an important matter 
for separate research, it is nevertheless significant to note that iGoli 2002 would 
entrench inequalities through its reservation of certain forms of life for those able to 
pay for them as the arts, culture, and access to basic services would increasingly 
become commodified and governed by the law of the market.  With regard to the 
delivery of water and sanitation, electricity, and waste management, iGoli 2002 
proposed  
 
the creation of a publicly owned corporatised utility, that will 
operate in terms of procedures laid down by the Companies Act 
and will be professionally managed while dividends, regulation 
and policy direction is kept under political control through the 
Council (ibid: 13).   
 
The document also committed the City to the provision of „lifeline services‟ with 
regard to water and sanitation, and electricity, stating that one of “the key challenges” 
is “to extend universal but individualised access” (ibid: 15) to people.  Aside from a 
single line commitment, however, the document did not pay any more attention to this 
specific issue.  Together with the other few references to „the needs of the poor‟ 
already quoted above, iGoli 2002 laid the ground for future documents of the City that 
would argue more clearly for different standards of living to be made available to 
people based on their ability to pay.         
 
Recognising that the planned process of restructuring would result in changes in the 
employment positions of staff and on the nature of work, iGoli 2002 did not spell out 
what these changes might be, but made several recommendations to ensure that the 
plan be negotiated and discussed with organised labour and with individual 
employees.  It would also guarantee that no retrenchments would occur.  It would also 
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offer some reasons for the anticipated changes in the structuring and organisation of 
work in the city:  
 
Johannesburg is not a happy place to work in (and live in).  It is 
plagued by a series of problems that create uncertainty, lack of 
job satisfaction, inequity and an uncaring environment for staff 
which spreads to the external environment and impacts 
negatively on customers in the form of poor service, low 
productivity and morale, bad customer care which in turn, leads 
to a poor image for the city, resulting in less investment, 
increasing the financial crisis.  This forces decisions that produce 
an even more unhappy place to work in. (ibid: 8). 
 
Again, the priority of making the city work in the interests of a business logic would 
be wielded as the primary reason for changes in the nature of employment. 
 
In describing itself as an immediate term plan, the iGoli 2002 document would also 
emphasise the need for a longer-term vision, outlined in a section called „iGoli 2010‟.   
Here it would argue for the „fundamentals‟ set in place by iGoli 2002 to be 
strengthened and enhanced in a ten year vision to take forward the realisation of the 
building of “a world class African city” (ibid: 35).  Significantly, it would speak to 
the debate about whether to prioritise growth in its transformation strategy.  
Characterising the debate as one over whether economic growth or the meeting of 
basic needs should be prioritised, the document conveniently erases any notion of the 
need for redistribution that tends to feature in the discussions being cited.  Instead, 
economic growth is presented as the answer to the meeting of basic needs, which, in 
turn, are said to have to be met if further growth is to occur.   
 
It states,  
 
An ongoing debate in South Africa, which will remain a debate, 
focuses on one of the key questions that must be answered in 
order to put together a successful development strategy.  It refers 
to the relationship between addressing basic needs and creating 
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economic growth and competitiveness.  Some have argued for 
either of these to come first.  Our approach focuses on the need 
to address both simultaneously to ensure that the improvements 
in one contribute to the chances of the other benefiting.  Put 
simply, unless we are able to generate growth and 
competitiveness we will not have the resources to address basic 
needs.  It is also true that unless we address basic needs we will 
not create the environment and the necessary human capital to 
allow for economic growth to take place. (ibid: 34).   
 
Presenting itself as bringing together interests perceived to be at odds with each other, 
iGoli 2010 would completely ignore the claim made by its critics that it denies the 
possibility for redistributive mechanisms to play any meaningful role in the 
transformation of the city, leaving its future, rather, to the whims of the market.   
 
According to the document, iGoli 2010  
 
prioritises the unserviced and the poor by focusing on lifeline 
services, cross subsidies within services, cross subsidies between 
services, putting in place plans to address all current backlogs 
tied to performance agreements with the service providers…, and 
address the economic growth and financial constraints which will 
make available more resources to improve the operating and 
capital expenditure of the City. (ibid: 39).  
  
However, critics have argued that the City‟s arguments for the decentralisation of the 
provision of basic services have facilitated the entry of policies of privatisation and 
cost-recovery to the exclusion of policies of cross-subsidisation.  In the sphere of 
water delivery, for example, Patrick Bond shows how the free basic allocation of 6kl 
per month to households in South Africa forms part of a system in which the cost of 
water thereafter is more for consumers who use less water (low end consumers) than 
consumers who use more water (high end consumers), based on the logic of the 
market, that is, that the cost of provision of a larger amount of water is less than that 
of a smaller amount.  Bond argues, instead, that this logic of the market should be 
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subverted through an acceptance of principles of cross-subsidisation, that are not 
based on the desire to generate profit, but on the duty of high end users to cross-
subsidise increased access of low end users.  In this way, the price of consumption 
would direct efforts at conserving water towards high end users, rather than towards 
those who already use less water, a strategy that in turn would prevent the 
construction of extremely expensive water supply additions, especially further 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project dams (Bond, 2008).   
 
With decentralisation prioritised, however, „meeting the basic needs of the poor‟ 
becomes tied to a logic of profit and commodification, and city planning becomes 
based on long-term financial plans that seek to reorganise work and operations along 
the lines of a business.  iGoli 2010, then, calls for this kind of planning that puts the 
interests of good budgeting and careful spending over the need to spend created by 
the inequalities entrenched by apartheid spending and planning.  It states,  
 
A financial plan which does not seek to increase the financial 
burden but rather one that focuses on collecting revenues owed 
to the city, removing non and under billing problems, reducing 
operating costs, substantially reducing avoidable wastage, 
tackling fraud and theft, creatively identifying new sources of 
income, innovatively reducing our costs of capital, better cash 
management, improving access to new capital and leveraging 
greater intergovernmental fiscal transfers.  The financial plan 
will result in adequate operating expenditure to ensure adequate 
service delivery, improve capital expenditure to address 
maintenance and backlogs and the building of a cash-backed 
capital development fund to be able to finance the big public 
investments that grow our city. (Greater Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Council, 1999: 39). 
 
While the document would argue that a long-term strategy for the city “should be 
jointly produced by all its stakeholders so that they can share both the vision and the 
commitment to turn it into reality” (ibid: 9), city officials and the ANC government 
dealt harshly with critics of its plans, and did little to understand or engage with the 
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increasing resistance against iGoli 2002.  In 1999, local ANC Councillor from 
Pimville, Soweto, Trevor Ngwane, was expelled from his job and the party for 
publicly criticising the plan.  In 2000, protesting workers from the South African 
Municipal Workers‟ Union (SAMWU) were arrested and dealt with violently by 
police as organised actions against iGoli 2002 broke out.  As the ANC Alliance 
leadership closed ranks around those within the ANC, the SACP and COSATU (and 
its affiliates, in particular SAMWU) who were critical of iGoli 2002, individuals from 
within these formations began to come together outside of the Alliance in various 
groupings e.g. the Anti-iGoli Forum (consisting of aggrieved SANCO, SAMWU, 
SACP and ANC members, as well as unaffiliated community members).  Discussion 
and debate around iGoli 2002 within Alliance structures was closed down in a similar 
manner to that about the adoption of GEAR in 1996
73
, and many members of 
Congress formations began to feel constrained and silenced, looking to alternative 
spaces through which to make their voices heard and more effective.  (See Desai, 
2002; Naidoo and Veriava, 2005).    
 
In 2000, students belonging to the South African Students‟ Congress (SASCO) at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, workers organised in the NEHAWU Wits Local, 
municipal workers organised in SAMWU, members of the Anti-iGoli Forum, the 
Johannesburg central branch of the SACP, and community members came together in 
protest of a conference called „Urban Futures‟ that was being organised by the City 
and the University to showcase their respective plans for privatisation.  From the 
relations entered into in protests of the conference, the Anti-Privatisation Forum 
(APF) was formed.  The APF would quickly grow from a small activist forum to a 
formal organisation with over twenty affiliates in the form of community 
organisations and a few small political groupings.  Importantly, the APF would 
represent a period of heightened and politicised protest against the ANC government.  
In the struggles of the movements comprising the APF, as well as the many other 
community struggles that would emerge outside of the APF‟s influence, a language 
would be mobilised consisting of references to the status of poverty characterising the 
membership of these movements, and demanding redress and attention on the basis of 
                                                 
73
 In 1996, President Nelson Mandela, in the midst of growing criticism of the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), a clearly neoliberal macro-economic policy framework proposed 
for South Africa, declared that its adoption by government was “non-negotiable”.   
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this status.  In making these demands, these movements would also refer to the 
commitments and promises held and made in the struggle for liberation, holding the 
ANC government to its historical commitment to meeting the needs of all its people, 
especially the poor. 
 
In spite of these criticisms and growing resistance to the effects of the implementation 
of iGoli 2002, by now being felt by people, the City would release an even longer-
term vision, unqualifiedly claiming the city for the world‟s rich and envisioning a city 
built around the priority of market-driven growth.  Released in October 2001 and 
consisting of a vision statement, foundation report, and strategy document, Joburg 
2030 would “articulate what the City of Johannesburg can viably look like in 2030” 
(Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 2001: 2).  Reading the document, it 
becomes clear that the stating of this long-term plan is also, at many times, a response 
to many of the claims being made in struggles against the restructuring of the city, 
making its statements in the form of arguments against particular claims or demands 
being made by movements, groups and communities.   
 
While iGoli 2002 claimed to be „making the city work‟ for everyone, Joburg 2030 
unashamedly envisions the city as working as a global city and for the world‟s rich, 
stating that “In 2030 the quality of life of a citizen in Johannesburg will have more in 
common with the quality of life of a citizen in San Francisco, London or Tokyo than 
that of a citizen in a developing country‟s capital city” (ibid: 10).   
 
In opposition to its popular characterisation as a struggling „African city‟, the 2030 
document states: 
 
… Johannesburg will strive to become a world class city which 
operates in line with the highest internationally benchmarked 
norms and standards so that it can compete on a worldwide scale 
and ensure economic growth.  As such it will offer the same 
services, at the same standards with the same efficiency as New 
York, London or Tokyo.  Simultaneously, the City will be an 
African city, not simply as a happenstance of its geography and 
citizenship of its people, but as a positive statement of what is 
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different, special and unique about our people, their lifestyles, 
their history, their endeavours and dreams, and the environment 
in which they work and live. (ibid:13).   
 
In order to attain this vision, the document argues that Johannesburg should  
 
no longer seek to operate as only a provider and administrator of 
services to the City but to be a key agent of economic 
development. (ibid: 5).   
 
It would also spend a significant amount of time and space explaining its 
prioritisation of market-led economic growth, speaking directly to demands for the 
state to deliver basic services freely.  Commenting on over twenty vision statements 
from cities across the world consulted in its drafting, Joburg 2030 says about them,  
 
It was fascinating to note that, at a general level, all were 
identical, expressing the desire to achieve a „better quality of life 
and higher standard of living for all its citizens‟.  What was more 
interesting was that each of these vision statements had identical 
qualifying statements linked to them – namely: a better quality of 
life and higher standard of living, to be achieved by sustainable 
economic growth.  These international case studies, as well as 
academic research, fundamentally establish a pattern of causality 
and a modus operandi with respect to how city governments 
must place economics centre stage and grow the local economy 
as a crucially necessary but insufficient condition for the 
attainment of a better city.  This view is not readily accepted in 
South Africa or Johannesburg.  Due to the unique distortions 
faced by the post-apartheid government and the very real socio-
economic backlogs which accrued under apartheid there is a 
popular expectation that a „better city‟ and a „better quality of 
life‟ can and should be immediately funded fiscally through 
direct government intervention and delivery of essential services 
such as water, electricity, housing as well as jobs.  There are 
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three arguments which must be made in relation to this debate.  
First, sufficient evidence exists that government is not always 
capable or the most efficient deliverer of certain of these 
products or opportunities.  Second, the ability and rate at which 
government is able to provide such services is directly related to 
its tax revenue and hence economic growth will assist 
government in delivering such goods and services as it will have 
more resources at its disposal.  Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, economic growth allows individual households and 
businesses to decrease their reliance on government for such 
provisions, and allows them to purchase such goods and services, 
privately at market related prices.  In other words, economic 
growth will empower individuals, be they businesses or 
households, to be able to autonomously chart the course of their 
futures. (ibid: 4-5, original emphasis). 
 
Joburg 2030 is also very clear about its approach to basic services.  Wanting to ensure 
that the city “is perceived as a world class business location internationally” (ibid: 6), 
the document presents a list of opportunities that the city should provide for business.  
In describing these opportunities, it offers basic services up to the market, saying, 
 
Our utilities will offer electricity, water, sanitation and waste 
services to industry which comply to international standards of 
service and reliability and which are cost-effective and 
internationally price competitive (ibid: 6).   
 
Once again, the profit motive and business logic are promoted over the interests of 
redress and redistribution.   
 
It also deals with the issue of poverty in a very matter of fact way, treating it as an 
expected but manageable „aside‟ to the main business of growing the economy, 
stating that “poorer communities will continue to exist but their size will decrease and 
they will be more concentrated in special needs areas” (ibid: 9).  Stating that income 
inequalities will continue to exist in the city, and  that “poverty eradication is 
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probably an unrealistic goal”, the document goes on to argue that in 2030 there will 
nevertheless “be fewer households living in poverty than at present, and for those 
who are still struggling there will be substantial relative improvement in their quality 
of life”, with “hope and opportunities, previously absent, for them to move away from 
their current predicaments” (ibid: 11). 
 
Joburg 2030, then, envisions changes in the labour market reflecting its overall vision 
of a city driven by the priority of export-oriented economic growth, and meeting the 
needs of the world‟s corporations.  It states:  
 
In 2030 our economic landscape will be dominated by service 
sector activities rather than productive activities and specifically 
by enterprises whose cost structures fit into the business 
environment of the City.  Mining, primary good production and 
much of the manufacturing sector will no longer be key 
contributors to the City‟s economy, with financial and business 
services, transport, communication, trade, accommodation and 
catering and the utilities being the main providers of employment 
and GGP value added.  Productive activities in the City will have 
a strong export focus and those positioned for the international 
market outside of Africa will be high value added producers. 
(ibid: 8).   
 
Importantly, it imagines that a future Johannesburg will no longer be home to low-
skilled workers, migrant workers, or a large informal sector, claiming that the labour 
force “will be dominated by white and blue collar workers with a culture of 
numeracy, technology and high service standards” in 2030, with “the skills mismatch 
between industry needs and labour force supply” having been “substantially reduced” 
and “imbalances in the representivity of management” having been addressed.  The 
document also argues that “lower skilled migrant workers will no longer migrate as 
extensively to Johannesburg as they did when mining activity was a major contributor 
to the local economy”, and that although an informal sector will continue to exist, it 
will be “substantially reduced in size and fundamentally different in character”.  It 
states:   
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Survivalist informal sector operators will either no longer be 
resident in the City or will have found secure formal sector 
employment.  Remaining informal traders will operate as such by 
choice, rather than necessity, and will play an important cultural 
role in maintaining the African essence of our City. (ibid: 9).   
 
Grounding itself in the set of fiscal „realities‟ already outlined in the earlier iGoli 
2002 plan, Joburg 2030 would argue for the progressive realisation of its vision over 
a thirty year period, stating that this would be the minimum amount of time required 
for its growth path to begin bearing fruit.  With this logic, patience and sacrifice 
would be expected from the majority of citizens, as time would be given for the plan 
to take its course.  Interestingly, the document casts the need for patience and 
sacrifice in the mould of the sacrifices made in the liberation struggle, thereby 
equating the patience and sacrifices required for economic growth to „trickle down‟ 
and succeed for all, with the tenacity of freedom fighters: 
 
By growing the economy of the City, and, by basing our dreams 
of a better life for all our citizens firmly on economic growth, we 
are aiming to confer to the citizens of the City the economic 
freedom equivalent of the political freedom which they achieved 
in 1994.  Just as political freedom came with a heavy price tag 
(borne more heavily by some than by others), so too will 
economic growth and economic freedom achieved by sacrifice, 
patience and commitment. (ibid: 5).   
 
Extending this comparison to explain the importance of waiting this thirty year period 
out, the document states:  
 
It is understood that this is a sufficiently long time horizon, that 
many of the outcomes will not benefit this generation of 
households and businesses, many of whom are in dire straits.  
Rather, the realisation of this vision will be our legacy to the next 
generation, just as our generation is enjoying the legacy of 
pioneers of the Freedom Struggle. (ibid: 5).   
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In the face of the demands of movements that the ANC government remain true to its 
promises of a quality of life for all above the standards of basic survival and decency 
that were shaped in the liberation movement, Joburg 2030 would recast these 
commitments in terms of the neoliberal „realities‟ of the present, calling for patience 
and time to be allowed to take its course as the basic needs of all would only be met 
incrementally within this rationality.   
 
Including The Poor 
 
As communities rose up in organised actions aimed at putting an end to the punitive 
actions being taken against them for non-payment for services, and in demonstrations 
directly aimed at ending the plans for Johannesburg‟s restructuring, the City would be 
forced to reconsider its overwhelming focus on making the city „world class‟ through 
export-led growth alone, or, at least, to begin framing and showcasing its plans 
differently – to speak to the needs of the poor as a central part of these plans.  In the 
context of increased protests against water and electricity cut-offs (and the resultant 
growth in new social movements, such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee 
(SECC) and the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF)), the rise in reconnections and the 
failure to entrench a „culture of payment‟ for services in townships - the refusal of the 
poor to „know their place‟ - the City was forced to admit that its policy of „growth 
first, all will follow‟ was not appropriate to the needs of all of Johannesburg‟s 
residents.   
 
Between April and June 2003, the City conducted its first Residents‟ Satisfaction 
Survey (RSS) in an attempt to measure its progress and review its performance in the 
eyes of its residents, and to begin assessing and addressing some of the criticisms 
being laid at its door.  Through a process of conducting and analysing 3 300 
interviews with individuals representative of Johannesburg‟s eleven regions and 
community types, it was found that there were significantly high levels of 
dissatisfaction with the delivery of basic services, particularly in informal settlements 




The report from the survey, released in September 2003 states: 
 
This relatively large perception that services are declining in 
informal settlements warrants urgent attention. (Palmer 
Development Group, 2003: ii). 
   
In 2004, the City commissioned a number of research projects that resulted in the 
following documents being released in June of the same year: Developing a Profile of 
Urban Poverty in the City of Johannesburg (by the Palmer Development Group); 
Voices of the Poor: Case Studies of Urban Poverty in the City of Johannesburg (by 
the Community Agency For Social Enquiry – CASE); Social Services Package (by 
the Palmer Development Group); HIV-AIDS – by Richard Tomlinson; and Women in 
the City of Johannesburg (by Mirjam Van Donk).   
 
Each of these documents speaks to its place in the longer term development of a 
Human Development Strategy (HDS), contributing towards the City‟s attempts to 
understand and develop ways of intervening in the problems of marginality, precarity, 
and vulnerability present in the lives of the majority of its residents – those it would 
name „the poor‟.  Employing methodologies like those explored in Chapter Two, 
these projects began to carve out a „field of knowledge and intervention‟ in the form 
of poverty and the poor for the City of Johannesburg that would entrench inequality 
and lower standards of living for those declared to be the poor, increasingly those 
unable to afford the basic necessities for survival.   
 
Quantifying poverty in the city and giving it a human face, these documents began to 
argue for the adoption of a development strategy that would place human beings at the 
centre of its growth plans.  And „development‟ would come to mean the meeting of 
the very minimal survival needs of people to enable them to become „economically 
productive‟ members of society.  Explaining human development as an essential 
partner to economic development, these reports frame an approach for the city that 
would eventually replace Joburg 2030 and speak a language, in some ways, quite 
different to that of the iGoli era.  In the documents that the City produced from 2004 
onwards, a language emerges that seems to speak much more directly to those making 
claims on the state for greater attention – poor communities, many organising 
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themselves on the basis of their material position as the poor – in a manner that sees 
the elaboration of policies specifically targeting them as a separate group in society, a 
society that continues to be viewed in terms of its potential to grow as a „world class 
African city‟.  Significantly, this change is acknowledged overtly by the City as being 
necessary in the context of the threat of resistance.     
 
For example, the City‟s Human Development Strategy (HDS), launched in 2005, 
makes a clear departure from the smugness with which iGoli 2002 and Joburg 2030 
argued that growth would be the answer to poverty, understanding the need for this 
shift in terms of the threat of resistance („social instability‟).  It states:  
 
… the City cannot afford to maintain the status quo, nor be slow 
to act.  Unless direct and urgent interventions are made, 
projections show that poverty levels will worsen and the 
likelihood of social disruption will increase.  Action must be 
taken or Council will be faced with an increasingly unpredictable 
social, political and economic environment.  Poverty must be 
tackled head on or the ability of the City to deliver services to all 
its residents will be diminished and financial sustainability will 
be seriously compromised.  Economic growth cannot be 
optimised in a context where a substantial proportion of the 
city‟s population is living in hardship. (City of Johannesburg, 
2005: 12).   
 
The HDS would sell itself as “Joburg‟s commitment to the poor” and be developed as 
“partner to its economic development strategy”, Joburg 2030 (ibid: 2).  In the key 
strategic changes adopted by the City from 2004 onwards, the categories of poverty 
and the poor become increasingly prominent in both descriptions of the City‟s 
problems and in interventions envisaged for its transformation.  In the City‟s own 
presentation of these changes, the ideal of „an African world class city‟ still exists; it 
is now, however, dependent not only on economic growth, but on the gradual 
eradication of poverty.  The HDS would, therefore, see a change in the city‟s slogan 




Remaining committed to the vision of Joburg 2030, of a city speaking in the first 
instance to the interests of the world‟s corporate interests, the later documents‟ 
renewed commitments to and greater focus on the position of the poor and the 
problem of poverty are bound to a logic of export-oriented and market-driven growth, 
and the interventions designed in their regard are fully within a logic of fiscal restraint 
and the market.  In this way, any prescriptions said to be in the interests of the poor 
must be understood within the broader goal of enhancing growth and making the city 
efficient for better business.  As the need to address the problem of poverty arises in 
the context of the poor making demands for neoliberal policies to be halted and the 
state to accept greater responsibility in ensuring redress and redistribution to 
meaningfully address levels of inequality and hardship in the city, the HDS and other 
documents post-2004 pose solutions that seek to prevent social instability that arises 
from poverty as it poses a threat to economic growth.  The plight of the poor is not, 
then, the primary reason for changes in their favour.  Rather, their position demands 
address only because of the threat that it poses to economic growth.   
 
With economic growth, then, still clearly the driving force behind changes, 
interventions prescribed by the City in these documents for the poor speak to the most 
minimal requirements necessary to ensure social stability.  It is interesting that social 
stability is characterised in terms of access to basic services and an economic 
livelihood (a job or enterprise), demands that have been clearly enunciated by 
movements of the poor.  The research commissioned by the City and the policy 
documents that follow to suggest interventions to address the problem of poverty, 
then speak to the production of knowledge around what constitutes the most minimal 
requirements for individual survival, which, in turn, comes to be portrayed as those 
resources necessary to enable an individual to become economically productive (i.e. 
get a job or start a small business, etc.).  For example, one of the research documents 
produced in 2004, Social Services Package, states,  
 
Inadequate access to a sufficient supply of water of good quality 
and poor sanitation creates increased risk of disease, with 
diarrhoea being the most prevalent.  Considering the relative 
costs of benefits of improved water supply and sanitation, the 
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most important step is that which provides a properly 
functioning, properly managed service at a basic level (25 litres 
of water per person within 200 metres of the home and a VIP 
toilet, for example).  This step thus represents the greatest public 
benefit per unit of money invested.  There are health benefits in 
increasing service levels beyond this, notably by providing water 
on site and having a toilet in the home.  But typically the 
marginal health benefits of the next steps are smaller in relation 
to the total cost of the service. (Palmer Development Group, 
2004a: 38; my emphases).   
 
Later on its states, “… the primary trading services tend to yield higher public 
benefits when the focus is on providing basic levels of service” (ibid: 41).  In this 
manner, a language emerges that allows the City to commit itself to the eradication of 
poverty through an unchanged commitment and overall strategy that prioritises 
economic growth and the logic of neoliberal fiscal restraint and business efficiency in 
the delivery of basic services.  „Individual benefits‟ are measured against „public 
benefits‟, which are understood within the rationale of „making the city work along 
business principles‟, and the field of intervention that poverty and the poor become, 
are used to entrench a logic of commodification and market principles amongst those 
struggling against it as they feel their effects in their daily lives.      
 
The HDS is, however, very different from Joburg 2030 in the ways in which it 
foregrounds poverty and acknowledges the poor as a central part of Johannesburg‟s 
community rather than treating poverty as something that economic growth would 
„naturally‟ eliminate or no longer „draw‟ to Johannesburg.  Instead, adopting a 
perspective of „human development‟ it recasts the plans for the city in more „humane‟ 
terms that speak to the concerns and criticisms raised against them in struggles of 
communities feeling the early effects of its policy changes.  It states,  
 
The intention of the HDS is to provide a framework within which 
other city policies can accommodate a human development 
perspective and address conditions such as poverty, inequality 
and social exclusion on a city scale. (ibid: 2).   
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The HDS is also strikingly different from Joburg 2030 in that it describes and 
acknowledges the problem of poverty as a central focus of the City, stating,  
 
Currently, more than half the households in Johannesburg earn 
R1600 or less a month and almost one in five residents does not 
have formal housing… For the poor, Johannesburg is a 
dangerous place.  Many go from day to day without adequate 
water, sewerage and electricity, and they live in overcrowded and 
hazardously dilapidated buildings.  These daily realities, 
compounded by the devastating impact of HIV-AIDS, sharp 
inequalities between rich and poor, and an increasingly unstable 
population are among the challenges facing the city.  A human 
development perspective of the HDS recognises that people are 
the city‟s biggest asset and that they need to be supported and 
encouraged to realise their full potential and become fully-
fledged urban residents. (ibid: 2).     
 
Situating itself within the broad parameters of the developmental perspective adopted 
by the United Nations, the HDS explains its understanding of development,  
 
The basic purpose of development is to enlarge people‟s choices.  
In principle, these choices can be infinite and change over time.  
People often value achievements that do not show at all, or 
immediately in income or growth figures: greater access to 
knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure 
livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, 
satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms and a 
dense of participation in community activities.  The objective of 
development is to create an enabling environment for people to 
enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. (ibid: 4).   
 
In its prioritisation of export-led economic growth, this perspective would, however, 
as already shown above, be submitted to an overall logic of fiscal restraint and 
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business efficiency central to neoliberal policies.  „Enlarging people‟s choices‟ would, 
then, have to be met within this logic, and interventions to „assist the poor‟ would 
increasingly be defined within the logic of getting the poor to pay for services and 
encouraging self-reliance through small business development and individual 
entrepreneurship or the uptake of casual, part-time jobs in the growing service sector.  
It is important to note how this discourse of self-help emerges in the broader context 
of the neoliberal withdrawal of the state from the field of responsibility in relation to 
its citizens, and the decline of formal sector waged employment in Johannesburg and 
more generally in South Africa and the world.  As already discussed in Chapters One 
and Two, Franco Barchiesi highlights how this decline in wage labour results in the 
removal of the guarantee of social citizenship rights in the form of decommodified 
services provided through the benefits accompanying wage labour.  In this context, 
policies emerge that encourage individual responsibility, self-help, and self-reliance 
on the part of the individual citizen, with minimal resources being provided by the 
state.  Increasingly, this discourse has also come to encourage market mechanisms for 
becoming self-reliant and accessing the resources necessary for life.  The example of 
Johannesburg clearly illustrates how this discourse has come to take effect.         
 
In summary, then, the HDS proposes three broad fields of intervention to address the 
position of the city‟s poor.  Firstly, under the heading „Safeguarding and Supporting‟, 
the HDS argues for improvements to be made to Johannesburg‟s safety net in order to 
address household poverty by expanding the current social package of subsidised 
basic services and rates rebates for lower income property owners, as well as for 
measures to enable access of residents to social grants (administered provincially).  
Secondly, under the heading „Championing Rights and Opportunities‟, it proposes 
several measures to improve the position of potential entrepreneurs and job-seekers 
by exposing them to economic opportunities, and measures to address the position of 
women and children in accessing the benefits of the city.  Finally, under the heading 
„Building Prospects For Social Inclusion‟, the HDS highlights the need to find ways 
of enhancing social inclusion of youth and migrants, creating public space, building 
community trust in the city, and supporting civic life through partnerships at 
community level.  Unlike Joburg 2030, then, which imagined a city that would no 
longer attract low-skilled job-seekers and that would not have many low-income 
residents, the HDS very clearly accepts that the majority of the city‟s residents enjoy a 
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monthly income below R1 600 and makes plans to include them in a manner that does 
not threaten the growth plan celebrated by iGoli 2002 and Joburg 2030.   
 
The research process undertaken in 2004 and the revision of documents that followed, 
would also be directed towards showing how the City had already been speaking to 
the needs of the poor through its various social provisions in the form of a „social 
package‟.  The document entitled Social Services Package would primarily serve this 
purpose, and suggest ways of improving Johannesburg‟s provision of free and 
subsidised services to those earning below a particular income level in the city.  
Changes in this regard are explored in the next section.  It is again important to note 
here, however, that the social package comes to be seen as the minimal basket of 
services that the City should provide to those unable to care for themselves to enable 
them to survive, or to become economically active.     
 
In 2006, in another exercise in „long-term planning‟, the City released its Growth and 
Development Strategy (GDS).  It explained its purpose thus,  
 
At one level the HDS neatly complements Joburg 2030.  
However, at another level it raises the key question of whether 
Joburg 2030 still provides by itself the central strategic line that 
the City is following.  The City of Johannesburg believes that it 
is necessary to revise its core city strategy in order to clarify and 
convey one central and over-arching strategic message about the 
development course being followed.  The GDS serves this 
purpose. (City of Johannesburg, 2006b: 6).   
 
As its name suggests, then, the GDS would bring together the City‟s plans for 
economic growth and human development, no longer seeing them as separate parts of 
its overall plan.  In this manner, the GDS would build on the arguments made in the 
HDS, tying the potential of the poor to its model for economic development.     
 
In quite a stark departure from the language of Joburg 2030, the GDS acknowledges 
the permanence of the poor in the city.  One of the six principles making up its 
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development paradigm is a commitment to the “proactive absorption of the poor”, 
where it is explained that  
 
the City of Johannesburg will not plan on the basis that the poor, 
vulnerable and excluded will eventually go somewhere else.  It 
will proactively help new households, new internal and circular 
migrants, those in hostels, informal settlements and historical 
ghettoes, unemployed youth, refugees, and others negotiate 
access to the city and get onto the ladder of prosperity. (ibid: 54; 
original emphasis).   
 
Later on it states,  
 
Johannesburg is already home to a large number of poor people.  
Through natural processes of internal growth and social 
transformation it is generating new poor residents and 
households from within.  In addition, the city is a magnet for 
many people seeking opportunity from other parts of the country 
and the world.  While some of these newcomers will already 
have skills, connections and access to capital, many will not be 
able to secure their livelihoods immediately.  In the phrasing of 
the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, many will probably 
„cost the local tax base more than they are able to contribute to 
it‟, at least in the short term.  If it achieves major success in 
development, Johannesburg is likely to see even more poor 
people flock to it in search of a better life.  This means, 
ironically, that the more successful Johannesburg is today the 
greater will be its developmental challenges tomorrow.  The 
principle „pro-active absorption of the poor‟ communicates that 
the City fully understands this contradiction, and its historical 
mission in the face of it. (ibid: 56; original emphasis).   
 
It is significant to note, however, that any mechanisms proposed to be undertaken in 
the interest of „the proactive absorption of the poor‟ are clearly situated within the 
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logic of export-oriented economic growth, with the overall aim of preventing the 
threat of social instability caused by poverty and harnessing the potential of the poor 
to the goals of growth.  In this way, any potential for the poor to impose or demand 
alternatives to the logic of the market and to live differently or antagonistically to 
capitalist society is attempted to be contained and redirected.  While the language of 
the GDS suggests, then, a strong commitment to addressing the plight of the poor, it 
is also quite clearly committed to doing this through the logic of neoliberalism, a 
logic proven to worsen the situation of the poor in the first instance.  This is quite 
clear in the ways in which the GDS describes the principle of „proactive absorption of 
the poor‟.  It states,  
 
…the City owes it to current and future residents not to simply 
hope that the poor will go elsewhere.  A large transient or 
floating population of poor residents, not given any chance to 
secure livelihoods in the city, undermines stability.  It also 
represents a huge opportunity cost.  Simply put, dynamic cities 
attract and incorporate.  It is the presence of a large population of 
opportunity seekers that makes them dynamic.  A failure to 
absorb existing poor residents and poor newcomers – many of 
whom have the capacity to labour, or possess energy, 
enthusiasm, drive and an appetite for risk, or have some capital 
that they wish to invest or even just the willingness to take on 
debt for a stake that can be put to productive use – is therefore to 
fail to build the city‟s future foundations for development. (ibid: 
58).   
 
It goes on to state,  
 
„Proactive absorption‟ therefore means that the City will work 
boldly and innovatively to address the conditions of people 
finding themselves in these circumstances, so that they can 
access basic livelihoods, start to build a core of assets, gear up 
for participation in the urban economy, master the demands of 
urban life and negotiate urban costs of living, and ultimately 
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thereby get onto the first rungs of the ladder of prosperity. (ibid: 
59).   
 
Interestingly, the GDS would also attempt to argue that it was not in its plans to 
provide merely for „the basic needs‟ of the poor.  Rather, it would find ways of  
 
enabling the poor to access basic livelihoods, inter alia by 
helping them to secure social grants, facilitating skills 
development and basic employment opportunities, and 
supporting „self-help‟ projects, start-up micro-enterprises and 
community based co-operatives”, and assisting them with 
affordable basic services, low-cost rental housing, and other 
basic means of „ensuring their inclusion‟ (ibid: 59).   
 
Implying that „basic needs‟ refer to those resources necessary for mere survival (e.g. 
basic amounts of basic services such as water), the GDS would argue that the City 
was going beyond the provision of these „basic needs‟ by providing other services 
enabling the poor to help themselves out of poverty.  What it cannot deny is that even 
the provision of these „other services‟ happens at minimal levels, with much research 
and debate taking place about what constitutes these minimal interventions necessary 
to be undertaken or provided by the state.  It is also quite clear that the kinds of 
interventions prescribed by the GDS open up opportunities for the poor only at the 
level of becoming active through the market.  Rather than broadening their choices, 
then, such prescriptions deny the poor the potential opened up by their being outside 
of the discipline and regulation of wage labour and the market by forcing them into 
market-related enterprises or super-exploitative forms of work, especially in the 
context of the duty to pay for basic services.     
   
The GDS is also quite clear that its commitment to the “proactive absorption of the 
poor” should not result in the City ending up “with a bigger welfare burden”, but that 
“through shared growth and other measures” it will help people to help themselves 
“out of poverty” (ibid: 65).  In this manner, poverty is portrayed as a state of being 
from which one should desire escape or assistance out of, and something out of which 
people should individually strive to escape, with the limited assistance of the state.  In 
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this way, the eradication of poverty becomes a mutual goal of the individual poor 
person and the state, a state that is increasingly run according to the restraint of 
neoliberal spending and corporate „efficiency‟.  Far from the demands made by 
movements of poor people for the state to assume greater responsibility in the meeting 
of the needs of the marginalised through redistribution and redress, the GDS‟s 
mobilisation of the principle of „proactive absorption of the poor‟ provides a way of 
addressing the problems of the poor through the market in a manner that sees the poor 
assume far greater individual responsibility for the quality of their lives by accepting 
those minimal resources provided by the state and using them to become 
economically active and so ascend the ladder to „greater prosperity‟.  In this manner, 
the GDS foregoes any notion of eradicating inequality and rather entrenches division 
in the city, arguing for a particular targeted set of interventions for those identified as 
the poor that will allow them a certain standard and quality of life considered 
necessary to enable them to become economically active.  Access to a higher standard 
and quality of life will, then, be dependent on their success economically and their 
ability to progress so as to buy this higher quality of life.         
 
The GDS explains this approach in terms of the theory of the „two economies‟.  It 
states,  
 
… Joburg 2030 does not address all development concerns.  
Shortly after it was published, the President of South Africa 
pushed to centre stage the idea that the country has „two 
economies‟, where the opportunities for and benefits of growth 
in the first economy are not being shared with people still eking 
out livelihoods in the second economy, in large part because the 
two economies do not connect.  The President challenged the 
country to address the fact that the ladders between the two 
floors of the economic house are broken.  Joburg 2030, 
published before the President introduced the „two-economy 
thesis‟, did not address this concern.  Joburg 2030 therefore 
anticipates ASGISA‟s focus on „accelerating‟ growth, but not its 
equally important emphasis on „sharing‟ growth.  In practice, the 
City has done a lot in the last few years to target the second 
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economy.  But its core strategy does not reflect this emerging 
practice clearly. (City of Johannesburg, 2006b: 5).   
 
Describing the „second economy‟ as “the myriad of „generative interactions‟ between 
would-be business people that have not yet come to fruition, or which are struggling 
to stabilise… (ibid: 30), the GDS would, then, begin to reflect the above in its 
proposals for interventions at the level of addressing poverty and the problems of the 
poor.   
 
Making its „core strategy‟ for the eradication of poverty mechanisms for assisting 
people in the „second economy‟ and the provision of the very basic resources to those 
outside of the market to become active in this „second economy‟ with the hope of 
graduating to the „first economy‟, the GDS promotes certain forms of behaviour, 
values and principles amongst the poor, encouraging a logic of self-help, individual 
responsibility, and commitment to pay for services, as well as a commitment to the 
logic of the market.  In order to „escape poverty‟ and „graduate from the first to the 
second economies‟, the individual must live within the means afforded him/her by the 
state in a manner that allows him/her to become economically active by getting a job 
or starting a small business enterprise and slowly accumulate enough capital to 
ascend the economic ladder.  In order to „escape poverty‟, the individual must also 
pay for any services used beyond the limits provided by the state, pay his/her rates 
and taxes, and not make demands on the state for greater provisions or protections.       
 
Making The Poor Pay 
 
While the evolution of policy at a macro level resulted in the elaboration of a 
discourse of poverty and the poor in the manner outlined above, the implementation 
of these policy commitments in the context of resistance from poor communities 
would result in other more micro level changes in strategy on the part of the City, 
particularly as it came up against struggles in the delivery of basic services that would 
contest the logic of payment for services.  As the processes of service delivery came 
under the processes of restructuring outlined by iGoli 2002, individual residents 
would once again be encouraged to pay for their services, becoming „responsible 
citizens‟ in this manner.  The cries of Masakhane would once again be heard, with the 
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City prioritising the entrenchment of „a culture of payment‟ and the undoing of „the 
culture of non-payment‟.  In the context of growing unemployment and vulnerability, 
however, this call was not heeded, and non-payment for services persisted at township 
level on a wide scale.  Central to the demands being made by community movements 
and individual residents was the call for the City to scrap the mounting debt or arrears 
for services in townships.   
 
As the business logic of iGoli 2002 set in, and the responsibility for inculcating the 
„culture of payment‟ became that of the private entities responsible for the delivery of 
water and electricity (Johannesburg Water, and Eskom and City Power, respectively), 
punitive actions for non-payment began to be enacted against residents.  Increasingly, 
residents were cut off from their water and electricity supplies for non-payment.  In 
response, residents would begin reconnecting themselves illegally to these supplies, 
generating the many community movements already described above, and making the 
business of service delivery increasingly difficult for the private entities responsible 
for it.  As cut-offs became increasingly meaningless in effecting this „culture of 
payment‟, a new strategy would be devised to enforce the logic of payment and 
transfer the responsibility for accessing services to the individual „customer‟.  At the 
height of protests against water and electricity cut-offs and the growth in the practice 
of reconnections, the prepaid meter would be re-introduced
74
 in the delivery of 
electricity and water.  Unlike with cut-offs, where one has access to a service before 
one pays for it, the prepaid meter cuts one off from a service before one can pay i.e. 
one has to pay before one is able to make use of the service.  The prepaid meter also 
removes any responsibility for delivery from the state and the private sector service 
provider, making the individual responsible for accessing services.  In this way, 
reconnections as a collective strategy of resistance have come under attack, with 
prepaid technology working to individualise the relationship of people to the 
resources necessary for life and foreclosing possibilities for collective acts of 
                                                 
74
 Prepaid meters were first introduced by Eskom in the mid-1990s as part of its initiative to electrify 
black townships, and prepaid water meter projects were rolled out in 1998 (in Khutsong, Hermanus, 
Modderspruit, Koffiefontein and rural parts of the Eastern and Northern Cape (Ruiters, 2005: 11), as 
well as in Mogale city (previously Krugersdorp)), but it was not until 2002 and the roll-out of a 
campaign called Operation Gcin‟amanzi to install prepaid water meters in Soweto (preceded by a pilot 
project in Orange Farm) that the perniciousness of prepaid technology was confronted in the 
mainstream through protests led by residents in Orange Farm and Soweto, supported by affiliates of the 
Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), in particular the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee (OWCC) and 
the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC). 
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resistance to the system of commodification and the logic of profit.  (Coalition 
Against Water Privatisation, 2004, 2006; Harvey, 2005; Ngwane and Veriava, 2004).   
 
Significantly, the prepaid meter would be sold by the City and private companies as 
an efficient and practical way of delivering free, „life-line‟ amounts of water and 
electricity to people.  In this way, it was argued that the installation of prepaid meters 
allowed the national policy commitment to the delivery of 6kl of water and 50kW of 
electricity to all citizens free of charge, to be met.  The prepaid meter was, then, sold 
as a means to effect the „partnership‟ between the individual citizen, and the state and 
its private entities in the delivery of basic services, with the state delivering the basic 
amounts of water and electricity considered necessary for survival and the individual 
citizen assuming the responsibility to make use of this free allocation „sparingly‟ and 
to pay for any additional amounts consumed.  Studies conducted by the Coalition 
Against Water Privatisation and the APF (2003; 2004; 2006) have argued that the 
introduction of 'lifeline' provisions has entrenched inequality as a defining feature of 
service delivery in South Africa, and has been used by the government to prove its 
'commitment' to free basic services for the poor without any acknowledgement of how 
minimal these provisions are if one considers the generally large average household 
size in communities and the restrictive role that such provisions play in the lives of 
people, tying all that they do to the logic of the market.  These studies have also gone 
to great lengths to prove how much lower than the actual needs of households these 
'lifelines' are.  In situations, such as Phiri, Soweto, where research conducted by the 
Coalition Against Water Privatisation has shown that the average household size is 
16, the provision of 6 000 litres of water per household can hardly cover the monthly 
needs of individuals.  In addition, these studies have pointed to the fact that many 
plots in townships house two families, including renters.  In these cases, 'lifeline' 
provisions are not increased to account for larger household size. These extremely 
low 'lifeline' provisions for water and electricity seem to want to ensure the 
permanence of the poorest of the poor as a separate group in society, unable to 
exercise individual choice in matters of life.  More recent research conducted by the 
City itself points to the fact that the allocation of 6kl is inadequate due to the existence 
of “multiple dwelling units” in many disadvantaged areas, that is, plots on which a 
main dwelling and a backyard dwelling or more exist (Palmer Development Group, 
2006).         
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More recent writings (mostly from within movements - Ngwane and Veriava, 2004; 
Harvey, 2005; Coalition Against Water Privatisation, 2004) have described and 
analysed the introduction of prepaid water and electricity meters as a response by the 
state and capital to the struggles of community movements, and as indicative of a new 
form of rule under neoliberalism, one in which individualised, commodified systems 
of service delivery are naturalised through techniques of "governmentality" and 
"technologies of the self" (Foucault). These writings argue that with the introduction 
of the prepaid meter, responsibility for access to water and electricity has become the 
individual's, with no need for any interaction between the recipient ('client') and the 
service provider, and absolutely no responsibility on the part of the state.  In this way, 
there is no possibility for the accumulation of debt, removing the debt burden 
shouldered by private companies, and no possibility for individual access to a service 
without money.  The state and private companies have been teaching the poor how to 
'budget properly' so as to be able to afford to pay for the services that they need, and 
the logic of individualism and the market are spreading their roots in the lives of 
people as they struggle to survive under neoliberalism.  In spite of this, community 
movements and residents have come together to resist the installation of prepaid 
systems of delivery.     
 
While the introduction of prepaid electricity seems to have happened with very little 
resistance to it, the installation of prepaid water meters has resulted in sometimes 
bloody street battles that are today being pursued in a constitutional court case by the 
Coalition Against Water Privatisation on behalf of residents of Soweto.  The reason 
for this difference between the responses to the changes in the two services could 
relate to the fact that prepaid electricity was rolled out fairly quietly in disadvantaged 
areas without residents being given any other choice in the method of delivery at 
different periods since the 1980s already, while prepaid water has been introduced in 
areas previously enjoying access to an unlimited supply of water metered and 
charged/billed according to a flat rate, in a manner that restricts users to their free 6 kl 
allocation and thereafter requires them to pay for further water.   
 
Evidence also suggests that resistance to the prepaid electricity system is less overt as 
it takes the form of individual illegal bypassing of the meter rather than collective and 
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direct actions against Eskom.  While initial protests against the installation of prepaid 
water meters took the form of direct action by residents against Johannesburg Water 
and the symbolic collective collection and destruction of the meters, over time, as the 
rollout continued, resistance took on a more individualised character, with the act of 
bypassing happening quietly at an individual level rather than as a collective and 
overtly symbolic act of refusal (Coalition Against Water Privatisation et. al., 2006).  
Nevertheless, resistance to and the creative bypassing of the prepaid meter have 
meant that the City and its private sector service providers would need to find newer 
ways of entrenching the logic of payment and commodification in the delivery of 
basic services.  For this, it would take its direction from the various research processes 
commissioned by the City in 2004, as well as from measures adopted by 
Johannesburg Water in its attempts at enforcing „cost recovery‟ practices in the 
delivery of water to residents in disadvantaged areas.     
 
Through the various research processes commissioned by the City in 2004, a critique 
would emerge of the City‟s indigent management policy, seen as a key vehicle in 
delivering the City‟s „social package‟ to poor residents.  The 1998 Indigency 
Management Policy, which saw the successful registration of just 25 199 applicants, 
was said to have been “faced with administrative and process problems that made it 
difficult to implement” (Palmer Development Group, 2004a: 11), and there is little 
documented evidence of its experiences.  In 2002, the Special Cases Policy would 
replace the 1998 policy in an attempt to determine  
 
special cases in respect of payment for basic services provided 
by local government to those who cannot afford to pay for basic 
services, the elderly and HIV-AIDS patients and orphans (ibid: 
11).   
 
Its objectives would include the provision for subsidies on refuse removal and 
sanitation for individual households unable to pay for these services (in addition to 
the universal free basic provisions of water and electricity provided for at a national 
level); the establishment of a “poverty register to inform poverty mapping and 
targeted socio-economic developmental programmes”; and  
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to enhance credit control measures by providing a safety net for the 
poorest of the poor and identifying those using poverty to not pay for 
basic services (ibid: 11; my emphasis).   
 
The research conducted in 2004 would, however, argue that  
 
the Special Cases Policy has not been implemented in a way in 
which it has been able to meet these multiple objectives.”  “In 
particular, the objective of establishing a single city-wide poverty 
register for targeted social welfare programmes from various 
parts of the City has not been met.  The current application 
system for inclusion on the register by its nature restricts the 
register to formal accountholders – thereby failing to include the 
bulk of poor households in the City.  Thus as a tool to provide a 
comprehensive register and map of poor households in the City 
the policy is not appropriate as currently constructed and is likely 
to lead to an under-count of impoverished households.  The 
option does exist for the City to substantially increase the level of 
administrative effort applied to the Special Cases policy and 
thereby to develop a formal register of poor households.  The 
administrative costs of this, however, would only be warranted if 
the City were to use such a register for a broader set of social 
welfare targeting than simply refuse and sanitation rebates. (ibid: 
49).  
 
It would, however, go on to state,  
 
… there are sound reasons for the universal targeting approach 
being followed by some services (such as electricity and water) 
and there are possibly other reasons for the targeting approaches 
being followed by other welfare support of the City.  In this 
regard it seems that at present there is no compelling argument to 
develop a comprehensive Special Cases register for the City 
through which numerous types of social welfare will be 
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disbursed.  Further, there are potentially large problems of 
exclusion (people who will always fail to be included on such a 
register) and inclusion (people incorrectly included on the 
register).  The existence of such a register also gives rise to 
possible concerns about corruption (bribing City staff to include 
certain people on the register) and policing (the City will have to 
exercise strong controls over people who falsely claim to 
qualify).  The Special Cases policy has had limited success in 
providing relief to some households.  However, it is evident that 
many poor households are not supported by this policy.  
Alternative policy options, such as rebates for sanitation and 
refuse based on broader and less administratively intense 
approaches should be considered. (ibid: 49-50).   
 
But the City would not take this advice.  Rather, it would work towards improving 
and extending the reach of the Special Cases policy, reorienting and restructuring it to 
fulfil the objective of knowing the poor in order to intervene in their lives in ways that 
encourage their acceptance of the duty to pay for services and make use of their 
targeted assistance to „help themselves out of poverty‟ through the market.   
 
As part of the roll-out of prepaid water meters in Operation Gcina „Manzi in Soweto, 
the City had approved an initiative by Johannesburg Water to progressively write off 
arrears in deemed consumption areas, on condition that a prepaid meter was accepted 
and used.  In a discussion document of the City‟s Finance and Economic 
Development Mayoral Committee, the following is noted,  
 
Johannesburg Water advises that the implementation of the 
project is successful and addresses the affordability and access to 
water simultaneously whilst a culture of payment is engendered 
with the incentive of having the historical arrears proportionately 
written off over an extended period of time on condition that the 
customer manages his prepaid water meter.  To leverage the 
positive impact of the model and bring holistic relief to the 
consumer from the City of Joburg, as the overarching custodian, 
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it is recommended that the total historical debt be brought into 
the progressive write off programme on exactly the same basis of 
performance and incentive.  Accordingly, the customer will be 
obliged to accept a prepaid electricity meter to qualify for the 
progressive write off of the composite debt over the matching 
period. (2005: 1-2).   
 
In the context of increased demands by township communities for the scrapping of the 
arrears and for the City to become more proactive in addressing the problems of 
inequality and poverty plaguing it, the key principles, objectives and mechanisms of 
the Special Cases Policy and the debt write-off programme would be brought together 
in the crafting of a new indigent management policy, consisting of the Municipal 
Services Subsidy Scheme (MSSS) and Reathusa („We Are Helping‟).  Through these 
policies, the City would introduce „incentives‟ for „customers‟ to „rehabilitate‟ their 
accounts and be offered „a second chance‟ at becoming „responsible‟, paying citizens.  
In this way, the City would also be able to strengthen its ability to sift out the „can‟t 
pays‟ from the „won‟t pays‟, and develop a proper system for the monitoring of 
poverty and the actions of the poor.     
 
In April 2005, newspapers began to report talk of the City exploring the sale of its 
debtor‟s book.  In these reports, the City‟s plans to write off arrears conditional on 
individuals accepting prepaid meters began to emerge.  In a press release from the 
City, the following is said,  
 
The City is facing a considerable challenge in that part of the 
debt that is owed by low-income people who, although not 
indigent, are unlikely to be able to afford to pay off the debt 
however effective credit control might be.  In these cases there is 
a need to re-establish the compact between the customer and the 
City, with the emphasis on ensuring that all current amounts 
owing are promptly paid.  If the arrears can be used as an 
incentive to re-establish this compact, then that would also be 
positive. (City of Johannesburg, Press Release, 14 April 2005).   
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In May 2005, the MSSS was launched as “a major incentive to poor communities in 
Johannesburg to relieve the burden of debts but at the same time create a new culture 
of payment” (City of Johannesburg, Press Release, 6 April 2006).  It would encourage 
residents fitting a particular profile (outlined below) to come forward to have their 
arrears written off in exchange for signing a binding agreement to pay for services in 
the future and to install prepaid water and electricity meters for household „budgeting‟ 
within twelve months of being accepted into the scheme.  Its rules contained in the 
Special Cases Policy (approved in October 2004 with amendments adopted in May 
2005), the MSSS would apply to account holders who are pensioners as well as 
unemployed, self-employed, or employed people with a total family income of less 
than R1 100 a month; account holders receiving disability grants who have a total 
family income of less than R1 100 a month‟ an account holder whose partner also 
receives a government pension and has a total family income of less than R1 241 per 
month - the equivalent of two government pensions plus R1; and HIV positive/AIDS 
breadwinners and/or their orphans (Joburg City, How It Works?  Subsidies - 
http://www.joburg.org.za/content/view/724/131/ - accessed 10/11/2007).   
 
The MSSS would also ensure the delivery of 6kl of free water and 50kW of free 
electricity to households on its register monthly, and would cover refuse removal and 
sanitation charges.  In addition, there would be no charge for assessment rates for 
properties valued at less than R20 001 (City of Johannesburg, Press Release, 9 
December 2005).   
 
The obligation to sign onto the prepaid system would be explained by the City as a 
necessary way of enforcing a culture of payment amongst those “unable to afford 
debt” (Bongani Nkosi, Legal Officer, Department of Revenue, City of Johannesburg, 
interview, 20 November 2006).  In line with the mantra of individual responsibility 
being assumed for one‟s standard and quality of life, the prepaid meter would be 
proposed as a practical way for the poor to budget efficiently and so to „live within 
their means‟.  When a city official was asked whether there was any possibility for 
one fitting the criteria for indigency to avoid accepting the prepaid system of delivery, 
this was her response:  
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Unfortunately not.  Look, if they don‟t want to sign onto the 
prepaid they will have to just spend less.  They will just have to 
spend less because it‟s all a question of consumption.  So, I think 
the best thing for them, in order to manage their monthly bill, 
would be to go prepaid.  I mean, even the poor nowadays have 
prepaid phones.  And they know how much to spend on these 
phones.  So, unfortunately, and, do remember that they do get 
certain amounts of water and electricity free per month.  So that 
is how we have also tried to help them.  So, as I said, it‟s better 
for them to go prepaid.  If they can manage their phone bills then 
they can manage their electricity and water.  So these are the 
things that we are doing.  And off course, it‟s making people 
more aware which is customer education really. (Nomasonto 
Radebe, Acting Director, Credit Control, Department of 
Revenue, City of Johannesburg, interview, 20 November 2006).   
 
With the application process open from May 2005 to the end of March 2006, by 30 
January 2006 the City reported that 92 000 people had registered for the scheme, with 
around R1.2 million in debt being written off (City of Johannesburg, Press Release, 
30 January 2006).  While there have been no statistics forthcoming from the City 
since then, the figure quoted above is fairly close to the target set for itself by the City 
at the launch of the scheme – 100 000 households with a collective debt of R1.5 
million (City of Johannesburg, Press Release, 9 December 2005).  It is also 
significant that while the City notes that more than half its households earn R1600 or 
less a month, a figure far lower than half of the 3.2 million population making up 
Johannesburg is targeted by the MSSS.  This is discussed in more detail below.      
 
In February 2006, the City launched what it billed as “the second phase of its 
programme of poverty alleviation aimed at assisting the indigent and poor in the city 
to rehabilitate their municipal accounts and create a culture of payment amongst its 
account holders” (City of Johannesburg, Press Release, 30 January 2006).  With the 
name „Reathusa‟ („We Are Helping‟), the scheme targeted municipal account holders 




The principles of the Reathusa scheme are that the customer 
concludes a formal repayment arrangement for half their debt as 
well as keeping their current account up to date.  If they stick to 
this for the period agreed to and pay their arrears, they will then 
have their remaining half of their debt written off. (City of 
Johannesburg, Press Release, 30 January 2006).   
 
As with the MSSS, successful applicants to the Reathusa scheme would be expected 
to install prepaid water and electricity meters in their homes within twelve months of 
acceptance to the scheme.  Applications to the scheme were open between 1 February 
and 31 December 2006.  Importantly, the City would view the Reathusa scheme as its 
recognition of the fact that  
 
people with this level of income have some means to pay, but 
perhaps not the means to settle huge arrear debts immediately.  
So this programme aims to create an incentive for these account 
holders to begin paying their accounts regularly and in so doing, 
create a culture of paying for municipal accounts as a priority. 
(Mandy Jean Woods, spokesperson for the City‟s Revenue 
Department, quoted in Johannesburg City, Press Release, 30 
January 2006).   
 
While the basic principles behind the MSSS and Reathusa are similar, it is significant 
that a separation has been made between different levels of poverty.  It is also striking 
that income levels significantly higher than those ordinarily associated with poverty 
(R6 500) are treated with the same general approach applied to those traditionally 
identified as the poor.  In doing this, there is an increase in distinctions made between 
„those who can pay and won‟t‟ („the won‟t pays‟) and „those who really cannot afford 
to pay‟ („the can‟t pays‟), with one of the aims behind both schemes being the 
increasing of the City‟s capacity to separate out „the can‟t pays‟ from „the won‟t 
pays‟.  In an interview conducted for this thesis, a city official trying to describe the 
thinking behind the introduction of Reathusa said,  
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I think the need was then identified to say let‟s try to sit back 
„cos we‟ve got people who cannot afford and we‟ve got people 
who can afford but don‟t want to pay.  So you‟ve got to treat 
those two differently.  And obviously if you can identify those 
people who cannot afford to pay, then you can come up with 
incentives as to how you can best assist those who can pay to 
pay. (Bongani Nkosi, interview, 20 November 2006).   
 
Such distinctions would serve a broader moral prescription wielded increasingly by 
the City that services should be paid for and that „responsible governance‟ of the City 
should be based on notions of reciprocity and „partnership‟ between the City and its 
residents, with the City undertaking to provide the very basic resources deemed 
necessary for residents to become economically active and „self-reliant‟, accepting the 
logic of payment for services and thereby contributing to the growth of the city.   
 
This growing separation between „the can‟t pays‟ from „the won‟t pays‟ and its 
accompanying discourse of responsible citizenship through payment for services, 
together with the attempt to portray the MSSS as an intervention directed at a 
minority of the poor, work together to further reinforce the idea that access to 
decommodified services should only be possible for the desperate few in society who 
have no ability to become successful in market society.  While the City‟s own 
documents state that more than half the city‟s population earns less than R1 600 a 
month, its interventions to address their plight target just 100 000 households.  This 
alone indicates that the City‟s „commitment to the poor‟ does not lie in any real 
redistributive desire, but in a concerted effort to entrench a logic of access to different 
standards of living and qualities of life dependent on one‟s individual ability to pay 
for them.   
This has most recently been confirmed in the City‟s responses to the most recent 
struggles undertaken by residents against its roll-out of prepaid water meters.  In 
2007, with the assistance of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) and the 
Coalition Against Water Privatisation, five residents of Phiri brought a class-action 
suit in the Johannesburg High Court against the installation of prepaid water meters in 
the township, demanding that the free allocation of water be increased from 6 
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kilolitres per household per month to 50 litres per person per day; and that prepaid 
water meters be declared unconstitutional and that normal credit meters be reinstalled 
in homes.  On 30 April 2008, in a landmark ruling, Judge Tsoka declared that prepaid 
water meters were “unlawful” and “unconstitutional”, ordered the municipality to 
begin providing 50 litres of water per person per day, and allowed all residents of 
Phiri access to water measured by a normal credit meter.  While the Coalition seemed 
vindicated, the City appealed the ruling, and drew attention to changes it had begun 
making since 2007.  In July 2007, after prolonged struggles in Phiri and greater 
Soweto against prepaid meters, and in the run-up to the hearing of the case, the City 
announced its increase in the allocation of free basic water from 6kl to 10kl per 
household per month for all households registered as indigent with the City.  In 
addition, it made available 4kl of emergency water to all households on the prepaid 
water system, and established the special-needs water application mechanism, by 
which residents could make special appeal to the municipality for additional water 
(CoJ, Mid-term Report, September 2008: 199).     
When, on 14 May 2008 Mayor Amos Masondo announced that the City would be 
appealing the judgement, he claimed that “the judgment was distorted as the 
municipality was already providing 50 litres per  day to households on the indigence 
register and who had fewer than seven people” (Business Day, 15.05.08).  In 
justifying the appeal, Masondo argued that the City‟s bringing together of prepaid 
technology, and a targeted system of free basic service provision, would enable  the 
City to begin to address the plight of poor residents by offering a targeted system of a 
social safety net as a first step towards realising the benefits of a full social package: 
The amount of water that households get for free is not determined 
by prepayment meters.  It is determined by the City‟s package of 
free basic services.  We call this our social package.  Since 2001 
and 2002 this social package has been gradually expanded over 
time.  Residents of Phiri are in a better position than they were in 
June 2002.  (Masondo, statement, 14/05/08) 
He used the increase in the amount of free water provided as an example of how 
progress is being made in this regard.  Later on he stated: 
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We want to conclude by reiterating that we believe that the 
introduction of prepayment meters, coupled with a dynamically 
expanding social package that gives poor households more and 
more water for free, is the best way to progressively realise the 
right of access to water on a sustainable basis in our context.  We 
do not think that this approach is unreasonable and unlawful under 
the circumstances.  (ibid.). 
In March 2009, the Supreme Court of Appeal granted the municipality two years in 
which to change city bylaws in order to make prepaid meters legal, and stipulated that 
an amount of 42 litres of water be provided free to each resident per day.  The City 
argued that its indigent residents were already receiving an amount higher than this.  
Appealing to the Constitutional Court, residents of Phiri were disappointed by its 
setting aside of both the previous orders and its finding that the City of 
Johannesburg‟s installation of prepaid water meters did not violate national policy or 
the Constitution with regard to the delivery of water.  Rather, the final judgement 
argued that the City‟s approach to the delivery of water fell within Section 27 of the 
Constitution‟s allowance for the progressive realisation of the right to water.  The 
Court also presented the finding that the quantifying of a sufficient amount of water 
was not within its jurisdiction, leaving it to government to make such a decision.   
 
It would seem, then, that the careful crafting of an indigent management policy by the 
City and its representation as a means towards ensuring the progressive realisation of 
access to water beyond the bare minimum, was what would after five years of 
litigation finally win it legitimacy in the eyes of the judges of the Constitutional 
Court.  It is interesting that the Court would choose to speak of the differential levels 
of access prescribed in this policy in terms of progressive realisation without 
acknowledging the further entrenchment of inequality through such an approach
75
.   
 It is, therefore, likely that struggles for „a better life‟ will for some time to come be 
characterised by contestations over what constitutes „the poor‟ and „poverty‟ and over 
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 In the context of such high levels of unemployment, it is more likely that those provided with the 
very minimal levels of access to services will remain in their unequal and inferior positions rather than 
being able to build on and from these.  The experience of Orange Farm  where large numbers of 
residents live without flush toilets as a result of their inability to afford the cost of installation of a 
prepaid water meter (which is required for connection of toilets to the main water pipes), attests to this. 
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what quality and standard of life is due to the poor.  The experience of Orange Farm, 
explored in the next two chapters, is significant in that it will illustrate how, in trying 
to implement these policies targeting the poor, another category, „the poorest of the 
poor‟, emerges to designate those who are unable to afford the conditions of being on 
the indigent register i.e. signing onto the prepaid system of delivery.  For this section 
of society, an even lower standard and quality of life is provided, further separating 
out „the can‟t pays who can be encouraged to pay‟ and „those who cannot be made to 
pay‟.     
During the period of the court case, a new indigent management policy was being 
crafted, and has been implemented from July 2009, with a lot less publicity than the 
MSSS and Reathusa.  Seemingly much more complex than the MSSS and Reathusa, 
the new scheme, called „Siyasizana‟ („We are helping each other‟), also referred to as 
the Extended Social Package, builds on the principles of targeting and minimal 
interventions based on need set out in these earlier policies, and continues to argue for 
the assumption by the individual citizen of the responsibility for the securing of 
access to resources over and above those minimal amounts provided by the state, 
primarily through becoming economically productive.  It is important to acknowledge 
the emergence of Siyasizana in a context of heightened struggle against the prepaid 
water system and a problematisation of the minimal allocations determined for water 
and electricity.  And, once again we see the mobilisation of a discourse of „helping 
each other‟ in order to further displace responsibility for „the better life‟ away from 
the state and onto the individual citizen.   
Contrary to suggestions that the adoption of more targeted approaches or indigent 
management policies could reflect a move away from neoliberal policies as they offer 
a means for those areas without access to services to gain access and because they 
have been tied to debt write offs (Everatt 2008, Von Schnitzler 2008
76
), the 
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 For example, Antina Von Schnitzler (2008: 903) writes, “While more recent policies, such as 
indigent policies and the social development packages, have stepped away from the more openly 
neoliberal documents like iGoli 2002 and Johannesburg 2030, the corporatisation of Johannesburg 
Water and the subsequent promulgation of Operation Gcin‟amanzi have to be seen as part of this 
earlier paradigm”.  What both Everatt and Von Schnitzler also miss is the fact that policies that come to 
be portrayed as „pro-poor‟ evolve in response to resistance from individuals and communities 
identifying politically as the poor.  Often, then, a „pro-poor‟ discourse serves to quell resistance by 
speaking a language of changed commitment to the poor while in fact further entrenching inequality 
through the provision of lower levels of services and standards of living for that population group 
identified and targeted as the poor.    
 218 
experience of the City of Johannesburg reflects clearly the further enforcement of 
neoliberal prescriptions of individual responsibility, self-restraint, conservation, and 
payment for services through indigent management.  While the language adopted 
increasingly includes the term „pro-poor‟, the provision of differential levels of 
service to, and the encouragement of particular forms of behaviour amongst, those 
identified and targeted as the poor reinforce inequality and the principle that access to 
higher levels of services and a better quality of life should be restricted to those able 
to pay.    
Siyasizana puts in place a three-tiered system for determining and addressing need on 
the part of the poor.  Introducing a new „poverty index‟, Siyasizana stipulates the 
criteria for determining 3 „bands of poverty‟ for all individuals earning a monthly 
income of below R3 366.  Band 1 would aim “at helping those on the borderline of 
poverty” and would provide the lowest level of subsidy; Band 2 would be aimed at  
“those who earn some formal income but whose earnings fall below the survival level 
defined by the poverty index”, being granted a middle level of subsidy; and Band 3 
would be “the highest level of subsidy, aimed at those with no formal income living in 
the most deprived circumstances” (City of Johannesburg, Social Package - 
http://www.joburg.org.za/content/view/3432/168/, accessed 20/02/2009).  
According to the new system of classification, each individual applicant will be given 
a „poverty score‟ out of 100, 70 of these points being allocated based on a person‟s 
individual socio-economic circumstances, and 30 based on the conditions of the 
geographical area in which the person resides.  Since 1 July 2009, every adult 
individual resident earning below R3 366 per month has been expected to apply for 
indigent status, each person being classified according to one of the poverty bands 
described above.  Every household would, thereafter, be assessed according to the 
number of indigent individuals residing in it and allocation of benefits from the 
extended social package would be determined based on the level of need determined 
by the overall poverty status of the household, with the maximum allocation to any 
 219 
household being 15 kl of water and 150 kW of electricity
77
 (Interview, Jak Koseff, 15 
June 2010).   
Two striking differences from earlier indigent management policies are the 
registration of individuals who are not account-holders i.e. who do not reside in a 
formal dwelling, and the provision of individual benefits over and above household 
benefits, such as rental and transport subsidies.  For non-account holders, then, 
registration as indigent would not result in access to the subsidies related to owning or 
renting a property (water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal, and rates rebates), but 
provide access to subsidies for transport.  In addition, Siyasizana has established an 
institute called „The Job Pathways Centre‟, which provides contacts to those 
registered as indigent for accessing employment and/or becoming economically 
active, including Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) jobs and “new venture 
creation training” (Interview, Jak Koseff, Director of Community Development, CoJ, 
15 June 2010).  Siyasizana clearly states that all those coming forward for registration 
as indigents will be encouraged to join the centre and have access to a social worker 
to assist them in any special needs they might have with regard to accessing 
employment and/or becoming entrepreneurs.  Social workers are also envisaged as 
playing the role of determining need amongst households for accessing „emergency 
allocations‟ of water, provided for by the City more recently primarily for households 
in which HIV- positive people reside. 
Jak, Koseff, Director of Community Development of the CoJ, responsible for 
Siyasizana, explained that the Job Pathways programme had been designed according 
to the rationality of “welfare to workfare” approaches adopted in the USA, UK, 
Australia, and parts of the developing world, such as Brazil, Argentina and India: 
So, we looked at all these experiences.  We obviously have some 
key differences – we don‟t have a universal adult grant; we don‟t 
have a long history of warehousing poverty in gigantic council 
estate-type set-ups; so, therefore you don‟t have nearly as much of 
a dependent population that can be coaxed into employment which 
is what most of the developed country systems do.  What you do 
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 According to Jak Koseff, households in Band 1 receive 10kl of free water and 50 KW of free 
electricity, those in Band 2 receive 12 kl and 100 KW, and those in Band 3, 15 kl and 150 KW.   
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have, however, which is comparable, is a population with very 
limited experience of the formal labour market, very poor 
understanding of how to access the labour market, often with skills 
deficits, training deficits, and personal barriers that act against 
them in terms of accessing the job market, and also bear in mind 
that UK Job Centre Plus system operates in a condition where the 
poorest parts of London have 40% unemployment rates, most of 
them amongst the youth, with very high skills deficits, poor access 
to the formal economy, same things that we face.  So, not all of it 
is purely a first-world centric view of things.  Some of it can 
actually cross-apply.  (Interview, Koseff, 15 June 2010). 
Koseff went on to argue that many of the programmes in South Africa that have 
focused on the poor have “centred around the National Qualifications Framework 
(NQF) system and capital development, developing qualifications, developing 
certifications that the individual can then use to get themselves ahead in the labour 
force”.   He said: 
We refer to this sort of thing usually as „train and dump‟ because 
you get to a certification level and either the training doesn‟t meet 
the needs of the market or the individual can‟t match himself to the 
market because he doesn‟t understand the way it‟s going; 
certifications often end up being ineffective in allowing individuals 
to exit their own poverty.  So, what we instead said was „Let the 
market tell us what to do‟, and we will train or screen to meet the 
market‟s needs (usually both).  (ibid). 
After running a pilot with a consortium of NGOS that took on the task of co-
ordinating a programme along the lines described above, “which was a massive 
learning curve” (ibid), the CoJ ran a formal tendering process for the management of 
the Job Pathways programme.  The process was concluded in July 2009, with the 
appointment of the Workforce Group, “a really tooth and claw capitalist entity, a 
labour broker” (ibid) to oversee the programme.  According to Koseff, “The key thing 
they brought to bear was a range of critical systems that could basically directly suss 
out and react to market need, which was what we realised the NGOs spent most of 
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their time doing is building their capacity to do what the private sector already had.” 
(ibid).  He argued that the key choice that they faced was whether to “make the 
private sector act more like an NGO or the NGO sector act more like the private 
sector” (ibid).  The City concluded that “since the market is the ultimate actor that 
needs to absorb people, it makes more sense to go with the private sector and get 
them to adopt the relevant NGO-type practices that will allow them to deal more 
effectively with the very impoverished sectors of the community” (ibid).   
Assessing the short life of the programme, Koseff spoke of the realisation that 
“creating new ventures is not nearly as easy as government policy might have made it 
out to be over the last few years, not least because, to be frank about it, there‟s often 
in the poorest parts of the city a limited cultural experience of entrepreneurship”.  He 
said: 
You know, people haven‟t grown up as the sons and daughters of 
shopkeepers and small business owners.  So, there isn‟t, like, a 
family figure you can lean on for advice that would be there in 
countries say, for example, like India where a lot of this kind of 
thing is lived intergenerational experience.  So, you‟ve got to 
basically provide a lot of the psychology of the entrepreneur as 
well as the basic tools of managing your own business, etc.  And, 
people are afraid of it because it‟s poorly understood.  (ibid).   
In this way, individual responsibility and self-reliance have come to be foregrounded 
in the new indigent management policy as state interventions that target those who are 
unable to provide for themselves have begun to entrench levels of inequality amongst 
those identified as the poor, with different standards of living being prescribed for 
different groups of the poor based on their ability to pay and/or to be made to pay, and 
the state‟s own role being cemented as that of providing the very minimal levels of 
resources necessary for the individual to survive.  The overt linking of access to jobs 
and the development of skills for small business development, to the status of 
indigency has also seen the emphasis on moral attributes of „the deserving poor‟, that 
is, those willing to work and become economically productive, taking responsibility 
for their own development and the improvement of the lives of their families.   
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Comparing the poor in South Africa to experiences of the poor in places like India 
and Brazil, where activity in the informal sector of the economy is much higher than 
in South Africa, Jak Koseff suggested that this could be the result of “a certain kind of 
attitudinal issue that needs treading, especially amongst the young, to correct 
efficiently” (Interview, Koseff, 15  June 2010).  It is for this reason that Koseff sees 
possibilities opened up by jobs in the service sector, although not “ideal”, for helping 
to change attitudes towards work.  He said: 
I remember interviewing a site manager for a workforce 
development centre in New York.  He got a lot of flack from NGO 
partners and a range of other commentators for sending a lot of 
people at the entry level of the labour force into very service sector 
jobs that didn‟t have a lot of benefits and had long hours, etc, etc, 
and weren‟t particularly progress-oriented.  His reply was that if 
someone can hold down a clerical job for a year and they show up 
on time and they don‟t get drunk and they demonstrate a record of 
reliability, that‟s something they can sell to another employer – if 
they want to do customer service in another area, etc, etc.  So, it‟s 
about providing that career ladder opportunity path in a meaningful 
way.  And, if what you‟re after is labour force attachment as 
opposed to human capital development, in other words, you want 
to get people into economic activity so they can start helping 
themselves straight away, the service sector‟s going to be a natural 
place where your efforts get directed.  And it‟s tricky, because the 
temporary work agenda is complex in SA because the market is 
very strangely structured.  There‟s a lot of movement in temporary 
employment. (ibid; my emphasis).  
 
With regard to the rise in temporary employment opportunities, the CoJ has also 
established the „Preferred Candidates Pool‟ programme “for the labour broking side 
of workforce operations” (ibid).  Koseff explained the programme thus: 
  
So, a certain number of people are enrolled in the programme that 
prioritises them for temporary contracts that come up stacking 
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shelves, doing stock-takes, data-capturing, those kinds of things.  
Because there is a lot of money that can be made, but not on one 
job, but a few sequential jobs that pile up over a certain period.  
So, it‟s a difficult exercise trying to provide economic opportunity 
to people, but the important thing is that they don‟t lose their 
benefits in any way unless they exit to an opportunity that then 
takes them out of the earnings range, in which case we feel it‟s fair 
play.  We‟ve given you the opportunity, you‟ve got to pull yourself 
further along by your own best efforts, and there are a range of 
other programmes available to you out there.  (ibid).   
In this way, the CoJ encourages a particular form of life for those identified as 
indigent, that of entrepreneurship and economic self-sufficiency. Koseff also pointed 
out that the City was considering other inducements to introduce into Siyasizana, 
based on the experiences of cash transfer programmes in Brazil, which require 
recipients to show that their children are enrolled in health and education 
programmes, and the like.  In South Africa, treatment contracts that accompany 
certain prescriptions of anti-retroviral therapy, have seen the introduction of such an 
approach.  Until the Phiri court case, it could also be argued that the stipulation by 
MSSS and Reathusa that registered persons sign onto prepaid meters was such a 
mechanism to encourage a particular relationship of restraint and responsibility to the 
consumption of water and electricity.  While the CoJ has, since the court case, ceased 
to roll out prepaid meters in any concerted manner, with Koseff insisting that signing 
onto prepaid systems of delivery is not a mandatory requirement of Siyasizana, he 
made a strong case for the resumption of the installation of prepaid meters in indigent 
households, suggesting that the City might very well return to them once legislation 
has been changed, in particular for those residents who do not currently enjoy access 
to services, such as those in informal settlements: 
People in informal settlements right now don‟t have an 
accountable relationship with the city.  One legitimate way to 
introduce this relationship is through prepaid meters because on a 
prepaid basis they can access services, and you can still subsidise 
them through Siyasizana.  We don‟t have perfect technological 
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alliance, but certainly good enough to be able to distribute services 
through ppms, and at some stage we will probably provide a 
voucher system of some kind.  For electricity, we do it via the 
backend; so the next time they touch in the benefits accrue to their 
accounts.  With the water system, you‟ve got to do it with the 
token itself.  But there are ways of working around the technology 
to be able to distribute your Siyasizana benefits onto prepaid 
platforms.  It‟s got a lot of benefits for them because it doesn‟t 
have all the credit management challenges saying „No, no, you 
can‟t, you can‟t, you can‟t‟.  (ibid).   
 
Acknowledging that there have to date been problems raised by poor residents with 
regard to the affordability of the cost of the installation of the meters (R2000, 
currently expected to be borne largely by residents), Koseff explained that the City is 
currently discussing proposals towards waiving the installation cost for poorer 
residents, possibly graduating levels of payment for installation according to the 
different bands of poverty determined by Siyasizana.  Koseff also argued that 
“conversion to a prepaid customer” was preferred by poor residents: 
 
So, we convert you to a prepaid customer.  It‟s considered a 
preference by a range of households that approach our social 
workers.  They say they would rather know that they have no debt 
history at the end of the month, and even if it leaves them short of 
electricity for two days, they know they are capable of paying for 
it; there‟s no credit balance owing.  (ibid).    
 
However, Koseff pointed out that conversion to the prepaid system should always 
remain a choice of the individual resident, unless it came with a debt write-off.  He 
also argued that the requirements of the business-oriented entities of the City 
responsible for service delivery had to be considered in laying out the means for the 
delivery of basic services to the poor: 
 
I think it always has to remain a choice, unless you want to access 
something like a write-off that will only be given if you take a ppm 
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– that‟s quid pro quo; dealing with utilities you‟re dealing with 
entities that do have to have a commercial aspect to them.  At the 
very least they‟ve got to balance their investment and their 
overheads with the charges they recover; so you‟re never going to 
be able to get complete freebies out of them.  But you can get a 
much better level of service if you say „ok, we‟ll improve the 
credit management through prepaid meters‟.  I personally think it‟s 





Koseff also refuted a number of the criticisms of prepaid meters, reinforcing that they 
continue to be viewed by the City as an appropriate technology for the delivery of 
water and electricity to poor residents.  Explaining that there are very few options 
open to a resident if they haven‟t paid for services, Koseff rejected the claims made in 
the Phiri court case that administration of justice was denied by the prepaid meter by 
arguing that “if you‟re cut off under a credit regime that applies with a normal meter, 
it‟s not as if your interaction with the municipality‟s that different”, with the 
individual having to sign up for services through Siyasizana or make a separate 
arrangement with the municipality.  Koseff explained: 
 
It‟s tricky with historical debts, but if you‟re starting with a zero debt 
basis, as you would be allowing the prepaid meter people to do, it‟s not 
clear to me that a credit meter is actually preferable, especially if you 
consider that you might get away with a couple of months of bill-
dodging, but then you‟re facing a cut-off anyway, and you‟re not going 
to be able to talk anyone out of it because you‟ve incurred the last – if 
you haven‟t registered for us, then really you would be in the same 
situation as if you had a prepaid meter.  So, the administration of justice 
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 While the experience of service delivery in Orange Farm will be explored in greater detail in the 
following two chapters, it is important to note here that certain areas of Orange Farm, in which access 
to flush toilets has previously been absent, individual households have been given toilets and promised 
connection to water so that they can flush only if they sign onto prepaid water meters at a cost of R650.  
Unable to do this, their toilets have not been connected so that they can flush.  When this was pointed 
out to Mr Koseff, he stated that this stipulation can no longer be enforced.  However, while the CoJ 
workshops different proposals around payment for the cost of the installation of prepaid meters, several 
residents go without flush toilets.   
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issues, I don‟t think are a death blow to the prepaid meter structure.  
(ibid).  
 
He went on to argue that the prepaid meter “does stop bypassing electricity (the new 
ESKOM green boxes, at least, are tamper proof)” (ibid).  While half joking that “they 
won‟t be tamper-proof forever; nothing‟s tamper-proof forever”, Koseff said:   
 
So, you‟re denying people the opportunity to bypass and run illegal 
connections.  That‟s probably a good thing from a point of public 
safety alone because the amount of deaths, disfigurations, fires, 
etc. that are caused by the illegal connections and the wiring and so 
on are a huge problem.  So, it does put an end to that kind of thing 
if you run tamper-proof metering.  (ibid). 
 
Koseff also highlighted that the CoJ had begun to deal with the criticism from the 
poor and analysts that tariffs for prepaid services are often higher than those for 
ordinary metered services, stating that while this might have been the case 
historically, “utilities are reversing the trend, making prepaid meters the more 
attractive tariff” (ibid).  He argued that an additional benefit of the prepaid meter was 
that it did away with incorrect billing as the system did not need to rely on interim 
estimates of consumption and meter readers.  For the City, then, the prepaid system 
continues to be viewed as offering several benefits.  However, Koseff accepted that 
poor residents, such as those in Orange Farm, would continue to be critical of it:   
 
Orange Farm, I know, there‟s a lot of resistance because, if you 
think about it, people haven‟t paid for years and years on end.  And 
they‟re kind of expecting that there‟ll be a legal settlement of some 
kind.  If that legal settlement comes in the form of prepaid meters, 
certainly there‟ll be very vocal minorities that believe that all 
services should be free for those below a certain income, period.  
They don‟t believe that prepaid meters are fair.  I think that if you 
want to continue to encourage investment in the areas and actually 
upgrade them, you‟ve got to have some kind of cost recovery; 
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you‟re not going to get the utilities in there without it, and I think 
prepaid meters are a logical way to do that.  (ibid). 
The installation of prepaid meters will be taken up in the specific experience of 
Orange Farm explored in the following two chapters. 
It is also significant that Siyasizana will require individuals to re-register every 6 
months.  While the City argues that the only requirement for registration and re-
registration is the possession of an identity document, it is likely that the 
administrative burden of the City will be increased through this process.  All 
applicants will also be fingerprinted, the fingerprint serving as a means of identifying 
and tracking indigent members of society.  It could be argued that Siyasizana marks 
the evolution of policy with regard to the function of security elaborated by Foucault 
(see Chapter One), allowing for the capturing of detailed information about and the 
close surveillance of a population group, in this case those identified and registered as 
„the indigent‟, through which particular interventions are crafted through which forms 
of self-restraint, conservation, and self-discipline are internalised by targeted groups.  
Importantly, Siyasizana makes the responsibility for registration and re-registration as 
indigent, and therefore for access to free basic services and other forms of state 
assistance, that of the individual citizen rather than that of the state.  If individuals do 
not apply for registration, they simply do not enjoy the „benefits‟ of being declared 
indigent.   
The evolution of the City‟s policies with regard to the delivery of free basic services, 
from the Special Cases Policy of 2002 to Siyasizana must be understood within a 
context of increasing resistance on the part of poor communities, as well as changing 
institutional frameworks and approaches at national and municipal level with regard 
to enforcing the duty to pay for services.  This was confirmed by Jak Koseff, 
appointed Director of Community Development in the CoJ in 2007, at the beginning 
of the Siyasizana process, who acknowledged that the process of municipal policy 
formulation outlined above was characterised by experimentation with institutional 
forms and approaches in the context of heightened mobilisation and resistance on the 
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part of the poor.
79
  Describing Siyasizana as the City‟s first attempt at “individual 
identity management”, Koseff outlined how the MSSS and Reathusa, emanating from 
the City‟s Revenue Department, and being produced in the absence of a nationally 
agreed on poverty line, functioned primarily as debt write-off mechanisms, without 
developing any means for collecting “proper” knowledge about the nature of 
households in order to enable the crafting of household specific interventions that 
would assist in separating out the “unable to pay” from the “unwilling to pay”.  He 
said: 
So, even when you move to 2005 with the major indigent 
management systems that were introduced by the MSSS policy, 
there is detailed take in at household level but there isn‟t anything 
done about it.  There isn‟t the household level programming that 
tries to go in and say, you know, you‟ve got a gogo living with two 
kids, they need a combination of services for the aged, services for 
vulnerable children, plus any other rebates we can give them – that 
kind of detailed level intervention that actually screens the 
household for need and tries to connect the household with the 
scope of available government resources wasn‟t really done.  
(Interview, Jak Koseff, 15 June 2010).   
Koseff went on to explain that the CoJ was constrained by the lack of progress in this 
respect at a national level: 
To be fair to the city, it wasn‟t really done at national level either.  
I mean, the various government service areas all maintained and 
continue to maintain their own service regimes; they don‟t really 
share or integrate their targeting in a way that they would have one 
set of people approaching the household and saying, „This, this and 
this needs to be done‟.  The Presidential project that now resides 
with the Department of Rural Development, the national war room 
on poverty, it attempted to do that but found that it is incredibly 
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 Koseff explained that the crafting of Siyasizana “hasn‟t been without its teething problems 
managerially”.  Arguing that these are the kinds of things to be overcome, he said, “This idea that you 
can plan and implement a perfect system doesn‟t actually exist anywhere in the real practice of public 
policy.” (Interview, Koseff, 15 June 2010).   
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labour-intensive work, not least of which because you can create a 
to-do list of interventions that a household requires, but to actually 
get those interventions executed requires much more institutional 
kind of integration than you actually have available as one 
department conducting a survey of need.  So the city established 
the MSSS policy back in 2005 against this background of still very 
fragmented and silo-based, to be fair, government service 
offerings.  So, that‟s not necessarily the service agency‟s particular 
fault.  That‟s the way these particular kind of services tend to be 
delivered in all government contexts.  (ibid).   
Koseff also explained how a targeted approach arose in the context of the City 
needing to prioritise with regard to the spending of a limited pool of resources: 
Inevitably, not all potential clients can be served; therefore you 
have to decide which client groups are highest priority.  So, once 
again the poverty definition, need definition question becomes a 
critical one.  Now at the time of the MSSS and Special Cases 
Policy, you don‟t really have a proactive attempt to define poverty 
and therefore establish what the needs of poor households are for 
the purposes of trying to establish a more comprehensive 
intervention.  That was always the intention, and the fact that it 
was historically called „The Social Package‟ as a predecessor to the 
Expanded Social Package tells you that there was always the 
intention to create a basket of benefits, but the exact construction 
of that basket was a bit of an ongoing effort that was mainly led 
through the HDS.  It wasn‟t really tied up with the indigent policy 
until the time that the Siyasizana programme takes over in mid-
2007.  (ibid).  
He went on to show how these policy shifts were related to institutional changes, in 
particular the moving of responsibility for indigent management from the Revenue 
Department to the Department of Community Development, established in 2007: 
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It‟s important to know that 2005-2007 you‟ve got a couple of key 
institutional changes that happen.  Obviously you have a new 
mayoral administration starting with a range of new priorities.  
You have a new departmental alignment – the Department of 
Community Development, as now stands, was created including a 
specific human development directorate whose job it basically is to 
administer the HDS, and, therefore, to run both regulatory and 
outright programmatic facilitation and catalysing programmes that 
help those kinds of special needs groups.  So, the needs of the 
various categories of the poor are once again to be taken into 
account by the human development directorate.  The story isn‟t so 
simple because the indigent policy in general and the free basic 
services policy in particular was always seen as something of a 
revenue competency, and throughout the country if you look at it, 
indigent policies usually are actually maintained and managed by 
the finance divisions of the municipalities they work with.  That‟s 
the consequence of two things because obviously it‟s charges for 
services that have to be addressed, for example for structures and 
rebates, and looking at affordability of services, but it‟s also 
because a lot of local governments don‟t necessarily have a lot of 
social policy experience, especially the smaller municipalities 
which will often rely on your provincial layer for that expertise 
level and the provincial layer didn‟t really get heavily involved in 
promoting a social service infrastructure at local level.  So, 2005-
2007 you‟ve got the MSSS policy looking at basic services, but 
still there‟s no connect the dots operation going on with the NGO-
delivered services and the service through human development.  
(ibid). 
Siyasizana, represents, then, for the City the culmination of a long process 
through which it has attempted to develop a “single-view” or “single 
window” approach to poverty, in which “individual identity management” 
has become the fulcrum (Interview, Koseff, 15 June 2010).  With the 
priority of producing individual paying, and economically active citizens, 
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Siyasizana aims to produce a proper administration of the poor through the 
elaboration of complex and highly technical systems to know and manage 
the poor.  Jak Koseff explained why the CoJ chose to adopt such a 
complex system of indigent management in spite of complaints from 
municipal administrators that it would increase their administrative 
burden: 
The poverty index is quite a complex instrument in itself; so 
people may wonder why we don‟t use something simpler.  The 
cruder your measure, the more distortions it creates because it 
creates a world in which people will try to avoid its 
consequences.  So, if you set things at a certain level, people may 
not be honest about their economic circumstances because 
they‟re trying to  avoid coming in above that level, for example, 
or people might not take on things that would marginally 
improve their situation because they don‟t want to cross a bridge 
and suddenly be left facing the full cost of their lifestyle because 
they then void access to benefits, etc, etc.  Also, you want to be 
able to differentially target those benefits; so you‟ve got to be 
able to give less to some people to be able to give more to others; 
so you‟ve got to internally prioritise within your service 
population to see who can receive more extensive benefits than 
other people would.  And, therefore, who you‟ve got to 
concentrate more of your other resources on to move them 
upwards so that they graduate your index and become non-
dependent on you. (ibid). 
He also explained that the fears of administrative managers that the system would be 
unmanageable were “not wrong; they just didn‟t see the full range of possibilities that 
we have developed today”, such as the many technological developments that have 
allowed for the creation of a centralised, paperless, digital system that allows for all 
information about an individual to be traced from a single point through an identity 
number (and fingerprint), that aims to connect all systems at municipal, provincial 
and national levels.  The Siyasizana database is already connected to the South 
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African Social Services Agency (SASSA) database, which contains all data related to 
individual social grant recipients, and is linked to the National Integrated Information 
System (NISIS), for which it is the national pilot.  Koseff explained that the 
individual data of Siyasizana registrants is, in this way, “verified against 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) data, the grants database held by SASSA, the 
Home Affairs databases and the housing subsidy system”, giving the City “a fair 
understanding of any formal income people are earning”.  However, he went on to 
complain that the inability to “catch and sway” individuals operating outside of the 
formal economy was “a compromise” that had to be accepted for now, pointing out 
that currently there are approximately 250 cases of fraud related to individuals whose 
UIF records indicate that they were claiming benefits while earning salaries, that are 
being investigated by the City.  It is for this reason, Koseff explained, that the City 
has become “quite aggressive”, with the introduction of fingerprinting related to this, 
and in particular the need to combat identity fraud.  For him, the taking of fingerprints 
must simply be seen as “an identity management tool”.     
Koseff also offered a number of rebuttals of criticisms of the adoption of indigent 
management policies: 
I haven‟t been presented with an argument against an indigent 
register that stands up.  I‟ll give you the top three arguments that 
are always used.  Firstly, it is reminiscent of apartheid era policies.  
Whether it is or not, if there are practical reasons for it, this isn‟t an 
apartheid era policy – it‟s not racially targeted, it‟s not racially 
specified, it doesn‟t consider your race a determining factor in 
anything.  So, therefore, to my mind, it‟s a disanalogy.  If people 
have memories of apartheid it‟s not in way for the same reasons – 
it‟s not to exclude you, it‟s not to send you to a Bantustan, it‟s not 
to classify you under the Group Areas Act; it‟s to give you 
benefits.  So, that argument I don‟t buy into very heavily.  
Secondly, that it‟s an ordeal for people to register.  You‟ve got to 
balance the ordeal of registration against what can responsibly be 
given if people do not register because if you‟re stuck with non-
targeted benefits, contrary to a lot of the academic consensus on 
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this issue, I think you‟re actually in a very compromised space 
because you‟ll never be able to get to a point where you can 
completely manage your resource base effectively.  You‟ll always 
be over-supplying and under-supplying, missing the target all of 
the time.  The third reason given is that registers under-estimate the 
numbers of the poor because people won‟t be willing to identify 
themselves as poor.  I understand the point, but if you‟re not 
willing to ask for help, it‟s very difficult to give you help, and you 
can‟t let the enemy of the perfect be the enemy of the possible.  If 
there was some x-ray vision way of identifying exactly who was 
poor and who wasn‟t, we wouldn‟t need the system – true, but 
there‟s very few targeted beneficiary regimes that don‟t require 
some form of registration.  Mexico, Brazil, India, and the 
developed countries do it, so this idea that it is somehow insulting 
is, to me, a little overblown.  You can say that no one but the poor 
can speak for the poor – sure, legitimate – but, once again, if 
you‟re not willing to ask for help, it‟s difficult to give you help, 
and that, I think, is part of the problem. (ibid).   
It will be interesting to see how poor individuals, communities and movements 
respond to this new indigent management policy.  While mobilisation on the basis of 
being poor might have forced the state to change its stance on various policies related 
to the management of the poor or the indigent, increasing the amount allocated for 
free provision of water and electricity, for example, over time the state has come to 
use the very language mobilised in struggle against its neoliberal policies to push 
forward its logic of payment for basic services and differential levels of access based 
on ability to pay for services, as well as its diminishing responsibility in the provision 
of those resources to all its citizens to enable their enjoyment of a decent standard and 
quality of life.   
In doing this, it has separated out various levels of the poor, limiting its role to that of 
providing those minimal levels of resources to „the poorest of the poor‟ necessary for 
their survival, and levels of services to other categories of the poor based on their 
ability to pay for more than these minimal levels.  Siyasizana might signal the time 
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for a re-evaluation of strategy by movements of the poor, and a need for the rejection 
of any classification by the state in order to access services.   
These questions will be taken up through the experiences of residents of Orange Farm 
in the chapters that follow. 
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Making one‟s way from Johannesburg‟s shopping mall suburbia and bustling inner 
city past its fast developing townships like Soweto, and then the slower-paced 
Eldorado Park and Lenasia, to the even slower smallholdings, and pockets of life that 
spring up along the Golden Highway (in the form of RDP housing projects or 
informal settlements like Vlakfontein), on to the peri-urban sprawl of shacks and 
ramshackle houses that appears almost out of nowhere just under an hour‟s drive 
south from the city, that is Orange Farm, apartheid‟s legacy of inequality and the 
neoliberal policies today intended to redress it, are striking – in the very real and 
visible differences in the socio-economic conditions of residents in these different 
parts of Johannesburg, and in the clearly evident signs of a logic of „incremental 
development‟ in the delivery of the „better life‟ promised by the ANC government, 
with the „informal‟ living standards entrenched for the majority of black people under 
apartheid continuing to form the basis for the provision of services to socio-
economically disadvantaged residents and communities in townships on the periphery 
of the economic hub of the city, today.   
 
As the pace of life slows down as one moves further along the Golden Highway, away 
from the city, it is tempting to describe Orange Farm and the many small „developing‟ 
settlements south of the city as part of „the second economy‟, their residents confined 
by their inferior socio-economic status to a „marginal‟ life of poorer quality than that 
enjoyed by the richer in other parts of Johannesburg.  Indeed, it is a different set of 
goods and services that one has access to on the streets of Orange Farm.  But there are 
also signs all over Orange Farm of „the first economy‟ – in the slow arrival of 
supermarket chains, billboards and commercial branding to the township, and in the 
aspirations of residents for the individual luxuries and comforts afforded by a job or 
business in „the first economy‟.  And while I would make my way to Orange Farm on 
many days of this project in search of people and information about the place, Orange 
Farm would make its appearance in my everyday goings about the inner city and its 
suburbs.   
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From the newspaper seller on the street corner in Killarney to the car guard in 
Braamfontein who diligently make their ways along the Golden Highway each 
morning to the city to earn enough money for their families‟ daily survival needs, it 
becomes difficult to sustain neat separations between a „second economy‟ operative in 
Orange Farm and a „first economy‟ to which its residents should aim to „graduate‟.  
Rather, it becomes apparent that the economy of Orange Farm is part of the greater 
Johannesburg economy, the lives of its residents as much a part of Johannesburg‟s 
economic life as the lives of those in its northern suburbs.  And the representation of 
Orange Farm as a part of „the second economy‟ (a place of „formalised informality‟, a 
„place for the poor‟) would be seen as working to entrench the idea that those who are 
unable to pay deserve a poorer quality and standard of life, with the benefits of „the 
first economy‟ being accessible to those individuals who work hard and develop their 
entrepreneurial abilities, and the responsibility of the state being reduced to that of 
providing the basics necessary for survival.    
 
While Orange Farm makes its appearance in occasional newspaper articles and with 
some regularity in state policy documents post-1994, it is not a place that gains 
prominence in any official histories of South Africa nor in any major research projects 
trying to understand apartheid or the transition.  Under apartheid, there was one 
official research report on the first relocation of squatters to Orange Farm, published 
in 1990 by Owen Crankshaw and Timothy Hart for the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC).   
 
After 1994, there are only two other published research reports that have been 
produced about Orange Farm, both by groups of residents assisted by NGOs and other 
organisations - one published in 2002 by Khanya College and the Kganya Consortium 
(a group of thirteen women's projects in Orange Farm) that looks specifically at the 
position of women in Orange Farm after 1996 and the national government's adoption 
of GEAR, and the other in 2003 by the Coalition Against Water Privatisation, the 
Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee 
(OWCC), that focuses on the effects of the installation of prepaid water meters on the 
lives of residents of Stretford, Extension 4.  This, together with the absence of any 
official history of Orange Farm in state documents, has made it extremely difficult to 
 237 
piece together the history of Orange Farm for this thesis.  While several hours were, 
then, spent poring over documents, searching for information about Orange Farm, 
little of these efforts are reflected in the following pages.  Rather, it is a history made 
from the stories of residents, newspaper articles, and a limited selection of state 
documents that makes up this chapter.  This must, in itself, be viewed as reflective of 
the ways in which Orange Farm has featured in the collective imaginary of the state 
and policy-makers.  Unlike Soweto or Alexandra, whose histories are celebrated in 
the collective production of the history of the struggle against apartheid, Orange Farm 
appears with increasing frequency only in state policy documents and newspaper 
articles seeking to define and know „the poorest of the poor‟.  In this way, it becomes 
a symbol of the interventions of the ANC government targeting „the second economy‟ 
rather than a memory and repository of struggle against attempts at entrenching „an 
informal life‟ for black people.   
 
This chapter tells the history of Orange Farm as one of continued attempts at 
entrenching and naturalising a logic of „informality‟ and a poorer quality of life for a 
section of the population, first black people resisting the policies of influx control 
under apartheid, and then, under the ANC government, those categorised as the poor.  
Established by the apartheid government in the context of failed attempts at 
disciplining black people forcing their presence in the city, Orange Farm tells the 
story of how state strategies for exercising power change from disciplinary 
mechanisms (such as the force of the police) towards „technologies of the self‟ 
(Foucault) that encourage certain kinds of behaviour and particular forms of life 
amongst people e.g. self-restraint, self-discipline, self-reliance, individual 
responsibility, and entrpreneurship.  This chapter will show how a logic of individual 
responsibility comes to be encouraged both by the apartheid and ANC governments as 
the logic of privatisation and commodification come to define the delivery of basic 
services and erode the responsibilities of the state in this sphere.  In doing this, it will 
also reflect on how „poverty‟ and „the poor‟ come to be mobilised in service of these 
changes.  In particular, it will explore the use of these terms by the post-apartheid 
state in its attempts to enforce a logic of commodification and individual 
responsibility in the delivery of basic services, focusing on their mobilisation within a 
moral economy that emerges in the transition in the context of the introduction of 
neoliberal policies and resistance to them.  While the next chapter focuses on 
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contestation and resistance, this chapter tells the history of Orange Farm largely from 
the perspective of how it was imagined by its planners under apartheid and how it has 
been imagined post-1994 in the „development‟ plans of the ANC government. 
 
From Influx Control to 'Orderly Urbanisation' and 'Controlled Squatting' 
 
While apartheid influx control policies aimed to keep non-working black people in the 
Bantustans or homelands by restricting urban residential opportunities to employed 
men (and a few women, mainly in domestic service, or those married to working 
men), by the mid-1980s, poor economic opportunities in the homelands and the 
promise of paid work in the towns, had resulted in enormous pressure being placed on 
South Africa's urban centres by black people, taking up residence in backyard shacks 
in formal townships or squatting vacant plots of land in and around the city centres.  
As influx controls were abolished in 1986, the apartheid government would require 
new means of regulating and controlling the newly urbanised black poor, a figure that 
came to be defined increasingly in the language that emerged to manage and direct the 
groups of black people who had forced their acceptance in places from which their 
exclusion had been attempted by the apartheid state.   
 
In the context of failed attempts by the apartheid state to control this movement of 
black people to the city of Johannesburg through disciplinary measures (such as 
police harassment and arrest), Orange Farm emerged as a place through which power 
would come to be exercised in a different form.  Through the provision of a basic site 
and services, individuals were encouraged to assume responsibility for their own well-
being and become self-disciplined, accepting their poorer standards of living as a 
„first step‟ in the process towards securing „a better life‟.  It is significant to note that 
in the context of an absence of secure access to the basic resources necessary for 
survival, the provision of serviced sites became an important „carrot‟ in luring 
individuals away from their strategies of constant resistance and illegality to more 
„responsible‟ ways of living that posed less of a threat to the stability of the apartheid 
regime.     
 
Newspaper, organisational and state archives clearly reflect that Orange Farm was 
imagined and established as a response to squatting and the housing crisis more 
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generally in the Transvaal in the late-1980s.  In the late 1970s, large quantities of land 
were left unused as land was expropriated and rezoned for Asian and Coloured 
development to the south of the city of Johannesburg.  As black people moved closer 
to the city, seeking employment, the lack of formal housing resulted in these pieces of 
land being squatted by the homeless poor.  By 1989, there were estimated to be 1.4 
million squatters in the Transvaal, with 80 per cent being found in the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Transvaal (PWV) region (The Star, 27 October 1989).   
 
While Orange Farm would eventually comprise people coming from a number of 
different townships and squatter camps in the Transvaal, it was squatters at a place 
called Weiler's Farm and another called Vlakfontein who provided the impetus for its 
establishment.  The settlement that came to be known as Vlakfontein developed on 
land designated Asian, while a farm owned by the Weiler brothers began to be 
occupied from the early 1980s.  The Weiler brothers are said to have allowed „illegal 
African tenants‟ on their farm.  By 1983, approximately 300 squatters were said to be 
occupying Weiler's Farm illegally. (Crankshaw and Hart, 1990: 7).  In 1985, the 
elderly landowners left the farm, allowing the illegal squatters to remain.   
 
As white residents' complaints grew, and the largely unemployed squatters came to be 
seen as a threat to the safety of white residents in the area and their possessions, the 
apartheid state came into conflict with various groups of squatters as it attempted to 
restrict their movement, activities, and very presence in the area.  Between May 1981 
and May 1985, there were 696 recorded arrests in Weiler's Farm (mainly between 
1983 and 1985) (ibid: 7).  And in late 1984, a mass removal that had been planned 
was overtaken by unrest and political violence in the townships of the Vaal, and hence 
did not take place.  In spite of the repression, by March 1987, there were 800 families 
living in Weiler's Farm, and this number increased to 1 135 families by August 1987 
(ibid: 8).  This rapid proliferation of shacks in the area led to increased white 
opposition to Weiler's Farm and general protest from white landowners in the area in 
the form of petitions and mass meetings, which in turn led to an increase in arrests of 
squatters and the emergence of the practice of anti-squatter raids.  In 1986 and 1987, 
Vlakfontein was similarly subjected to "traumatic raids" (ibid: 10).   
 
 240 
But as the apartheid state had no choice but to respond to the growing number of 
black people demanding housing in and around Johannesburg, influx controls were 
abolished and Orange Farm emerged as part of the newly formulated policies of 
'orderly urbanisation' and 'controlled squatting' that would replace these laws and 
attempt to deal with the growing urbanisation of black people in a manner that made 
sense for the privileged positions of white South Africans.  In June 1988, Orange 
Farm was part of a number of portions of land in the south of Johannesburg marked as 
Section 6(a) areas under the Amendment to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act i.e. 
areas marked for low-income housing development for black people in the form of 
'informal towns'.  Initially, 4 300 sites were set out at Orange Farm, under the 
administration of the Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA), 2000 of which were 
reserved for residents of Weiler's Farm.  Whereas moving to Orange Farm was made 
voluntary for residents of Vlakfontein, Weiler's Farm residents were given no option 
but to move.  While the only research project conducted to evaluate the move 
suggests that the majority of Weiler's Farm residents were satisfied with their move to 
Orange Farm (Crankshaw and Hart, 1990), newspaper and other evidence suggests 
that some amount of persuasion was necessary on the part of the state to move 
squatters from Weiler's Farm and from other parts of the area.  Strategies used to 
entice squatters to designated areas such as Orange Farm included the promise of 
basic services, ownership of one's site, and legality.  The latter became particularly 
important as the state also began a targeted campaign at squatters, aiming to prevent 
the strategic mobilisation of its status by the poor.   
 
In early 1988, it is recorded that attempts were made by the TPA Department of 
Community Affairs to levy service charges in Weiler's Farm.  These were, however, 
met with protests from the Weiler's Farm community representative committee who 
recognised it as a ploy to get them to move.  In their study of the effects of the move 
on squatters from Weiler's Farm and Vlakfontein, conducted in October 1989, 
Crankshaw and Hart argue "In terms of the carrot and stick approach to squatter 
relocation, it is expected that services in the reception area will be designed to be 
better than those in the settlements to be demolished.  However, it is also possible to 
improve or to tamper with services in squatter areas.  The provision of water is one 
example where officials can actively improve or downgrade quality of life in squatter 
settlements, according to their own agendas.  In the case of Weiler's Farm, and in 
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other cases, water (or the lack of it) has been used as a device to persuade squatters to 
move." (ibid: 20).  While the initial firm offer of serviced sites at Orange Farm split 
the community into two factions, by the end of May 1989, 309 families from Weiler's 
Farm had been settled in Orange Farm (ibid: 9) and others were continuing to move.   
 
In the final analysis, it would seem that the promise of one's own serviced site 
triumphed in the decisions made by residents of Weiler's Farm to move to Orange 
Farm.  Crankshaw and Hart show how the majority of respondents in their study, 
including those who were forced to move to Orange Farm, exhibited satisfaction and 
improvement in their lives through the move.  For one of the respondents in their 
study, Orange Farm was seen as "the promised land
80
" (ibid: 33), primarily because it 
offered him so much more than Weiler's Farm with regard to services and the 
ownership of his own site.  While there is little recorded in official policy documents 
and newspaper archives about Weiler's Farm after the establishment of Orange Farm, 
it would seem that some squatters did resist removal, and others have continued to 
take up residence in the area.  Current documents from the City of Johannesburg, in 
fact, make particular recommendations for those living in Weiler's Farm today, which 
also officially falls under Region G.           
 
It would also seem that, where forced removals were not the order of the day, the 
move to Orange Farm was less likely by squatters.  For example, few families 
relocated from Vlakfontein, with residents of Vlakfontein demanding recognition of 
their permanency and formality over time in their existing places of residence.  
Today, Vlakfontein is one of the fastest-growing informal settlements to the south of 
Johannesburg, with many squatters being moved to Vlakfontein from their places of 
illegal occupation even today.  Until as late as 1992, then, it would appear that 
particular efforts were made by the state to coerce squatters to move to Orange Farm.  
Several memoranda can be found in official archives that were distributed by the TPA 
to squatters in Vlakfontein, Weiler's Farm, Finetown, and other parts of the Transvaal, 
urging people to obtain their own sites at Orange Farm.  For example, in a TPA 
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 This idea of Orange Farm as „the promised land‟ resonates all over the township even today, with, 
for example, several businesses taking the name „Palestine‟, for example „Palestine Butchers‟, and the 
ANC branch being named the Palestine branch.   
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pamphlet handed out in Vlakfontein and Finetown on 1 February 1989 and 21 January 
1989 respectively, the following was said,  
 
As you would obviously like to own a permanent piece of land 
where you can live in peace and erect your own permanent home 
according to your personal means, the TPA would like to help 
you to get a permanent site.   
 
In addition, the position of squatter came to be objectified and made to be loathed by 
the TPA, which issued firm orders for landlords to deal harshly with squatters and 
which gave the police unqualified powers to deal with squatters.  In a press package 
prepared by the Department of Provincial Affairs and Planning of 7 June 1991, the 
following is said under the heading 'Profile Of A Squatter':  
 
What distinguishes him from his fellow man is the fact that he 
has no shelter or permanent home.  He occupies land on which 
he has settled illegally, that is, land which he does not legally 
own or for which he was not given permission by its legal owner 
to settle there.  He is a squatter…  As a homeless person, he and 
others who share his fate, place incredible strain on the existing 
infrastructure.   
 
In another statement, entitled 'This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land - 
Reporting Squatting', the Department states,  
 
On balance, everyone is a loser in this kind of situation.  In the 
final analysis, random and haphazard settlement is an appeal to 
the democratic norm of an orderly community, something which 
ought to be guarded jealously by all South Africans.  Every 
individual should act as a watchdog, reporting squatting 
immediately, no matter where it occurs.  The prevention of 
squatting is not only the responsibility of the government or the 
police.  We should all make a contribution in this regard. 
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In this context, Orange Farm was offered as an alternative place of secure tenure and 
promise for squatters.  In the statement of the Department dated 7 June 1991, the 
following is also said,  
 
If a squatter obtains and occupies a stand in this area (a Section 
6(a) area), he is no longer a squatter, no matter how rudimentary 
his house may be.   
 
For the apartheid state, then, offering squatters a better quality of life was not the 
primary aim, but what was key was making squatters accept the responsibility of 
living in accepted and regulated areas, and making for themselves their own 'better 
lives'.  For many, faced with the threat of arrest or harassment, as well as the stigma 
and uncertainty of being homeless and illegal, Orange Farm came to represent the 
possibility of some form of independence and security with regard to owning a stand 
and having access to basic services, and being free from harassment by the 
authorities.  In the strategies of the state to lure people to settle in specific areas that 
would be manageable and controllable, the promise of tenureship, i.e. the possibility 
of owning one's own home, would come to feature increasingly.   As the apartheid 
state sought to discipline and manage black communities and individuals who had 
defied the influx control regulations to take occupation of spaces in and around 
Johannesburg, its adoption of policies of 'orderly urbanisation' and 'controlled 
squatting' came to pivot on the promise of tenureship and basic services to individuals 
and communities living in situations of extreme poverty and precarity and under the 
constant threat of arrest and harassment by the authorities.   
 
Over time, as the housing crisis grew worse in the Transvaal, the offer to purchase 
sites in Orange Farm was extended to backyard dwellers in formal townships such as 
Soweto and Sebokeng.  With the problems of overcrowding and sharing of services 
growing in townships, many people would see Orange Farm as a way of improving 
their lives through their chance at ownership of a serviced site.  In the context of 
cramped and under-serviced living quarters in the townships, Orange Farm, in spite of 
its frugality, would indeed appear to many as 'the promised land'.  And in the current 
official profile of Orange Farm, the initial settlements of Weiler's Farm and 
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Vlakfontein do not get a mention as the later townships and squatter camps come to 
feature more prominently in its recorded (and narrated history) –  
 
Most of the people now living in Orange Farm came from areas 
such as Soweto, Evaton, Sebokeng, Westrand and Bekkersdal; 
and from 'squatter camps' such as Mshenguville, Majazana, 
Johnson-stop, Chicken Farm, Sweet-waters, Kliprivier, 
Finetown, Vlakfontein, Walkerville, Dunuza, etc. (Orange Farm 
CDWs, 2007: 4).    
     
The promise of ownership and access to services was also used to usher in a logic of 
'self-help housing' and privatisation by the apartheid state, spurred on by private 
institutions like the Urban Foundation (UF)
81
 which had an interest in ensuring 
stability for the economy and in opening up new areas for investment by the private 
sector.  As the increasing presence of black people in and around urban centres could 
no longer be controlled through the enforcement of legislation, housing of the urban 
black poor needed to be addressed in a manner that did not threaten, but in fact 
enhanced, the interests of white society, and, in particular, white business interests.  It 
in this context that the policies of 'controlled squatting' and orderly urbanisation' 
emerged, to regulate the threat already being posed by black people refusing removal 
from the urban centres and their surrounds.  In the words of Colin Appleton, speaking 
in 1987, as then Director of the Urban Foundation in the Cape,  
 
Informal settlements are already with us.  We have to look at 
developing a policy to enable us to upgrade informal settlements 
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 The Urban Foundation (UF) was established in 1977 as a not-for-profit organisation by South 
Africa‟s white business community.  With Anglo American‟s Harry Oppenheimer as its first 
chairperson, the UF would raise a significant amount of capital from local sources to take forward its 
programmes aimed at lobbying the apartheid state to change its policies and towards developing black 
communities economically.  In particular, the UF can be credited with pushing for a business logic to 
be adopted in the sphere of housing delivery.  The UF also takes credit for the abolition of influx 
control laws, having organised a significant business lobby against the apartheid government in this 
regard, arguing for the acceptance of the permanence of black people in South Africa‟s urban areas.  
From the late 1970s, the UF had been arguing for the granting of 99 year lease-hold for blacks in urban 
areas, and then for full freehold rights, which were eventually granted.  It would, however, claim its 
greatest victories in legislative and policy changes in the form of the White Paper on Urbanisation of 
1986 that introduced the policies of „controlled squatting‟ and „orderly urbanisation‟ (Smit, 1992), that 
would introduce the „site and service schemes‟ that would come to characterise housing developments 
(Bond, 2000a).   
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and to provide for the establishment of further ones, on a 
controlled basis. (Quoted in Urban Foundation, 1987: 46).   
 
The policies of 'controlled squatting' and 'orderly urbanisation' then laid the basis for 
the development of 'informal towns', such as Orange Farm, where the state's only 
responsibility would be to provide a site with access to very basic services.  The rest 
would be up to the individual who would be expected to build his/her own house 
according to his/her personal needs, tastes and capabilities.  Within this logic, then, 
places like Orange Farm were not viewed by the apartheid state as places of transit or 
„waiting‟ while formal houses and full services were being made available elsewhere.  
Rather, informality was the final provision made by the state, after which the 
individual was expected to improve his/her own standard and quality of life.     
 
State documents clearly indicate an adoption of the logic that housing development 
for poor black communities should proceed along market lines and should involve the 
state only at the level of making available the services and resources necessary for 
individuals to accept responsibility for their own development.  In a press release 
from the TPA dated 27 June 1990, the following is said,  
 
It is the policy of the central and provincial governments to 
establish a free market system in the sphere of housing.  Implied 
in this policy is the requirement that sufficient land and services 
be made available for development.  
 
Within this logic, the poor are expected to build incrementally on the basic site and 
services provided by the state in attaining better living standards for themselves.  
Elsewhere in the press release it is said,  
 
It is a worldwide accepted fact that informal housing is in many 
cases the only form of affordable housing for the poorest sector 
of the community.  
 
In another press release, dated 18 may 1990, the TPA states,  
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Permanence in informal towns is an important asset.  There, 
people are enabled to improve their home or the erven they 
purchased as their finances allow them, and may also decide if 
they wish to stay there or to move to another neighbourhood, as 
determine by their needs and finances. 
  
In the words of Colin Appleton,  
 
If provided with adequate servicing and public facilities, 
informal settlements provide a low entry point into the housing 
process.  As such, they form an essential component in the 
housing options that need to be made available. (Urban 
Foundation, 1987: 46).  
  
Orange Farm therefore represents one of the first attempts by the apartheid state to 
introduce a logic of individual responsibility and private sector delivery in the sphere 
of housing provision for black people.  Informality and incremental housing 
introduced as options for ownership and independence for black people seemed to 
work well at a time when there were few other options open to the urban black poor.     
 
An additionally significant feature of the policy of 'orderly urbanisation' was that of 
the decentralisation of industries.  In a newspaper article from 1989, it is stated,  
 
Government and provincial officials stress that blacks have come 
to the cities to stay.  They talk of the need to provide land and 
finance which would make housing affordable and promote the 
concept of site and service schemes.  But they are still committed 
to a 'decentralisation' policy which assumes that the growth of 
the major cities should be curbed and that government should 
spend billions creating jobs outside them. (Joffe, H, 1989).   
 
By this logic, job creation and development were to be stimulated in rural and peri-
urban areas, in this way creating "alternative centres for urbanisation" (ibid).  While 
Orange Farm was designated a Section 6(a) area for low income black residential 
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development, by 1991 an industrial area had also been zoned for Orange Farm - 
Portion 371IQ - for "black entrepreneurship development" (Mphaki, A, 1991).  It 
would seem, then, that Orange Farm was imagined by apartheid planners as an 
'informal town' that would keep poor black people on the periphery of the city, 
involved in their own peripheral economy and life, away from the protected city of 
whites that was imagined as Johannesburg.    
 
From 'Informal Town' to 'Township' 
 
While there are no statistics that allow us to trace the growth of the population of 
Orange Farm in its early years, it would appear that the 'orderly urbanisation' 
envisaged with the marking of 4 300 sites in 1989 was quickly overtaken as people 
flocked to Orange Farm in the 1990s.  By 1990, there were already 5 200 households 
(Mavuso, 1990: 1).  And by the time the ANC government was elected into power in 
1994, Orange Farm was far more than the 'informal town' it was imagined as by the 
apartheid government.  And the dreams of residents for better homes, services and 
lives came to be invested in the democratic government.  Between 1996 and 2001, 
Census data shows that there was rapid population growth in the region (Region 11, 
now Region G).  The population grew by 44%, that is from 263 145 (in 1996) to 378 
537  (2001), occurring mainly in the marginalised areas of the region (City of 
Johannesburg, 2006a: 3).       
 
In September 1997, Orange Farm was declared a township, with promises from 
government for the building of proper infrastructure and the delivery of improved 
services.  At this time, official records stated that there were approximately 300 000 
residents in Orange Farm (Cooke, A, 1997).  Since then, there has been significant 
growth in this number and in disagreements about this number.  According to the 
official profile of Orange Farm, its current population stands at approximately 957 
810 (Orange Farm CDWs, 2007: 2).  In a focus group discussion with some of the 
CDWs who compiled this profile, however, it was claimed that the current population 
is closer to 1.5 million.  This is a figure that was also given to researchers by the 
police superintendent in 2001, seven years ago (Khanya College/Kganya Consortium, 
2002: 29). What is certain, however, is that the population has grown well beyond the 
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imaginings of its apartheid planners, and continues to grow today providing old and 
new challenges to planners of the new dispensation.           
 
While the apartheid authorities sought to assert some form of control and 
administration over what they portrayed as situations of disorder and chaos, evidence 
suggests that systems of accountability, responsibility and representativity were 
established amongst squatters in the early settlements by squatters themselves.  
Crankshaw and Hart point out that an elected residents' committee existed in Weiler's 
Farm as early as 1984.  While other documents also record meetings and 
engagements between the TPA and a residents' committee in Weiler's Farm and the 
early Orange Farm, it is unclear what happens to this initial committee in the move.  
All that can be pieced together is that, under the direction of the TPA, a new 
residents' committee is elected in 1991 to represent the interests of residents in 
engagements with the TPA.  In a TPA newsletter distributed in Orange Farm in 
March 1991, the following is stated,  
 
From the inception of Orange Farm, the TPA has followed the 
policy of taking major decisions ONLY AFTER 
CONSULTATION WITH THE PEOPLE… The TPA stands by 
this policy.  The present regulations were adopted by the TPA 
during 1990 only after the people of Orange Farm had agreed to 
them.  Since their adoption, many more people have moved to 
Orange Farm.  The TPA therefore decided not to implement 
these regulations without CONSULTING THE RESIDENTS 
AGAIN to find out whether they are satisfied with them. (TPA, 
1991: 1 - original emphasis).   
 
The newsletter then goes on to invite all organisations that it lists - ANC Women's 
League, ANC Youth Organisation, ANC Orange Farm Branch, People's Project 
Committee, Creche Committee, elderly people, Orange Farm School Crisis 
Committee, taxi associations, Interim Informal Committee, Sofasonke Party, 
churches, Natural Residents' Committee and the civic association - to a community 
meeting to decide on the future of an interim residents' committee.  While there is 
little that records the political state of play in Orange Farm in its early years, the same 
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newsletter states, "All of these organisations agreed that politics should play no role in 
the community affairs of the people of Orange Farm." (ibid: 1).  The current character 
of the local municipality and its relations with residents seems, however, to suggest 
that, as in other parts of the country, civic associations, ANC formations and their 
members came to dominate processes and institutions established to oversee the 
implementation of policy changes in Orange Farm, closing off spaces for critique and 
debate of the policies being implemented in their supposed interest.  This is taken up 
in greater detail in the following chapter.     
 
Until June 1993, Orange Farm fell under the administration of the TPA.  In July 1993, 
the TPA engaged the Municipal Management Services (MMS) to provide town 
management services in Orange Farm and other parts of the south.  The MMS played 
this role through the changes in government to the Northern Vaal Metropolitan 
Substructure in January 1995 and the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council's Service Delivery Component in November 1995.  In 1996, MMS handed 
over the administration to the Southern Metropolitan Local Council, and in January 
2001, the city of Johannesburg placed Orange Farm under the administration of 
Region 11, today Region G.  From interviews and focus groups conducted for this 
thesis it would seem that the ANC has always played an active role in the community 
of Orange Farm, and that post-1990 attempted to gain control of all representative 
structures at community level in an effort to influence the processes of co-operative 
governance and participatory democracy that were being established in the process of 
negotiations and constitutional development enveloping the country at the time.  
Today, Orange Farm consists of four wards, administered by four elected Councillors, 
assisted by elected ward committees, ten in each ward.  All four Councillors belong to 
the ANC and the majority of ward committee members are ANC members 
(Councillor Simango, interview, 16 October 2007).   
 
The next chapter will explore, in greater detail, how residents relate to and engage 
with attempts at participatory governance in Orange Farm, and the relationship 
between the ANC, ordinary residents, and these processes and institutions.  
Significant to note here is the fact that the traditions, culture, organisational processes 
and practices of the ANC Alliance come to be remoulded in the context of governance 
as opposed to protest, and mobilised towards encouraging widespread acceptance of 
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its neoliberal policies of individual responsibility, self-discipline, self-restraint, and 
commodification, particularly in the sphere of the delivery of basic services.        
 
A Place of ‘Permanent Informality’ 
 
While many of those who moved to Orange Farm under apartheid did so with the 
belief that their situations of informal living would change once a democratic 
government was elected, with the demands being made of the apartheid state for 
decent, quality housing and services by the liberation movement becoming the basis 
for the development plans of the new government, very few residents have been able 
to escape their informal living conditions, with access to employment and quality 
services still being restricted to a few.  This may be attributed to the fact that the ANC 
government, rather than reversing the neoliberal trajectory in the delivery of basic 
services that the apartheid government had already embarked on since the 1980s, 
chose to pursue and strengthen it, making cost-recovery, commodification and 
privatisation its driving principles in this sphere.   
 
This has meant that it has promoted a differentiated and incremental system of access 
to basic services based on a partnership between the individual citizen and the state 
where the state makes certain minimal amounts of resources accessible in return for 
the individual‟s acceptance of the responsibility to pay for any additional services.  
While this will be explored in much greater detail in the next chapter, it is important 
to note here that in the context of rising unemployment in post-apartheid South 
Africa, the expectation that individuals would be able to pay for a quality of life 
higher than that of survival has meant that large communities of unemployed and 
socio-economically disadvantaged people have remained in their situations of 
precarity, their informal living conditions made permanent as the possibilities for 
change have diminished.  Where new arrivals in Orange Farm have squatted vacant 
land post-1994, the ANC government has insisted that they move to site-and-service 
schemes within Orange Farm much like those established by the apartheid 
government.  In this manner, Orange Farm has become the place of permanent 
informality spoken of by the apartheid government, and the neoliberal policies of the 
ANC government have allowed this to happen. 
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This permanence of informality is evident in the very character that life has assumed 
for the majority of its residents, with unemployment and the need to find the means to 
access the resources necessary for life (in the absence of an effective social welfare 
system and wage labour) determining the everyday strategies adopted by individuals.  
A close look at the profiles of groups of residents over the years, as well as the levels 
of access to and quality of services, shows clearly that the informal living conditions 
imagined for residents of Orange Farm by the apartheid government have not been 
transcended in spite of the commitments of the liberation movement to ensure a 
decent, quality life for all.   
 
In the Crankshaw and Hart study, conducted in 1990, including a survey of 100 
household heads, 21 per cent said that they were unemployed, 6 per cent were active 
in the informal economy, and 13 per cent were pensioners.  The rest were employed 
in clerical and sales jobs, and semi-skilled or unskilled manual labour.  11 per cent of 
the sample said that they had no regular monthly income, 41 per cent that they 
enjoyed a monthly income of between R1 and R100, 36 per cent between R101 and 
R200, 9 per cent between R201 and R300, and just 3 per cent above R300.  Only 3 
percent of interviewees possessed a matriculation certificate, with 24 per cent saying 
that they had no formal education at all.  (Crankshaw and Hart, 1990: 12, 15).   
 
In the study conducted by Khanya College and the Kganya Consortium between 2001 
and 2002, 66 percent of the 203 women interviewed said that they were unemployed, 
21 percent that they were employed, and 12 percent that they were self-employed.  Of 
the few who were earning, the majority said that their monthly income lay between 
R200 and R1500.  The majority of women interviewed also stated that they worked in 
domestic and casual forms of labour (Khanya College/Kganya Consortium, 2002: 31).  
In a study conducted by the Coalition Against Water Privatisation, the Anti-
Privatisation Forum and Public Citizen in Stretford, Extension 4, Orange Farm, out of 
a total of 184 households, 30 per cent said that they had no regular monthly income, 
11 per cent below R200, 15 per cent between R200 and R500, 32 per cent between 
R500 and R1000, 10 per cent between R1000 and R2000, and just 2 per cent above 
R2 000.  The study also showed that only 50 per cent of households had some kind of 
income related to work, both formal and informal, with most people being employed 
in "elementary occupations or as craft and related trade workers".  29 per cent of 
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households stated that they relied on the state for their basic income in the form of 
social grants and pensions (Coalition et al, 2004: 16).   
 
The majority of participants in this study had been living in Orange Farm since the 
early 1990s, needing to leave situations of overcrowding in townships like Soweto, 
Sebokeng, Evaton and Alexandra where many of them had been living in backyard 
shacks or rented rooms.  The majority had also come to Orange Farm unemployed 
and remained unemployed, surviving on social grants (mainly pensions, foster care 
grants and child support grants), odd jobs, and seasonal and contract forms of 
domestic and manual labour in and around Orange Farm and the Indian and Coloured 
townships of Lenasia and Eldorado Park.  Many of the women in this study had come 
to Orange Farm to escape unhappy marriages or situations of domestic violence.  In 
the Khanya College/Kganya Consortium study that focused solely on women in 
Orange Farm, the experience is also given of women taking up residence in Orange 
Farm when dismissed from positions of domestic labour where they resided in a 
backroom of their employer's.  All of those under the age of 25 years, who 
participated in this study, had come to Orange Farm with their mothers when their 
parents had divorced or separated.  From all accounts, then, it would appear that 
Orange Farm was a place to which 'the poorest of the poor' and those marginalised by 
society and the economy turned in the hope of a 'better life' for themselves
82
.       
 
One exception to this general trend is a group of residents who had been full-time 
workers at Premier Milling Company and its subsidiaries, such as Epic Oil, since the 
1980s, who had been offered the opportunity to buy formal four-room houses in 
Drieziek 2, Orange Farm.  As its milling activities grew in the Vereeniging area, the 
company would need to entice semi-skilled and unskilled black workers.  And Orange 
Farm would present an ideal location in which to provide cheap, basic serviced 
accommodation for the growing unplanned for urban black population.  From the 
early 1990s, then, Premier Milling Company acquired the assistance of banks to 
                                                 
82
 Both the secondary and primary research processes that contributed to this thesis point to the 
gendered nature of poverty, with women forming a disproportionately high number of the poor and 
absorbing the effects of neoliberal policies in the household and community.  While this is an 
extremely important area for further study, the scope of this thesis has allowed only for reference to 
this concern in relation to specific experiences thrown up by this particular research process.  The 
gendered nature of poverty, as experienced in Orange Farm, is explored in a chapter entitled „The 
Feminisation Of Poverty: A Disabling Discourse‟ in Bond et al. (eds), 2010.   
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secure bonded houses on fully serviced sites for its potential workers in Drieziek 
Extension 2.  In this way, many families were lured to Orange Farm, with their heads 
of households securing fulltime jobs as well as formal houses with access to 
electricity, water, water-borne sewerage, and refuse removal.  Having the status of 
full-time waged employees, these residents were able to repay their bonds on these 
houses and to pay for their services.  For them, moving to Orange Farm did not 
represent an acceptance of poorer standards of living or the status of „poverty‟ or „the 
poor‟.  Rather, life in Orange Farm represented their hope for a decent quality of life 
of a standard above that determined or imagined to be for „the poor‟.  Sadly for these 
workers, a few years into their contracts, the company would undergo several 
processes of „restructuring‟, resulting in widespread retrenchments, leaving them 
without the means to pay for their services and make their bond repayments.  This 
experience is explored further in the next chapter.  For now, however, it is important 
to recognise in this experience contested visions for Orange Farm.         
 
The representation of Orange Farm as a place for the poor is, however, reinforced in 
the City of Johannesburg‟s most recent policy and discussion documents.  Forming 
part of the city‟s Region G, Orange Farm is described as a poorer part of this region, 
requiring different interventions from its slightly richer neighbours like Lenasia.  The 
City‟s official website states,  
 
The total population of Region G is estimated at 270 000, with 
170 000 of these people living in the Greater Orange Farm and 
Weilers Farm area
83
. The population is extremely young, with 40 
percent under 18. Income levels are very low: 50 percent of the 
population has no income and about 62 percent of the remainder 
earn less than R1 500 a month, indicating that the majority live 
below the breadline. Unemployment is estimated at 70 percent, 
far higher than the national average, with most people in the 
region being employed in elementary occupations or as craft and 
related trade workers.  
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 It has already been shown, above, that these figures are gross under-estimates for the population of 
the region as Orange Farm alone is estimated to be home to over 1.5 million people.     
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Under the heading „Key Issues‟, the document goes on to state,  
 
For Greater Ennerdale and Lenasia the issues are: informal 
settlements; the absence of higher-income residential areas; and 
the lack of control of local economic activities.  For Greater 
Orange Farm and Weilers Farm (Kanana Park) the issues are: 
extreme levels of poverty and unemployment; the geographic 
isolation and marginalisation from the economic and social 
opportunities afforded by greater Johannesburg; low quality 
basic services - both infrastructural and social; invasion of 
planned residential areas, public and private land; and civil 
disobedience - this fragmented community has strong political 
and local groupings. 
(http://www.joburg.org.za/content/view/179/123/1/1/ - accessed, 
10/04/2008).   
 
In the regional spatial development framework of the City, Orange Farm and Region 
G are targeted in the overall strategic goal of „proactive absorption of the poor‟ 
(already discussed in Chapter 2), with its development being conceived of in terms of 
enhancing the potential for residents to access jobs and become economically active.  
In the case of Orange Farm, this is not viewed in terms of the state creating greater 
infrastructure for economic development, but providing the incentives for private 













Table 1: Status Of Services In Orange Farm (April 2007) 
 
Township Water Sewer Electricity 
Orange Farm Proper Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 1 Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 2 Standpipes Pit latrines/Water-
borne 
Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 3 Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 4 Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 6 Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 7 Standpipes Pit latrines Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 8 Communal taps Pit latrines Yes 
Orange Farm Ext. 9 Water tank Pit latrines No 
Orange Farm Ext. 10 N/A N/A N/A 
Stretford Ext. 2 Communal taps Pit latrines Yes 
Stretford Ext. 3 Communal taps Pit latrines/Water-
borne 
Yes 
Stretford Ext. 4 Standpipe Condominium Yes 
Stretford Ext. 5 Communal taps Pit latrines Yes 
Stretford Ext. 6 Communal taps Pit latrines  Yes 
Stretford Ext. 7 Communal taps Pit latrines Yes 
Stretford Ext. 8 Communal taps Pit latrines Yes 
Stretford Ext. 9 Communal taps Water-borne Yes 
Stretford Ext. 10 Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
Drieziek Proper Water tanks Pit latrines No 
Drieziek Ext. 1 Communal taps Pit latrines Yes 
Drieziek Ext. 2 Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
Drieziek Ext. 3 Standpipes Pit latrines Yes 
Drieziek Ext. 4 Water tanks Pit latrines Yes 
Drieziek Ext. 5 Communal taps Pit latrines No 
Drieziek Ext. 6 Standpipes Water-borne Yes 
 
(City of Johannesburg, Regional Spatial Development Framework 2007/8: 11) 
 
More importantly, with regard to the levels of access to services envisaged for 
residents of the area, documents of the City confirm that it imagines Orange Farm to 
be a place for „the poorest of the poor‟, that is, those unable to pay for services and 
therefore deserving of lower levels and inferior quality of services.  The table above 
illustrates clearly how low the targeted levels of service for Orange Farm continue to 
be, confirming its place in Johannesburg as one for „the poorest of the poor‟. 
 
For many who had taken up residence in Orange Farm under the harsh conditions of 
apartheid and its limited choices for black people, the promise of liberation and a 
democratically elected government signalled different and better times in which a 
decent standard of living and quality of life were imagined and struggled for.  While 
the liberation movement provided a platform from which the black poor could 
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imagine and fight for equality and justice under apartheid, the 1990s would present 
the liberation movement with new challenges - those of governing 'responsibly' under 
a global neoliberal order and rationality.  The language of ungovernability and the 
demands for immediate change and redress would come to be replaced by that of 
patience, discipline, self-restraint, and responsibility in the interests of nation-building 
and reconciliation in the interests of export-orientated growth through enhancing 
investor confidence and the like.   
 
While those who had taken up residence in Orange Farm under apartheid might have 
expected far-reaching and immediate change in their interests fairly soon after the 
ANC's election into government, thirteen years after the first democratic elections 
Orange Farm is just a much bigger 'informal town' imagined by its apartheid planners.  
Informality and substandard living conditions continue to be the norm for its over 1.5 
million residents, and Orange Farm continues to be seen as 'a place for the poorest of 
the poor'.  The next chapter will show how current policies being advocated by the 
City of Johannesburg for Orange Farm serve to entrench such inequality today.       
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They told us to wait.  So we waited.  We saw apartheid criminals 
go free and men who called themselves leaders become rich.  We 
saw them give up their red t-shirts for silk suits made in Italy.  
We watched as their bellies swelled and their voices thinned in 
their new accents of the market and the state. Still we waited. 
Fifteen years now we have been waiting, here in this place they 
call Orange Farm - a farm where little grows. 
 
Fifteen years ago, hope brought us to this place. Some came here 
fleeing the violence of those who killed in the name of party and 
power, others came when they closed the factories where we 
once worked, or to escape the misery of life in the overcrowded 
backyard shacks in every Gauteng township. But we all came 
here because we hoped for more - for ourselves, and our 
children. Then, the world around us was changing, “Freedom is 
coming,” they said, and all we had to do was wait. “Just wait, 
and don‟t forget to vote.” So we waited, and we voted. We waited 
while they went fishing with Roelf Meyer, had tea with Betsie 
Verwoerd, and mourned Harry Oppenheimer. We waited while 
they cut our electricity and installed prepaid meters. We waited 
as HIV/AIDS killed our friends and relatives. We waited in 
darkness and rain…. We waited and nothing happened. No 
roads. No toilets, no houses and no jobs. Nothing…or what 
might as well have been.    
 
So, we are not waiting anymore. None of us were born here. Still, 
each day, we bury our children here. Perhaps they thought we 
were waiting to die or maybe they simply forgot that we were 
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alive. But we are not waiting, now we are „saying‟…saying, „give 
us, or we take‟.  
 
(Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee, November 2006). 
 
It is significant that almost twenty years since the apartheid government's concerted 
efforts to prevent Orange Farm from being imagined as a transit camp (a waiting 
place for those demanding permanent places of dwelling), the narratives of residents 
continue to speak of it as a place in which they have been waiting for change, their 
patience now worn thin.  While the apartheid state might have imagined Orange Farm 
as a place through which the informal and substandard quality of life being offered to 
black people would be formalised and made permanent, with black people taking on 
the responsibility of providing for themselves, the fact that residents today continue to 
demand the delivery of 'a better life' from the post-apartheid state is evidence of a 
long history of struggle against this apartheid imaginary for Orange Farm.   
 
While the pamphlet above was released by the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee 
(OWCC) during a blockade of the Golden Highway by residents of Orange Farm 
demanding the delivery of services in the area in November 2006, its spirit speaks to 
earlier contestations of the apartheid planners' visions, and to a collective imaginary 
of 'a better life for all' that was being shaped and fashioned in the struggles of the 
liberation movement against the apartheid regime.  It is this collective imaginary, held 
together in the promises of the liberation movement, that sees residents of Orange 
Farm today contesting the discourse of the current democratically elected 
government, which seems to be returning to the logic of 'self-help' and individual 
responsibility, espoused by the apartheid state, to entrench a logic of payment for 
basic services and the rule of the market and the profit motive in all aspects of society, 
as neoliberal policies take their hold.   
 
While the ANC government today demands that individual citizens stop waiting for 
the state to deliver and assume some responsibility in accessing their own means to 'a 
better life' through participation in the commodified system of delivery, residents who 
have taken to the Golden Highway almost every year since 2002 (and many others) 
argue that they will not wait any longer for the state to deliver on its promises of this 
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'better life' outside of the logic of the market.  In struggles today, then, we see the 
moral economy enabled by the liberation movement, that developed both a critique of 
and an alternative to the apartheid state, coming up against its refashioning by the 
ANC government to facilitate the naturalisation and acceptance of neoliberal policies 
that once again need the individual to assume responsibility for his/her own conduct 
and quality of life in a system dominated by the logic of the market and the profit 
motive.  In these struggles, we also see the vision of the liberation movement of an 
equal and just society coming up against current attempts to entrench divisions 
between those who can pay and those who can't by making access to a better quality 
of life dependent on one's ability to pay.  In the latter attempts the category of „the 
poor‟ emerges as something to be quantified, identified and registered in an attempt to 
separate out those „deserving‟ of assistance from the state and those who continue to 
claim this assistance „in spite of their ability to pay‟.                 
 
This chapter attempts to understand the moral economy that is being produced in 
Orange Farm today as the morality of making good on past promises comes into 
conflict with the morality of becoming a responsible citizen by paying for services 
and giving government a chance to deliver.  In the circulation of this moral economy, 
many values, beliefs and commitments of the liberation movement come into 
conversation, debate and conflict with the new language of neoliberalism.  This 
chapter explores the emergence of this moral economy through attempts at 
introducing the logic of commodification, cost recovery and payment for services in 
Orange Farm and resistance to them, both under apartheid and post-apartheid.  
Understanding that a moral economy is what ultimately determines how an individual 
understands his/her position in society and his/her relationship to others, the state and 
other institutions, and how s/he decides to act in relation to all of these, this chapter is 
structured largely around the views of individuals interviewed for this thesis and who 
participated in focus groups for it.  In particular, it will look at those instances where 
there have been contested visions, definitions, understandings, and approaches to 
issues.     
 
It is also important to acknowledge that there is no easy way to classify the ways in 
which residents of Orange Farm relate to and, thereby, shape this moral economy.  
While organised responses to the introduction of neoliberal policies could quite 
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readily be separated into pro- and anti-ANC, research conducted for this thesis 
showed that there is contestation of this moral economy not just between these two 
„camps‟, but amongst ANC members and within community movements and projects.  
While party political affiliation can certainly be seen to play an influential role in how 
certain residents approach improving their lives and the life of the community of 
Orange Farm, it is also significant that the sometimes common histories of struggles 
in the liberation movement and the common conditions of life experienced by all 
residents of Orange Farm produce similar beliefs and approaches to issues amongst 
otherwise oppositional groups.  This chapter reflects on the many ways in which 
residents, from various political orientations, contested, and continue to contest, the 
poor quality of life imagined for them by state planners whose vision for Orange Farm 
was that of a „place for the poor‟.                
 
Tenureship : A Means of Control vs Independence 
 
While the offer of tenureship through site and service schemes may have been viewed 
by the apartheid state as a way of regulating and managing the growing urban black 
poor, it also featured significantly in the decisions made by individuals and families to 
move to Orange Farm and to remain there.  In the first and only study conducted on 
the relocation of squatters to Orange Farm from Vlakfontein and Weiler's Farm, it is 
stated,  
 
With tenure as a pivotal variable, commitment to Orange Farm 
was remarkably strong among the sample of respondents.  
Although 50 per cent of the interviewees at Orange Farm who 
had moved from Weiler's Farm felt that they had been forced to 
move from Weiler's Farm, 65 per cent chose Orange Farm as 
their preferred home, compared to only 23 per cent who chose 
Weiler's Farm. (Crankshaw and Hart, 1990: 33).   
 
In one of the few research projects conducted in Orange Farm between 2001 and 
2002, it is stated that the majority of the 203 women interviewed for the project (59 
per cent) said that "they chose to come to Orange Farm because they wanted their 
own homes" (Khanya College/Kganya Consortium, 2002: 30).  In the majority of 
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interviews and focus groups conducted for this project, participants stated that they 
had chosen to live in Orange Farm in order to have their "own place".  While the 
apartheid state and private sector interests may have viewed site and service schemes 
as a way of naturalising amongst the urban black poor a logic of individual 
responsibility and private sector delivery in the sphere of housing and basic services, 
for those who had few alternatives under apartheid, the promise of tenureship was 
imagined, rather, as a way out of situations of extreme poverty and dependency and as 
the promise of a better life to be fought and struggled for from there on.  For many of 
the first residents of Orange Farm, then, life was viewed as a constant struggle with 
the apartheid authorities and their laws and visions for black people.       
 
There is no better example of this tension at play than in the retelling of stories by 
residents of Orange Farm interviewed for this project, of the process of securing a 
site.  In order to secure a site, it is told, individuals would have to produce their 
shacks - 'no shack, no site', the saying went.  As many of those desperate for a piece 
of land did not have a shack, many sites came to be secured with the same shack as 
people shared and borrowed shacks from each other.  Some also pointed to the fact 
that this stipulation by the apartheid authorities seemed to suggest that they were 
trying to enforce a certain standard of living for black people, encouraging 
informality and substandard development.  In the words of one resident,  
 
… people were forced to build shacks because when you ask for 
a piece of land, they were not saying, 'Bring bricks to come and 
build your house.'  They were saying, 'Bring your shack'.  And if 
you don't have zinc then they are not going to allocate you a 
piece of land.  So, people were forced to live in shacks because 
of the apartheid system. (Bricks Mokolo, focus group, Kganya 
consortium, 25/09/2007).   
 
The fact that the majority of residents of Orange Farm today still don't have title 
deeds also points to the fact that tenureship was not necessarily viewed positively in 
and for itself at the time.  The official profile of Orange Farm, prepared and updated 





 October 2002, the State President – Mr Thabo Mbeki 
ceremoniously issued the first residential Title Deeds to the 
following senior citizens: Ms Patisi Notshizili Rosy-Brook of 
1306 Orange Farm Ext.1, Ms Nomadlozi Gasta Khumalo of 1923 
Orange Farm Ext.1, and Ms Swewu Lizzy Monare of 1926 
Orange Farm Ext.1. The Executive Mayor – Mr Amos Masondo, 
assisted by the M.E.C. for Housing – Mr Paul Mashatile, issued 
Title Deeds to the following residents: Mr Butinyana Abram 
Moeketsi of 2363 Orange Farm Ext.1 and, Mr Pitso Moses 
Lintso of 2608 Orange Farm Ext.1.   
 
In the majority of interviews and focus groups conducted for this thesis, people, some 
of whom have been living in Orange Farm for over fifteen years, said that they did not 
possess the title deeds to their homes, and few were involved in processes towards 
securing them.  For members of the OWCC, a struggle for title deeds is not their 
priority as, for them, having a title deed would mean acceptance of one‟s substandard 
quality of life and the responsibility as an individual for improving this life without 
the assistance of the state.   
 
In official plans for housing delivery in Orange Farm, it is clear that the spirit of „self-
help‟ and individual responsibility introduced by the apartheid government continues 
today in the policies of subsidisation for the poor to access decent quality housing.  
Currently, the poorest households in the city (those with a monthly income below 
R1500) qualify for an amount of R23 050 towards a house.  With the exception of 
pensioners, the disabled, and those with temporary or permanent disabilities or health 
problems, beneficiaries are expected to contribute R2 479 towards the building of 
their houses.  Beneficiaries unable to afford this amount are expected to contribute in 
the form of „sweat equity‟ through the People‟s Housing Process (PHP), through 
which people are skilled, through Housing Support Centres, to help build their own 






Table 2: Status Of Housing Delivery In Orange Farm (April 2007) 
 
 
Project Name Description Comment 
Orange Farm Proper House construction 
(PHP) 
Project ongoing 
Orange Farm Ext. 1 House construction 
(PHP/Thubelisha) 
Project ongoing 
Orange Farm Ext. 2 House construction Project ongoing 
Orange Farm Ext. 3 Upgrading of services 
(water-borne sewers and 
standpipes) 
Project ongoing 
Orange Farm Ext. 4, 6, 7 
and 8 
Upgrading of services 
(water-borne sewers and 
standpipes) 
Project ongoing, KTI 
appointed 
Orange Farm Ext. 9 Formalisation of 
township and road 
construction 
Project ongoing 
Orange Farm Ext. 10 Formalisation of 
township 
Project ongoing 
Stretford Ext. 2, 5, 7 and 
8 
Upgrading of services 
(water-borne sewers and 
standpipes) 
Project ongoing, KTI 
appointed 
Stretford Ext. 3 Upgrading of services 
(water-borne sewers and 
standpipes) 
LTE appointed by 
Province 
Stretford Ext. 6 Upgrading of services 
(water-borne sewers and 
standpipes) 
Emba appointed by 
Province 
Drieziek Ext. 3 and 5 Formalisation of 
township and installation 
of services 
Project ongoing 
Drieziek Ext. 4, 9 and 10 Construction of houses 
by Thubelisha 
Project ongoing 
Drieziek Proper Upgrading of services Arcuss Gibb consultant 
engineers appointed by 
Province 
(City of Johannesburg, Regional Spatial Development Framework 2007/8: 29) 
 
From the table, it is clear that the levels of access to housing are of the minimal 
possible standards and quality, with the added dimension that creating access should 
occur through a „partnership‟ between the individual and the state, with some show of 
responsibility on the part of „the poor‟ for making ownership of a house possible for 
oneself with the minimal assistance of the state.  During one of the many site visits 
conducted for this thesis in Stretford, Extension 4, Orange Farm, it was observed that 
construction on a small RDP house had come to a halt.  On enquiring what the 
problem was from the owner, it was learnt that he had just lost his wife and was 
struggling with the care of his three young children.  After the funeral, he had run out 
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of money to buy water to mix the concrete mix that had been provided to him to help 
with the building of his house.   
 
'We Cannot Pay, We Will Not Pay': The Struggle for Basic Services 
 
While all historical records indicate that Orange Farm was established as a site and 
service scheme underpinned by the desire to enforce a logic of payment for these 
amenities (as basic as they were) amongst residents, it is also clear that little success 
was achieved in enforcing such a culture of payment and individual responsibility.     
 
Crankshaw and Hart (1990) argue that the absence of rent and service charges in 
squatter settlements is partly what contributed to them being attractive to poor black 
people making their way into urban areas or escaping overcrowding in townships.  
The apartheid government was therefore uncertain as to how successful its site and 
service schemes would be as they would, in the long-term, require residents to pay for 
these sites (in the form of rent or a purchase price) and for services.  In Orange Farm, 
sites were to be purchased at the cost of R500 per 210 square metres or rented at the 
cost of R6 per month, and a service charge of R29 per month was to be levied per site.  
Services being paid for included communal taps and refuse removal only.  While 
these charges were supposed to take effect from July 1989, by 1990 there was still no 
sign that they were being levied (Crankshaw and Hart, 1990: 10).   
 
Interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this thesis suggest that the 
obligation to pay for rent and services was not enforced in Orange Farm in any real 
way by the apartheid authorities, with no real memory of any bills being received by 
residents for rent or services in the early to mid-1990s.  Participants argued that this 
was due to the fact that the quality of service delivery in Orange Farm did not 
improve, with the majority of residents believing that they were not receiving any 
services that deserved to be paid for, and because of the generally poor economic 
position of the majority of Orange Farm residents.  They also pointed to the fact that 
there was a general campaign of resistance, led by the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), that questioned the poor quality of services and infrastructure provided for 
black people by the apartheid state, and that boycotted payment for rent and services.  
Residents of townships and informal settlements across the country united under the 
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banner of the UDF in national campaigns, beginning with the Asinamali (We Have 
No Money) campaign in 1984 to boycott payment for unequal and inferior basic 
services and standards of living.   
 
In a memorandum presented to Hernus Kriel, then Minister of Planning and 
Provincial Affairs by the UDF on 16 August 1990 the following is stated,  
 
The UDF rejects the current government policies of privatisation 
of housing, which fail to cater for the housing needs of 80 per 
cent of the black population in South Africa.  The UDF believes 
that all the people of South Africa deserve more than third-class 
housing in the form of site and service schemes.  The UDF 
believes strongly that the state has a centrally important role to 
play in the provision of land, services and houses for all South 
Africans.  The UDF commits itself to a process of serious 
negotiations towards the establishment of new land and housing 
policies that can begin to solve the problems of landlessness and 
homelessness.   
 
Further on it states,  
 
There can be no justification for the continuation of landlessness 
and homelessness, for the lack of clean water, electricity, water-
borne sewerage and other basic facilities, and the government 
must move rapidly to rectify the situation.  Constitutional 
negotiations and a political settlement in South Africa will be 
rendered useless if urban areas continue to be inaccessible to the 
poor and the homeless. (UDF, 1990: 6-7).   
 
Orange Farm, it would therefore seem, became a place from which people could 
struggle against the very logic that underpinned its establishment.  And the election of 
a democratic government in 1994 would mean new hope amongst residents for the 
development of Orange Farm according to the vision of the liberation movement and 
their own dreams.  
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But, as the liberation movement transformed to fulfil the new tasks of governing 'a 
reconciled nation' in a democratic manner post-1994, it would also be embraced by 
(and embrace) a world that was becoming increasingly neoliberal.  This would mean 
the adoption of policies that would see the ANC government try to enforce an 
acceptance of the duty to pay for basic services and the logic of individual 
responsibility with regard to ensuring and facilitating delivery.  This would see the 
first real enforcement of a logic of payment in Orange Farm by the ANC government, 
with the first bills for services and rent being presented to residents after 1996 and the 
launch of the Masakhane campaign.   
 
In the study conducted by Khanya College and the Kganya Consortium (2002), 
participants are quoted as remembering 1997 as the earliest year in which they 
remember receiving bills reflecting how much they owed the municipality for rent and 
services.  They are also said to have called these bills 'Masakhane bills' as each 
statement of account would have the title, 'Masakhane'.  In interviews and focus 
groups conducted for this thesis, participants offered similar recollections.  In both 
cases, participants also stated that these bills were not taken seriously by residents 
both because the majority of residents were unable to afford the high amounts that 
they were said to be owing, and because there was the continued belief that services 
were of such poor quality in Orange Farm that they did not deserve to be paid for.  It 
should be remembered that while residents would be billed for rental of their sites, 
water (in the form of communal standpipes) and refuse removal only, there was still 
the expectation from residents that the basic services they would be receiving would 
include running water in their homes, electricity, sanitation, and refuse removal.  
Paying for services that were seen to be non-existent (largely due to the lack of 
electricity and sanitation), was seen to be unjust and unacceptable.  In other words, 
non-payment continued on a large scale, and Masakhane failed to engender the 
culture of individual responsibility and payment for basic services that was its aim.    
 
Instead, there is evidence that residents actively protested against this logic of 
individual responsibility and payment, taking to the streets several times since 1994 to 
demand that the ANC government deliver on its promises of free basic services for 
all.  In 1996, residents marched to the municipal offices to demand an end to random 
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water cut-offs and an improvement in the delivery of water.  Without a memorandum, 
they staged a sit-in at the offices, resulting in the arrests of two men and two women.  
In 1999, women from Drieziek 2 initiated a blockade of the Golden Highway, also 
demanding an improvement in the delivery of water to the area.  While most of these 
early actions did not take place under the banner of any organisation or political party, 
in 1997, SANCO claimed responsibility for the burning of an ANC Councillor's 
house, Councillor Madikane.  (Khanya College/Kganya Consortium, 2002: 39).  In 
2002, residents organised themselves in protest action against electricity cut-offs, 
leading to negotiations between an elected group of residents and ESKOM, resulting, 
in turn, in the reconnection of households that had been cut off.  When, later on in the 
year, Johannesburg Water began its campaign to install prepaid water meters in 
Stretford, Extension 4, this group would again organise residents to resist the prepaid 
water system.  Through these struggles, the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee 
(OWCC) was established.  Members of the OWCC describe it as a social movement, 
rooted in the issues and struggles of community members like themselves.    
 
It is also significant that Orange Farm, unlike other more established townships, 
presented the new government with a slightly different challenge - delivery of 
services where they had been largely non-existent.  Unlike in Soweto where residents 
enjoyed access to services that they had strategised individually and collectively 
against paying for, in Orange Farm, the 'culture of non-payment' was not 
accompanied by a culture of enjoying access to full services.  In Orange Farm, then, 
there was the opportunity to introduce the new logic of commodification and payment 
in the context of residents' desperation for services.  Rather than needing to undo a 
culture of enjoyment of services without payment for them, then, in Orange Farm 
what was required was persuasion of residents to accept that their access to services 
would require them to pay upfront for them.  In the context of a lack of full services, 
prepaid technologies would be sold as the answer for the poor, including residents of 
Orange Farm.  With no other alternatives available to them in order to access much 
needed services, residents would have no choice but to accept prepaid systems of 
delivery.  The provision of electricity to Orange Farm by ESKOM in 1993, thus 
happened under this logic, with no overt resistance from residents.    
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But, this lack of overt resistance should not be read as the blind acceptance of prepaid 
electricity by residents.  Rather, evidence suggests that hidden strategies of resistance, 
such as illegal reconnections and the bypassing of meters, do also exist.  While the 
delivery of electricity in Orange Farm has always been through the prepaid system, 
data collected for the Khanya College/Kganya Consortium study (2002) and the 
report produced by the Coalition Against Water Privatisation et. al. (2003) record high 
levels of bypassing or illegal connections to the electricity grid that allow residents 
free access to electricity.  In all focus groups conducted for this project, the majority 
of residents stated that they were illegally connected to the electricity grid, and a 
number of interviewees also indicated that they were bypassing their metered 
connections illegally.   
 
While the reports cited above make these claims based on focus group discussions 
and observations made by researchers, both found it difficult to make numerically 
substantiated claims as to how widespread the practice of bypassing or reconnection is 
as the fact that it is an illegal practice means that its level of reporting would be low as 
most people would want to hide the fact that they are connected illegally.  Similarly, 
interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this thesis could not force 
participants to reveal whether they were connected illegally.  Where participants did 
reveal this, they were assured of anonymity.  While it is difficult, then, to provide the 
extent to which bypassing and reconnections are taking place illegally in Orange 
Farm, the fact that evidence exists that it is happening at some scale is significant 
enough to show that there are still levels of resistance to payment for electricity, even 
in the prepaid form.  While it may be argued that Orange Farm residents have been 
paying for their electricity for a number of years now through the prepaid system, it 
may also be shown that levels of resistance to this system exist in the form of the 
bypassing of meters and illegal connections to the grid that do not require 
prepayment.  Up until the writing of this thesis, there have been no signs of the 
replacement of electricity meters with new tamper-proof boxes, as Jak Koseff, 
Director of Community Development in the CoJ, suggested was currently happening 
(see Chapter Four).     
 
While the introduction of electricity through the prepaid system seems to have 
happened without much protest in Orange Farm, attempts by the CoJ and 
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Johannesburg Water to introduce prepaid water meters were met with much stronger 
resistance from residents.  However, even in this instance, the desperate situation of 
residents in need of proper sanitation and sewerage seems to have been exploited in 
trying to enforce a logic of payment for water.  In early 2002, residents of Stretford, 
Extension 4, Orange Farm were approached by Johannesburg Water with the news 
that their water pipes would be replaced with a shallow condominium system
84
 that 
would allow residents to have flush toilets for the first time.  However, in order to 
access this system, each household would have to pay R100 for a prepaid water meter.  
In the report produced by the Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al., it is stated 
that 90 per cent of a sample of 194 households in Stretford, Extension 4 claimed that 
they had been led to believe, by Johannesburg Water, that they had to buy a prepaid 
water meter in order to get a flush toilet (2003: 14).   
 
In recorded video footage of a mass meeting of residents held in the streets of 
Stretford, Extension 4 in 2002, speaker after speaker (mainly old and young women) 
accuse Johannesburg Water of deceiving ("crooking") residents who were desperate 
for flush toilets and an end to their endless sewerage problems (Indymedia video 
footage – September 2002).  In the face of widespread criticism in the community and 
media, Johannesburg Water would turn its strategy towards increasing and enhancing 
its education and awareness campaigns, showing how responsible citizenship involves 
the „efficient use‟ of water; water conservation in the acknowledgement that it is a 
scarce resource; and payment for any water consumed above the „lifeline‟ provided 
free by the state.    
 
While Johannesburg Water has tried to show the benefits of self-regulation and 
individual responsibility facilitated by prepaid technologies, the Coalition report also 
details a number of adverse consequences that the prepaid water meters have begun to 
have on the lives of residents.  These include the fact that residents on the prepaid 
system often run out of essential water as a result of their inability to purchase units 
                                                 
84
 The CoJ and Johannesburg Water, in adhering to the policy of keeping the costs of delivery to poor 
communities to a minimum, introduced shallow sewage systems, with smaller pipes and lower 
gradients, that were expected to clog up with faeces frequently, requiring unclogging by hand.  In poor 
areas, such as Orange Farm, where toilet paper is often unaffordable, newspaper is used in its place, 
resulting in even more frequent clogging of toilets.  While the CoJ has developed instructions for 
residents to assist them to unblock their own toilets, residents and activists have pointed to the health 
risks entailed.  (Bond, 2010: 10; Coalition Against Water Privatisation et al, 2003).    
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additional to the free 6 kl provided free by the state to all citizens.  While government 
and Johannesburg Water have gone to great lengths to show how 6kl is sufficient for 
the basic needs of a five person household, and that the prepaid system is a means 
through which delivery of the 6kl can be effected, the lived experiences of residents, 
as recorded in the Coalition survey paint a different picture.  The Coalition's report 
states,  
 
The majority of residents interviewed stated that they are now 
unable to afford to have the amount of water that they need for 
their daily activities.  47 per cent of respondents have asked their 
neighbours for water since receiving prepaid meters as they have 
been unable to purchase water units.  In the failure to secure 
access to additional free water, residents have also begun to 
change their behaviour, trying to reduce their necessary 
consumption of water. (2003: 19).   
 
The report then goes on to illustrate how residents have begun to try to reduce their 
water consumption by limiting the number of times they flush the toilet, bath, wash 
dishes, cook, clean and garden.  While Johannesburg Water has spent much time and 
money on advertisements and educational campaigns to show how 6 kl is sufficient 
for the basic needs of the average household, the City‟s own commissioned research 
has argued that this amount may indeed be insufficient for the average township 
household (Palmer Development Group, 2006: 9).   
 
While the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee (OWCC) claims that the prepaid 
water meter project was brought to a halt by the protests it helped organised amongst 
residents in Stretford, Extension 4, Johannesburg Water has continued with its roll-out 
of prepaid water meters in Soweto in its flagship project called Operation Gcina 
'Manzi (Operation 'Save Water').  Citing the successes of its 'pilot project' in Stretford, 
Johannesburg Water entered into fiery street battles with Soweto residents as it forced 
the installation of prepaid water meters, first in Phiri and then in neighbouring parts of 
Soweto.  In parts of Orange Farm where flush toilets and water-borne sewerage are 
lacking today, residents are also being asked to buy into the prepaid system in order to 
access these levels of service.  For example, in Extension 8, residents have been 
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provided with toilets that have not been connected to water pipes.  In order to flush 
their toilets, they have to carry water in buckets from standpipes outside their yards 
and pour them into their toilets.  This system has come to be known as the 'pour and 
flush' system by residents.  For residents to access a level of service that would allow 
them to have their toilets connected to running water, they are currently required to 
pay an amount of R650 for a prepaid water meter.  Once again, residents are being 
told to sign onto the prepaid system in order to access flush toilets.  What this, in turn, 
is saying is that those residents who do not wish to submit themselves to the logic of 
prepayment and the regime of restraint imposed by the need to budget according to 
their income and general needs, will have to make do with lower levels of service.  
Several focus group participants and interviewees therefore remarked that the plans of 
the state for Orange Farm are based on the belief that particular places need to be 
developed in particular ways that are deemed appropriate for 'the poor' or 'the poorest 
of the poor'.     
 
For now, while many residents are refusing to buy prepaid water meters in these 
extensions, there is evidence that people are beginning to connect their own toilets to 
standpipes, thereby allowing their toilets to flush.  While the municipality has 
threatened to fine residents caught doing this R1 500, it is said that the practice is 
spreading rapidly.  (Bricks Mokolo, interview, 22/10/07; Philemon Tjeba, interview, 
25/09/07).  In interviews and focus groups conducted for this thesis, residents also 
stated that they would find it difficult to accept prepaid water meters as they would 
find it difficult to survive on 6 kl a month and to buy further water needed.  Residents 
already found it difficult to survive on the prepaid electricity system, and felt that 
having to restrict essential water consumption would have more serious effects on 
their lives.  These views were expressed by respondents from both within ANC 
structures and outside.   
 
Even the Councillor of Ward 4 (an ANC Councillor) stated that she would not support 
the installation of prepaid water meters in the extensions for which she was 
responsible.  Arguing that it would be difficult for people as poor as those living in 
her ward to afford to sign onto the prepaid system, Councillor Simango stated that she 
would oppose any attempts to enforce prepaid meters in Ward 4.  In fact, it would 
seem that the Councillor might be taken by surprise when she learns of the plans for 
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greater Johannesburg, which include Orange Farm.  In an interview conducted for this 
thesis in 2007, the Councillor recounted her frustration with the process of providing 
flush toilets in her ward.  She stated that after speaking with the Mayor, she had 
contacted the relevant service providers and been passed between Johannesburg 
Water and the Department of Housing as neither wanted to take responsibility for 
joining water pipes to the "toilet structures" that currently exist on sites.  When asked 
whether she thought that this could be the first phase of the installation of prepaid 
water meters, the Councillor answered in the negative, stating that she was sure that 
on further consultation with the Mayor, she would receive the answers to her 
dilemmas.  One wondered then whether the Mayor would be able to convince the 
Councillor of the need for prepaid water meters in her ward. (Councillor Simango, 
interview, 16/10/07). 
 
While Councillor Simango and other residents of Orange Farm, for example those 
involved in organisations actively resisting the further erosion of the rights of 
residents to the basics necessary for life, might have bene optimistic about access to 
water and water-borne sewerage being made possible outside of the prepaid system, 
others closer to the 'nuts and bolts of service delivery', like the Community 
Development Workers (CDWs), believed that Orange Farm would not escape the 
plans already agreed on by the City Council for Johannesburg, which included the 
roll-out of prepaid water meters. (CDWs, focus group, 25/10/2007).  What is clear 
from the different opinions expressed in interviews and focus groups conducted for 
this project is that it will be difficult to enforce a logic of prepaid water on residents of 
Orange Farm.  This is perhaps why the most recent strategies of the City Council 
include ways of answering to the charge that the state should take some responsibility 
for the provision of basic services to the poor (through the provision of 'lifeline' 
amounts of water and electricity free of charge), together with attempts to commit the 
poor to regimes of payment (and prepayment).   
 
In a follow-up interview with Councillor Simango, conducted in August 2010, it 
became clear that no progress with regard to the problem of toilets had been made in 
Orange Farm.  In the words of the Councillor, “Nothing has happened.  I am still 
waiting.  Different departments have made promises, but there is still nothing.” 
(Interview, Councillor Simango, 20 August 2010).  According to the Councillor, 
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Extension 2 has become the focus of her work as residents there have been living with 
pit latrines for over twenty years, and “proper connections and pipes” are needed for 
flush toilets to be installed.  However, the Councillor is not hopeful as most recently 
Extensions 8 and 9 have been provided with ventilated improved pit latrines (VIPs) 
rather than flush toilets.  Extension 8 is an area where conversion to the prepaid 
system was attempted at the cost of R650 to be borne by a household; however, 
residents were too poor to afford this cost, rendering the attempt unworkable.  This 
would, then, suggest that lower levels of service are being provided to those who are 
unable to afford the costs of prepaid meters.   
 
In Orange Farm, as Masakhane began to try to encourage individual responsibility 
through payment for services, there is also evidence that the City Council was 
beginning to think in terms of an indigent management policy that would attempt to 
separate the 'can't pays' from the 'won't pays' and provide 'the poorest of the poor' with 
certain minimal levels of services.  Newspaper reports indicate that in August 1998, 
an Indigent Management Policy was introduced by the Greater Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Council to "subsidise families who cannot afford service and rate 
payments" by providing "families identified as the poorest of the poor" with monthly 
council subsidies of R70 in the areas of Orlando East, Dobsonville, Bertrams, and 
Orange Farm (Sepotekele, 1998).   
 
Those to be targeted as recipients of the policy were to include pensioners, single 
parents, unemployed and disabled people with a household income of less than R1 
500 a month.  The assistance envisaged at the time would include a municipal service 
subsidy to cover the cost of 10 kl of water as well as sewerage and refuse removal.  In 
the words of Loretta King, chairperson of the credit control task team of the City of 
Johannesburg at the time, the purpose of the policy was  
 
mainly to identify those citizens in the Greater Johannesburg area 
desperately in need of assistance in terms of basic services, and 
to ensure that residents who are able to pay for services do not 
claim inability to pay. (ibid).   
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But the only real evidence of the implementation of these apparently noble plans can 
be found in a couple of newspaper reports.  Municipal officials in Orange Farm have 
no recollection of such a policy, explaining, however, that it has always been the case 
in Orange Farm that those who cannot afford to pay for services could come forward 
to the local municipal office with a signed affidavit prepared at a police station to 
state that they are indigent i.e. unemployed and unable to afford to pay for services.  
In the experiences of those interviewed for the Khanya College/Kganya Consortium 
study (2002), very few residents followed this route, largely because they did not 
know about it or did not think that they stood to benefit much from it.  For the few 
who did pursue this avenue, it was mainly in the hope of receiving assistance with 
their sewerage and sanitation needs as there was the promise of such help if one 
produced an affidavit and declared one's indigent status.  According to the report,  
 
In no discussions did any participant raise the existence of an 
indigent management policy, and it would seem, from interview 
results relating to forms of income that this policy, while it may 
exist on paper, does not play a real role in the survival 
mechanisms of the poor. (Khanya College/Kganya Consortium, 
2002: 38-39).    
 
While these initial attempts at introducing an indigent management policy may have 
had little success, it is important to note that they were underpinned by a need to 
contest the moral economy that was emerging in response to the enforcement of the 
duty to pay i.e. that in the context of such high unemployment and the widespread 
lack of infrastructure and inequality of service provision characteristic of apartheid's 
legacy, as well as the commitments, promises and dreams shaped in the liberation 
movement and the struggle against apartheid, residents continued to hold the ANC 
government responsible for delivery rather than accepting the individual duty to 
secure access to services and 'a better life' through payment.   
 
In enforcing a logic of payment in this context, then, the ANC government would 
have to prove its commitment to its past promises, which would see its own 
contestation of this moral economy in which people would be asked to redirect their 
energies and commitments to making 'the new nation' work according to neoliberal 
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principles.  In this new moral economy, the individual would have to assume 
responsibility for his or her own quality of life, striving to work and pay for his/her 
services and contribute to the efficient running of the country.  And the state would be 
at pains to show its commitments to a certain section of society - 'the poorest of the 
poor'.  While these commitments were initially borne out through certain universal 
provisions of minimal levels of services, as contestation over these minimal levels 
began, government would return to refashion an indigent management policy that 
would once again look towards targeted interventions aimed at 'the poorest of the 
poor', in most cases identified as those who cannot afford to pay for their services. 
 
In May 2005 and February 2006, residents of Orange Farm were targeted, along with 
residents of other townships and informal settlements, in the City‟s Municipal 
Services Subsidy Scheme (MSSS) and Reathusa, discussed in detail in Chapter Four 
of this thesis.  In a show of its recognition of the difficulties faced by the poor in 
paying for their services, and in an attempt to draw residents into partnerships with 
the state under the logic of neoliberalism, the City would give the poor the 
opportunity to come forward, acknowledge their past debts, and commit to paying for 
services in the future, in return for having all or half of their past service arrears 
erased.  It is significant that while these policies were advertised in Orange Farm as 
elsewhere in the city, their implementation has seen several changes in their character 
based on the extremely low levels of household income prevalent in Orange Farm.  In 
interviews with Councillor Simango and a clerk responsible for the administration of 
these policies at the Orange Farm municipal office, it became clear that these policies 
have not been able to be implemented in their envisaged manner.  It would also 
appear that Reathusa has not been implemented on a large scale, with very few 
residents earning as much as R6 500 a month.   
 
In particular, the enforcement of prepaid water meters has not been possible.  
According to the clerk interviewed, residents of Orange Farm are “too poor” to be 
expected to survive on the prepaid water system.   
 
People living in Orange Farm are the poorest of the poor.  So 
they cannot afford to pay.  We ask them to come and prove that 
they cannot afford to pay and then we scrap their debts and we 
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ask them to sign that they will pay between R10 and R25 a 
month, and they don‟t have to get a prepaid water meter.  But all 
electricity is prepaid in Orange Farm already. (Eva Kgatitswe, 
interview, 16/10/2007).   
 
This was echoed by the Councillor, who stated:  
 
We just ask people to pay whatever they can after we scrap their 
debts – R10 or R15.  We cannot ask them to get a prepaid water 
meter because most of them cannot afford to pay.  So how can 
we expect them to pay for their water?  People of Orange Farm 
are the poorest of the poor.  So, as long as they can show that 
they can give something, then it‟s alright.  Because government 
cannot do everything.  There has to be a partnership.  (Councillor 
Simango, interview, 16/10/2007).   
 
When asked whether non-payment would result in any form of punitive action against 
defaulters, both the Councillor and the clerk answered that there would be no physical 
punishment for those still not paying under the new system.  In the Councillor‟s 
words,  
 
No, no, there is no punishment.  There‟s nothing like that.  We 
just ask them to help us – let‟s help each other – because if I just 
fold my hands and look at you to give me everything, it‟s not 
only you, we are plenty.  So government can‟t afford.   
 
This experience suggests very strongly, then, that the City has remobilised its indigent 
management policy as a strategy primarily to enforce a logic of payment and cost-
recovery amongst residents rather than to ensure the recuperation of monies spent in 
order to effect delivery as its main preoccupation, and to show that the state is 
fulfilling its role in providing for the poorest of the poor.  In contrast to the City‟s 
general arguments made that prepaid meters are necessary for the poor in order to 
enable them to budget properly and make efficient use of their services, the 
arrangements entered into by municipal officials in Orange Farm with residents 
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suggest that officials have had to accept the reality that its constituency cannot even 
afford the terms of indigency.  In this manner, Orange Farm has become, for the state, 
a place for the poorest of the poor, requiring attention different even from those 
determined to be the poor in society.   
 
While residents might not be forced, through their signing onto the indigent register, 
to install prepaid water meters in their homes, the fact that they will not have access to 
flush toilets unless accepting the prepaid meter means that lower levels of service will 
be enforced for those unable (or unwilling) to pay upfront for their water.  In this way, 
life in Orange Farm is imagined as one for „the poorest of the poor‟, that is, a place in 
which the very minimal levels of access to services are made possible by the state for 
those unable to pay for higher standards of living.  And in order to access a higher 
standard of living, some form of commitment to pay for services over and above the 
free amounts provided for by the state.  In this way, distinguishing between „the poor‟ 
and „the poorest of the poor‟ becomes a means of distinguishing between „the poor 
who can be made to pay‟ from „the poor who can‟t be made to pay‟.  In Orange Farm, 
then, there is a recognition by municipal officials that the majority of its residents fall 
into the category of „those who can‟t be made to pay‟; hence a different approach to 
the implementation of the City‟s revised indigent management policy in the form of 
the MSSS and Reathusa, and most recently Siyasizana, and a different standard and 
quality of life promoted for those unable to pay for their services.         
 
Very few residents canvassed for this project, when asked whether they had 
knowledge of or had signed onto „the indigent management policy‟, „the MSSS‟ or 
„Reathusa‟, responded in the positive.  However, when the nature of the policies were 
described to interviewees or focus group participants in terms of the debt write-off, 
there would be much greater knowledge expressed and experiences shared about 
individuals‟ relationship to these policies.  Across all focus group discussions and 
interviews, participants displayed amongst them, in fairly equal proportions, three 
main experiences of these policies.  While some respondents displayed no knowledge 
of these policies; others had signed onto the MSSS in order to have their debts erased, 
entering into individual agreements with the local municipal office to pay a small 
amount for services every month; with the remaining group viewing the MSSS and 
Reathusa suspiciously and choosing not to apply for consideration as indigents.  
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These responses cut across party or organisational affiliation, and did not conform to 
any patterns with regard to who was responding or the context in which the response 
was made.     
 
For those who had applied for acceptance by the MSSS, the promise of the 
cancellation of their service arrears was the driving factor.  No knowledge of the 
stipulation that prepaid meters would have to be installed, was displayed.  Rather, 
participants confirmed the explanations given above by municipal officials that, in 
recognition of the fact that the majority of Orange Farm residents are unemployed and 
therefore unable to pay for services, agreements are entered into which required 
individuals to commit to paying small amounts of between R10 and R25 each month 
in exchange for their arrears being cancelled.  However, it would seem, from 
interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this thesis, that few people are 
able to meet these monthly commitments, with individuals currently on the indigent 
register once again accumulating debt.   
 
In the words of a female pensioner belonging to the OWCC,  
 
I heard about the indigency policy.  I went to the offices as they 
say that I owe more than R6 000 for the site where I'm staying, 
but if I come to the office and talk - tell the municipality that I'm 
not working, I can't afford to pay and so on - they'll scrap my 
debt.  So I went to the office and they scrapped my debt, but it 
still comes to the same thing.  After they scrapped what they said 
I was owing, R6 000, it's still the same thing because they said I 
must pay R10 a month - that was two or three years back.  So, 
I'm not working; so I now owe again.  So I don't know what will 
happen to me this time.  I don't know if I'll be locked in a cell.  I 
don't know.  But I haven't received any bills since the scrapping 
of my debt to show how much I owe.  Before, we always used to 
get white envelopes with the bills saying R6 000 and some odd 
every month.  And I've never paid that R10 or anything before or 
after.  When we got the stand, we paid R6 for a stand number - 
that's all.  And after that, nothing.  Because there was nothing to 
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pay rent for.  There were no toilets, no taps - we came here and 
made taps in our yards - no electricity, there was nothing at all to 
pay rent for until they brought these plastic rubbish bas only for a 
couple of years now.  And then they say that we owe debt.  I 
don't know how much I owe the government.  (Female 
Pensioner, interview, 24/05/2007).   
 
While the debt write-off was envisaged by the City as a means of „incentivising‟ 
payment for services amongst the poor, it would seem that the extreme levels of 
unemployment and socio-economic deprivation prevalent in Orange Farm work 
against the ability of many residents to pay any amount, no matter how small, for their 
services.  In addition, the fact that the majority of residents continue to suffer the most 
basic and minimal levels of service results in the general view held amongst residents 
that they are not receiving a quality of service deserving of payment.   
 
In interviews and focus groups, it was emphasised that the initial roll-out of the MSSS 
in Orange Farm targeted pensioners and those receiving social grants from the state.  
In one focus group discussion, residents claimed that pensioners had been threatened 
with having their grants withdrawn if they did not sign onto the scheme (Focus group, 
OWCC, 26/09/2007).  While the view that those receiving social grants should be 
able to pay for their services as a result of their receiving a regular sum of money 
monthly, is largely what underpins this targeting, the majority of interviewees and 
focus group participants shared a different view - that these grants were too small to 
cover the cost of basic services in addition to the other constantly rising living costs 
that all people are having to bear.  Respondents also pointed out that pensioners and 
other recipients of social grants, in the majority of cases, use their monthly allowances 
to cover the costs of maintaining households rather than those of an individual person.  
In many cases, pensioners end up supporting multiple households, as they become the 
sole breadwinners when their children and their spouses are unemployed, who have 
the responsibility, in turn, of supporting their own children.  In some cases, where the 
children of pensioners are employed in the inner city and suburbs of Johannesburg 
(usually as live-in domestic workers, gardeners, or security guards), grannies (and 
sometimes grandfathers) become the primary caregivers of their grandchildren, using 
their grants to supplement whatever little money is earned by their children.   
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In the words of a female pensioner participating in a focus group discussion,  
 
With the old age grant, people are struggling because I can tell 
you that right now I‟ve got nothing, and it‟s only the 25
th
 [of the 
month].  I‟ve got nothing left; not a penny from that R850 that I 
got because there‟s so many things you‟ve got to do with that 
money, especially those old men and women who have 
grandchildren, children who need to be taken to school because 
of these youngsters not working.  They are being supported by 
the old people in the house.  So that‟s why that R850 is too little. 
(Female pensioner, Focus Group, Kganya Consortium, 
25/09/2007).   
 
A significant number of residents chose, however, not to sign onto the scheme, 
believing that it would, for the first time in their lives, bind them to paying for 
services they needed but could not afford.  In the words of Thando Ngoma, 
Chairperson of the Lebone Skills Development Centre and a proud member of the 
South African Communist Party (SACP), when asked what he thought of the revised 
indigent management policy of the City,  
 
You have to begin to understand the ground before you bring 
your fancy policies.  It‟s useless – you can‟t tell me you‟re going 
to scrap a debt that I wasn‟t even going to pay you in the first 
place.  Whether you scrap it or not it‟s all the same to me – I‟m 
not going to pay you.  (Thando Ngoma, interview, 16/10/2007).   
 
These words were echoed by Bricks Mokolo, Organiser of the OWCC, who called the 
revised indigent management policy “a trap” as it forces individuals to take 
responsibility for previously unacknowledged debt and commit to a logic of payment 
under the guise of being a means for individuals to „start over with a clean slate‟ and 
take responsibility for proper management of their finances and efficient use of their 
resources.   
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For some participants in this study, the MSSS and Reathusa were also viewed as 
attempts by the state to enforce a logic of individualisation in all aspects of service 
delivery, from the establishment of single monitored delivery units, to the 
development of systems for the tracking of individual consumption and payment, and 
the encouragement of individual responsibility at the level of the „customer-citizen‟.  
When asked to comment on the effects of the introduction of policies of cost recovery 
and privatisation in the delivery of basic services, interviewees and focus group 
participants spoke, in particular, of the erosion of communal practices and customs 
related to the use of water, for example.  Weddings and funerals were often cited as 
occasions requiring large amounts of water, and therefore exerting tremendous 
pressures on families and communities in the context of it needing to be purchased.  
Some participants also highlighted the fact that access to free basic services has been 
secured for all through a collective commitment to the individual act of non-payment.  
For them, signing onto the MSSS or Reathusa would amount to „selling out‟ as it 
would be an acceptance of the individual duty to pay for these services that have 
historically been held through common struggle.  In the words of one of the OWCC 
members in response to being asked about their knowledge of the revised indigent 
management policy,  
 
I‟ve heard about it but I didn‟t go and sign.  I‟ve taken it to be 
that if I go there and sign I‟ll be selling out some of my 
colleagues. (Female pensioner, Focus Group, OWCC, 
26/09/2007).   
 
For the majority of those interviewed or canvassed through focus groups, however, 
this collective commitment to non-payment would, in all likelihood, disappear if the 
quality of service delivery improved in Orange Farm.  All participants stated that they 
would be prepared to pay for services if the quality of their delivery improved 
substantially and if they were earning enough to afford these services.  However, for 
all those interviewed, payment for services would not be easily enforced in Orange 
Farm for as long as there was the perception amongst residents that they were not 
receiving quality services.  For many participants in this study, then, the introduction 
of the indigent management policy in Orange Farm in its current form entrenches the 
informality imagined for Orange Farm by the apartheid government, allowing access 
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to different levels of service in an incremental fashion that is based on an individual‟s 
ability to pay.  With the majority of residents of Orange Farm falling into the category 
of „the poorest of the poor‟, levels of service made available are of the lowest standard 
and quality in society, with refusal to accept the system of prepayment resulting in 
access to flush toilets being denied, for example.   
 
In the words of a member of the OWCC,  
 
People, as long as they are being labelled as „poor communities‟, 
being given substandard development, I don‟t think people will 
pay for services.  I, for one, am not going to pay.  I‟ll never pay 
as long as I‟m living in Orange Farm and no one is trying to 
transform Orange Farm.  We are being told that Orange Farm is 
part of the city of Johannesburg, but if you look at the 
development of Randburg and Orange Farm, they differ.  Even 
the Mayor, Masondo, is not ashamed, because he was involved in 
Soweto civic politics in the „80s, to be leading one city with 
different development approaches.  As long as they treat Orange 
Farm as a place for the poorest of the poor I am not going to pay. 
(Male participant, Focus Group, OWCC, 26/09/2007).  
 
It would seem that the introduction of Siyasizana holds no hope for residents of 
Orange Farm.  According to Councillor Simango, “people of Orange Farm are signing 
on very slowly to Siyasizana” (Interview, Councillor Simango, 20 August 2010).  
This was confirmed during a visit to the municipal office in Orange Farm where one 
registration point is open for residents, when no residents were observed approaching 
the registration desk over a period of three hours.  The clerk responsible for 
registration also said that residents of Orange Farm were signing on very slowly to the 
programme, attributing this to her observation that “Orange Farm residents are 
ignorant and take life easy” (Interview, Mpumi Tsotsetsi, 21 August 2010).  Herself a 
resident of Soweto, employed by the CoJ, she stated that Siyasizana had been 
advertised to the community of Orange Farm and that further outreach programmes 
were planned.  She also stated that the registration process had attracted many more 
registrants in areas like Soweto and Ennerdale.   
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When asked why he thought the registration process was going so slowly in Orange 
Farm as compared with other areas, Jak Koseff had the following to say: 
 
… it also remains possible that those that are connected to 
accounts of some kind are afraid of a formal registration process 
on account of their poor credit history with the city. As the credit 
management measures grow more intensive, and the ESP becomes 
their only means of shielding themselves from those measures, I 
expect that constituency to register in larger numbers.  (Koseff, e-
mail communication, 25 August 2010). 
 
It is also significant that the clerk responsible for Siyasizana registration in Orange 
Farm insisted during her explanation of the application process that individuals had to 
produce proof that they were receiving services, either through their account 
statements or through prepaid tokens and/or receipts.  This was clarified by Jak 
Koseff to be “a problem of communication” with lower level staff in the programme, 
who also insisted that the individual benefits are accessible to residents who do not 
pay for services from the City.  It is also significant that, in addition to being 
fingerprinted and having to present their identity documents, residents are also having 
to present photographs.     
 
In spite of the City‟s commitments to target the poorest of the poor for benefits 
through Siyasizana, its set-up for registration in Orange Farm seems to suggest that 
not many potential registrants are being targeted from Orange Farm – there is a single 
clerk responsible for a population of over 1.5 million people, housed in a single desk 
cubicle within the Orange Farm municipal office that is responsible for the 
administration of many other services, pamphlets have been produced only in English 
and are not visible anywhere but on the desk of the clerk, there are no posters 
advertising registration points and dates, and community members are unaware of 
public meetings that are taking place in relation to Siyasizana.   
 
For Councillor Simango, Siyasizana‟s benefit seems to lie more in its ability to 
capture information about residents than in its expansion of service delivery.  She 
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stated that she was looking forward to its roll-out in Orange Farm as it would finally 
provide the municipality with the correct data about “how many people are working, 
how many are not working, how many youth with matric are not working, and so on”.  
She went on to explain that this would assist as “people are always saying that they 
cannot pay for services because they are not working; so now we will know” 
(Interview, Councillor Simango, 20 August 2010).  By September 2010, however, the 
CoJ had recorded the official registration of just 732 individuals on the Siyasizana 
programme (e-mail communication with Farida Taaka, Social Assistance Directorate, 
Department of Community Development, CoJ; 7 September 2010).  This, in an area 
with a population of over 1.5 million, and a recorded 15 039 granny-headed 
households and 676 child-headed households (ibid).     
 
For members of the OWCC and Kganya Consortium, Siyasizana represents a further 
entrenchment of inequality, this time amongst the poor, and will be opposed.  
However, they too have heard little about the programme, and many heard of it for 
the first time when approached for comment for this project in March and August 
2010.  In the words of Bricks Mokolo: 
 
If there was honesty in this [the introduction of Siyasizana], it 
should have been publicised and advertised, but it hasn‟t.  
Residents are not aware of it.  City statements do not talk about it.  
(Interview, Bricks Mokolo, 21 August 2010). 
 
Mokolo also believes that Siyasizana merely extends the positions already taken in 
the MSSS and Reathusa, cementing “class inequality amongst the poor” and forcing 
poor people to declare themselves in order “to be given a status as the poor” and “bar-
coded” so that “everyone knows just how much you can have and how you can live as 
a poor person” (ibid).  Mokolo stated: 
 
My status of poverty is something that I don‟t need to go and tell 
other people – how poor I am – but if government wants to provide 
services, it must provide the same standards for all.  Basic services 
are a fundamental right for all.  This screening of the poor is not a 
demand from the people.  It is a foreign idea.  (ibid).   
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In opposing inequality and stigmatisation, the OWCC and Kganya 
Consortium believe that the only way forward for them as organised 
residents of Orange Farm is to oppose Siyasizana, and to encourage 
residents to continue to enjoy free services through illegal connections.  
Mokolo explained that the majority of Orange Farm residents have 
survived illegally for years since apartheid, having installed their own taps 
and toilets (pits and flush) on the bare and largely unserviced sites that 
they were provided with by the apartheid government.  To now begin 
regulating payment for these services would be extremely difficult.   
 
Contested Understandings of Self-Reliance 
 
While we have already seen how the apartheid state mobilised a language of self-
reliance and individual responsibility to try to limit its role to that of providing the 
minimal resources necessary for black people to survive in Orange Farm and to 
entrench substandard and informal living conditions amongst black people, it is also 
important to note the emergence of an alternative logic of self-reliance amongst black 
people resisting apartheid.  From within the liberation movement, in particular from 
within the Black Consciousness tradition growing from the teachings of Steve Biko, 
people began to commit themselves to developing the collective self-reliance of black 
communities and their independence from the apartheid state.  As part of its 
philosophy of encouraging black people to stand up for themselves against a system 
that taught them that they were inferior, the Black Consciousness philosophy and 
tradition also saw the establishment of a number of community projects aimed at 
developing self-reliance amongst democratic collectives of black people.  In contrast 
to the notion of self-reliance as a means of assuming individual responsibility for 
one's standard and quality of life promoted by the apartheid state, Black 
Consciousness spoke of the building of the individual as part of the development of 
the collective self-reliance of black people as an oppressed group in society (Biko, 
2004).   
 
Today, as the ANC government perpetuates the apartheid vision of formalised 
informality for Orange Farm through its encouragement of a culture of self-reliance 
 286 
and individual responsibility amongst the poor, we also see the re-emergence of past 
commitments to self-reliance of the collective sort.  And the contest over the ways in 
which ordinary residents imagine their own development with regard to different 
notions of self-reliance is an ongoing one that forms part of the shaping of the moral 
economy today in Orange Farm.  This contest manifests primarily in the ways in 
which people imagine their relationship to wage labour and the formal economy, and 
the related ways in which they understand the responsibilities of the state versus the 
responsibilities of the individual citizen.   
 
A drive or walk through Orange Farm highlights just how the majority of its residents 
are surviving in the context of such high unemployment described in the previous 
chapter.  What has come to be known as the informal economy plays a significant role 
in this regard, as the many spaza shops, home salons, and side-street salespeople bear 
testimony to.  As jobs have become increasingly difficult to secure for long periods of 
time, hawking and other small business enterprises have mushroomed.  In addition, a 
number of community projects have been established with the help of larger NGOs, 
government and various religious groupings.  While there is no official audit of the 
number of NGOs working in Orange Farm or the number of community projects 
existing, the Khanya College/Kganya Consortium report (2002: 50) records that there 
has been "a proliferation of community projects and organisations" operative in the 
area, and it is clear from a visit to Orange Farm that this is indeed the case.  It is in 
these spaces that the shaping of a moral economy is occurring around notions of self-
reliance that speak to past and present understandings of the concept.   
 
Interviews and focus groups conducted for this thesis included members of different 
projects in Orange Farm, those initiated and supported by government, and those that 
have arisen out of the initiatives of groups of residents who have come together on 
their own and/or with the support of other organisations like NGOs and religious 
groupings, to provide ways for residents to generate income for themselves or to 
provide services to other residents of Orange Farm that are lacking.  In all cases, 
members interviewed stated that it was due to their inability to find full-time, secure 
employment in the formal economy that they were working as volunteers in projects.  
For a few, however, it was also the nature of the full-time employment available to 
them that had led to their choosing to work in projects rather than for racist, sexist or 
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otherwise problematic employers for poor pay and/or under poor conditions.  Some 
also spoke of the projects offering far more than just an income or ways of dealing 
with material problems, with their alternative forms of work in the context of 
unemployment being a means for them to show their children a way of life still 
deserving of respect despite their poverty.  In the words of one of the female 
pensioners interviewed,  
 
When we work in projects it is to bring ourselves up so that 
somewhere along the line we can get something for our children 
to eat, to buy clothes for them to wear, and so on.  At the same 
time, we are gaining experiences from other women who are 
doing different things.  At the same time we are gaining 
experience of how to let our children grow in a very respectable 
way.  And educating our children in a decent way.  Though we 
have nothing to do things for them in the future, they can learn 
from what we are doing, the way we are living. (Female 
pensioner from Thandeka Ratheha, Focus Group Discussion, 
Kganya Women's Consortium, 25/09/2007).   
 
For all members of projects interviewed, young and old, in a world where a person's 
worth is measured by his/her relationship to a job or secure income, the various 
collective spaces which have been made places of production of different types in the 
form of projects have become important symbols of their redefined contributions to 
society.  Members from projects across the spectrum spoke of their "creativity" in 
establishing projects, and of "creative forms of work" that the projects have produced.  
Interestingly, many individuals also spoke of their creativity in dealing with 
unemployment as a means of showing that they "are not lazy" or "idle" in trying to 
make a living for themselves, as government often tries to portray the unemployed 
and poor in this manner.   
 
While all the projects and organisations surveyed for this thesis have similar histories 
and face similar problems, there are also some striking differences with regard to the 
ways in which members of different projects understand their role in broader society 
and their relationship to the state.  In particular, some projects and organisations see 
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themselves as "assisting" the state to deliver in its developmental role while others see 
the projects as answering problems caused by the state's own policy failures.  In the 
latter case, project members are more critical of government and its policies, making 
more demands for change from the state and being less amenable to working with 
government.  While „self-reliance‟, for the former group, tends to be imagined in 
terms of empowering and capacitating individuals to become entrepreneurs of 
themselves, the latter group exhibits a tension with regard to approaches and 
understandings of the concept, tending to want to strengthen collective approaches to 
self-reliance but coming up against difficulties having to survive in an increasingly 
individualising and entrepreneurial world.   
 
The Hlanganani Youth NGO and the Lebone Skills Development Centre are two 
projects that exemplify the former type of project.  Working closely with local 
government's appointed Community Development Workers (CDWs) for the area is 
Hlanganani, an NGO established recently by a few youth in Orange Farm, with the 
help of local government, in order "to assist government to intervene in the lives of 
poor young people".   
 
Members of Hlanganani volunteer without any regular remuneration, sometimes 
receiving a small stipend for their work.  Generally, however, their individual 
transport costs to work, food, and so on must be found by themselves individually.  
At present there are three members whose main task is to provide assistance to the 
five CDWs  by way of assisting young community members to access identity 
documents and the information about state policies and other avenues open to them in 
order to better their lives.  While the NGO is still small, members see their 
effectiveness lying in their working in partnership with government and the 
community.  They also see their participation in the project as a way for them to 
access skills, make contacts, and gain more knowledge about the workings of 
government so that they may access better jobs in the future or be able to enter 
politics by becoming leaders in Orange Farm.  In the words of one of the young 
members of Hlanganani,  
 
We have to sacrifice a lot because we have to pop out money out 
of our own pockets to get here in the first place, then to eat, and 
 289 
then at the end of the month you have to put something on the 
table at home.  But, on a positive note, volunteering here makes 
you knowledgeable - knowing everything, and being informed as 
far as what is happening in that sector that you are focusing on.  
Like now, I can say that I know almost everything in as far as 
what is happening inside the government, and what the 
government has in store for the people at the grassroots level. 
(Male Hlanganani member, Focus Group Discussion, CDWs and 
Hlanganani, 24/10/2007). 
 
While life as volunteers in a project providing assistance in difficult circumstances is 
generally hard and trying, these young members of Hlanganani remain committed to 
their roles as a result of their belief in the programmes of the ANC government.  
Central to their commitment is the notion that every individual needs to contribute to 
the development of themselves and the country through assuming responsibility for 
their basic needs and their further growth.  In assuming this responsibility, each 
individual needs to accept his/her responsibilities as a citizen to participate in 
partnerships with government and to assist the state to deliver.  For the young people 
of Hlanganani, then, the problems and difficulties experienced in their work are 
accepted as part of their "sacrifice" or contribution to the partnership necessary for 
development to occur.  (Focus Groups, CDWs and Hlanganani, 24/10/2007).      
 
The Lebone Skills Development Centre is another community initiative of residents 
of Orange Farm, working together with the Department of Labour and the local 
municipality.  The Centre's basic mission is to provide skills training for the Orange 
Farm community, which it currently attempts to do in the fields of catering, welding, 
agriculture, and sewing.  With the provision of service providers from the Department 
of Labour (DoL), the Centre is supposed to train members of the community in the 
hope that they establish their own projects which are able to be sustainable and, in 
turn, sustain them and the community.  At present the Centre is only able to train 
between fifty and sixty people, that is, approximately fourteen people per sector per 
year.  For the Director of the Centre, Thando Ngoma, this is a real problem as Orange 
Farm's population far outnumbers this tiny number that the Centre is able to reach.  In 
addition, there are currently problems being experienced with regard to the 
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partnership with the DoL.  While the Centre applied for service providers to conduct 
training in April 2007, by the time of the interview (October), training had still not 
begun.  While the DoL had given a commitment to the Centre that training would 
begin in October or November 2007, by the time of the interview there had still been 
no firm communication about plans being made by the DoL to indeed begin training.   
 
The Centre also faces serious problems in trying to restrict training programmes to 
the small number possible as it has no strict criteria for selection or any real selection 
process.  Instead, acceptance to programmes happens on a first come, first serve 
basis.  As the only state supported skills centre in Orange Farm, Lebone is under 
tremendous pressure to increase its capacity.  In spite of this, its Director is adamant 
that government's policies with regard to job creation and self-reliance are "correct".  
In his words, the problems lie, rather, in "their implementation".  He also stated that 
there are sufficient opportunities for young, unemployed people to become active in 
their own self-interest.  He said,  
 
I also believe that if someone is self-motivated, they're not going 
to wait for some training to make means.  That's why I always 
encourage the community - don't wait for some government 
official to tell you to initiate something.  Look deep inside 
yourself and find something you are passionate about.  Don't 
wait for structures and all these policy-making people to 
determine your life.  You be the ruler of your life.  If you think 
you have an idea, don't wait for the DoL to train you.  Act on that 
idea.  There are many avenues available for the youth especially 
to develop. (Thando Ngoma, Interview, 16/10/2007).   
 
While government's problems faced with regard to implementation should be 
addressed, individuals should also go ahead with trying to take responsibility to see to 
it that this implementation happens.  In other words, individuals should make it their 
responsibility to make their elected and appointed representatives in government 
accountable to their constituencies.   (Thando Ngoma, Director of Lebone, interview, 
16/10/2007).  This is explored further in the section looking at attitudes to 
participatory governance, below.    
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While organisations like Hlanganani and the Lebone Skills Development Centre see 
their role as "assisting government in delivering on its policies and plans, which are 
good" (Thando Ngoma, interview, 16/10/2007), members of other projects and 
organisations interviewed for this thesis see their work as providing solutions to the 
problems left unanswered by government policies or produced by government 
policies.  In the latter group of organisations and projects, members tend to be more 
critical of the ANC government, arguing that current notions of individual self-
reliance allow the state to shift its responsibility to individual citizens and prevent 
more collective approaches to the creation of work and self-reliance.  In these spaces, 
older notions of self-reliance, fashioned in the liberation movement, come into contest 
with the new language of individual responsibility espoused by the ANC government, 
and with the realities of survival in a neoliberal world.  The thirteen projects forming 
the Kganya Women's Consortium reflect different responses from ordinary people 
coming together to find solutions to the problems produced by their poverty and lack 
of access to jobs.  Projects include a food gardening, crèche and recycling project; 
child-care projects; sewing collectives; baking projects; the provision of home-based 
case and support for people living with HIV-AIDS (PWAs); the provision of support 
and care by PWAs for PWAs; the making of shoes; and upholstery.  In interviews and 
a focus group of members from these projects conducted for this thesis, members 
recounted how most of their projects began as a result of their individual search for a 
way out of their poverty in the context of an absence of fulltime, secure jobs, and their 
coming into contact with groups of people faced with similar circumstances trying to 
find answers to their problems.  While many of these projects have approached the 
state for assistance and only sometimes received it, they have also, through their 
experiences, developed a critique of the programmes of the ANC government, and 
posed alternatives to them, both in theory and in their everyday practices.     
 
For the Itsoseng Women's Project and Thandeka Ratheha, two member organisations 
of the consortium, the idea of establishing the projects arose out of neighbours sharing 
their problems and their skills, as well as their past experiences and histories of 
struggle against apartheid and against continued poverty under the ANC government.  
Let Us Grow, another member organisation, was established by a brave resident, Rose 
Thamae, who came out about being HIV positive in her church and after receiving 
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much support and listening to the stories of many others like herself who began 
coming out after her, decided to start a project for HIV positive residents to come 
together and share their experiences, offer each other comfort, generate some income 
through the making of paper mache toys, recycled paper and the like, and providing 
home-based care and education and awareness about HIV-AIDS in Orange Farm.  
Today, Let Us Grow provides a home to over fifty young and old residents, and offers 
services to all of Orange Farm, with limited support from NGOs and government.  
Rose Thamae and Let Us Grow have also become household names in civil society, 
with appearances in several magazines and newspapers, television shows and radio 
programmes.  Let Us Grow still operates from the shack that Rose first lived in when 
she came to Orange Farm.  Over the years, she has made more and more of her own 
space available to the project, and built her own brick house next door.   
 
Another prominent organisation in Orange Farm, also a member of the consortium, 
that has grown with the support of the church is Inkanyezi, which provides home-
based case, Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) and Anti-retroviral Therapy 
(ART) to residents of Orange Farm who are HIV positive.  Members of Inkanyezi 
come from the unemployed congregation of the St Charles Lwanga Roman Catholic 
Church based in Extension 8, Orange Farm.  Inkanyezi is staffed largely by 
volunteers, only some of whom receive a monthly stipend.  The church has also 
established an advice centre through which residents are able to access information 
and assistance with regard to their problems, such as getting identity documents and 
social grants.  Beginning as a one-man volunteer driven project, supported in spirit by 
the church, the advice centre is today a permanently funded space that hires three 
fulltime paid staff, and offers much-needed services to a considerable portion of 
Orange Farm residents.     
 
While the majority of those involved in such projects as described above see their 
work as a means primarily of survival, there are a significant number of members 
who also see their work as allowing them to develop their self-reliance in ways 
reminiscent of past dreams.  In the words of one of the founding members of 
Itsoseng, which was established in 1999,  
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Our ideas were influenced by Steve Biko's ideology of 'Black 
man, stand on your own' and we said 'Now we stand on our own, 
we need to do things on our own'.  And we also tried to translate 
the talk of self-reliance into reality by doing things on our own. 
(Bricks Mokolo, interview, 29/03/2008).   
 
While what this meant was fairly self-evident under apartheid, after 1994 'doing 
things on our own' would come to mean different things to different people.  Against 
the logic of the ANC government which had begun to redefine self-reliance within 
notions of individual and market success, members of the latter group of projects 
speak of these initiatives arising to meet the needs of those adversely affected by the 
individualising logic of the policies adopted by the ANC government, and surviving 
and succeeding due to their collective strength.  But even this commitment to 
collective approaches comes into conflict with and is threatened by the logic of 
individualism that upholds capitalist society.  
 
While members of the Kganya Women's Consortium bragged about how they started 
their projects "with nothing but our ideas" (Female Participant 4, Focus Group, 
Kganya Women's Consortium, 25/09/2007), they also spoke of the tremendous 
difficulties faced in the context of working with very few material resources and the 
pressures that this brought to bear on their work as collectives.  With most of the 
projects offering no guarantee of a regular, stable monthly income, when paid work, 
usually in the form of contract jobs in construction, retail or the domestic sphere, 
becomes available, members leave the projects to take up these more stable and 
lucrative offers, only sometimes to return.  This has often seen projects within the 
consortium changing their form completely, adapting to suit the needs of fewer 
members or new members, and so on.  This has also meant that the majority of 
projects are unable to operate at a level of stability necessary to ensure the 
predictability and patterns of productivity required for proper management and 
planning.  And, as the individual pressures faced by members of the projects (from 
families or debtors or society generally) to become economically successful mounts, 
collective solutions to problems are often put aside when more immediate, 
individualised, opportunities for income generation become available, even if they 
might be short-term and short-lived.  In some cases, such as Itsoseng, there are a few 
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members who work in the project, as well as other seasonal and part-time jobs when 
they are available.  In this manner, the composition of the project is constantly 
changing, bringing both new skills and experiences to the project and presenting it 
with the challenges of working with an unpredictable community of producers.  In 
cases, such as Thandeka Ratheha, however, the loss of members to jobs has seen its 
membership drop by half over the last year.  With just twelve members, and no source 
of income besides their collective pooling of whatever funds they have remaining 
from their pensions each month, this loss of members has had a terribly negative 
effect on the work of the project.        
 
In the early days of the work of the Kganya Consortium, many of its members spoke 
proudly of their projects as “the alternative” to wage labour, offering the unemployed 
spaces outside of their daily grind of looking for work, to begin collective production 
of different kinds.  While attempts at the organisation of production may have been 
successful, with collective forms of decision-making, sharing of tasks, and the sharing 
of income generated being experimented with, the difficulties of making the projects 
successful within a market logic has proven to be problematic for members.  This has 
seen members change their views of the projects, no longer seeing them as “the 
alternative” to formal fulltime jobs, but presenting them as “pressure groups”, forcing 
government to assume responsibility for job creation and showing government a 
different form in which production could be organised.  In the words of Gladys 
Mokolo, Chairperson of Itsoseng,  
 
You can't say that we are solving problems by creating jobs.  
Yes, we have tried to create something so that we mustn‟t just 
stay at home doing nothing, we must come together and do 
something for ourselves.  But, at the end of the day, it's giving us 
problems, especially because people who are coming from the 
projects are people who are hungry, who don't have anything at 
the end of the day. (Female Itsoseng Volunteer, Focus Group 
Discussion, Kganya Women's Consortium, 25/09/2007). 
 
In particular, the notion of volunteering has become a problem for members of 
projects, in much the same way as described above by members of those NGOs closer 
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to the ANC government.  In the context of project income often being insufficient to 
pay all members cost-of-living stipends, volunteers are constantly under pressure to 
meet the expectations of family members who believe that they should be earning 
something for the time they spend working in the projects.  When funds do become 
available, through periods of increased production or sales or the injection of donor 
funds, relations amongst members of projects tend to come under additional strain as 
the demands of the project as a whole or the stipulations of funders often prevent 
individual members from gaining materially through the payment of stipends.  While 
several projects have attempted to address some of the problems of members in 
collective ways, such as the provision of one meal a day to members or making 
arrangements for childcare, there have been no broader attempts made to ensure the 
well-being of members‟ households and families.  In this context, many members of 
projects view their participation as volunteers as temporary, fighting within projects 
for regular monthly stipends or constantly looking for wage labour to provide an 
income for themselves and their dependents in addition to whatever resources they 
may access through the projects.     
 
For many members of the projects, then, life as volunteers is fraught with conflict 
over the opportunities presented by the projects and the difficulties that they bring.  In 
the words of a young woman volunteering for Inkanyezi,  
 
Volunteering is bad, very bad.  I told you that I'm a mother.  So if 
I'm volunteering it means that I'm getting nothing, but sometimes 
I get a stipend.  But if there's no stipend, I have three mouths to 
feed.  So how am I going to feed those mouths without money?  
Now I'm starting to hate what I'm doing.  I think maybe if I go 
back to school and get my matric maybe I'll get something better.  
But I know it's going to be hard for me because there are all these 
graduates with lot of certificates without jobs.  So I'm sticking 
where I am, but I'm starting to hate it. (Female Inkanyezi 
Volunteer 1, Focus Group Discussion, Kganya Women's 
Consortium, 25/09/2007).   
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Many members of projects also view their work in these spaces as ways of 
accumulating experience and developing skills that will one day give them access to a 
paying job in the formal sector or the means to establish their own small businesses.  
As one respondent stated,  
  
I see it as a job now because I work now as a caregiver, caring 
for the sick ones.  I think if I have a lot of experience, I can go to 
the hospices because it seems as if there is not going to be a cure 
for AIDS.  So, we are going to help them a lot there.  So, I think 
what I'm doing is part of a job now, and I‟m expecting something 
for it. ((Female Inkanyezi Volunteer 1, Focus Group Discussion, 
Kganya Women's Consortium, 25/09/2007).   
 
While working in projects may have been imagined as alternatives to wage labour by 
some, for the majority, however, the hard grind of working as volunteers and needing 
to find ways of surviving in a context of rising living costs has led to the majority of 
those working in projects continuing to value wage labour and seeing their 
involvement in projects primarily as a means towards accessing a fulltime job in the 
formal economy or finding the means to start their own small businesses or income 
generation projects.  While several respondents acknowledged the value of the 
projects with regard to their collective organisation of work and decision-making, and 
their flexibility with regard to participation in production and the nature of one‟s 
participation in production, they would go on to highlight the value of such practices 
for their own individual development as opposed to the collective development of the 
projects.  For example, in the words of a young female member of Itsoseng,  
 
Me being in Itsoseng, I see it as a stepping stone because it gives 
me courage and power to think about others and to know how to 
help people outside so that in the future when I'm going to open 
my own business or project - because I don't think I want to work 
for a boss - well, I'll have the skills and all the training that I got 
in Itsoseng.  And I don't think I'll be able to go outside and get a 
job, working everyday for someone who‟s going to tell me what 
to do and what not to do without sharing ideas and asking for 
 297 
ideas. (Female Itsoseng Volunteer, Focus Group Discussion, 
Kganya Women's Consortium, 25/09/2007).     
 
While the problems with wage labour featured strongly in discussions held with 
members from projects (e.g. excessively long hours of work; low wages; contract and 
casual labour; hierarchical forms of organisation of production and decision-making; 
unequal distribution of profit), job creation continued to be proposed by the majority 
of respondents as the solution to be assumed by the state as its responsibility in 
meeting the needs of South Africa‟s citizens, the majority of whom are poor.  
Respondents did, however, stress that the kind of jobs to be created should be 
fulltime, permanent, secure, protected, and with full benefits.  In addition, it was 
argued that the nature of production should be reorganised in a more collective and 
fair manner, with the experiences of community projects providing an example for the 
state to define these changes along.   
 
Access to jobs was also seen by the majority of respondents, across the board, as the 
solution to the problem of creating access to basic services.  With fulltime wage 
labour, it was argued, residents would be able to assume responsibility for paying for 
services, building their own homes, and so on.  In the words of a paralegal community 
worker at the St Charles Lwanga Advice Office in Orange Farm,  
 
I think that government is trying to shift its responsibility onto 
people so that people can blame themselves.  But the fact is that 
it is government's responsibility to make sure that everybody is 
living a normal life by getting the basic services because our 
government is always preaching this thing of providing free basic 
services, but it is not being realised.  According to me, if people 
have jobs, they can build their own houses - decent houses - they 
can do whatever they want with their own money, rather than 
saying that you'll build houses for people and do everything for 
them.  What people need are secure jobs so that they can take 
care of themselves rather than government providing everything.  
So what government needs to do is to create jobs for people - 
secure jobs. (Philemon Tjeba, interview, 26/09/2007). 
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For members of the projects, their role is both to demand that government assume its 
responsibility for job creation and to provide an alternative form for the organisation 
of production.  In the words of Bricks Mokolo,  
 
I think that the projects are not there to take government's 
responsibility, but are there to act as a pressure group to force 
government to create jobs… As the OWCC, we don't see 
projects taking over from fulltime employment.  It is the 
government, through public works programmes, that should 
create full-time jobs for the people, and the local municipalities 
can also create more jobs for people - full-time jobs.  The aims 
and objectives of the OWCC are to see government reducing the 
high rate of unemployment.  People who are unemployed should 
be able to access an unemployment grant until government 
creates space for them in the formal economy because everyone 
has the right to work.  And if government says that there are no 
jobs, as OWCC we see a lot of jobs in Orange Farm that can be 
created through municipal programmes, public works 
programmes - people don't have water; just putting pipes in is job 
creation; building a certain standard of housing is job creation; 
building streets, roads, lights, recreational centres - that is job 
creation that needs to be taken by the government, not by the 
community projects. (Bricks Mokolo, Focus Group Discussion, 
OWCC, 26/09/2007).   
 
In the current context of such widespread unemployment, however, the projects do 
provide spaces for unemployed residents to come together in the pooling of their 
resources (human and material) and the creation of forms and processes of production 
that do not necessarily conform to capitalist ways of organising production but which 
depend on the capitalist market for their reproduction through the distribution of their 
products through the traditional circuits of capital.  The Kganya Consortium, bringing 
together various projects in Orange Farm, is a unique initiative at creating an 
alternative platform and space for those attempting to live differently in spite of 
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neoliberalism‟s attempts to keep them in „their places‟ as „the poorest of the poor‟.  
While the work of many of its projects continues to depend on the market, and many 
members imagine their work in the projects as allowing them to develop their abilities 
to gain access to wage labour or small business development, the projects, 
nevertheless, present various opportunities for the imagination and organisation of 
production and work in different ways.  For many members of these projects, then, 
work in these spaces becomes to them a way of exercising a form of counter power in 
contexts which otherwise render them powerless.  In the words of a member of the 
Itsoseng Women‟s Project,  
 
The consortium is an alternative form of power because it is a 
way for us to unite and as individual organisations to do more 
and better things with other organisations. (Male Itsoseng 
Volunteer 2, Focus Group Discussion, Kganya Women's 
Consortium, 25/09/2007). 
 
In exercising this „alternative power‟, some members of the projects believe that they 
are showing the state an alternative way of organising production and life.  In the 
words of Bricks Mokolo,  
 
What people are practicing is what they expect from the state 
because the struggle that the people are taking is the struggle of 
changing the system from a capitalist approach to a socialist 
approach.  Under the socialist approach, people are expecting 
that all people are employed and that even the hours of work will 
be designed by the people.  The demand from the trade unions is 
now for eight hours of work a day, but if the eight hours is also 
long, the workers should be able to decide because they will be 
part of the management, to create more space for leisure time and 
create more jobs for other people.  But under the capitalist 
system, which is not actually for developing human beings but to 
destroy the human being in order to make profit - they are the 
bloodsuckers - today, there are even people who work for 
eighteen hours a day.  There are more people today who do not 
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know their children…  But our kinds of projects are different and 
government must learn from these projects how people can 
produce because their concern is production.  But production can 
also be done by many people.  If a country has a number of 
people, then it is developed because people can share in the 
work.  And there must be no poverty because everyone can work. 
(Bricks Mokolo, Focus Group Discussion, OWCC, 26/09/2007).   
 
While the majority of interviewees and participants in focus groups did not speak of 
socialism as an alternative to their current problems, those working in community 
projects not aligned to the ANC or government did speak of the projects as providing 
alternatives to the current form of work under capitalism, particularly with regard to 
the hours of work, wages (or the ways in which labour is given value), the 
distribution of profits, and the organisation of production.  These alternatives are, 
however, shaped and developed in the context of the need to survive in a capitalist 
world.  The process of building these alternatives, is, therefore, one of constant 
struggle against the ideas, beliefs, values, aspirations, kinds of relations, and so on 
that the capitalist economy attempts to naturalise.       
 
In all of the discussions and interviews held, the issue of social grants came up in the 
context of exploring notions of self-reliance.  For the majority of project members 
interviewed, creating and increasing access for poor residents to currently existing 
programmes of social welfare, is a priority.  For those projects closely linked to 
government and the ANC Alliance, assisting individual residents to get proper 
identity documents and learn about the services available to them from the state is a 
key function of their duties as volunteers, encouraging individuals to take 
responsibility for their lives by working in partnership with the state in a mutual 
commitment to improve their lives.  For projects more critical of the ANC 
government, an additional feature of their work is the call for the current grant 
system
85
 to change, primarily with the amounts allocated for disbursement to be 
increased.   
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 In particular, participants spoke of the child support grant, the old age pension, the foster care grant, 
and the disability grant (also given to people living with HIV-AIDS).   
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Members of the OWCC and the Kganya Women‟s Consortium also argued that an 
additional grant should be introduced by the state for the unemployed, that is an 
„unemployment grant‟ or a Basic Income Grant (BIG) as espoused by COSATU.  For 
these residents, such a grant would take the burden off the unemployed, allowing 
them to come together to start their own income generation projects or small 
businesses in the absence of fulltime jobs.  It would also allow the unemployed some 
control over their lives by providing them with the means to look for work or to start 
small businesses.  For these residents, however, such a grant would have to be 
substantially higher than that proposed by COSATU (R100), corresponding with 
today‟s rising cost of living.   
 
In a focus group consisting of male workers who had been retrenched from Premier 
Milling Company and its subsidiaries, as well as Dairy Belle, and CNA Stock 
Planning, participants felt strongly that government should make some 
acknowledgement of the fact that formal, well-paid, secure, permanent, protected jobs 
are on the decline and that those previously employed in such jobs require assistance 
in meeting their needs in the context of their prolonged unemployment.  For all of 
these workers, their commitment to their companies with service of over ten years (in 
most cases) had ended with them being forced to accept contract jobs with worse 
conditions of service and lower pay, or retrenchment packages that would amount to 
very little in the long term and the promise of receipt of a „surplus‟ from company 
earnings
86
.  With all focus group participants having accepted the retrenchment 
packages, unwilling to “work for R20 or R50 a day”, the discussion focused, for a 
considerable period of time, on their experiences of “running out of money” and being 
unable to find formal sector employment or even scarce contract jobs.  For these 
workers, life has become a constant search for a way to make a little bit of money, the 
promise of a contract job or an interview for a permanent job an expensive taxi ride 
away in Lenasia or the city of Johannesburg, if lucky.   
 
In the words of one of the retrenched Premier Milling Company workers,  
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 In the focus group discussion, it became clear that workers faced with retrenchment had been told 
that they would receive part of a „surplus‟ of funds generated by their companies.  They were not ever 
given any information related to this „surplus‟, and it would appear that this has been the subject of 
dispute in engagements between the various managements of the companies over the years and the 
elected committee of residents of Drieziek 2 of whom the majority are retrenched workers of Premier 
Milling and its subsidiary companies.   
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Me, individually, I think I‟m running now for twelve years 
without working.  So maybe I used to live with five in my 
family, including me.  But now, I‟m ending up alone in the house 
because no one can stay for so long without any income every 
month…  So it‟s been affecting us until now.  I don‟t know what 
I can say because now it feels like I never worked before as it‟s 
been twelve years.  That‟s a long time.  In twelve years you can 
do a lot of things, many of them different.  So if you stay for 
twelve years, I can say maybe I surrender.  I won‟t get a job 
anymore or anything like a surplus whereby the management 
gives us our money.  So I just forget something like that…  What 
I thought I‟d survive on is just to make a private job around here 
in Orange Farm.  It‟s how I can say I survive – in that way.  It‟s 
not like before when I knew that if I want a job I must go to 
Johannesburg or Vereeniging or Krugersdorp.  But looking at 
today‟s situation, I think I will survive just by getting piece jobs 
around here in Orange Farm.  (Male Participant 8, Focus Group, 
Premier Milling, 30/05/2007).  
 
Since being retrenched, these workers‟ lives have become consumed with the search 
for ways in which to survive, their sullen attitudes and sombre, smile-less dispositions 
betraying their sense of hopelessness, surrender, and sadness at having lost their jobs, 
their livelihoods, their ways of ensuring the security and comfort of those who 
depended on them as providers.  In the words of another retrenched Premier Milling 
Company worker,  
 
Sometimes you just know how to survive.  To be honest, when 
they gave me that package, I sold my fridge, TV, whatever I had.  
When that starvation comes, you start selling whatever you can 
in the house just to make sure that the children have something to 
eat.  At the end you see that you‟ve already sold everything in 
the house.  You‟re going to start struggling again and then you‟re 
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going to start looking for a job again. (Male Participant 4, 
Premier Milling Focus Group, 30/05/2007).   
 
Other participants in this focus group felt, however, that it could not be claimed that 
they have been surviving.  In the words of a retrenched worker from Epic Oil,  
 
Yes, people may start to sell things in the home and so on, but, 
truly speaking, at the end of the day they are not surviving.  It‟s 
only that we make ourselves survive.  Sometimes my children try 
to help out and it‟s a bit better – a little bit.  But to survive, you 
have to do your own things.  You can‟t depend on your children 
because if they are no longer here – if they die – you‟ll be 
struggling badly again. (Male Participant 8, Premier Milling 
Focus Group, 30/05/2007).   
 
This was echoed by another retrenched worker from Premier Milling, who said,  
 
I gave up on the hope that I will get another job like at Premier.  
So, what I do to survive is piece jobs around Orange Farm.  But 
I‟m not surviving exactly as I used to work in the big companies 
before and now it feels like it‟s just play.  But I‟m not just sitting 
and folding my hands, doing nothing. (Male Participant 3, Focus 
Group, Premier Milling, 30/05/2007).   
 
In acknowledgment of this context that retrenched workers find themselves in today, 
focus group participants argued strongly that government review its current grant 
system to include some form of recognition of the contribution made by formal sector 
workers now unemployed and struggling to find employment in the formal sector.  In 
particular, participants argued that the current Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) 
should be revised to operate for a longer period of time in recognition of the difficulty 
with finding wage labour.  Participants also argued that the current age at which 
individuals may receive the Old Age Pension (OAP) should be reduced.  The latter 
argument arose in the context that a number of participants shared the fact that they 
had lost their jobs well before the age of forty.  Their retrenchment packages 
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exhausted within the first two years of their unemployment, and with no hope of 
another job, they would like to have access to their pensions earlier in life
87
.  In this 
discussion, participants also spoke of the fact that many of them had accepted that 
they would die young due to the high incidence of HIV-AIDS and due to the 
hardships of their lives.  In the words of one,  
 
After twelve years without working, you just give up because 
you don‟t believe you‟ll get a job again.  For instance, now I‟ve 
got twelve years without working.  I‟m now just over 40 and I‟ve 
given up.  So what must government do?  It‟s rather we form 
another organisation for unemployment and start toyi-toyiing and 
tell the government that pension at 66 years is not good; why not 
give us the pension at the age of 44 or 46?  At 50 I‟m maybe 
going to die because there is too much disease now.  (Male 
Participant 9, Focus Group, Premier Milling, 30/05/2007).   
 
Striking about this discussion was how nonchalant participants were about making 
these points, and how easily participants would choose an early death over a longer 
life considering their inability to provide for themselves and their families without 
access to wage labour.   
 
At the time of the focus group discussion, however, all that these residents had 
available to them was the MSSS.  While many of them had „been to the office to sign‟ 
that they would pay a small amount for services every month, it was with some 
amount of disbelief that participants spoke of these arrangements.  In the words of 
one,  
 
Last year, July, I used to go to the office and they used to write 
letters for us – every house, I think – they said all those who 
don‟t work must come and report at the police station.  When we 
                                                 
87
 It is significant to note that, in July 2008, government announced that it would be phasing in the 
lowering of the age for men at which they could apply for the OAP.  From 2008, the age will be 
lowered to 63-64 years; in 2009 to 61-62 years; and in 2010 it will be the same as for women, 60 years.  
(Bua News, 13 July 2008 - 
http://www.buanews.gov.za/view.php?ID=08071313451003andcoll=buanew08; accessed 15 July 
2008).      
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go there, they ask you „How do you survive?  How can you 
survive?‟  Then they give you a statement that more or less how 
much you can pay, they ask from you.  So, this person who 
doesn‟t work, some months from 1 until 30, I don‟t even have 
R10 in my hand, they say, all those who don‟t work must pay 
something like R10 a month.  So, it‟s whereby we must pay R10 
a month – those who don‟t work. (Male Participant 6, Focus 
Group, Premier Milling, 30/05/2007).   
 
In this manner, these retrenched workers face very similar conditions to the members 
of the projects discussed above when it comes to their relationship to the indigent 
management policy.     
 
While these retrenched workers continued their individual struggles for survival, 
during the period of the Masters research project, they elected a committee to pursue 
negotiations with the companies to secure title deeds for houses in which residents 
currently live.  However, focus group participants pointed out that title deeds are not 
really the solution to their problems as they would then own houses with access to full 
services that they would not be able to pay for.  In the words of one,  
 
How are you going to buy services, like electricity, if you don‟t 
have a meal in the house for the children to survive and go to 
school? (Male Participant 4, Focus Group, Premier Milling, 
30/05/2007).   
 
While it seemed at the time of the focus group discussion that the committee could 
potentially do more than fight for title deeds, the committee has, according to 
members of the OWCC, since disbanded.  Attempts to make contact with focus group 
participants in 2010 were unsuccessful.     
 
There was, however, also, particularly in the all-male focus group of retrenched 
workers described above, an overwhelming sense of anger at being let down „as men‟ 
by a system for which they had worked and committed themselves in order to be able 
to provide for their families.  Much of this anger manifested in the form of comments, 
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unprompted by the facilitator, usually directed against young women receiving the 
child support grant (CSG).  In the words of one participant,  
 
Talking about grants, I think that government must look with 
three eyes because it‟s giving a child, who has never been at 
work, who is having four or five children before she turns 21, 
this child is getting grant, grant, grant…  She‟s still young but 
she falls pregnant because of the rush for this money.  And they 
are playing marbles with this money.  We were working, we 
supported our government, but it is giving someone who has 
never worked that money.  And they are playing with that money 
every month end at the mall – two babies the front, two babies at 
the back.  And what have we got?  (Male Participant 6, Focus 
Group, Premier Milling, 30/05/2007).   
 
Others in the group argued that government should take responsibility for “fathering 
these children” as they felt that the CSG encouraged young girls from poor families to 
fall pregnant.  It is interesting that the majority of female participants in other focus 
groups and interviews conducted for this thesis echoed these views in less hostile 
ways.  Although the Department of Social Welfare has conducted research that proves 
that the CSG is not “a perverse incentive” for young girls, it is striking that such 
views do exist at community level, even amongst those organised in otherwise 
progressive organisations and groups.  In a context where socio-economic hardship is 
so severe that the very basic and few provisions made by the state begin sowing 
feelings of anger and hatred amongst groups of poor people, it would be important for 
the state to consider the gendered implications of its targeted interventions within the 
broad context of the ways in which the lives of poor men and women have been 
adversely affected since the mid-1990s.     
 
Also striking in the all-male focus group discussion described above was the anger 
with which the view was expressed by the majority of participants that the loss of 
their jobs was the result of an influx of „cheaper labour‟ from other African countries.  
In the words of one participant,  
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How can we survive in Africa, like other countries, a country like 
Zambia, the people of Zambia come to take our food here.  
We‟re calling this cheap labour because they haven‟t got 
qualifications, passports, like you see in the TV, they‟re crossing 
the border and they come here.  (Male Participant 3, Focus 
Group, Premier Milling, 30/05/2007).   
 
Another participant in the discussion said,  
 
The other big difference that I see between now and apartheid is 
that then I don‟t think there were any foreigners in South Africa.  
A big thing that is causing this problem of unemployment is that 
there are these other people here all the way from Africa.  
They‟ve come down here.  So it‟s where you see government 
handling it hard from both sides – people inside the country and 
people from outside.  They are still coming because they say 
South Africa is one of the better countries in Africa.  So this is 
why we live like this.  You see, someone from Tanzania comes 
to South Africa.  There‟s no rands there.  I don‟t know what kind 
of money they use there.  But if you have R10 in South Africa, 
it‟s a lot of money for him because he didn‟t grow up in this 
country.  But for me, if I‟ve got R10, it‟s like I‟ve got 10c now in 
2007.  It‟s whereby we stay like this because I can‟t work for 
R50 a day, I can‟t.  I rather stay and make piece jobs in Orange 
Farm because I have to spend to go to work in a contract job in 
Johannesburg… It doesn‟t make sense. (Male Participant 9, 
Focus Group, Premier Milling, 30/05/2007).   
 
While the statements of hostility expressed towards young women and immigrant 
workers are the subject for independent theses and papers, it is important here to note 
that the conditions of hardship that have come to face particular groups of residents 
do often produce feelings of animosity and anger towards other groups of similarly 
disadvantaged people whom they see as benefiting from the state or the market in 
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more ways than themselves.  In such instances, the building of lasting and meaningful 
bonds in the form of community is made much more difficult.   
 
It is also significant to note that some of the projects have sustained themselves 
through their collective appropriation of resources, such as water and electricity.  
Several of the income generation projects, whose members participated in interviews 
and focus groups for this thesis, spoke of their gardens being watered from illegal 
water connections and their electricity being accessed illegally.  In this manner, the 
income generation projects represent the collective laying claim to resources 
previously held in common that have begun to be commodified and sold to individual 
consumers.   
 
Since 2009, the OWCC, Itsoseng and Kganya Women‟s Consortium have 
spearheaded the formation of the Orange Farm Early Childhood Development Forum 
(OFECDF) to take up the fight for crèches in Orange Farm to be allowed to exist in 
spite of their trespassing of certain city by-laws.  The CoJ‟s public health by-laws 
stipulate that all crèches must be run out of a permanent building and must have a 
running toilet and ablution facilities on their premises.  Mothers and teachers point out 
that crèches have existed in Orange Farm for over fifteen years, and have, out of 
necessity, been run out of shacks that have been erected on land not usually owned or 
able to be owned by the crèche teachers and/or mothers.  This makes the erection of 
permanent structures impossible.  In the case of Itsoseng, for example, the CoJ has 
been approached to buy the land from its private owner for the crèche; however, the 
private company refuses to sell to the City.  Mothers and teachers also point out that 
there is no infrastructure in Orange Farm for the installation of flush toilets even 
though residents have been fighting with the City for them for many years.  This 
makes it impossible to fulfil the by-laws; hence disrupting the collective care of 
children in Orange Farm. 
 
On 26 March 2010, over fifty priniciples of crèches, together with other teachers and 
parents of Orange Farm, marched in central Johannesburg to deliver a memorandum 
to the Mayor demanding that the right to education be protected for children in 
Orange Farm.  Among their demands were the right to land for the development of 
crèches, and the scrapping of the related by-laws, taking into consideration the vast 
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inequalities within the city.  In a statement released on the day of the march, the 
Forum stated: 
 
The City of Johannesburg must fast track service delivery in 
Orange Farm because the City of Johannesburg By-laws apply too 
high standards of developed areas such as Sandton or Houghton. 
(OFECDF press release, 26 March 2010).   
 
Five months later the OFECDF had received no response from the Mayor‟s office 
(Interview, Bricks Mokolo, 21 August 2010).  However, the struggles that have 
developed around the crèches have re-ignited old groups of activists and brought them 
together with new residents in re-imagining approaches to change and to life in 
Orange Farm.   
 
Significant in these evolving approaches to effecting change in Orange Farm is the 
centrality of protest in the shaping of its organisations and movements.    
 
Protest vs ‘Constructive Engagement’ 
 
Since the establishment of Orange Farm as an area designated for „controlled 
squatting‟ in 1987, there were attempts on the part of the apartheid state to include 
community representatives in consultative processes around decisions being made 
about the area‟s future.  Documents from the apartheid period suggest, however, that 
community representatives received communication about decisions already taken by 
the municipality rather than participated in decision-making in consultative forums.  
In this manner, consultation served to deliver the word of government to the people of 
Orange Farm in an effort to make them accept it and abide by it.  Nevertheless, it 
would seem that, under apartheid, an elected residents‟ committee did exist in the 
early years of the settlement, dominated by representatives from ANC Alliance 
structures.   
 
As part of the processes of governance negotiated during the transition from apartheid 
to electoral democracy, Orange Farm would organise itself into the current system of 
representative local governance in the form of elected street and ward committees, 
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reporting to four elected ward councillors.  By all accounts, this system has always 
been and continues to be dominated by the ANC.  In this manner, the programmes 
and direction of these governing structures have come to reflect those of the ANC.  In 
addition, many residents canvassed for this project from outside of the ANC claimed 
that they had been refused access to particular services in Orange Farm by municipal 
officials if they were unable to produce an ANC membership card.  They also felt that 
the dominance of the ruling party in structures supposed to be broadly representative 
of residents had meant that genuine criticism of government policies had been 
disallowed by defensive reactions on the part of ANC members.   
 
While interviews and focus group discussions for this project would suggest that there 
is genuine criticism of some of government‟s policies coming from within ANC 
Alliance structures in Orange Farm, they also point to the existence of a culture within 
the Alliance of encouraging the putting aside of any of these criticisms in the interests 
of „nation-building‟ through „development‟, understood as the incremental attainment 
of higher standards of living for groups of people dependent on the fiscal constraints 
of the state and the ability of the economy to grow, as well as the individual 
commitment of people to help themselves out of their „poverty traps‟.  In advancing 
this understanding of development, however, the ANC would come up against 
residents, from both within its ranks and outside, differing with this approach, 
reminding it of its past commitments to the creation of quality living standards of 
equal value for all and demanding that it deliver on its past commitments to free basic 
services for all.  While the internal organisational discipline of the Alliance would see 
such critique being channelled and quieted from within local Alliance formations, 
ordinary residents and those organised in community movements, such as the OWCC, 
have on several occasions protested at the lack of delivery of the ANC government on 
its historical promises to its people.   
 
The OWCC, formed in 2002, is the only movement of residents in Orange Farm that 
exists outside of political parties and their influence, and that campaigns in the 
interests of all residents, bringing together different groups of residents at different 
times and organising around issues that affect all residents.  In 2002, as a group of 
residents belonging to projects of the Kganya Women‟s Consortium were threatened 
with electricity cut-offs for non-payment, and as prepaid water meters began to be 
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installed in Stretford, Extension 4, members of the consortium began organising 
protests against these moves.  In their organising efforts and discussions, the OWCC 
was born, bringing residents, primarily members of income generation projects 
organised in the consortium, together to collectively struggle against the immediate 
problem of cut-offs and prepaid meters, as well as the more general moves by the 
municipality towards entrenching a logic of commodification, and an inferior standard 
and quality of life for residents of Orange Farm, imagined and portrayed as „the 
poorest of the poor‟.   
 
In 2002, the occasion of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), 
hosted by the ANC government in Sandton, Johannesburg, was seized by the OWCC 
to draw the attention of the world, through protest action, to the continued poverty and 
disadvantage suffered by residents of Orange Farm.  Almost every year since then, the 
OWCC has mobilised residents to come out in protest, demanding action on the part 
of the municipality to speed up the delivery of basic services.  In the years before 
2006, marches to municipal offices and demonstrations outside them complemented 
delegations entering into negotiations with officials of the different service providers 
and the authorities.  On 6 September 2007, however, the OWCC decided to change 
tactics and blockade the Golden Highway.  A few weeks later, receiving no response 
to its demands from the municipality, the OWCC took to the Golden Highway again.  
In a communiqué, it explained: 
 
Highways are the arteries and veins of the capitalist body.  This 
week, we took the Golden Highway.  With our bodies and 
whatever else we could carry, we blockaded this highway.  For a 
few hours it wasn‟t business as usual.  For a few hours, our voices 
could be heard… This was not the first blockade.  On 6 September 
this year, we took the highway for the first time.  Our slogans were 
„No Freedom Without Basic Services‟ and „No Peace Without 
Development‟.  We wanted the Mayor of Johannesburg, Amos 
Masondo, to come to Orange Farm to address the lack of service 
delivery in our township.  Over many months, we had been coming 
together in house meetings to share our problems and we had 
decided that it was time our voices were heard.  For too many 
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years we have been waiting for decent houses, flush toilets, 
running water inside our homes, and electricity.  When we have 
invited our local councillors to address our meetings, they have 
said that they have „more urgent‟ tasks to attend to.  So, we took 
their highway – peacefully.  Their police responded with rubber 
bullets, birdshot and teargas.  Many people were hurt.  We refused 
to disperse.  Others joined us as the police went into Orange Farm 
randomly shooting people busy with their daily chores. (OWCC, 
September 2007).     
 
Speaking out against the actions of the authorities, the OWCC proceeds, in its 
communiqué, to state that the method of the blockade will continue to be used in the 
struggles of residents for access to a decent standard and quality of life: 
 
This was not the last blockade.  Each time we return to the 
highway, we are able to hold it for longer.  For as long as our 
voices are not heard and our problems not addressed, we will 
return to say „there will be no peace without development‟. (ibid).   
 
The OWCC has led residents in blockading the highway on 12 May 2008, 8 
September 2008, 14 September 2008, 24 September 2009, 22 February 2010, and 3 
March 2010.  Each time, it has reiterated its demands for improved service delivery 
and its refusals of the inferior standards and quality of life prescribed for residents of 
Orange Farm.  Media coverage has mostly been positive, focusing most recently on a 
statement made by ANC Parliamentary Chief Whip, Mathole Motshekga, after a visit 
to Orange Farm during the most recent protest action, that protesters demands were 
“reasonable” (Beeld, 3 March 2010).  The OWCC has also cultivated a healthy 
relationship with the local community radio station, Theta FM, on which its members 
have regularly appeared, and for which its members have produced content about 
their struggles.   
 
However, the media has also picked up on isolated incidents of violence amongst 
small groups of breakaway protesters, including some related to xenophobia.  On 23 
February 2010, news reports carried stories of Somali shopowners fearful of angry 
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mobs of protesters.  On 26 February 2010, the Mail and Guardian reported that 
vendors in Orange Farm were attacked and their stalls looted by unemployed youth 
and school children during a protest.  Bricks Mokolo explained that these were small 
and isolated incidents, probably undertaken by individuals not related to any of the 
organisations that were participating in the protests.  However, he also explained that 
the OWCC was aware of levels of xenophobia that existed amongst its members and 
residents more generally, and was therefore actively attempting to counter this 
through programmes such as social activities in which members of immigrant groups 
are invited to participate with South African members of the OWCC.  For example, 
during the World Cup, friendly soccer matches and braais were organised in which 
South African and immigrant residents socialised and enjoyed each other‟s company.   
 
As Mokolo explained in an interview, movements like the OWCC have to be self-
aware and self-critical, working consciously to counter any forms of discrimination 
and inequality that might exist within them, including xenophobia, and sexism.       
 
In discussions held with residents for this project, a sometimes vicious critique of 
protest action emerged from those closely aligned to or belonging to the ANC 
Alliance.  In their view, the post-1994 „democratic dispensation‟ is different from 
apartheid times, particularly with regard to the fact that a democratically-elected 
government has assumed control for the running of the country.  In this context, it is 
argued, citizens need to become partners of government, participating in the 
processes of decision-making and control made open to individuals, and voicing their 
disagreements and dissatisfaction within the accepted channels of „rational 
engagement‟ set up to deal with conflict by the state or using the accepted 
„mechanisms and processes of democracy‟ to effect change in leadership or 
representation.  In this way, politics, for many ANC Alliance members, has been 
reduced to the moments at which representatives are elected to pursue change or 
implement policies, with very little room being left for the effecting of change to be 
imagined outside of the processes of lobbying elected representatives or becoming 
elected oneself to processes of policy formulation and decision-making at the level of 
municipal and/or party structures.  This is, perhaps, no better expressed than by 
Thando Ngoma, who said,  
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Politics is all about structures.  It‟s about how you get people to, how 
you mobilise people, how you get those numbers.  You can‟t stand 
aside as an individual and say, „Ah, ANC is not working.  Ah, 
Mugabe is a tyrant.‟  But there are people voting for them.  If you 
believe their policies are not good, there is democracy here in South 
Africa.  You can challenge that.  There are ways you can use.  I‟m 
not going to say that I‟m an ANC fanatic.  No, I‟m not.  But I respect 
their history when it comes to their involvement in the struggle… In 
terms of Orange Farm, ANC has a stronghold.  Why?  Because other 
parties are not active.  Even the ANC itself is not active.  It‟s just that 
they are here because they are they ruling party and the majority of 
the people of Orange Farm know the ANC.  They know that old face 
of Mandela and will always support it.  If other parties have issues 
with the ANC, why don‟t they mobilise the people and expose the 
ANC where it is lacking?  It‟s no use going on about the problems.  
Come with solutions.  Don‟t come to me to discuss problems – „The 
Councillor is not doing this and that‟ – no, no, no, no.  I don‟t want 
those kinds of discussions.  I want discussions like, „If we were to do 
this project and go to the Councillor and hear what she has to say …‟  
Those are the kinds of discussions I want.  If she‟s there, she‟s 
already the Councillor.  It‟s useless trying to backstab her and all 
that.  Why don‟t we work with her?  If we fail to work with her, let 
us expose her to the community and vote in a new Councillor. 
(Interview, Thando Ngoma, 16/10/2007). 
     
As representative governance and politics have come to determine the broad character 
of the ANC Alliance since the 1990s, various structures have worked, at community 
level, to represent „the common interests‟ of residents.  Those aligning themselves 
with the tradition of the ANC would include the South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO).  Established in 1992, SANCO marked the first national 
attempt at bringing together township-based civic structures that had predated its 
formation (Seekings, 1997: 1).  In aligning itself with the ANC, SANCO would bring 
all of the concerns of its members within the programmes of the ANC government, 
leaving little room for critique of the neoliberal policies that would be introduced by 
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it.  In Orange Farm, many of the members of the OWCC previously belonged to 
SANCO.  However, as they began to realise that the policies of the ANC government 
were no longer working in their interests and that SANCO leadership in Orange Farm 
were unwilling to challenge government, these residents left SANCO and helped to 
form or joined the OWCC, a space which claims to have no party political affiliation.     
 
While residents from the OWCC claim that SANCO does not currently exist, the 
Chairperson of the Orange Farm branch of SANCO appeared during a focus group 
being conducted with CDWs for this project, and was subsequently interviewed for 
this thesis.  Claiming that the SANCO branch does exist but does not have many 
signed up members to show because of the inability of its poor constituency to pay 
the R10 membership fee required to join, the SANCO Chairperson did, however, 
confirm that the local SANCO branch enjoys an extremely close relationship with the 
local municipality and the ANC.  Prioritising the building of the partnership between 
SANCO (representing the interests of the community), the CDWs and Councillors 
(representing the local state), and individual residents and the ANC, the Chairperson 
went on to explain the changed role of civil society organisations post-1994, stating,  
 
It‟s not like before in the 1980s with regard to struggles when 
SANCO was driven by what we were being told by those leaders 
who were in exile before 1994.  It‟s a different opinion now because 
after 1994 it‟s no longer a question to operate like we were operating 
in the apartheid system.  Now the challenge that we have is to help 
the government to implement these policies. (Interview, SANCO 
Chairperson, Orange Farm, 24/10/2007).   
 
This general view was echoed by CDWs, the Councillor, and members of NGOs and 
projects aligned to the ANC Alliance and/or set up by the municipality or local 
government.  In the words of Councillor Simango,  
 
You know, people think that when they are making toyi-toyii, 
blocking the roads and all that, the services will be speeding up.  And 
they don‟t see that they are delaying things because when they spoil 
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other things you must go back and fix those things, and I don‟t think 
it is nice.  (Councillor Simango, interview, 16/10/2007).   
 
For others, residents who took to blockading the highway in order to make their 
demands heard need to acknowledge that the post-1994 „democratic dispensation‟ 
affords them channels for engagement that do not require extreme forms of 
disruption.  And there was the view expressed that protesters were not giving due 
respect to the history and traditions of the ANC Alliance by calling its members in 
government into question through protest action.  In the words of Thando Ngoma,  
 
Protesting is a good thing, but I don‟t want that kind of protesting 
where you have to disrupt.  There are ways in which you must 
protest.  As much as I‟m a communist and communists are related to 
toyi-toyiing and all that, I don‟t encourage those things.  I did them 
when I was young.  I know the results of those things, and now I 
think we‟ve developed.  That‟s why I‟m saying we are a developing 
people.  When you are a developing people, you can‟t use the same 
old policies – you can‟t always be digging with your sticks, you have 
to develop digging with a pick, digging with a bulldozer.  Don‟t use 
those old fashions, the tried and the tested, toyi-toyiing because it 
worked – no, it doesn‟t work.  It only shows your incapabilities…  If 
there is a housing problem in the community, we need to get together 
and come up with a plan to say we are prepared to build our own 
houses and go to government with it, not to toyi-toyi and cause 
problems saying that the Councillor is not building houses.  Does the 
Councillor build houses?  No.  You find that you are actually toyi-
toyiing for yourself because the head of the municipality is the 
government and who is the government?  You are the government.  
So, you are like an idiot toyi-toyiing in your own house. (Interview, 
Thando Ngoma, 16/10/2007). 
 
But for members of the OWCC and other unorganised residents of Orange Farm, 
voting for the ANC has not given them a sense of ownership of government.  Rather, 
there is the increasing feeling amongst people that the ANC government uses them in 
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order to win elections and then disregards them as it pursues policies that ultimately 
work against their interests.  In the words of a female pensioner participating in a 
focus group for this thesis,  
 
Those who are on the top there, their children are fed, they get 
everything smooth in life, but we on the ground, we have to suffer, I 
don't know until when.  But soon they are going to the elections.  So 
you'll see cars running around, pamphlets will be put all over the 
place, so that we must just go and vote for them, so they can win 
again.  After that, they'll just dump us again.  Empty promises since 
1994.  I was turning 60 recently, but nothing has been done since 
1994.  I haven't seen anything being done. (Female Pensioner, Focus 
Group Discussion, OWCC, 26/09/2007).   
 
A younger female volunteer from Inkanyezi stated,  
 
Government, each and every time they come to the community and 
say, 'We are promising a better life for all‟.  Why?  Because they 
want our votes.  And then we vote for them.  What do they do?  They 
just forget about the whole people.  They represent their own jackets.  
You see, they'll be saying 'job creation', but at the end of the day, 
because they've had our vote, they don't worry about this but worry 
about themselves.  They don‟t even think about you as a person. 
(Female Inkanyezi Volunteer 2, Focus Group Discussion, Kganya 
Women's Consortium, 25/09/2007).   
 
In this context, many residents have lost their faith in representative politics, with the 
studies conducted by Khanya College and the Kganya Consortium (2002), and the 
Coalition Against Water Privatisation et. al. (2003) arguing that a minority of 
residents included in their household surveys belonged to any political party, 
organisation or movement, and that a minority of their respondents had any 
knowledge of the OWCC or any other new social movements.  Nevertheless, the 
existence of the OWCC and the protest action of residents over the years since 1994, 
both affiliated to the OWCC and independent, suggests that there is a political 
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sensibility amongst residents of Orange Farm that cannot find voice within the 
structures and processes of government and the ANC Alliance, and that will make its 
voice heard in other forms and spaces.   
 
Members of the OWCC argue that the ANC government has foreclosed any potential 
for change within and through the formal processes of participatory local governance 
as it has made its overall neoliberal macro-economic framework non-negotiable.  As 
such, it sees its role as pressurising the state from outside to change this neoliberal 
approach, and to make demands on the local state for the quality of life of residents of 
Orange Farm to improve so that they meet the standards imagined and dreamed of in 
the struggle against apartheid.  In doing this, it does not see itself participating in 
many processes of participatory governance, choosing to remain outside of processes 
and institutions that might coerce its members to adopt neoliberal policies themselves.  
This has seen it refuse to participate in local government elections, leading a 
campaign encouraging residents not to vote and refusing to field candidates for 
election.  OWCC members belonging to income generation projects have also resisted 
being taken over by the state, refusing to have their projects brought under the 
management of appointed state officials given the mandate to transform these projects 
along the lines of business entities.     
 
In research conducted for this thesis, then, we see the emergence of the contested 
moral economy in the form of arguments made against protest action in the interests 
of participatory governance and rational forms of engagement that want respect to be 
given to the history of struggle of the ANC today mobilised in the interests of 
preventing critique of its neoliberal policies, and in demands made that the ANC 
remain true to its historical promises of „a better life for all‟ based on commitments to 
a standard and quality of life determined in the liberation movement.  For those who 
believe that the ANC government has prevented any hope of this quality of life being 
attained for the majority of those disadvantaged by apartheid through its adoption of 
neoliberal policies, participatory democracy has become but a means of making small 
gains for the poor within the rationality of neoliberalism, with protest action and the 
collective strength of those who have recognised the limits of their responsible actions 
as citizens of a „democratic dispensation‟ becoming the real alternative for more far-
reaching and meaningful change to be realised.   
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Who are 'The Poor'? 
 
While state and ANC policy documents, as well as the pamphlets, press releases and 
discussion documents of new social movements, are full of references to the poor and 
the poorest of the poor, when participants in focus groups and interviews conducted 
for this thesis were asked how they felt about the employment of these terms, the vast 
majority, across organisational or political affiliation, expressed dislike for them, 
arguing that they operate to stigmatise people or to make people believe that they are 
worthy only of a substandard quality of life, and to speak out against the quality of 
life encouraged by the state for those identified and managed by these categories 
 
In interviews and focus groups conducted with individuals closely aligned with the 
local municipality and/or the ANC Alliance in Orange Farm, the common view 
expressed was that the use of the terms the poor and the poorest of the poor to 
describe places like Orange Farm had a stigmatising effect on people and did not 
acknowledge the immense creativity, sacrifices, and resolve evident amongst these 
groups in spite of their socio-economic hardship.  In the words of a CDW,  
 
The usage of the term „the poor‟ might not be suitable – it‟s 
like being stigmatised.  However, we might be able to turn it to 
say „the disadvantaged people‟, so that at a later stage they may 
be more advantaged to access more of government services, 
jobs and everything that government is delivering.  Even if 
government is delivering the services, the disadvantaged 
people will get their own jobs to be able to build their own 
sewer systems and so on. (CDW 1, Focus Group, CDWs, 
24/10/2007). 
 
In a similar vein, a member of Hlanganani argued,  
 
I think the right term to define the people of Orange Farm – 
because there are people like us in Hlanganani who want to move 
away from our background, not so good background, poor 
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background as well – I think we should say „the rising people‟, 
people who are moving from point B to point C.  So, I think for 
the usage of the term „poor‟ to refer to people of Orange Farm, to 
me it feels like you are sorry for me as a human being.  It makes 
me feel like I‟m coming from nowhere, from another planet, I‟m 
not coming from Joburg.  So, I think we must use the term „the 
rising people‟ maybe. (Young Male Hlanganani Volunteer, 
Focus Group, Hlanganani, 24/10/2007).   
 
In another interview, Chairperson of the Lebone Skills Centre argued,  
 
I don‟t like that word „poor‟ or „disadvantaged‟ blah blah blah.  I 
think it demoralises people because I think there are other people 
who like to take comfort in it – „I come from a poor background, 
that‟s why I‟m like this‟ – and so on.  I don‟t come from a poor 
background.  I come from a nothing background.  My mother had 
nothing.  She had only passion for the struggle to try to change 
the country that didn‟t guarantee that it was going to do 
everything for her.  Don‟t label yourself „poor‟ because I‟ve 
never seen a baby being born and given a bank account…  You 
are only given life, and what you have to do with that life is to 
develop.  So I‟d rather you use the words „developing 
communities‟, „developing people‟, you understand? (Thando 
Ngoma, interview, 16/10/2007).    
 
Behind these various proposed alternatives for the terms the poor and the poorest of 
the poor, lie very similar understandings of the ways in which residents of places like 
Orange Farm need to be empowered to take responsibility for their own development.  
In the various quotes above is evidence of the ways in which members of the ANC 
and servants of the state have naturalised the logic of individual responsibility and 
„creativity‟ in tackling their problems of unemployment and poverty.  Rather than 
being seen as complacent, these residents want Orange Farm to be seen as a place in 
which people are active in removing themselves from their situations of socio-
economic hardship.   
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In interviews and focus groups conducted with members of the OWCC and Kganya 
Consortium, as well as other unorganised residents, people also highlighted the fact 
that usage of these terms by the state encourages people to think of themselves in 
these terms.  In the words of a female pensioner belonging to the Thandeka Ratheha 
project,  
 
I think people call themselves „the poorest of the poor‟ because 
of our own government.  Our government always stresses 
poverty, we must do some work, have jobs for those people who 
live in poverty, we must provide jobs for them, and do 
promises…  The government always tells people that they are 
poor and the people themselves become, they give themselves to 
become the poorest… (Female pensioner, Focus Group, Kganya 
Women‟s Consortium, 25/09/2007).   
 
With residents of Orange Farm being targeted for assistance through policies aimed at 
and designed for the poor in the city, participants in discussions argued that they were 
forced to engage with the state about their needs in terms of these categories.  While 
the state has mobilised these categories to try to enforce a lower standard and quality 
of life for those falling into these categories in society, members of community 
movements and organisations claim, however, to employ these categories in order to 
contest the kind of life prescribed for people by them.   
 
In the words of the organiser of the OWCC,  
 
Government, by promoting this thing of „the poorest of the poor‟ 
is developing class differences in communities.  You can even 
see with this development.  Under apartheid we were fighting 
against apartheid development, saying that we are being given 
substandard development because we are black people.  Today, 
after this new dispensation, the government says that it builds this 
same kind of development for poor people because they feel for 
the poor.  Even the words that we use for solidarity as the poor, 
 322 
government also uses to show that it is a government that cares 
for the poor. (Bricks Mokolo, interview, 20/01/08).   
 
For these residents, government‟s professed commitment to the poor and the poorest 
of the poor allows it to get away with entrenching inequality in society, with those 
unable to pay for decent quality services and living standards restricted to the most 
minimal resources considered necessary for survival.  While movements like the 
OWCC might, then, employ the terms the poor and the poorest of the poor in order to 
effect action on the part of the state, a state that has recognised the need for targeted 
interventions to allow access for groups fitting these definitions to certain minimal 
resources considered necessary for survival, it does so fully aware of this character of 
the state and with the intention of fighting against this logic of provision of the very 
basic and minimal resources to the poor.  Groups like the OWCC, and individual 
residents of Orange Farm, mobilise these categories strategically, then, as part of their 
individual and collective strategies to force from the state greater provisions in the 
form of resources necessary for a quality of life beyond that of survival. 
 
Bricks Mokolo also argues that the role of donor organisations has resulted in the 
increased mobilisation of the discourse of poverty and the poor within new social 
movements as the ability to access funds and other resources is often based on the 
ability to present a particular organisation or movement as representing the poor or 
working to fight poverty: 
 
Our struggles are today controlled by funders.  If they want to fund 
violence against women, you start to campaign on violence against 
women; if they want to fund women‟s empowerment, you become 
focused on women‟s empowerment; and most want you to say „We 
are poor‟, „We fight for the poor‟, „We are fighting poverty‟; so 
now we start to say that we are poor. (Interview, Bricks Mokolo, 
21 August 2010).   
 
These comments reveal, then, that there is some validity to the claim that the identity 
of the poor is strategically mobilised by groups of the poor in order to elicit various 
gains from both the state, organs of civil society, and individual members of society. 
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While Orange Farm might have been imagined by its apartheid planners as a place 
through which the „permanent informality‟ of black people could be controlled 
through the encouragement of individual responsibility amongst them for their own 
and Orange Farm‟s development, and by the ANC government as a place in which the 
poor and the poorest of the poor could be made to conform to the logic of individual 
responsibility and self-reliance espoused by neoliberalism, this chapter has shown 
how there has always been, and continues to be, a contested imaginary for Orange 
Farm, one held and shaped in common by its residents, organised and unorganised, in 
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As the post-apartheid state has attempted to enforce an inferior standard, quality, and 
way of life for that population group in society identified as the poor and to produce 
particular behaviours and the acceptance of neoliberal logics amongst the poor 
through the sphere of the delivery of basic services, individuals and collectives have 
spoken out and acted against such efforts, reasserting that resources, such as water, 
remain free to all, their ownership being imagined as common.  In slogans such as 
those above, social movements, often beginning as small groups of neighbours 
commonly affected by restricted access to services for non-payment, have both made 
demands of the state, and organised their own access to the resources necessary for 
life (often illegally).  As formal sector, fulltime, permanent employment declines, and 
flexible forms of work and informal economic activity increase, struggles over access 
to basic services speak to contestations over a much broader sphere than the 
immediate context of service delivery, that is, over the grid of possibilities for the 
everyday lives of those identified as the poor.  As state policy has evolved in the 
context of resistance from poor communities, the delivery of basic services has 
become a space through which the behaviours of the poor have been targeted for 
reform and „rehabilitation‟ in the interests of producing economically active, and 
therefore paying, citizens.    
 
While the radical potential that exists amongst the poor, understood as „the dangerous 
classes‟, has been shown to emerge in instances such as illegal reconnections, the 
experiences shared in this thesis also speak to the tremendous difficulties faced in the 
realisation of this potential, partly as a result of the making of the poor by and through 
state policy in such a manner that plays on the survival needs of its most marginalised 
                                                 
88
 A slogan first seen on a placard carried by a member of the LPM in the march of social movements 
under the banner of the Durban Social Forum (DSF) in Durban during the World Conference Against 
Racism (WCAR) in 2001.  It has since been used in pamphlets and other media of various new social 
movements.  For example, it appears in the OWCC pamphlet that opens Chapter Six of this thesis, and 
on an Indymedia-SA t-shirt. 
89
 A slogan first painted on various walls in Orange Farm in 2002 during struggles of the OWCC 
against the installation of prepaid water meters in Stretford, Extension 4.  The slogan has since been 
used by various activists and movements in South Africa and globally.   
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citizens in order to confine them to a particular standard of living and to get them to 
accept and adopt particular forms of behaviour.  The poor and poverty, explored as 
governmental categories, have been shown, then, to produce particular definitions of 
the poor and measures of poverty in order to prescribe interventions to be undertaken 
by the state in order, increasingly, to provide the most minimal resources necessary 
for survival to those considered to be unable to provide for themselves, and to 
encourage a logic of self-restraint, conservation, „careful budgeting‟, individual 
responsibility, and entrepreneurship development amongst this population group in 
society.     
 
With the post-apartheid state defining its roles and responsibilities to its most 
marginalised citizens in terms of providing only for their survival needs, individuals 
and groups have come to identify themselves as the poor, strategically.  And the effect 
and acceptance of neoliberal policies have often relied on the outcomes of 
contestations that happen over definitions of and policies for the poor.  In the 
struggles of individuals and groups or communities of disadvantaged people for 
socio-economic improvements in their lives, then, the making of the poor and poverty 
has become a strategic field of contestation – a field of engagement in which 
categories are mobilised not for their innate value or meaning, but as ways of 
attaining the ends of improved living conditions through the struggle over their 
definition and the ends to which they work.  In this making, contestation over what 
constitutes basic needs and the role of the state, have come to be the central issues 
around which debate and disagreements have occurred.     
 
In the experience of Orange Farm, we have also witnessed the mobilisation of a 
discourse of self-reliance and mobilisation of the resources existing amongst the poor 
in the creation of spaces of production that are antagonistic to and, at times, 
subversive of the relations of capital.  While the various income generation projects 
provide instances in which capitalist understandings of and approaches to work, the 
wage, relations of production, surplus creation and distribution, individual progress, 
and so on are challenged and given new meanings, they have also been shown to exist 
within contexts of extreme precarity and insecurity, composed of individuals who 
continue to face the constraints imposed by capitalist society in spite of their choosing 
to think differently about their circumstances.  Whilst the collectives, in the form of 
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income generation projects and movements (like the OWCC), provide, then spaces for 
alternative imaginings of life and opportunities for the development of collective 
solutions to individual problems, they cannot escape their own production in and by 
capitalist society, in particular the fact that their individual members are constantly 
coming up against the forces of attempted discipline, regulation and control of 
capitalist society in their everyday struggles to survive.   
 
In this way, the contested terrain produced by mobilisations of the categories and 
identity of poverty and the poor/s may be viewed as a space of subjectivation, in 
which the attempted production of a particular subject (in the form of the politically 
docile, entrepreneurial, paying poor) comes into conflict with subjectivities that are 
produced in and from the experience of poverty, that are antagonistic to its logics.  In 
post-apartheid South Africa, the slogans, symbols, and traditions of the liberation 
movement have come to be struggled over in the definition of what constitutes 
survival and whether it is the responsibility of the state to provide for the survival or 
life of its people.  In this way, the poor and poverty have been shown to constitute a 
field of knowledge and intervention on the part of the state that becomes a strategic 
field of contestation for the citizens potentially constituted by the field.   
 
While this field of contestation is certainly important in the struggles of movements 
currently, and has produced some favourable changes in policy for the poor, actions 
of those identified as the poor that do not focus on this field have also continued e.g. 
illegal reconnections.  This would suggest that often the radical potential said to 
characterise the subjectivity of the poor is realised and apprehended outside of the 
strategic field of contestation that emerges around the meanings and mobilisations of 
the term, outside of the imaginary of survival and in that of life.  The experience of 
Orange Farm has also shown how this strategic field has come to be driven by highly 
technical debates that have come to centre on questions of survival, with the 
possibilities for life often being imagined outside of this field.             
 
The problems raised in the practical implementation of the City of Johannesburg‟s 
changed indigent management policy, in the form of the MSSS and Reathusa, in 
Orange Farm (explored in Chapters 4 and 6), speak to this fact that governmental 
strategies unfold in specific contexts that determine their efficacy and indeed their 
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successful implementation.  When state officials have attempted to implement 
policies targeted at the poor as set out in the City‟s revised indigent management 
policy in Orange Farm, the glaringly obvious socio-economic desperation of residents 
has prevented officials from insisting on the prescription that residents accept the 
prepaid system of delivery due to the extreme poverty and unemployment 
experienced by the majority of residents.  In this context, residents of Orange Farm 
have come to be identified and to identify themselves as the poorest of the poor, those 
unable to pay for services in any form, in particular those delivered via the prepaid 
system.  In individual agreements set up between officials and residents, the 
stipulation that households sign onto the prepaid system has fallen away and residents 
have been asked to pay whatever they can afford for services each month.  While the 
CoJ engages in debates about whether to waive the cost of installation of prepaid 
meters for indigent residents, it appears as though individual household access to 
services in parts of Orange Farm that have not previously enjoyed such delivery is 
taking place at a lower level of service.  For example, residents are being given VIP 
rather than flush toilets.  In this manner, the categories of the poor and the poorest of 
the poor have become ways of separating „those who can be made to pay‟ from „those 
who cannot be made to pay‟, with a lower standard and quality of living being 
provided to the latter group.   
 
For the poorest of the poor, then, those unable to be put to the use of the market and 
the logic of commodification, life is restricted to the bare minimum, a level at which 
„prevention of wastage‟ and „conservation‟ is enforced through mechanisms such as 
toilets that do not flush automatically and the like.  For the poor life becomes one 
governed by the logic of restraint, conservation, and „careful budgeting‟ as the state‟s 
responsibility becomes that of providing only the very basic and minimal resources 
for survival, with access to a better quality of life being the „reward‟ for such 
behaviour.  The experiences explored in this thesis, then, highlight how power comes 
to be exercised in new ways to encourage acceptance of logics in which the individual 
and his/her relationship to the resources necessary for life and his/her related 
conception of what this life should entail, become the means through which the logic 
of the market are entrenched and resisted, in a continuous and changing cycle through 
which capitalism is reproduced and alternatives to it imagined and attempted.  Forced 
onto a terrain of engagement about how one lives that begins with the most basic 
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standard of living, that is, survival, whether at the level of the household or within a 
community or movement, it has become increasingly difficult to resist the conditions 
of survival that people have been told are „necessary‟ and reflect „best practice‟ in our 
current neoliberal „reality‟.   
 
This contestation that happens at the level of the individual or „the self‟ has been 
shown, in this thesis, to unfold in the form of a moral economy, in which the promises 
of the past are held up in the demands of the present against the inferior quality of life 
being prescribed for the poor.  While the contestation of this moral economy has at 
times presented opportunities in which the potential for relations and ways of life 
different from and/or antagonistic to the logic of capital have been imagined and 
acknowledged, it is also through the contestation of this moral economy that the state 
and other exponents of neoliberalism operate so as to close these opportunities.  While 
residents of Orange Farm showing allegiance to the ANC Alliance, for example, have 
been shown to be as critical of state policies targeting the poor as those organised in 
community movements like the OWCC, the discipline of the Alliance has worked to 
ensure that these criticisms are subjected to a logic of patience, incremental gains, 
fiscal constraints, and faith in the market, portrayed as „the only alternative‟ 
considering „the reality‟ of neoliberalism faced by the post-apartheid state.   
 
Even in the spaces promising the most radical alternatives to capitalism in the 
experience of Orange Farm, the logic of consumerism, commodification, and wage 
labour are almost always reinscribed, thus foreclosing the potential for the production 
of relations and ways of being different from those of capitalist society, and 
reasserting the fact that the production of these alternatives lies in continuous 
processes of contestation and struggle over the meanings and values upheld in society 
or against it.  An example here would be the income generation projects and the 
OWCC in Orange Farm, a unique organisational relationship through which there 
have been times in which an imagination of a life beyond that of survival, wage 
labour, and the other constraints of capitalist society has existed.  However, this 
imagination is constantly contested by the promise of „the better life‟ made by 
neoliberal society through the individual solutions that it offers, and by the sheer need 




This thesis has also shown that the realisation of the potential that exists amongst 
those outside of capitalist society‟s traditional forms of control, discipline and 
regulation for the production of relations and ways of being and living different from 
and/or antagonistic to those of capitalist society, is an ongoing process of struggle.  In 
the example of the City of Johannesburg‟s attempts at entrenching a logic of 
commodification and payment for basic services, this is clear in the ways in which 
municipal policy and strategies for implementation have changed as community 
struggles have contested their logic, and in how struggles have changed in response to 
the former set of changes.  The example of Orange Farm has also shown how 
individuals and organised groups of residents have resisted the implementation of 
City policy in their everyday lives and in collective protest actions, and continue to do 
so.     
 
The experience of Orange Farm suggests that, rather than celebrating the poor as an 
always radical subjectivity, then, it would be more appropriate to understand its 
radical potential as lying in the ways in which it is mobilised as a strategic field of 
play by groups and communities of people resisting the kind of life prescribed by its 
governmental mobilisation.  As the last chapter has shown, many residents of Orange 
Farm approach the current indigent management policy as a strategy to ensure their 
continued access to free basic services.  In addition, movements have undertaken 
struggles to ensure that a certain standard and quality of life is provided to the poorest 
of the poor, those unable to pay for services.  Approaching the definition of the poor 
and poverty and their accompanying interventions as a field through which 
contestation can happen around what constitutes a „decent quality life‟ for the poor 
and the poorest of the poor, movements have been able to make demands of the state, 
mobilising past commitments made in the liberation movement to contest current 
arguments by the state that particularly low standards of living be accepted by the 
poor and the poorest of the poor.   
 
While the South African government may celebrate its policies as meeting the 
interests of the poor, that figure that has come to symbolise „the second economy‟, the 
experience of Orange Farm and disadvantaged communities of the City of 
Johannesburg highlights how these policies entrench inequality in society and the 
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most basic and minimal standard and quality of living for a large section of society.  
The proposal of targeted interventions for the indigent today serve only to entrench 
the logic of permanent informality begun by the apartheid state in areas like Orange 
Farm, imagined as designated areas for the development of „black life‟ according to 
lower levels of service and infrastructure provision.  And, „pro-poor‟ commitments 
and strategies have been shown to entrench poorer standards of living for the poor 
under a logic of commodification and payment for services.   
 
As the language of struggle mobilised by movements that emerged post-apartheid has 
been colonised by the state and employed to its own ends, it might well be time for 
movements to revisit their strategic use of the category and identity of the poor.  As 
the state moves towards entrenching a particular quality of life for those it 
acknowledges to be the poor or the poorest of the poor, movements might have to 
begin struggles against the definition and targeting of people through categories such 
as the poor.  Whether the latter happens will depend, partly, on how the contest 
between survival and life unfolds within movements that currently identify 
themselves as movements of the poor.   
 
Post-apartheid South Africa provides, then, an experience of the two histories of 
capitalism in the contested space of subjectivation produced by various mobilisations 
of the categories and identity of poverty and the poor/s, that speaks to current 
processes of neoliberalisation.  In presenting the unfolding process of policy 
formulation around the delivery of basic services as one in which attempted 
governmental deployments of the categories of poverty and the poor happen within a 
context of heightened resistance against such attempts, this thesis has, it is hoped, 
provided a reading (and writing) of poverty and the poor in neoliberal South Africa 
that will allow us to begin to move away from “the econometric imaginary” (Du Toit) 
and “impact model” (Hart) approach to neoliberalism and questions of poverty.  In 
this way, it is hoped, „giving poverty a human face‟ will come to mean much more 
than adding qualitative dimensions to quantitative models in which the economic 
continues to structure ways of thinking about the social and the political.  Rather, it is 
hoped that it will get us thinking about the values, beliefs, morals, cultures, and so on, 
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Where names are not provided, the anonymity of participants was 
guaranteed at the start of the relevant discussion.  Full registers containing 
names of participants are, however, available on request. 
 
 Retrenched Workers Of Premier Milling Company and Its Subsidiaries 
(30/05/2007) 
 
1. Male, 59 years old 
2. Male, 43 years old 
3. Male, 52 years old 
4. Male, 50 years old 
5. Male, 39 years old 
6. Male, 51 years old 
7. Male, 43 years old 
8. Male, 43 years old 
9. Male, 49 years old 
10. Male, age not given 
 
 Retrenched Workers of SAMANCOR (30/05/2007) 
 
1. Male, 64 years old 
2. Male, 59 years old 
3. Male, 46 years old 
 
 Retrenched Workers Of Pickitup (31/05/2007) 
 
1. Male, 79 years old 
2. Female, 21 years old 
3. Female, 66 years old 
4. Female, 23 years old 
5. Female, 47 years old 
6. Female, age not given 
7. Female, 33 years old 
 
 Kganya Women‟s Consortium members (25/09/2007) 
 
1. Male, 52 years old 
2. Female, 24 years old 
3. Female, 25 years old 
4. Female pensioner (exact age not given) 
5. Female, 23 years old 
6. Female, 45 years old 
7. Female, 50 years old 
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8. Female, 37 years old 
 
 
 Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee members (26/09/2007) 
 
1. Male, 22 years old 
2. Male, 19 years old 
3. Female, 34 years old 
4. Female, 23 years old 
5. Female, 56 years old 
6. Female, 45 years old 
 
 Hlanganani Youth NGO (24/10/2007) 
 
1. Mthandeni Mdakani (age not specified; young male) 
2. Zandile Dlomo (age not specified; young female) 
3. Nomalanga Thonsi (age not specified; young female) 
 
 Community Development Workers Of Orange Farm (24/10/2007) 
 
1. Selby Ramaloise (age not specified; young male) 
2. Martha Mopo (age not specified; young female) 
3. Amen Khumalo (age not specified; middle-aged male) 
 
 Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee members (17/03/2010) 
 
1. Male, 59 years old 
2. Male, 46 years old 
3. Female, 47 years old 
4. Female 57 years old 
5. Female, 30 years old 







1. Kgatitswe, Eva, Account Assistant in the finance office of Region 11, 
Orange Farm – 16/10/2007 
2. Koseff, Jak, Director of Community Development in the City of 
Johannesburg – 15/06/2010 
3. Magoga, Samuel, member of the OWCC and Itsoseng Women‟s 
Project - 15/03/2010 
4. Mahlangu, Nthabiseng, member of the OWCC – 24/05/2007 
5. Makgethla, Thabang, Clerk in the Housing Department, Region 11, 
Orange Farm – 16/10/2007 
6. Mazibuko, Pinky, member of Itsoseng Women‟s Project and the 
OWCC- 21/09/2008 
7. Mbombiya, Abel, Chairperson of SANCO, Orange Farm – 25/10/2007 
8. Mokolo, Bricks, Co-ordinator of the OWCC – 22/10/2007 
9. Mokolo, Bricks, Co-ordinator of the OWCC – 20/03/2008  
10. Mokolo, Bricks, Co-ordinator of the OWCC – 29/03/2008 
11. Mokolo, Bricks, Co-ordinator of the OWCC – 16/03/2010 
12. Mokolo, Bricks, Co-ordinator of the OWCC – 21/08/2010 
13. Mokolo, Gladys, Director of Itsoseng Women‟s Project and member of 
the OWCC – 20/09/2008 
14. Mokolo, Gladys, Director of Itsoseng Women‟s Project and member of 
the OWCC – 15/03/2010 
15. Ngoma, Thando, Director of the Lebone Skills Development Centre, 
Orange Farm and member of the SACP Orange Farm branch 
16. Ngwenya, Nonhlanhla, 34 year old female resident of Orange Farm – 
24/05/2007 
17. Nkosi, Bongani, Manager of Legal Administration in the City of 
Johannesburg‟s Revenue Department -  
18. Nthoroana, Christina, 56 year old female resident of Orange Farm – 
24/05/2007 
19. Phillips, Millicent, female pensioner, resident in Orange Farm – 
21/09/2008 
20. Radebe, Nomasonto, Director of Business Planning and Organisational 
Performance, City of Johannesburg‟s Revenue Department  
21. Simango, Meisie, Orange Farm Councillor, Ward 4 – 9/10/2007 
22. Simango, Meisie, Orange Farm Councillor, Ward 4 – 20/08/2010 
(telephonic interview) 
23. Tjeba, P, Paralegal, St Charles Lwanga Advice Office, Orange Farm – 
25/09/2007 
24. Tsotetsi, Mpumi, CoJ administrative clerk responsible for Siyasizana 
registrations in Orange Farm – 21/08/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
